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Abstract
It is my contention that the presence of Nietzsche in FCM is of central importance for 
both  reading  this  text,  and  for  understanding  the  stakes  of  Heidegger's 
Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche. This thesis will, therefore, endeavour to re-locate 
FCM within the Heideggerian corpus via a reading of the text “as a whole”. The focus 
of this re-location, and indeed the locus of this reading as a whole, is the contention 
that  FCM  is part of a Heideggerian  Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche. This task is a 
response to the majority of existing readings of the 1929/30 lecture course that regard it 
as  a  fragmented work,  and subsequently  focus  on  its  two most  novel  elements  in 
isolation  (namely  Heidegger's  analysis  of  boredom  and  the  supposed  “theoretical 
biology” that comprises the majority of 'Part Two'). When read out of context, and as a 
fractured project,  FCM appears to straightforwardly reassert the primacy of man in 
western  metaphysics,  thus  succumbing  to  the  pitfalls  of  a  “metaphysics  of 
subjectivity”. On the basis of a reading of Nietzsche's presence in  FCM, I will situate 
'Part Two' within a philosophical and hermeneutical context not established in other 
readings heretofore. This opens the space for the genuine philosophical trajectory of 
the text to emerge, namely the grounding of a confrontation (an  Auseinandersetzung) 
with Nietzsche as the site of contemporary philosophising. Taking up this trajectory 
allows  for  a  re-invigorated  understanding  of  the  development  of  Heidegger's 
Nietzsche reading, and a deepening of the case regarding the centrality of Nietzsche 
for Heidegger's own thinking.
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Thesis Introduction
...  the most monstrous danger in philosophy is cheating...  but where the 
greatest danger of cheating is, there is also the ultimate possibility for the 
genuineness  of  thinking  and  questioning.  The  meaning  of  doing 
philosophy consists  in  awakening the  need for  this  genuineness  and in 
keeping it awake.
Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, §26c
It is my contention that the presence of Nietzsche in FCM is of central importance for 
both  reading  this  text,  and  for  understanding  the  stakes  of  Heidegger's 
Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche. This thesis will, therefore, endeavour to re-locate 
FCM within the Heideggerian corpus via a reading of the text “as a whole”. The focus 
of this re-location, and indeed the locus of this reading as a whole, is the contention 
that  FCM is part of a Heideggerian Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche.1 This task is a 
response to the majority of existing readings of the 1929/30 lecture course that regard it 
as  a  fragmented work,  and subsequently  focus  on  its  two most  novel  elements  in 
isolation  (namely  Heidegger's  analysis  of  boredom  and  the  supposed  “theoretical 
biology” that comprises the  majority of 'Part Two').  The most dominant readings of 
FCM are those dedicated to 'Part Two', where the bulk of interpreters accuse Heidegger 
of abject anthropocentrism in his response to the question of the genuine essence of 
life.  When  read  out  of  context,  and  as  a  fractured  project,  FCM appears  to 
straightforwardly  reassert  the  primacy  of  man  in  western  metaphysics,  thus 
succumbing to the pitfalls of a “metaphysics of subjectivity”. On the basis of a reading 
1 This term and the multiple avenues for interpretation that it presents will be the focus of the opening 
section of Chapter 1.
1
of Nietzsche's presence in FCM, I will situate 'Part Two', and thus “life” in FCM, within 
a philosophical and hermeneutical context not established in other readings heretofore.
2 This context will allow me to make the claim that “life” in FCM is a subsidiary matter. 
At stake in the text taken as a whole is a genuine confrontation with philosophy, and 
the manner in which this can be achieved. I will present the major themes of FCM as 
grounded in the under-examined 'Preliminary Appraisal', allowing for a reassessment, 
and indeed a reduction, of the status of “life” in  FCM.  This opens the space for the 
genuine  philosophical  trajectory  of  the  text  to  emerge,  namely the  grounding of  a 
confrontation  (an  Auseinandersetzung)  with  Nietzsche  as  the  site  of  contemporary 
philosophising.
Correlatively, FCM  provides  the  ground for  Heidegger's  later,  extended reading of 
Nietzsche  as  found in  the  Nietzsche Lectures. It  is  my contention that  the  Nietzsche  
Lectures mark the high-point of Heidegger's  dealing with “life”,  and only then as a 
continuation of the tasks of  FCM.  FCM  calls for an approach to philosophy that can 
overcome  its  lostness  amidst  the  history  of  a  confusion  of  the  relationship  of  the 
fundamental  concepts  of  metaphysics.  This  overcoming must  move  beyond an  all-
pervading contemporary  boredom with mankind,  wherein all  investigations  into  the 
nature  of  man fail  to  genuinely confront  the  structures  of  subjectivity.  Heidegger's 
presents  this  as  the  covering  over  and  forgetting  of  an  underlying  and  originary 
experience of  φύσις as the ultimate jointure of its two divergent aspects: beings as a 
2 “Life”  has  a  number  of  different  meanings  relevant  to  its  usage,  in  BT it  is  considered  to  be  a 
'designation' that engenders 'form' in a field of phenomena [see §10 of BT and Chapter 4 of this thesis]; 
in  FCM it refers to the opposite aspect of spirit when understood in relation to  Kulturphilosophie  [see 
§18 of  FCM  and Chapter 3 of this thesis]; in relation to the life-sciences it is defined as 'the specific  
manner of being pertaining to the animal and plant' [see  FCM §45 and Chapter 4]; in  NIII it is read 
within the context of Nietzsche's philosophy as a translation of the Greek φύσις [see chapter 5]; prior to 
BT it refers to facticity. There are other possible interpretations and various meanings, but the term is 
never fully disambiguated by Heidegger. As this project unfolds the reasons why shall become evident.
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whole and being as such. Guided by his reading of Nietzsche's conception of life, in NI 
Heidegger aligns himself with Nietzsche, and offers up a reinvigorated conception of 
philosophy as the project of the “new interpretation of sensuousness”. In so doing, he 
sees the possibility of opening a space within which we can once again take ourselves 
up as subjects for genuine investigation under the aegis of “life” as the polemic jointure 
of the Apolline and the Dionysiac. 
In  NIII Heidegger's  seemingly  reverses  his  position,  and  suggests  that  Nietzsche's 
interpretation of  “life”  as  “Being” falls  foul  of  the  confusion of  being as  such and 
beings as a whole. Situated within the context of my reading of FCM, I will show that, 
for Heidegger, Nietzsche presents a  metaphysics of life, wherein the essence of life is 
thought on the basis of a certain projection of man's relation to world. This represents a 
continuity  with the  history of  metaphysics  as  presented in  FCM,  where  Heidegger 
suggests  that  the possibility of  an ontology of  life  – access  to life's  essence – must  
respect an essential division between the world relation of man, and the world relation 
proper to life, lest it fall foul of anthropomorphism. 
This aspect of the thesis is  forwarded in response to wide debate that continues to 
assess the status of the presence of Nietzsche in Heidegger's work, with recent years 
having witnessed something of a resurgence of Heidegger-Nietzsche scholarship.3 This 
3 Driven by the  recent  publication  of  a  volume of  seminars  on  Nietzsche  conducted  by Heidegger 
[Heidegger, M.  GA 46: Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung. 1938 (Klosterman, Frankfurt am Main: 
2004) and GA 87: Seminare: Nietzsche. Übungen SS 1937. Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung. Sein und  
Schein  (1937).  [The  content  of  the  two  volumes  is  largely  the  same],  the  prevalence  of  Nietzsche 
throughout  the  also  relatively  recently  published  middle-period  monographs  [Heidegger,  M. 
Contributions  to  Philosophy:  (From  Enowning).  (GA  65).  Trans.  Parvis  Emad  and  Kenneth  Maly 
(Bloomington,  Indiana  University  Press,  1999),  and  Mindfulness.  Trans.  Parvis  Emad  and  Thomas 
Kalary (London, Athlone: 2006)], and the work being conducted on the historical context and origins of 
Heidegger's  thought  [The main exponents  being Bambach,  Taminiaux,  Babich,  Haase,  Colony,  and 
Zimmerman, as exemplified by the Heidegger Jahrbuch, A. Denker und H. Zaborowski (Freiburg: Verlag 
Karl Alber, 2005) and the translations of GA86. See also my review of more minor recent materials on 
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movement  in  Heidegger's  Nietzsche-reading  has  been  interpreted  by  various 
commentators as a  shift  in Heidegger's response to Nietzsche, and indeed one that is 
indicative of Heidegger's ability to step outside of his own anthropocentric readings of 
life. It is only on the basis of a reading of both Auseinandersetzung as it appears in FCM, 
and also the problem of life as it is formulated in  FCM, that a genuine grasp of the 
stakes of Heidegger's encounter with Nietzsche can be grasped.
 
These two correlative aspects of this thesis thus examine Heidegger's understanding of 
the character of philosophy as metaphysics as it unfolds between FCM and NIII, and 
offer a reading of the role of history in this process. The specific concept of historical 
relationship that Heidegger forwards as necessary in order to confront ourselves, begin 
to  philosophise  for  ourselves,  and  indeed  “to  become  who  we  are”,  is 
Auseinandersetzung. In investigating the roots of this conception of  Auseinandersetzung 
as found in its first appearance together with Nietzsche (its direct object) in FCM, this 
thesis  offers  a  meditation  on  the  philosophical  ground  of,  and  thus  the  stakes  of 
Heidegger's encounter with Nietzsche. I will posit these stakes as founded in FCM, and 
therefore  motivated by  a  need to  avoid  the  ‘fatally  contemporary’,  which  ultimately 
emerges  as  a  need  to  understand  Nietzsche  as  a  metaphysician of  life,  devoid  of 
biologism. This claim itself provides the basis for my own attempt to read Heidegger in 
a similar manner, that is, away from an understanding of his own engagement with 
“life” as being an attempt to positively determine its  essence. In understanding the 
this matter in JNS V.43 (Penn State University Press: 2012)].
NB. These recently published volumes are seemingly highly relevant to this thesis, given that they 
focus  on  Nietzsche's  UMII,  and  specifically  the  concept  of  life  presented  therein.  However,  these 
volumes are very much in note form, and do not present a cohesive approach to the matter. Where 
commentators have approached this material (see my discussion of Bambach's reading in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis) they have set their readings back into a larger analysis of  NI and NIII, which constitute a 
more sustained handling of life in Nietzsche. To focus on these texts would thus constitute an exercise 
in sheer novelty.
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genuine goals of  FCM,  and subsequently reading it within the wider context of the 
Nietzsche Lectures, I will present Heidegger's reasons for not attempting to conduct an 
ontology  of  life,  suggesting  that  he  would  consider  this  endeavour  to  be  at  once 
untimely, and at the same time captivated by the fatally contemporary.
Clarification of the project from within studies of FCM
Recent years have seen a renewed focus on FCM. As aforementioned, the focus of these 
texts is  upon Heidegger's examination of the organism in the sections devoted to a 
comparative analysis of world in 'Part Two'. Arguably, this interest has less to do with 
the philosophical issues raised in FCM, and more to do with the centrality of questions 
of “life” in the modern day. As Thacker puts it:
If the question of being was the central issue for antiquity (resurrected in the 
twentieth century by Heidegger), and if the question of God, as alive or dead, 
was  the  central  issue  for  modernity  (Keirkegaard,  Marx,  Nietzsche),  then 
perhaps  the  question  of  “life”  is  the  question  that  has  come to  define  our 
contemporary era...4
Derrida turned to FCM in his later years in order to pursue the question of the animal 
other as it appears in Heidegger's philosophy, a topic most thoroughly examined by 
Krell. Krell himself has lead the way in FCM interpretation, presenting 'Part Two' as a 
theoretical biology that re-establishes transcendent structures of meaning in the face of 
the naturalising powers of life.5 This Krellian interpretation of FCM divorces 'Part Two' 
4 Thacker, E, After Life (UCP, Chicago: 2011). Thacker does not provide a direct reading of FCM, but does 
discuss Heidegger's approach to the ontology of life. For a discussion of this see the evaluation section 
in chapter 5.
5 In  Derrida and Our Animal  Others  Krell  suggests  that  he  introduced Derrida to  the  lecture  course, 
specifically 'Part Two', after its publication as part of the  Gesamtausgabe.,  thus adding credence to the 
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from the remainder of the lecture course, raising the status of Heidegger's comments 
on the organism beyond what was intended. This reading has structured the majority 
of responses to the text.6 Where Krell's  reading is challenged, i.e.,  Heidegger is  not 
repudiated for his supposed response to the question of the essence of life, it is only 
done so on the basis of a disconnected and close reading of 'Part Two'.7 Along these 
lines,  a recent  resurgence  of  interest  in  the  philosophical  character  of  19th century 
German  biology  has  resulted  in  FCM  being  taken  up  on  the  basis of  Heidegger's 
discussion  of  contemporary  biological  approaches  to  life  in  'Part  Two'.8 Those 
interested in developing philosophical-ethical relationships to the environment or to 
issues of animal welfare have also turned to 'Part Two'.9 These readings of FCM have 
some commonalities, they consider FCM to stand out from the rest of the Heideggerian 
corpus as a result of 'Part Two', and they read 'Part Two' in isolation from the rest of the 
text. In response to this, I want to rehabilitate FCM and present a reading of the lecture 
course  as  a whole  that  locates  'Part  Two'  within the broader themes of  the lecture 
course. 
My motivation for this reading is not merely to counter the findings of these various 
investigations, but rather to relocate the position of FCM in the corpus in order to allow 
for its genuine philosophical contributions to emerge. Namely, the contribution  FCM 
makes to Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche. Understanding the character 
and scope of this Auseinandersetzung allows for a deeper understanding of Heidegger's 
idea that Krell introduced FCM to the academy. As I shall show in Chapter 1, Krell's interpretation of 
this part of FCM is the most prominent.
6 See Chapter 1.
7 McNeill's reading being the most prominent. See Chapter 4 of this thesis for further detail.
8 See Buchanan,  B. Onto-Ethologies:  The Animal  Environments  of  Uexkull,  Heidegger,  Merleau-Ponty,  and  
Deleuze (SUNY, New York: 2009)
9 See  Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (University of Toronto Press, Toronto: 
2009) .esp. the essay by Tom Greaves and Schalow, F, The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, Animals, and the  
Body in Heidegger's Thought (SUNY, New York: 2007).
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conception of historical rigour to emerge. This will, in turn, allow for a re-framing of 
Heidegger's  response  to  the  question  of  life.  Motivated  by  the  overlooking  of  the 
presence of Nietzsche in  FCM, I intend to tackle the concerns of these engagements 
with  “life”  in  'Part  Two',  without  becoming  absorbed  by  them.  Whilst  primarily 
focused  on  FCM  and  its  possible  inclusion  within,  and  deepening  of,  Heidegger's 
Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, this is a project that must nonetheless consider the 
centrality of the concept of life within these approaches to FCM. I, like the Heidegger 
that I will present, am not looking to develop a positive conception of the essence of life 
(the structure of being that distinguishes the living as living) from within his work. 
Rather,  where  I  engage  with  this  matter,  I  am  looking  to  distinguish  Heidegger's 
approach from existing readings, thus reducing the status of life as found in FCM. In this 
sense,  in  my  handling  of  “life”  I  seek  to  view  it  through  the  lens  of  Heidegger's 
philosophy, rather than view Heidegger's philosophy through the lens of “life”.
Clarification of the project from within studies of Heidegger's  
Nietzsche-reading
Earlier  engagements  with  Heidegger's  Nietzsche  encounter  sought  to  draw  his 
interpretation  under  critical  scrutiny,  assessing  the  veracity  of  his  reading,  and 
generally seeking to show the manner in which Nietzsche's thought still operated in 
excess of Heidegger's.10 In this sense comparative analysis held sway in this emergent 
field. Characterisable in terms of its primarily Heideggerian concerns, in what can be 
seen  as  something  of  a  second-wave,  a  more  contemporary  trend  for  Heidegger-
Nietzsche studies was set. The general aim of many of these engagements is to grasp 
10 The most notable being C. Scott, Krell, and Haar.
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the role that Nietzsche plays in the development of Heidegger's thought in order to 
generate  a  greater  understand  of  the  context  and  development  of  Heidegger's 
philosophy.  Foremost  amongst  these  readings,  in  terms  of  its  scope,  is  that  of 
Taminiaux. Rather than approach Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche from within 
a schema that affords  Being and Time a central position, Taminiaux thinks  Being and  
Time in terms of its location within the Heidegger-Nietzsche debate.11 He caveats this 
attempted reorientation of the classic approach to Heidegger studies by pointing out 
that 'there is no indication in Heidegger of an explicit debate with Nietzsche either in 
the lecture courses which paved the way to Being and Time or in the book itself and the 
lecture  courses  and papers  delivered by him directly  after  its  publication.'12 In  this 
regard  I  will  suggest  that  a  recognition  of  Nietzsche's  presence  in  FCM provides 
privileged philosophical access to the Nietzsche encounter at large. 
The  specific  site  of  this  access  is  the  aforementioned  alteration  in  Heidegger's 
relationship to Nietzsche's own project between his alignment therewith in  NI to his 
distantiation in  NIII. There are a number of commentators who recognise a shift in 
Heidegger's  Nietzsche reading,  and posit  their  own schema for  understanding this 
seeming change. One of the key thinkers in this regard is Zimmerman. Zimmerman 
maps this  change according to Heidegger's  political  concerns,  identifying a shift  in 
Heidegger's  relationship to Nazism as a political movement capable of realising his 
aims for the future of philosophy. The thrust of Zimmerman's argument suggests that 
Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche is never direct, and is always motivated and caught 
11 Taminiaux, J. Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology. Trans. Michael Gendre (State University 
of New York Press, Albany: 1991) 
12 Taminiaux, 'On Heidegger's Interpretation of the Will to Power as Art' in New Nietzsche Studies, Volume  
3:1/2, Winter 1999. P1.
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up with non-philosophical concerns.13 This type of reading is mirrored in Nietzsche 
scholarship,  where  there  is  a  trend  (led  by  Conway)  to  dismiss  Heidegger  as  an 
interpreter  of  Nietzsche.14 For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis.  Krell  is  a  more  directly 
informative commentator on this shift in Heidegger's Nietzsche reading, as he takes 
Heidegger  seriously  as  a  reader  thereof.  Krell  sees  this  movement  away  from 
Nietzsche's  conception  of  “life”  as  a  decline  in  Heidegger's  thought,  seeing  it  as 
indicative of Heidegger's ability to engage with the grand Other of life. 
As Heidegger states in WCT, 'If we wish to go counter to a thinker’s thought, this wish 
must  have  minimised  beforehand  what  is  great  in  him'.15 My  understanding  of 
Heidegger's  method of  Auseinandersetzung will  deny this  idea that  he fabricates  his 
Nietzsche,  offering  in  its  a  place  a  reading  of  Heidegger  that  shows  that  he 
understands the necessary violence that a reader has to perform to those that he wishes 
to learn from. I wish to take up the type of developmental framework and approach 
that Taminiaux suggests. However, Taminiaux is only capable of sketching the basis for 
an understanding of Nietzsche's presence within Heidegger's work. Where he posits 
13 Zimmerman, M. 'The Development of Heidegger‘s Nietzsche-Interpretation', p3 “[In NIII], Heidegger 
had at  least  two motives.  First,  he  wanted to  show that  he could draw out his  own fundamental 
ontology  (with  the  notable  exception  of  the  ―truth  of  Being)  from  Nietzsche‘s  thought,  thereby 
rescuing it from the clutches of Nazi ideologues. Second, he wanted to demonstrate the abyss lying 
between the  reductionistic  Nazi  interpretation of  art  (e.g.,  as  the  ―expression of  the  Volk‘s  racial 
essence, or as formless intoxication [Rausch] à la Wagner), on the one hand, and the sublime view of art 
available in an ontologically informed interpretation of Nietzsche‘s works, on the other […] At times, 
Heidegger strains his readers‘ credulity. Could Nietzsche‘s frequent references to physiology, blood, 
and organic degeneration be so readily transformed into Heidegger‘s ontological concepts?.”
14 In his essay on the relationship of Heidegger to Nietzsche, ‘Heidegger, Nietzsche and the Origins of  
Nihilism’ (JNS 3. Spring 1992), Conway describes Heidegger’s understanding of the history of Western 
thought as providing a ‘meta-narrative’.  [p11] He claims that Nietzsche’s thoughts (on Nihilism in 
particular) are subsumed within this meta-narrative, and subsequently ameliorated and  incorporated, 
into Heidegger’s own work. Conway understands this to be a move which at once reduces Nietzsche to 
the position of ‘Last Metaphysician’ and at the same time distances Heidegger’s interpretation from its  
object; Conway believes that Heidegger is following his own agenda when reading Nietzsche, causing 
it to be inaccurate “…his [Heidegger’s] own agenda, which requires him to figure Nietzsche as the ‘last 
metaphysician’,  crowds  his  own  interpretive  project.  Translating  Nietzsche  into  the  Procrustean 
categories of his own philosophical project.” [p22] “Heidegger fails to appreciate the self-referential 
implications of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of modernity.” [p37]
15 WCT, p77
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the earliest  explicit engagement as  NI, I posit it as  FCM. Constituting a sustained and 
concentrated effort  to highlight the explicit  character of  Nietzsche's presence in the 
1929/30 lecture course, this thesis will fully elucidate the implications of this presence 
for the way in which FCM has been interpreted, the way FCM has been incorporated 
into  the  Heideggerian  corpus,  and  for  the  way  in  which  the  Nietzsche lectures 
themselves are read.  As Taminiaux states, Heidegger elevates Nietzsche to a central 
role in his philosophy. To grasp the importance of Nietzsche for Heidegger one has to 
enter into Heidegger's position, and not merely have eyes for his reading as an extant 
piece of criticism. In this sense, whilst I suggest that Heidegger reads Nietzsche well, I 
will not be engaging with him as a Nietzsche scholar as such. I am primarily concerned 
with Heidegger's Nietzsche and the role Nietzsche plays in his philosophy, rather than 
the veracity of Heidegger's claims. I will provide extensive justifications of this claim 
throughout the thesis. 
I  intend to map the philosophical contribution of  FCM  on to the  deeper reading of 
Nietzsche that the text  demands.  This will  provide the basis for understanding the 
development  of  Heidegger's  Nietzsche  reading  as  hinging  upon  the  promise  of 
Nietzsche's  concept  of  “life”.  In  light  of  both  the  major  themes  of  FCM,  and  the 
articulation of the problem of “life” contained therein, I offer a reading of the Nietzsche  
Lectures that clarifies Heidegger's position, and defends him from the Krellian inspired 
accusation.  This  reading,  as  I  show  in  Chapter  1,  stems  from  the  idea  that  “life” 
remains  unthought  throughout  Heidegger's  work.  This  idea  originates  from 
Heidegger's  discussion of  life in  FCM,  but with Krell,  becomes read into his larger 
engagement with Nietzsche. In Chapter 1 I will identify this philosophical thread and 
suggest the ways in which it can be disrupted.
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In addition to exploring these two lines of investigation as clarified above, and on the 
basis  of  these  two  chiefly  archival  contributions  to  Heidegger  scholarship  (which 
constitutes  the main focus of  this work),  I  hope to explore the challenges faced by 
academic  philosophy  in  the  contemporary  world.  Seemingly  the  current  trends  in 
philosophy are to favour speculation over exegesis,16 to value pragmatics over historical 
reflection,  and to  mine philosopher's  works  for  the resources they offer  to existing 
problematics,  often shakily established, rather than engage with them on their own 
terms. Where it is purely motivated by curiosity, historical work in philosophy is in 
danger of falling away from a “living philosophising”, as Heidegger would name it. 
This is to say, that history loses its relevance to the present day, cutting itself off from 
current debate. However, the process of determining what is relevant “today” cannot 
have  recourse  only  to  the  salient  and  everyday  character  of  what  seems to  be  the 
necessary tasks for thinking. Ignoring the,  often daunting, demands of historicising 
runs the risk of deciding the modern day relevance of philosophy from a position that 
has never had access to philosophy itself. Examining Heidegger's own attempt to read 
Nietzsche in a way that does not succumb to the fatally contemporary offers space for 
reflection  on what  it  would  take  to  extend Heidegger,  or  any philosopher for  that 
matter, the same treatment.
The structure of the project
Chapter 1 draws out a working conception of Auseinandersetzung in order to flesh out 
16 As  advocated  by  those  effecting  a  “speculative  turn”  in  philosophy,  see 
http://fracturedpolitics.com/2011/06/29/interview-levi-bryant.aspx for example.
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the technical character of this term. Indicating the initial profundity of presence of this 
term in FCM, I will draw out a philosophical thread from amongst key commentators 
that  highlights  the  effects  of  misconceiving  the  location  of  FCM within  the 
Heideggerian  corpus.  This  chapter  will  therefore  serve  to  specifically  orientate  the 
thesis with regards to both existing readings of Heidegger's encounter with Nietzsche 
on the subject of “life”, and the major philosophical treatment of FCM that this thesis 
seeks to counteract. This orientation will ground the need to read FCM as a whole.
Chapter 2 comprises the first part of my reading of FCM. In analysing the 'Preliminary 
Appraisal' I will draw out the major themes of  FCM, highlighting its historical intent 
and its methodologies. In the 'Preliminary Appraisal' Heidegger will establish the need 
to  find  a  mode  of  engagement  capable  of  accessing  philosophy  itself,  rather  than 
remaining  within  a  discussion  about philosophy.  This  mode  of  engagement  is 
understood as a confrontation, an Auseinandersetzung. Chapter 3 establishes the manner 
in  which  this  concept  of  Auseinandersetzung is  operative  in  framing  Heidegger's 
analysis  of  Boredom, establishing  the  presence  of  Nietzsche  as  the  site  of  the 
contemporary in FCM. I will then conduct a reading of the historical character of the 
boredom analysis, and prepare for the projection of the major historical themes of FCM 
out onto 'Part Two' (which houses the supposed “theoretical biology”).
Chapter 4 establishes the specific context within which Heidegger approaches life in 
FCM, and subsequently conducts a reading of the sections devoted to a comparative 
analysis of world from within a heightened understanding of its historical intent. This 
reading establishes the need for a direct reading of Nietzsche in order to bring the 
ideas initiated in FCM to a conclusion. Chapter 5 maps the connections between FCM 
and the Nietzsche Lectures which acts a basis for a reading of NI and NIII that allows for 
12
an understanding of  the internal  necessity of  the alteration in Heidegger's  position 
regarding Nietzsche's conception of life. This chapter also evaluates the findings of this 
thesis.
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Chapter 1: FCM - Grounding an Engagement with 
Heidegger's Reading of Nietzsche and Life
Introduction
It is my contention that the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics represents Heidegger's 
first sustained and explicit engagement with Nietzsche. I do not intend this opening 
contention to function as a heuristic principle, a (hypo)thesis which provides a lens 
through which the contents of the 1929/1930 lecture course can be refracted in order to 
suit  an  overarching  goal  which  has  itself  been  derived  from  extra-Heideggerian 
concerns. Heidegger explicitly provides us with the resources to interpret his lectures 
on the concepts of World, Finitude and Solitude as being founded in an engagement 
with Nietzsche. Contemporary scholarship on  FCM has ignored its inclusion within 
Heidegger's larger reading of Nietzsche, and accordingly, misconstrued the context of 
FCM  as  well  as  it  status within Heidegger's  work.  Reading  FCM closely,  and as  a 
whole,  shows it  to point  directly toward Heidegger's  later,  more intense Nietzsche 
interpretation.  On this  basis  the standard categorisation of  FCM as  a high-point  of 
Heidegger's reflection on life and biology can be challenged.
In this chapter I  will present the basic reasons for my claim regarding the status of 
FCM as forming part of Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, and how this 
notion establishes a need to read FCM in a different manner from the most prominent 
readings already conducted within Heidegger scholarship. 
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1. Auseinandersetzung
The closing sections of the first chapter of 'Part One', namely §18,a), provides the first  
piece  of  evidence  in  support  of  the  claim  that  FCM is  indeed  founded  in  an 
engagement  of  some  kind  with  Nietzsche.  Here  Heidegger  is  conducting  the 
groundwork for,  and clearing a path toward,  the task of  awakening 'a  fundamental 
attunement in our philosophising'.1 Heidegger takes a brief moment to lay out four 
interpretations of the contemporary situation for man from within which this task of 
awakening  will  operate.2 For  Heidegger,  these  interpretations  are  fundamentally 
characterisable in terms of their understanding of the play between life and spirit. On 
these grounds Heidegger states the following:
...we can easily see that what is at issue here is not some theoretical elucidation 
of  the  relation  between  spirit  and  soul  [Seele  and  Leben  both  designate  the 
opposing concept to Geist], but what Nietzsche means by the terms Dionysian 
and Apollonian. ... All four interpretations are only possible given a particular 
reception  of  Nietzsche's  philosophy.  This  hint  is  not  meant  to  put  the 
originality  of  the  interpretations  into  question,  but  is  merely  intended  to 
indicate the place and source where the confrontation proper must occur.3
From  this  quote  the  following  provisional conclusion  can  be  made:  the  task  of 
awakening a fundamental attunement in our philosophising must come about, in some 
manner,  even  if  only  minimally,  from  a  'confrontation'  with  the  contemporary 
situation,  where  this  contemporary  situation  is  bound  up  with  the  thinking  of 
Nietzsche (namely his account of the Dionysian/Apollonian).
1 How this is to be done and moreover what this even means shall be taken up in a larger context and in  
greater detail in the following chapter.
2 Those of Spengler, Klages, Scheler and Ziegler.
3 FCM,p 71. The clarification of these opening comments will the task of this Introduction, the associated 
concepts will dealt with in detail in the later sections concerned with producing a reading of FCM.
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1.1. Issues in Translation
A closer  examination  of  the  closing  sentence  of  this  quote  highlights  the  genuine 
importance of this claim for generating an understanding of the philosophical context 
of FCM. By turning to the original German we are instantly opened onto the depth of 
this statement:
[...]  die Stelle und Quelle zu zeignen, an der die eigentliche Auseinandersetzung zu  
geschehen hat.4
McNeill  renders  “Auseinandersetzung”  as  “confrontation”.  There  is  nothing 
immediately problematic about translating the term in this fashion. As with almost all 
key  words  in  the  Heideggerian lexicon  there  is  no  straightforward  possibility  of 
rendering a term stable, fixed in a singular meaning that stretches immutably across 
his entire corpus.  Confrontation, debate, exposition,  deconstruction,  dissociation:  all 
these terms give us purchase on the possible meanings that this term comprises.5 With 
such an apparent depth of meaning, and clear potential for diversity in interpretation, 
4  Heidegger M, Gesammtausgabe 29/39. (Klosterman Frankfurt am Main), p107
5 Emad and Kalary forward a characteristically daring interpretation of Auseinandersetzung as it is found 
in  Mindfulness:  “dissociating  exposition”. They justify  their  efforts  with  recourse  to  a  claim  that 
standard  renditions  such  as  'debate',  'confrontation'  and  'coming  to  terms  with',  have  been 
conceptually surpassed with the technical-conceptual meaning that the term takes on in the course of 
the  private  monograph  from  1938.  Taking  the  components  of  this  word  'auseinander'  as  'apart, 
dissociated'  and  'setzung'  as  'setting,  positioning',  the  translators  here  divorce  the  term  from  the 
vernacular and offer it as a strict term for those responses to the question of being that are being-
historical,  as  opposed  to  metaphysical.  “Dissociating  exposition”,  in  its  movement, surpasses its 
metaphysical  conceptual  counterparts (refutation  and  refusal) which  seek  to  confront  previous 
philosophical endeavours in a direct fashion. A “dissociating exposition” does this by moving in the 
manner  akin  to  that  of  an  overcoming,  a  particular  path  of  confrontation  that  is  unavailable to 
Auseinandersetzung's philosophically inferior metaphysical counterparts. De Beistegui takes issue with 
this translation, providing further insight into the possibilities of the term, his comments are worth 
quoting at length: “With Auseinandersetzung as "dissociating exposition" we reach etymological mania, and  
total  absurdity:  contrary to what  the translators want us to  believe,  it  is  a question of  engaging with,  and  
confronting, the major philosophies and systems of our tradition, in the way that Heidegger has done from the  
start, that is, by bringing out the unthought of the thought of system in question, with the question of the truth  
of being as his guiding thread. It's a matter of Aufbau, of deconstruction or destructuring. I fail to see what's  
dissociative about this enterprise, and why it should be defined as an exposition.” [De Beistegui,  M,  Notre  
Dame philosophical reviews - http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9484)] 
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it  does  not  suffice  to  merely  point  out  that  Auseinandersetzung  has  a  multivalent 
character. 
1.2. Philosophical Implications – Rodolphe Gasché 
Gasché presents a treatment of the character of the term Auseinandersetzung regarding 
its status as a method of philosophical approach of the order of critique (in all its broad 
forms) and deconstruction. In this direction he considers it to relate to matters of self-
determination and heteronomy in such a manner that it  itself  refuses translation in 
anything  other  than a  problematic  fashion.6 Discussing  its  origin,  Gasché  says  the 
following:
Auseinandersetzung is a term that, in the mid-thirties, abruptly appears in 
Heidegger's work, in particular in his lectures on Nietzsche and Introduction 
to Metaphysics.7
Gasché is not alone in ignoring the presence and importance of this term in FCM. At 
best this is an oversight, and at worst it is symptomatic of the general treatment of  
FCM by readers of Heidegger, which is to say, that of exclusion and isolation.8 This 
oversight  poses  fundamental  problems  for  classifications  and  readings  of  FCM,. 
6 Gasché himself will not venture a translation, but points toward the paucity of similar terms, or indeed 
the lack of correctness of terms such as critique, confrontation, debate etc. [Here he is not engaged in 
the  business  of  translation,  merely  explication,  so  he  ultimately  is  not  required  to  comment  on 
translators approaches. It should be pointed out that I am not here, or at any other point, attempting to 
disparage McNeill's translation; in the practice of translation it is necessary to translate – if every term 
that houses specific, and indeed novel philosophical meanings in Heidegger's lexicon were to remain 
untranslated or rendered neologistically we would be left with either the German text alone, or worse,  
something  incomprehensible  that  leads  the  English  reader  to  conclude  that  the  text  itself  is 
incomprehensible as such.]. Gasché seeks to determine the specific conceptual content of the term such 
that he can 'confront its current use with its strict definition' and 'set conditions for fruitfully putting 
this term to work'[Towards and Ethics of Auseinandersetzung, 315].
7 Towards and Ethics of Auseinandersetzung, 316
8  Gasché  is  not,  however,  guilty  of  a  pernicious  oversight,  indeed  Auseinandersetzung's  earlier 
appearance does not drastically disrupt his claims.
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Equally  it  is  problematic  for readers who,  themselves,  seek to problematise certain 
Heideggerian  positions  regarding  his  relationship  to  Nietzsche  and  the  various 
philosophical  issues  that  this  relationship  incorporates.  Gasché  claims  that 
Auseinandersetzung  is  devoid  of  any  anterior  philosophical  meaning,  has  legalistic 
origins  which  are  known  and  evoked  by  Heidegger,  and  actually  'functions  as  a 
terminus  technicus'.9 This  strengthens  the  notion  that  there  is  something  important 
about the appearance of this term within FCM.10 Having, albeit mistakenly, pointed out 
that the term abruptly appears in the mid-thirties, Gasché identifies the textual site 
where Heidegger explicitly deals with the concept in depth:
The Nietzsche lectures advance the term in question as  the  philosophical and 
hermeneutic mode of relating to the subject matter of a philosopher's thought. 
The  term  serves  to  conceptualize  the  relation  to  that  which,  in  a  thinker's 
thought, resists access, by its very nature, to any extraneous approach, namely, 
that which “cannot be determined anywhere else than from within itself11
Returning to §18 of FCM, Heidegger's task of awakening a fundamental attunement in 
our philosophising is bound up in a 'confrontation' of some order with Nietzsche and 
the  contemporary  situation.  Following  Gasché,  we  can  no  longer  consider  this 
confrontation  to  obtain  from an exterior,  ultimately  heteronomous  perspective  (i.e. 
Heidegger vs. Nietzsche). In this sense, the task of FCM can now be considered to be 
that  of  determining  the  ground  of  philosophising  (in  this  case  awakening  a 
fundamental attunement) from within the matter of Nietzsche's thought itself.
9 Ibid, 316
10 It  may be the case that the entire depth of  Heidegger's  philosophical-conceptual understanding of 
Auseinandersetzung as  expounded in the  later  works  (the  Auseinandersetzung with  which Gasché is 
concerned) cannot be pinned to §18; this is something that must be established within the body of my 
reading of FCM at large. However, that there are concrete grounds for investigating §18 as a piece of  
evidence in support of the opening contention is clear. 
11 Ibid, p316
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Whilst resistant to heterogeneity,  Auseinandersetzung does not admit direct repetition, 
this  would  not  have  the  character  of  relation  but  simply  of  re-iteration.  If  not 
confrontation,  then in  what  does this  relation consist?  It  is  not  repetitive,  nor is  it 
extraneous. It is of the order of, but not identical with critique or deconstruction. A 
'hermeneutic mode of relation':  this implies distance;  the distance of  interpretation. 
Gasché turns to the opening sections of NI to expand upon the origin and character of 
this  implied  distance  that  itself  is  something akin  to  an  immanent  stance.  Gasché 
quotes Heidegger himself:
Nietzsche's thought and speech are still too contemporary for us. He and we 
have not yet been sufficiently separated (auseinandergesetzt) in history; we lack 
the  distance  (abstand)  necessary  for  a  sound  appreciation  of  a  thinker's 
strength12 
The  contemporary  frustrates  our  ability  to  achieve  the  necessary  distance  and 
separation from which the strength of Nietzsche's thought can be encountered. The 
terminology and the thrust of such a statement bares striking resemblance to §18 of 
FCM: the task of awakening a fundamental attunement in our philosophising requires 
the  setting  back  of  the  contemporary  into  its  source,  such  that  the  'eigentlich  
Auseinandersetzung' can occur. Such a task, if it is proper, authentic Auseinandersetzung 
(i.e., that of a  terminus technicus) internally necessitates the appreciation of the as yet 
unappreciated strength of Nietzsche's thought. Gasché supports this comparison by 
pressing  the  point  that  this  is  not  just  a  mode  of  interpretation  for  the  sake  of 
interpretation  (i.e.,  supposing  that  we  want  to  read  Nietzsche,  conducting  an 
Auseinandersetzung would simply be the best manner), rather, it is  the  philosophically 
responsible response, pertaining to the highest order of intellectual conscience:
12 NI, p4
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Auseinandersetzung  is  the  exclusive  relation  to  that  which,  in  a  thinker's 
thought, is “true philosophy”, that is, to what in his thoughts obeys the law of  
thinking, thinking's own law. As such, it dictates a bracketing of anything that 
in thinking is of heteronomous origin...13
Gasché turns to Heidegger himself, whose comments here are not just akin to those of 
§18 of FCM, but as I aim to make apparent throughout my dealings therewith, speak of 
an identical concern. 
In confrontation we undertake to reflect on his [Nietzsche's] thinking and to 
trace it in its effective force, not in its weaknesses. To what purpose? In order 
that through the confrontation we ourselves may become free for the supreme 
exertion of thinking.14 
My argument, introduced here and then justified and sustained throughout this thesis, 
is that FCM is explicitly concerned with cultivating a proper appreciation of Nietzsche, 
such that the philosophically authentic and most intellectually conscionable relation to 
the contemporary can be achieved, whereby philosophising proper can begin.15
In his relation to Nietzsche, Heidegger is seeking to generate the resources for his own 
original  thinking,  his  own  philosophising.  This  process  of  generation  is  not  the 
13 Towards and Ethics of Auseinandersetzung, 316+317, Gasché quotes from the opening of Nietzsche Vol.1.
14 NI, p4-5
15 The  scope  of  such  a  movement  of  self-becoming  is  broadened  when  Gasché  points  towards 
Heidegger's chosen, Greek, grounds of  Auseinandersetzung, namely Heraclitean  Polemos,[Gasché here 
references Introduction to Metaphysics, which appears 5 years later than FCM. Whether or not this has 
implications for the meaning of Auseinandersetzung prior to this text is not something that can be dealt 
with here. That Heidegger sets his discussion of Nietzsche in  FCM directly after a discussion of the 
reception of Heraclitus' fragments concerning φύσις lends credence to the notion that there is no clear 
separation, despite a potential lack of an indisputable identity between the terms usage in 1929/30 and 
1930.] which he further relates to the original Greek understanding of Critique (Krinein). Drawing from 
Heideggerian accounts of their originary meanings, Gasché makes the the following assertions:“Rather  
than a severing of one thing from another in pure difference and free from all contamination, critique, in the  
authentic sense, serves to raise what is separated into its proper rank precisely by contrasting it to what it is  
separated  from.  Critique  secures  propriety  and  property  as  it  locates  its  possibility  in  the  other  ...  
Auseinandersetzung understood in this way is as much characterised by the setting apart as by the intimate  
interrelation of what occupies the respective sides of the division.”[Towards an Ethics of Auseinandersetzung, 
p320] 
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refinement of a pre-established position, or extrinsic movement of (heteronomous) self-
determination. Rather,  it  speaks of an attempt at achieving historical  immanence,  a 
mode  of  access  to  the  movement  of  thought  throughout  history.  But  what  of  this 
history? Are we to understand this as the movement of a history? Just a mode of access 
to thought's own movements? Gasché asks, '[i]s it a relation valid for all dialogue, or a 
model with only one application16? He contends that it is a model 'cut to fit the debate 
with Nietzsche' for reasons of distance. The distance sought by Heidegger is not the 
distance of one man to another, not a simple chronological-temporal distancing, but a 
historical (Geschichtlich, not  Historisch) one. The distance that Nietzsche traverses and 
the distance that Heidegger wants to take up anew, to determine anew, is distance from 
the question of Being – distance from the first beginning.
Auseinandersetzung seems to be limited to a debate in the name of the other 
beginning17
Auseinandersetzung,  in  Gasché's  eyes,  is  the immanent  philosophical  method  of 
obtaining an authentic historical relation to the first beginning, in the name of an other 
beginning,  a  method that  is  specifically designed to engage with Nietzsche who is 
inextricable from any engagement with the past in the name of the future, and thus the 
main, if not sole object of Auseinandersetzung.18
16 Ibid, p323
17 Ibid, p325
18 I am not directly concerned with Auseinandersetzung in itself, for its own sake – unlike Gasché. I am, 
here, engaged in preliminary work. As such I am only concerned with what Heidegger claims with 
regard to the term, and how the field has interpreted these claims. This means that for the time being 
any  critical  engagement  will  be  avoided.  To  venture  justifications  and  provide  a  more  complete 
analysis of Auseinandersetzung across Heidegger's corpus would not assist in the goal of achieving a 
suitable context within which to read FCM. I would also be forging nothing new, Gasché, and indeed 
others,  have  already  broken  this  ground.  If  successful  my  reading  of  FCM  will,  under  its  own 
immanent movement, come to shed light on the grounds and structures from out of which the explicit  
accounts of Auseinandersetzung in the mid-thirties. (Namely in  IM,  Contributions, and the  Nietzsche  
Lectures. There are additions to this, most importantly the 1961 authors foreword to all editions of the  
Nietzsche lectures) come to be articulated. 
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Indeed, as Heidegger would have it, what counts in this debate is not the 
person “Nietzsche”, or even “Heidegger” for that matter, but the essential 
Yes  that  both  share,  the  Yes  to  the  essential  question  [...]  In  the 
confrontation with the first beginning, this first beginning – metaphysics in 
other words – is not denounced as error19
Here then we are given some indication of the type of relationship to metaphysics that 
Heidegger  is  forming in  his  earlier  lectures  on  it:  we  will  find no  straightforward 
attempt  to  achieve  a  position  outside  metaphysics  and metaphysical  thinking.20 To 
herald Nietzsche, and claim that FCM is a book that has the matter of Nietzsche at its 
heart, is not to say anything that Heidegger himself does not say in the 1929/30 lectures 
themselves. 
2. Implications of my Preliminary Reading and Guiding Contention  
within the Field
On the basis of §18 and an elucidation of the meaning of Auseinandersetzung, there are 
19 Towards an Ethics of Auseinandersetzung, p326
20 If the above correctly characterises the thrust of Heidegger's thought between the sixth and twelfth  
year after the 1929/30 lectures were written, and the appearance of  Auseinandersetzung is not simply 
coincidental  (given  the  specific  philosophical  content  of  Auseinandersetzung the  burden  of  proof 
regarding  coincidentality  lies  n  the  opposite  direction),  then  The  entire  contents  of  FCM can  be 
productively  contextualised  within  the  framework  of  Heidegger's  later  attitude  toward  both 
metaphysics and Nietzsche. Covering over Nietzsche's  centrality, and thus removing the historicality 
that Heidegger gives his 1929/30 lecture course, belies the attempt by Heidegger to move within the 
history of thought as metaphysics via an  Auseinandersetzung.  It  belies his attempt to gain access to 
thought's  essential  movement,  whereby the  resources for  thinking's  own self-determination can be 
generated.  There  is  too  great  a  specificity  of  philosophical  content  attributed  to  the  term 
Auseinandersetzung  for there to be something arbitrary about its mobilisation in the  FCM,  especially 
given its location within the text at the end of an extended historical contextualisation that seeks to 
introduce and frame Heidegger's subsequent engagement with metaphysics within the lecture. To dare 
a quote from the Contributions: “The return to the first beginning is precisely a distancing [Entfernung] 
from it.”
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grounds for further inquiry into the role of Nietzsche in  FCM, as long as this task is 
conducted with a careful eye and is prepared, to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche, to 
read  lento. In the following I will identify a philosophical thread that alienates  FCM 
from  it  given  context,  and  at  the  same  time  structures  an  understanding  of  the 
potential paucity of Heidegger's relation to Nietzsche around the issue of “life”.21 This 
will provide the context for, first, my  reading of  FCM  as a whole, and secondly, my 
subsequent estimation and exploration of the philosophical importance of this reading.
2.1. Charles E. Scott
My  first  point  of  orientation  comes  in  the  form  of  Charles  E.  Scott's  chapter  on 
Heidegger and his potential re-inscription of the Ascetic Ideal:22 
... many commentators [...] fail to see that Heidegger is working from within 
the values and thought that he puts in question and that he recognizes that the 
question arises from within the values and thoughts, not from outside them or 
by virtue of the originality of his own thought. But we shall also find that one 
of  the  major  formations  in  Western  ethical  thought  and  practice,  which 
Nietzsche  described  under  the  name  of  the  ascetic  ideal,  functions 
unquestionably in Heidegger's thought and leads him to weaken considerably 
the question of ethics. He re-inscribes a quasi-ethical piety within 'the rule of 
being' ...23
21  I am not looking to expand the biographical-chronological horizons of recent work on the genealogy 
of Heideggerian concepts [See recent work by Kisiel and Sheehan, a list of relevant titles appears in the 
bibliography to this work]. It is needful to show that my proposed reading is necessitated in response 
to the text itself, but also in response to contemporary interpretations and critiques of Heidegger's  
thinking on Nietzsche.
22 Scott,  C.E.  The  Question  of  Ethics:  Nietzsche,  Foucault,  Heidegger. (Indiana  University  Press:  Indiana: 
1990). For the sake of brevity and maintaining a narrow focus I will not be able to do full justice to 
Scott's broader reading of Heidegger in this text. Unlike myself, Scott is not primarily intent on reading 
Heidegger from within a context and a historicality that has been determined by Heidegger himself – 
he  is  not  highly  sensitive  to  the  Auseinandersetzung.  Accordingly,  I  will  not  claim  to  fully 
problematise, critically disrupt or surpass his project on its own terms. From the outset of his text, Scott 
is concerned with showing the contribution and position of Heidegger within the history of thinking 
on ethics.
23 Ibid, p2
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Here we see that Scott is sympathetic to one aspect of Heidegger's historicality which 
has already been raised, namely the method of Heidegger's relation to heritage: that of 
internal  self-determination,  the  movement  described  by  an  Auseinandersetzung. 
However, Scott intends to show that Heidegger fails to generate a relationship to, and 
an understanding of, the full scope of Nietzsche's critique of the movement of western 
thought as most strongly characterised in the ascetic ideal. Scott attempts to articulate 
what he sees as the unthought ambiguity in Heidegger's intellectual conscience.
The withdrawal of being and the non-essence of its event are interpreted in the 
language of mystery under the aegis of bestowal in this aspect of Heidegger's 
thought. He speaks of chaos only in relation to the dispersions of life that has 
forgotten its  essence. It  seems in essence that the bestowal of essence is  the 
thought. There appears to be a continuing triumph of being over chaos, and for 
Nietzsche that is the ascetic ideal.24
Scott is claiming that Heidegger unjustifiably, and perhaps unwittingly, moves outside 
of the Nietzschean formulation of the human condition (itself nothing other than a 
conditioning of life and its chaotic forces). Thus, Heidegger becomes subject to a pitfall 
of western metaphysics identified by Nietzsche. When face to face with life's chaotic 
forces of  becoming,  Heidegger is  only capable  of  putting his  head back under the 
parapet of history, of turning away, back to a potentially pre-Nietzschean safe-haven of 
the mystical excesses of meaning.25  
Scott asserts that in his appeal to the centrality of the ecstatic constitution of human 
24 The Question of Ethics, p181
25 “The  issue  between  Nietzsche  and  Heidegger  at  this  point  rests  with  quasi-historical  claims:  for 
Heidegger, human history is constituted by the claim of being, its manner of thought, and its being  
forgotten; for Nietzsche, human history is constituted by a conflict between those who can live fully in  
the meaninglessness of life and those who must hide from chaos in order to survive it [Ibid, p182].”
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Dasein (wherein man and man alone is claimed by being and is, as such, implicated in 
the bestowal of meaning), Heidegger separates man off from animality, and thus “life”, 
in  a  manner  that  allows  him  to  place  chaotic  meaninglessness  at  a  safe  distance. 
Perhaps the most simple way to describe this move is to say that Heidegger seeks to 
(re)establish a moment of man's transcendence with regards to other beings, namely 
those beings that maintain themselves in the domain of 'living' being, such that, when 
viewed  from  a  macro  perspective,  there  is  an  essential,  qualitative  differentiation 
between the being of man and the being of, say, animals. Scott is correct when he tells 
us that, for Heidegger, man is not straightforwardly subject to the same processes of 
life whereby he can be said to exist on something more akin to a quantitative scale of 
differentiation, i.e.,  man is not one living being amongst others, distinguished from 
animals but ultimately categorisable with them. For Heidegger there exists an abyssal 
bodily kinship.
As Heidegger shifts the terrain of thought from a mind-body dualism, he puts 
the meaning of animality in question just as he has already put thought in 
question. It is not a question of adding qualities to animality; it is a question of  
rethinking  human  being  in  the  singularity  of  its  essence.  The  biological 
sciences, medicine, and psychology are also put in question... The human body 
is not an animallike [sic] object.26 
This contention brings Scott to ask his most important question.
Have we moved beyond the ascetic ideal by shifting the provenance of thought 
from  its  traditionally  dualistic  mind-body character?  Probably  not,  because 
undwellable chaos has been consumed in an assurance of dwelling that, no 
matter how mysterious and questionable, elevates our cries and our laughter 
by an ecstasis that finds its fulfilment in a re-conceived thinking and saying of 
26 Ibid, p183
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being. Is animality rethought, or merely lost?27 
Scott ultimately forwards the following answer to the above quoted question, which is 
seemingly a case of Nietzsche vs. Heidegger:
Nietzsche's account of the ascetic ideal is right in this, that whatever in our 
tradition saves and preserves seriousness concerning truth and meaning saves 
and preserves the very elements that are taken to be overcome by truth and 
meaning in their seriousness.28
Heidegger's is never interrupted by the serious consideration that the essential 
thought  of  being is  an  error,  that  our philosophy has  its  origin in an error 
whose only 'value' is the negative one of interrupting the experience and life of 
the  senses.  Rather,  Heidegger's  thought  means  that  humans  exist  in  an 
openness that has no disruption in its mystery. Its disruption of ordinary life is 
at  once a  calling of  human life  to  its  totally nonordinary and nonsensuous 
essence29
I  do  not  want  to  claim that  Scott  poorly characterises  Heidegger,  or  is  salaciously 
unfair in his reading, as he does investigate and accurately describe the conceptual 
structures within which he considers this ultimate failure in Heidegger's ability to cope 
with Nietzsche to occur. I do however, want to raise a question regarding his choice of 
text and his  selection of Heideggerian positions,  thereby destabilising his ability to 
make  the  above  critical  claims  really  stick.  In  FCM  Heidegger  furnishes  us  with 
arguments to combat the above conclusions. These topics, along with a discussion of 
the biological sciences, the transposability of man into the realm of the animal,  the 
nature  of  man's  location  within/without  the  nexus  of  living  beings  are  all  found 
together in FCM, along with Nietzsche. Scott does not discuss FCM in relation to these 
27 Ibid, p183
28 The Question of Ethics, p187
29 Ibid, 188
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claims.  Perhaps  we  could  hope  for  a  discussion  of  Heidegger's  understanding  of 
Nietzsche on truth, error and value, such as that found in  NI or  NIII?30 No. Instead 
Scott  opts  for  a  discussion  of  Letter  on  Humanism and  an  analysis  of  Heidegger's 
reading of Heraclitus from 1942, where special attention is paid to Heidegger's reading 
of  φύσις.  This  particular  tack is  problematic  as  neither  of  these  texts  represent  an 
explicit engagement with Nietzsche, and as such are not the best resources for bringing 
Heidegger to bear in the light of Nietzsche's thought.31
In  my  discussion  of  Gasché,  I  asserted  that  a  lack  of  recognition  of  the  earlier 
appearances  of  Auseinandersetzung were  either  the  result  of  an  oversight,  or 
symptomatic of the general exclusion and isolation of  FCM. The same can be said of 
Scott: the presence of Auseinandersetzung in his discussion of Heidegger, Nietzsche and 
life is, here, clearly lacking, as is the presence of  FCM  as a potential locus for these 
ideas.32 Scott concludes that in his responses to life and its chaotic forces, Heidegger is  
fatally  captivated  by  the  thinking  of  Nietzsche  and  maybe  even  surpassed  by  it. 
Ultimately,  Nietzsche  is  seen  to  be  more  successful  and  have  a  higher  level  of 
30 In Chapter 5 of this thesis I will provide a reading of the connections between FCM and NI and NIII  
and challenge these claims made by Scott.
31  Heraclitus, φύσις, and the origins of philosophy are indeed the subjects of the 'Preliminary Appraisal' 
of FCM, which then gives way to a discussion of Nietzsche, life and historicality. This ultimately leads 
(via a phenomenological account of boredom) to Heidegger's extended analysis of the question of the 
essence of life (on animality, life, and the biological sciences), which can be found in his comparative 
analysis of world.
32 Scott  considers  Heidegger  in  a  space  opened  by  an  independent  reading  of  Nietzsche,  one  not 
particularly attentive to Heidegger's own engagement therewith. Scott uses a reading of ascetic ideals 
to construct a problematic: the opening of the space of ethics and our ability to maintain an intellectual 
conscience in our engagement with it,  i.e.,  remaining conscious of the achievements of  Nietzsche's  
analysis of the ascetic ideal and it's deadening impact on the prospective positing of the transcendence,  
or non-moral origins of thought.  Within this problematic Heidegger is not taken up as a reader of 
Nietzsche,  that  is  to  say,  as  someone  who  has  a  position  that  is  itself  explicitly  caught  up  in  a 
continuation of this Nietzschean struggle [Heidegger takes his own account of Nietzsche's translation 
of  dike as justice (Gerechtigkeit) to be precisely this – a Nietzschean inspired effort to overthrow the 
history of a Platonic, ethical reading of the relationship of world and essence. See Chap 5.] Heidegger's 
account of the central importance of Nietzsche to any understanding of life (an understanding that 
requires distance, proximity, letting stand and extrication in equal parts) is not recognised. Instead 
Heidegger's  position  with  regards  to  this,  now  externally/extra-Heideggerianly  formed,  historical 
problematic is assessed against Nietzsche's.
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intellectual  probity  than  Heidegger:  he  can  confront  the  problematic  character  of 
human life in a way Heidegger cannot. Here, Scott takes Nietzsche and Heidegger to be 
two separate interlocutors both directed toward something that can be located as a 
common (or more dangerous still, general) problematic.
If Heidegger's claim in §18 is profound, then Nietzsche is central to any contemporary 
philosophising, and the matter of life is thus at the heart of the contemporary situation, 
and  any  attempt  to  extricate  oneself  from  it.33 Any  genuine  engagement  with 
Heidegger  and  “life”,  let  alone  one  that  explicitly  seeks  to  collect  thoughts  on 
Heidegger,  life  and  Nietzsche,  has  to  therefore  be  attentive  to  the  movement  of 
Auseinandersetzung, has to recognise (as Scott does go some way toward doing) that 
Heidegger  is  engaged  in  an  attempt  to  think  metaphysics  from  within  its  own 
structures and language. From the perspective of my comments on Auseinandersetzung, 
to situate Heidegger within an externally determined notion of who Nietzsche is and 
how he structures the contemporary situation for thinking is unstable. External, here, 
meaning without recourse to the intricacies and rigours associated with Heidegger's 
own  reading  of  Nietzsche,  ultimately  assessing  his  thoughts  using  criteria 
heteronomous to them. It does not attend to the subtlety of Heidegger's accounts of his 
own  relation  to  the  origins  of  philosophy,  and  more  importantly  his  immediate 
heritage, which, as has been shown, he considers to be nothing other than Nietzsche. 
To think the problematic of life in Heidegger externally to Heidegger's own historical 
delimitation/determination,  is  to  form  the  problematic  in  Nietzschean  terms, 
33 The following issues come immediately to the forefront: What is life? What does Heidegger take it to 
be in Nietzsche? What does Heidegger himself takes this to be? What characterises the interplay of  
these ideas? These questions are indeed of high importance to this thesis and are too complex to be 
tackled without the context that I am attempting to provide here in this chapter. As such, I am trying to  
establish the point that the connection of “life”, whatever this turns out to be, and Nietzsche in FCM is 
in need of further investigation.
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positioning  Heidegger  in  relation  to  a  problem  that  he  himself  approaches  in  a 
different manner,  with different criteria for success.  To whit,  Nietzsche will  always 
surpass Heidegger when the two figures are compared within specific problems of 
history that Nietzsche highlights as his own.34
2.2. David Farrell-Krell
With Scott, the subject of life was touched upon without ever being brought to the fore  
in such a manner that justice could be be done to Heidegger. With Krell's  Daimon Life 
Heidegger and his conception of life are put front and centre.
However  much  Heidegger  inveighs  against  life-philosophy  his  own 
fundamental  ontology  and  poetics  of  being  thrust  him  back  onto 
Lebensphilosophie again  and  again;  and,  finally,  that  the  most  powerfully 
"gathering" figure of his thinking during the years 1928 to 1944, the figure that  
"plays a role in holding the world together," is that of the daimon daimon life.35
Krell contends that life-philosophy is something which returns for Heidegger, and that 
“life” is  of central importance in the formulation and determination of Heidegger's 
thinking.  Given  my  argument  so  far,  this  is  not  a  point  of  contention. 
Auseinandersetzung has been shown to be a process of self-becoming that has Nietzsche 
as  the central  figure, a  figure  who,  according  to  §18  of  FCM,  is  bound  up  with 
contemporary  thinking,  which  itself  is  characterised  by  its  focus  on  life.  Krell 
recognises the historical centrality of life for Heidegger (albeit not in the form of the 
34 This is not to say that reading Nietzsche necessitates a reading of Heidegger, which is not necessarily 
the case. I am only claiming here that attempting to read the encounter between the two (i.e. reading 
one in light of the other) must take place first and foremost from within the structures of Heidegger's  
thought. How Nietzsche can be productively put to work against his “master interpretor” is a matter  
that exceeds this thesis, see chapter 5 for more.
35 Daimon Life, preface xi. Despite its length, scope, and importance within Heidegger scholarship, this 
text is not exhaustive of the subject. Krell's opening statement of intent is enough to show that space for  
my project, as elucidated so far, yet remains:
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matter of Nietzsche's thought):
Finally, the great daimon of life should enable us to expand the horizons of our 
interrogation of Heidegger back to Plato, then forward to German Idealism, on 
through Nietzsche and Freud, and onward (beyond Heidegger) to Derrida and 
Irigaray.36
Krell  is  contending  that  positioning  Heidegger  within  the  history  of  Western 
philosophy (a history which also unfolds after Heidegger) requires a recognition of his 
stance toward life, even if it is  a stance that attempts to stand outside life in some 
manner  ('however  much  Heidegger  inveighs  against  life  philosophy').37 The  point 
where my moment of departure from Krell's project becomes clear is in his description 
of FCM (and thus the Heidegger-Nietzsche-Life connection):
[...]For the most part, this book is a close reading of a number of Heideggerian 
texts, principally from the late 1920s through the mid-1940s, including  Being 
and Time (1927), Contributions to Philosophy (Of Propriation) (1936-1938), and the 
lecture  courses  of  1928  (on  Leibniz,  logic,  and  the  daimon),  1929-1930  (on 
theoretical biology)
FCM is  directly characterised as a lecture course on theoretical biology.38 I  want to 
resist the straightforward notion that these lectures are characterisable as being 'about 
biology'. With Scott we saw that it is in Heidegger's account of the singularity of man's 
essence that the biological sciences are put into question.39 If this holds, then we would 
expect an account of theoretical biology, or a lecture on biology to be situated within an 
36 Daimon Life, xii
37 Ibid, xi
38 The stated close reading of the lectures on “theoretical biology” occurs in chapter three 'Where Deathless  
Horses Weep: The 1929-1930 Biology Lectures'. This chapter is defined by its author as being a response to 
the Scott essay engaged with above, securing its status a development of the philosophical concerns 
held therein.
39 The Question of Ethics, p183
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account of the singularity of man's essence. Which is the case with FCM, as highlighted 
by Krell:
Heidegger seeks a third way to pose the "world question." [...[ The third will  
involve  a  fundamental  duplicity,  the  dual  or  double  position  occupied  by 
human beings in the world: man has a world, but is also a piece of the world; 
man is both "master and slave of the world" […]  Heidegger begins not with 
metonymic  stones  but  with  the  presumably  essential  distinction  between 
human beings and animals in the sphere of what we call, vaguely enough, life. 
His inquiry is not intended to solve any puzzles about evolution or the origin 
of species: the ape reappears for an instant, but is soon banished (264). Rather, 
the object of the inquiry is "the essence of the animality of the animal and the 
essence of the humanity of man".40
In the case of Gasché and in Scott, a general tendency to exclude and isolate FCM from 
its intended context begins to emerge. It is difficult not to take Krell's titling as being 
indicative of the same tendency. Why is biology prioritised here? Krell is not stating 
that he is reading the sections on Biology from a 1929/30 lecture course which has other 
concerns;  he clearly  states  that  he is  reading  the  Biology lectures.  With this  line of 
argument I do not seek to repudiate the content of Krell's reading; his is a reading too 
complex to allow such a simplistic characterisation. What I wish to show is that Krell 
does not exhaust his given topic, namely  FCM  and the question of life, but instead 
demands that we pay further attention, and conduct deeper enquiry. Krell does not 
overlook the intimate connection, the triadic relationship, of Heidegger, Nietzsche and 
life. The triad is given, but it is not fully realised, once again due to the lack of concern 
for,  or perhaps even the overlooking of,  the historicality of  FCM. This is  to say,  its 
status as intra-Auseinandersetzung,  as concerned with the possibilities of an authentic 
determination of the contemporary and a coextensive extrication/self-determination of 
40 Daimon Life, pp112 - 113
31
thinking.
At  this  point  that  we  can  see  both  the  potential  power  and  the  limit  of  Krell's 
meditation. He at once provides the connection with Nietzsche that I have uncovered 
as being needful, locates the problem of historicality in Heidegger (i.e., the difficulty of 
separation,  distancing,  and  thinking-from-out-of),  and  immediately  overlooks  the 
profundity of their presence together in FCM in the discussion of life.
When in  1929-1930  Heidegger  once  again  takes  up  the  question  of  life  by 
examining  the  comparative  world-relations  or  access  to  beings  of  stone, 
animal, and Dasein, he is, I suspect, oppressed by the sense of his earlier failure 
to confront the problems of  Lebensphilosophie.  The quandary will  continue to 
afflict  him  throughout  his  lectures  on  Nietzsche  in  the  late  1930s.  For  no 
recourse to the categories of body and soul, matter and form, sense and spirit 
can come to the aid of existential analysis. If Dasein is some body who is alive, 
its life will be a matter of care, time, and death, we are perhaps at the very 
nerve of Western ontotheology. When Heidegger tries to separate Dasein from 
the animal, or to dig an abyss of essence between them, he causes the whole of 
his  project  to  collapse  back  into  the  congealed  categories  and  oblivious 
decisions of ontotheology.41
The claim is that Heidegger, at least in FCM, is unable to sustain a distance from the 
'oblivious decisions of ontotheology'.42 On this point I  will  not disagree.  That these 
decisions have their very nexus in the philosophical  confrontation between Heidegger 
(albeit here positioned as a champion of ontotheology) and Lebensphilosophie is also a 
point that I will maintain. In order to prepare my own extrication from Krell's account 
41 Ibid, p104-105
42 “Onto-theology” is a Heideggerian term (with Kantian origins) that refers to the conflation of ontology 
and theology, wherein all ontology aims toward an understanding of the the Theon (the first cause, the 
divine etc.). Krell is using this term against Heidegger, indicating that he is ultimately guilty of the 
same sin that he charges against the rest of Western Thought. Heidegger provides an account of history 
of this concept in the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. For my reading of these sections see chapter 2.
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let us first return to the guiding claim of his project in Daimon Life.
My thesis is that these themes and issues all touch on the phenomenon of life 
as it appears in Heidegger's thought from the very outset of his path; further, 
that  however  much  Heidegger  inveighs  against  life-philosophy  his  own 
fundamental  ontology  and  poetics  of  being  thrust  him  back  onto 
Lebensphilosophie again and again43
In my reading of Auseinandersetzung and the clarification and preliminary justification 
of my opening contention, this thesis has been shown to be Heidegger's, not Krell's. A 
confrontation with  life  has  as  its  proper  place  and  source  a  confrontation  with 
Nietzsche.  Heidegger  does  not  think  that  a  confrontation  of  the  order  of 
Auseinandersetzung  contains  a  moment  of  heteronomy.  If,  to  take  up  Krell's 
classification of Heidegger's thought, “a poetics of being” is an essential determination 
of thinking that has a genuine historicality, then on Heidegger's account, there is no 
possibility of straightforwardly positioning it as being fully independent of, absolutely 
extricated  from,  heteronomous to,  life,  as  Heidegger  sees  this  term at  the  heart  of 
Nietzsche's thinking. To say that Heidegger has simply re-inscribed particular decisions 
of ontotheology, is to think outside Heidegger's thought.
Far from being a re-inscription, the movement of Auseinandersetzung follows a peculiar 
pattern of recall, one that,  as the mutual self-determining movement of non-identical 
yet nonetheless non-heterogeneous determinations of thought, requires a great deal of 
philosophical work to fully understand. Work that takes place in part in FCM and in 
greater detail throughout the  Nietzsche volumes. To characterise, from the very start, 
Heidegger's work in FCM as a re-inscription of onto-theological decisions in the face of 
43 Ibid, xi
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an inability to move outside  Lebensphilosophie, is,  as I  have begun show, not to give 
Heidegger's  own  account  of  his  historicality,  his  connection  to  Nietzsche,  its  own 
space.  It  does  not  therefore  take  Heidegger's  argument  on  its  strongest  showing. 
Ultimately,  this  means  not  having  the  intellectual  response  to  Heidegger  that 
Heidegger himself  wishes to have in relation to Nietzsche.  Which is to say,  that of 
allowing the thinkers own thought to be determined from within its own laws, such 
that  our  relation  to  this  thought  achieves  hermeneutic  proximity,  historicality  and 
maintains a solid intellectual conscience. This is my aim. It is narrower than Krell's in 
its initial inception: I do not immediately seek to move beyond Heidegger, nor seek to 
show the unthought in Heidegger's thinking (the Daimon of life on Krell's reading). I 
am  not  concerned  with  deconstruction.  I  am,  to  a  certain  extent  with  Gasché  in 
preparing to give Auseinandersetzung its space as the philosophical response.
2.3. Ansell-Pearson
If the story with FCM so far is one of exile from Heideggerian scholarship within its 
context  as  an  Auseinandersetzung with  Nietzsche,  then  Keith  Ansell-Pearson's 
discussion of FCM in Viroid Life44 highlights the impact that this exile has had on extra-
Heideggerian  scholarship.  He  is  the  final  philosopher  explicitly  connected  and 
engaged in this Scott-Krell thread.  In “Nietzsche Contra Darwin”45, Ansell-Pearson sets 
out  the  reasons  for  his  investigation  into  the  relationship  between  Nietzsche  and 
Darwin in a manner that immediately brings Heidegger, explicitly, into the heart of his 
questioning.
44 Ansell-Pearson,  K.  Viroid  Life:  Perspectives  on  Nietzsche  and  the  Transhuman  Condition  (Routledge, 
London: 1997).
45  Chapter 4 of Viroid Life. 
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... [Nietzsche's] engagement with Darwin has not received the kind of attention 
it  merits.1  Where it  has  been treated,  it  has  been so  cursorily,  without  any 
serious  effort  being  made  by  commentators  to  render  comprehensible 
Nietzsche’s ‘philosophical biology’
1. The connection between Nietzsche and Darwin is touched upon by Heidegger in his 1930s 
lectures  on  Nietzsche,  but  the  treatment  of  Darwin  is  perfunctory  and  cavalier.  See 
Heidegger 1961, volume 1:72; 1979:60. Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s ‘biologism’ and 
Heidegger’s own engagement with modern biology will be examined in the final section of 
this chapter. 46 
He introduces Heidegger as an interlocutor.
In the final part of this chapter I want to show how it might be possible to read 
Nietzsche’s  will-to-power  —  and  a  ‘contra  Darwinism’  position  —  in  non 
anthropomorphic terms so as to be able to begin to map non-human becomings 
of  life.  To  do  this  it  is  necessary  to  engage  with  Heidegger’s  reading  of 
Nietzsche,  in  particular  his  examination  of  the  vexed  issue  of  Nietzsche’s 
‘biologism’47
46  Viroid Life,  p85.The reading of Darwin that Ansell-Pearson wishes to mobilise is,  like my intended 
reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger,  not one that seeks to pit the thinkers against each other in a 
straightforward fashion, with only a single thinker remaining intact. It is instead concerned with the 
manner  in  which  the  two  can  be  brought  into  a  productive  relation;  where  productivity  is  not 
necessarily  the  possibility  of  gaining  a  perspective  where  one  thinker  can  refute  the  other,  but 
moreover,  the production of  'novel  insights into the difficulties of  Nietzsche’s thinking':  “...what  is  
decisive is the critical perspective which Darwin’s thinking on natural selection brings to bear on Nietzsche’s  
Lebensphilosophie, since it is able to show the extent to which it rests on an untenable anthropomorphization of  
nature, life, and evolution.” That there is an extent to which Nietzsche is guilty of maintaining within his 
life-philosophy an anthropomorphic account of nature and life is a guiding claim of this chapter. The 
opening sections follow this guiding claim by pointing out the ways in which Nietzsche fails to fully 
take into account the full depth of Darwinian notions of evolution. Ansell-Pearson shows that where 
Nietzsche considers himself to be thinking beyond a history of the anthropomorphisation of nature, 
thus achieving a position where he can propose 'a new task for thought - that of de-deifying nature so 
as [quoting Nietzsche] ‘to begin to  “naturalize” (vernaturlichen) humanity in terms of a purely, newly 
discovered, newly redeemed nature’, he is in fact potentially guilty of re-inscribing the very structures 
he  seeks  to  overcome.  Whilst  Ansell-Pearson  believes  Nietzsche  to  be  guilty  of  pernicious 
anthropomorphic thinking with regards to life in the places where he believes himself to be thinking 
outside of anthropomorphic models, he does not consider Nietzsche's thought on the matter to be a 
curate's egg. He will use his initial account of the prospective failure of Nietzsche's thinking to come to  
terms with the genuinely non-anthropomorphic elements of Darwinian evolutionary theory and to 
show the potential  ways in  which Nietzsche's  thinking can indeed be successful  in  its  attempt to 
naturalise man and de-anthropomorphise nature and life.
47 Ibid, p109
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It  is  interesting  that  when  talking  of  Heidegger's  reading  of  Nietzsche  within  a 
investigation that seeks solely to deal with issues of anthropomorphism in Nietzsche's 
reading of life and biology, the term 'necessity' is invoked. I do not take this lightly,  
Ansell-Pearson is claiming that Heidegger plays a necessary role in our ability to read 
Nietzsche at his fullest. The question of 'Biologism' is now at the fore.
The term ‘biologism’ can refer to two things. One is an unfounded extension 
and transfer of concepts from the field ‘proper to living beings’ to that of other 
beings;  the other,  and much more important,  is the failure to recognize the 
metaphysical character of the propositions of the science of biology.48
Ansell-Pearson suggests that we need to critically engage with Heidegger's claim that 
to read Nietzsche biologistically is to 'not  read him at all', suggesting that Heidegger 
may be too caught up in the metaphysicality of Nietzsche to not think that he indeed 
shares ground with someone like Darwin.49 In other words, we must be careful not to 
divorce  Nietzsche,  or  indeed his  specific  philosophical  communications  from  their 
specific  contemporary contexts  and connections.  Heidegger,  we are  informed,  does 
consider Nietzsche and Darwin to share ground in that they are both caught up in 
varying degrees of anthropomorphism (given that they are both located within the 
history of  subjectivism named by Occidental  metaphysics).  Ansell-Pearson presents 
flaws in this particular stance on Nietzsche, showing that there is both a heightened 
scientific  intent  within  Nietzsche's  thought,  but  also,  more  importantly  for  Ansell-
Pearson, a depth to Darwin that Heidegger has overlooked. In spite of this he considers 
there to be something productive about this non-biologistic, or rather non-biological 
(given the denigrative tone of 'biologism') reading.
48 Ibid, p109
49 Ibid
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On Heidegger's terms, it is in biologistically reading Nietzsche that his metaphysical 
intent is lost and a philosophically naïve understanding of man's relation to the animal, 
(which as a rubric generally concerns how man stands in relation to his origins), is 
superimposed onto a vastly richer intellectual landscape. Of course, for Heidegger, this 
is at heart, an issue of historicality.50 
[F]or  Heidegger  [...]  Nietzsche’s  project  of  thinking  the  will-to-power  only 
makes sense and becomes meaningful when read in the context of the history 
of Occidental metaphysics. This is a history that has to be rendered ‘historical’ 
since it is not simply given.51
It is in the manner in which Heidegger opens up the metaphysical intent of Nietzsche 
that Ansell-Pearson considers Heidegger to set Nietzsche in a position that renders him 
philosophically  'provocative',  in  spite  of  the  underplaying  of  Nietzsche's  scientific 
context.  Here Ansell-Pearson is  moving in proximity to the type of  methodological 
rigour that I have elucidated and argued for. Ansell-Pearson recognises that first and 
foremost  Nietzsche presents  himself  to  Heidegger as  a  problem of  history,  he  is  a 
thinker that must be set into a history that is not immediately given, where this setting 
is indeed a philosophical act that relates to thinking metaphysics itself. Further, within 
this  historical  problematic  the question of  life  (in this  essay seemingly a rubric  for 
animality and prospective non-human origins), and the nature of Nietzsche's insight 
into it, is a central concern. Ansell-Pearson turns to NIII where the issue of biologism is 
most extensively discussed.
50 As it is for Nietzsche with his genealogical analysis.
51 Ibid
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He [Heidegger] is adamant that in the explicit or tacit characterization of his 
[Nietzsche's]  metaphysics  as  biologism  ‘nothing  is  being  thought,  and  all 
Darwinistic thought processes must be extruded’. Moreover, while conceding 
that Nietzsche does indeed view man and his world in terms of the perspective 
of the body and his animality, in no way, he contends, does Nietzsche decide 
that man simply ‘originates’  from the animal —or ‘more precisely from the 
“ape”’ —since he maintains that such a doctrine of origin is able to say little 
about man..52
For Heidegger, in being separated off from scientific inquiry (the type of inquiry that 
continually remains peculiarly sealed off to its own grounds, namely the metaphysical 
decisions that open a realm of questioning, such that questioning itself is suspended in 
the name of answering) Nietzsche penetrates further into the essence of life than any 
straightforward biology can. Heidegger maintains that “life” is  central to Nietzsche 
and his  'metaphysics',  but  that  life  is  never  thought  from a biological  perspective. 
Ansell-Pearson  first  locates  Heidegger's  reductive  claims  regarding  Nietzsche's 
anthropomorphism as follows:
[Nietzsche's  thinking]  does  not  pose  the  question  of  being  free  of 
anthropomorphic  reasoning  but  instead  installs  a  subjectivism  through  the 
positing  of  the  self-assertion  and  self-expansion  of  the  will-to-power  that 
speaks of a desire for constant self-overcoming on the part of ‘life’53
In spite of this accusation regarding a re-inscription of subjectivism, Ansell-Pearson 
suggests that in showing Nietzsche not to be guilty of biologism, Heidegger manages 
to relate to Nietzsche's thinking in a manner that puts all things pertaining to “life”, 
52 Viroid  Life,  p112.  In  chapter  5,  I  will  suggest  that  Heidegger  comments  are  not  so  much directed 
towards  questions  of  origin,  but  of  methodology.  His  concern  is,  following  FCM,  how  Nietzsche 
understands the essential constitution of that which lives, namely, the essence of life. In conflating life 
and world, Heidegger considers Nietzsche to be guilty of metaphysical anthropomorphism, which is 
effectively the direct opposite of a radical extension of the world of the animal: it precisely covers over 
the animal itself.
53 Viroid Life, p 110
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i.e.,  notions  of  the  biological,  the  animal,  man  as  animal  etc.  into  question  in  a 
profound manner. Thus engaging with Heidegger's non-reductive claims as regards 
Nietzsche and anthropomorphism.
In this passage what is ‘biological’ and ‘non-biological’ and what is ‘human’ or 
‘non-human’  are  cast  into  question,  and  not  only  in  regard  to  Nietzsche’s 
speculations on life. For the most part, however,  Heidegger finds Nietzsche 
stuck within the iron cage of anthropomorphism. However, for him this is not 
to hold a charge against Nietzsche but to open oneself up to his provocation.54 
In Heidegger's  reading of Nietzsche,  the question of life is  raised in a manner that  
stretches  beyond  the  mere  page  of  Nietzsche's  text:  Nietzsche's  provocation  holds 
everything that pertains to anthropomorphism (and life: here, the body; evolutionary 
origins;  man's  animality)  out  in  a  decisive  space.  For  Heidegger,  the  limit  of 
Nietzsche's thinking is reached where any response to this holding-out-into-question 
of life is ventured. Nietzsche is simply incapable of achieving the type of historicality 
with regards to his own heritage that he would need in order to think outside of life-
like, thus subjectivist (on Heidegger;s terms), determinations.55
Ansell-Pearson recognises that Heidegger constructs something of a historical impasse 
when it comes to Nietzsche. This configuration of the Heidegger/Nietzsche encounter 
is very strong. For Ansell-Pearson, the impasse only becomes complete if you look to 
move beyond Nietzsche in a manner that rejects life as being the central concern, i.e., 
look towards Being instead, or misread Darwin in the way that both Heidegger, and 
Nietzsche himself, did. It is as a result of Heidegger's inability to read Darwin outside 
of his prejudices regarding biology and, and thus recognise his potential to offer non-
54 Ibid, p114-5. Ansell-Pearson is here commenting on page 122 of Heidegger's third Nietzsche volume.
55 Heidegger argues this in NIII. This matter is the subject of Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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anthropomorphic accounts of life (or at least create the grounds for such accounts), 
that  Ansell-Pearson  considers  Heidegger  to  have  an  equally  reductive  reading  of 
Nietzsche, and therefore history.56 
Here, Ansell-Pearson may not take full account of the specificity of Auseinandersetzung, 
i.e., the way in which Heidegger is attempting to read. He begins his detailed criticism 
of Heidegger's reading, his attempt at moving beyond the impasse created by it, with 
the following claim, which is worth quoting at length, because it fully represents the 
type of reading of FCM that I am attempting to draw into question:
A move beyond the impasse of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche—the impasse 
of  anthropomorphism  and  animalism  which  then  leads  to  a  devotional 
mourning of the question of Being in Heidegger’s later work, to waiting for a 
god—is possible by questioning the anthropocentric prejudices of Heidegger’s 
own determination of biology as biologism. It is classic anthropocentrism on 
Heidegger’s part to assume that the animal is firmly defined and closed in its  
rapport with the ‘environment’, that it is, as he maintains, ‘poor in the world’ 
(see Krell 1992:121). It is also bad biology. The problem, I want to argue, is that 
Heidegger,  along  with  the  modern  German tradition  of  thought  that  he  is 
working within (notably Kant and Hegel), is trapped within an ‘organismic’ 
conception  of  life  (and  death),  and  so  is  unable  to  articulate  the  kind  of 
‘machinic’ conception of evolution that is necessary to free the logic of life from 
anthropocentric naivety and blindness.57 
The task of moving beyond this impasse is characterised as a process in which the 
56 Viroid Life, p 115.
57 Ibid.  The  merits  of  this  machinic  conception  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis,  however,  this 
characterisation  of  Heidegger's  view of  the  animal  in  terms  of  openness  and  closedness  rests  on 
Nietzsche's understanding of the differences. In NIII Heidegger repudiates Nietzsche's account of the 
animal precisely because he understands Nietzsche to represent man as an undefined animal. As I will  
show in my engagement with FCM the abyssal nature of man's bodily kinship with the animal is not 
measured in terms of determination/ non-determination or autopoesis etc. But is posited precisely as 
an abyss of essential origins. To this end I present Heidegger as mounting a defence against the over-
determination of the living that he witnesses in Nietzsche. See Chapter 5.
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'logic of life' is freed from its trappings within the subjectivist history of organismic 
thinking.  Thus,  Ansell-Pearson  is  laying  the  same  claim  at  Heidegger's  door  as 
Heidegger himself laid at Nietzsche's. For Ansell-Pearson there is a particular historical 
tradition  that  has  been  incapable  of  perceiving  its  own  trappedness  within  the 
operative conception of living things: (that they are organisms).58
 
For  Ansell-Pearson,  Heidegger  is  incapable  of  dealing  with  life  as  presented  by 
Nietzsche (and Darwin) and in the face of the force of biology's potentially disruptive 
powers, Heidegger blindly repeats the history of the German tradition, failing to stand 
strongly within a decisive space for the history of anthropomorphism-subjectivism-
metaphysics  that  he  created.  Throughout  this  thesis  I  will  argue  that  Heidegger's 
account  of  the essence of  “life” in  FCM is  not  as  straightforwardly determinate as 
Ansell-Pearson (and Krell and Scott) claims.59 There is a specificity and a context to his 
58 He considers this impasse to be directly related to the possibilities that both thinkers offer for thinking 
techne  and  technicity.  Indeed  Ansell-Pearson  wishes  to  move  beyond  both  thinkers  in  his  own 
exploration  of  this  theme,  wishing  to  explore  non-human  (hence  'machinic')  technics.  It  is  in  the 
thinking of technics that nature, life, the artificial – essentially all the issues held within the rubric of  
life – are decided about.  Such a move is inextricably linked with the achievement of some type of 
authentic  historicality:  such  is  true  for  Heidegger  (as  we  have  seen  in  my  dealings  with 
Auseinandersetzung), for Nietzsche's in his genealogical method, and so too for Ansell-Pearson:  “The  
question is whether technics itself is to be treated as intrinsically and irredeemably anthropomorphic...While  
recognizing that any firm and fixed opposition between nature and technology, between art and artifice, is deeply  
problematic, one must be careful not to collapse the distinction too quickly or hastily. One can posit the evolution  
of life in terms of an originary technicity, but this should not be at the expense of serious historical labouring. The  
danger of neglecting the formation and deformation of these notions, of constructing a ‘history’ of them in some  
sense, is that of mystification and reification.” [Ibid, p114]
59 Returning to  the  opening claims of  Ansell-Pearson's  criticism,  the  tessellation of  these  various  yet 
contemporary (to each other) readings becomes fully apparent. Ansell-Pearson's reference to the lack in 
Heidegger's thinking animality is not taken from the thinker directly,  but from Krell's  Daimon Life, 
indeed precisely the same chapter that came under analysis in the previous section. This is, of course, 
not to point out that there is nothing original or idiosyncratic about Ansell-Pearson's reading, just that 
there is a collective form of interpretation prevalent amongst disparate interpreters, i.e., precisely the 
type of uniformity that one would expect to form as a result of a particular dominance of taking FCM 
outside of its aforementioned deeper context. However, there is something ultimately more compelling 
and  challenging  about  Ansell-Pearson's  reading  as he  takes  Nietzsche's  role  in  Heidegger's  own 
historical  self-determination  seriously,  locating  this  for  himself  as  a  question  of  the  wherefore  of 
technicity, and as the question of life/animalism in Heidegger. There is, still, a dislocation of FCM from 
its (prospective) context as an explicit engagement with Nietzsche, but it is, here, ostensibly figured as 
an account of life and animality that seeks to offer itself up as a mode of thinking beyond the historical 
impasse of Nietzsche. It is not possible to simply point out that a reading of Auseinandersetzung would 
destabilise Ansell-Pearson's account and move on, as there is an implicit recognition of the pervading 
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comparative analysis of world that opens up a different perspective on Heidegger's 
handling of “life” in FCM. Accordingly, following Ansell-Pearson's line of thought, this 
opens a space to understand this “impasse” of life in a different manner.60
Final Preliminary Remarks
Thinking  the  nature  of  Heidegger's  determination  of  the  Nietzsche  impasse,  and 
moreover,  its  potential  overcoming,  remains  open.  In  this  manner  Ansell-Pearson 
remains a provocative Interlocutor, whose grand challenge to Heidegger remains intact 
and informative, but not conclusive, thus precisely worthy of further investigation. It is 
my intention to extend the same courtesy to Heidegger that he attempts to extend to 
Nietzsche, which is to say, I intend to 'learn how to read well'. Reading well in this 
manner,  means  to  take  Heidegger  seriously  as  an  interpretor  of  Nietzsche,  to 
understand how he considers himself to have opened up to Nietzsche's provocation. 
Heidegger saw precisely this provocation at the heart of his  Auseinandersetzung – his 
polemos, his war – with Nietzsche. 
Heidegger contends that any attempt to grasp the contemporary situation and develop 
or open up a potential ground for philosophising anew (thus truly coming to terms 
with the movements of and fundamental concepts of metaphysics), must first locate 
itself  within  the  proper  site  of  the  contemporary,  wherein  it  must  engage  in  a 
confrontation of sorts, in an Auseinandersetzung, with this as yet incompletely-formed 
presence of Nietzsche and thus life in the thinking at work in the 1929/30 lecture course. The notion 
that what is at stake is an opening up to Nietzsche's provocation is indicative of a recognition of the  
stakes for Heidegger.
60 In chapter 5 I will present my own account of the nature of this impasse in Heidegger's reading of 
Nietzsche, based on my reading of NI and NIII as contextualised by FCM
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contemporary.  In  the  earlier  sections  of  FCM  the  task  of  determining  this 
contemporary  is  clearly  defined by  Heidegger  as  being  bound up  intimately  with 
Nietzsche.  In  the  later  sections  of  FCM, Heidegger  goes  on to  deal  with  the 
contemporary trends in, and the situation of, the Biological sciences, ostensibly leaving 
Nietzsche behind. However, where he initially structures the contemporary as having 
its ground in, and being an inability to properly think through, Nietzsche in general, 
he  more  specifically  locates  this  site  as  nothing  other  than  the  repercussions  of 
Nietzsche's notions of the Dionysian and Apollonian.
The reason why Heidegger takes time to present a number of quotations pertaining to 
Nietzsche's mature understanding of Apollo and Dionysus, takes the time to explicate 
these ideas in any depth at all, is, as yet, unclear. That this is a deliberate step, that it is  
not meaningless, is, for serious readers, indubitable. It would be too much, even for 
someone with a  keen eye  for  the presence of  Nietzsche,  to  make such an allusion 
towards this connection were it not for the fact that Nietzsche is seemingly lost in these 
later sections, only to reappear in the very last instance, at a point where, by way of 
conclusion and indeed provocation, Heidegger himself suspends the last words of his 
lecture.  He remains  silent,  allowing only  Nietzsche  to  speak,  as  though  the  entire 
lecture  course  had  been  steps  along  the  path  to  understanding  a  portion  of  the 
profundity of the last voice of metaphysics. By way of conclusion to what some have 
forwarded as his attempt at “theoretical biology”, one that supposedly considers itself 
to have surpassed Nietzsche,  Heidegger simply forwards the “intoxicated song” of 
Zarathustra.
The subject of life has been forwarded as the source of an impasse between Heidegger 
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and Nietzsche, and equally forwarded as the subject matter of FCM. The remainder of 
this  thesis  will  attempt  to  examine these  claims,  and established their  veracity.  As 
established in this chapter, the stakes of reading FCM are high. The incorporation of 
FCM within an Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche offers potential resources to both re-
conceive  the  contents  of  that  lecture  course,  and  reciprocally  to  re-conceive  the 
structure of  Heidegger's  relationship to Nietzsche.  This  calls  for  a close reading of 
FCM itself as a whole, one that has the course's own meaning/aims/context as a goal, 
and not  an  imported,  grander,  critical  schema.  Given the  stakes  for  the  history  of 
philosophy  that  both  Scott  and  Krell  have  outlined,  this  endeavour  clearly  has  a 
potential impact that spans out further into the Heideggerian corpus and beyond.
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Chapter 2. FCM's 'Preliminary Appraisal': Towards a 
philosophical Auseinandersetzung 
Introduction
Seeking to provide an orientation for the remainder of the lecture course, Heidegger, in 
the 'Preliminary Appraisal',  attempts to generate the context for, and a sense of the 
necessity  of,  the  two tasks  that  will  come to  constitute  the  majority  of  the  lecture 
course,  namely,  a  phenomenological  analysis  of  boredom and an investigation into 
world which takes the form of an engagement with contemporary biology.1 As such, it 
constitutes a propadeutic for these later tasks in a proper sense: it does not simply 
house a series of clarifications and definitions of concepts to be used in the main body 
of  the lecture course,  but rather,  it  teaches the rigours and logic demanded by the 
lecture course as a whole.2 As a process of securing a fundamental orientation, it cannot 
be dismissed in terms of its importance as a context for the following two parts.
The  'Preliminary  Appraisal'  of  FCM  primarily  deals  with  issues  in  methodology 
regarding how to move beyond mere opinions about metaphysics, and out towards an 
encounter  with  metaphysics  itself,  such  that  its  fundamental  concepts  can  be 
appropriately  grasped. Starting  with  the  character  of  metaphysics,  as  the  “master 
1 This is of course contemporary to 1929/30, as De Beistegui suggests in De Beistegui, M. Thinking With  
Heidegger  (Indiana University Press,  Bloomington: 2003), certain advancements in varying biologies 
provide a more advanced view.
2 Whilst §1 of the 'Preliminary Appraisal' of FCM immediately sets to work in the pursuit of the latter 
aim stated in its general subheading, namely seeking 'a General Elucidation of the Title and Course', 
the overall sweep of the opening section as a whole is forwarded as concerning 'The Task of the Course 
and Its Fundamental Orientation Starting with a General Elucidation of the Title and its Course'. The 
sections headings, chapter titles and titles of parts (indeed the very division into paragraph, sections,  
chapters and parts) are editorial additions. However, the titles are all phrases taken from the sections to 
which they refer. 
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discipline” of philosophy, Heidegger asks if 'it were a  prejudice  that metaphysics is a 
fixed and secure discipline of philosophy', suggesting that it may be an 'illusion' that 
philosophy can be taught and learned in a manner akin to the sciences.3 Heidegger 
contends, that in striving toward itself as an 'absolute science' (something supreme, 
that not only concerns everyone but is itself capable of being understood by all that it 
concerns) philosophy remains closed to its own essence. 
Rejecting the possibility of a productive comparison of philosophy with science, the 
lecture  course  becomes  devoted  to  maintaining  the  sovereignty  of  philosophy  by 
finding a way to think the essence of philosophy (as metaphysics) from “within itself”.
4 This encounter, Heidegger contends, requires the rejection of (mathematical) certainty 
as the 'measure of knowledge and ideal of truth for philosophy'.5 Such an ideal projects 
philosophy  onto  a  goal  (that  of  providing  and  securing  knowledge  with  absolute 
certainty)  that  lies  outside  of  its  authentic  possibilities,  one  that  precludes 
philosophizing from openly relating to its ultimately uncertain, turbulent ground. As 
such, philosophy has, hitherto, remained estranged from itself.
The nature of this ground structures the entirety of the lecture course. In this manner 
FCM as  a  whole can  be  thought  of  as  an  attempt  at  retrieving  philosophy  itself: 
encountering the essence of philosophy such that it can  once again be brought into a 
relationship with itself and accordingly with 'us', whoever we may be. This movement 
of retrieval and self-determination is, in FCM, ultimately characterised as being based 
in the establishment of a genuine confrontation with Nietzsche. As such, there is both 
3 FCM, §1 C)
4 Religion and art are also rejected as comparatives, although these disciplines are suggested as being in 
essence closer to philosophy than science: they are sisters.
5 Ibid.
46
an  historical  intent  and  an  historical  methodology  that  is  explicitly,  lengthily,  and 
forcefully espoused within the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. This manifold historicality has 
heretofore been overlooked in favour of the two modes in which this historical task was 
taken up within the remainder of the text.6 As such, the discontinuity of this work with 
regard to  what  follows  in  the  Heideggerian  corpus  has  been  emphasised,  i.e.,  the 
unique  character  of  the  focus  on  a  single  mood,  or  the  singular  nature  of  the 
engagement with the specificities of the life-sciences. 
Overlooking  the  'Preliminary  Appraisal'  results  in  an  misunderstanding  of  the 
ultimately historical direction in which the remainder of the FCM moves. This has the 
dual effect of dislocating FCM from its proper context and disorientating Heidegger's 
later meditation on Nietzsche and life. This point is not merely archival: establishing the 
philosophical  importance of  Auseinandersetzung within  FCM, allows  Heidegger's 
subsequent  thoughts  regarding Nietzsche,  life,  the  Sciences  and the  possibilities  of 
metaphysics, to be framed as  consequent thoughts of matters explicitly formulated in 
FCM.  Thus providing a platform for a more accurate understanding of Heidegger's 
relationship to Nietzsche and life.7 
In order to pursue this thesis goal, in the following chapter, in §1, I will justify and 
flesh-out the claim that  FCM is  aimed towards a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) 
6 Namely, first as a phenomenological examination of boredom – an attempt at awakening a fundamental 
attunement  from  out  of  which  philosophising  can  occur,  and  secondly  as  an  examination  of  the 
phenomenon of world via the comparative analysis of three beings that have varying modes of access 
to  world (namely  Dasein,  animals  and  stones)  –  an  attempt  to  philosophise  via  one  of  the  three 
fundamental  concepts  of  Metaphysics.  It  is  my  claim  that  the  orientations  of  these  particular  
engagements have become dissociated from their context in such a way that their historical intent has 
been forgotten. 
7 The direction of which was suggested at the close of the previous chapter.  My overriding claim is, 
therefore,  that  FCM does not represent a  high-point of Heidegger's meditation on life as a possible 
horizon for thinking. How and why this is the case will be most strongly argued for in chapters 4 and 5 
of this thesis.
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with philosophy, establishing the genuine goals of the text. §2 will focus on the manner 
in which this  Auseinandersetzung  is understood to be historical, establishing both the 
historical  context that Heidegger gives for his lecture course, and the historical  intent 
thereof. The opening of chapter 3 will take these matters up as they appear in 'Part 
One' of  FCM,  examining the Nietzschean character of this philosophically essential, 
historical  Auseinandersetzung, establishing not only Nietzsche's role in  FCM, but also 
the  manner  in  which  life  first  emerges  as  a  central  matter  in  the  text.  These  two 
chapters constitute my reading of the, heretofore under-examined, opening of FCM.8
1. Approaching Metaphysics
1.1. The Futility of Negative Determinations
Attempting  to  establish  an  inquiry  into  the  fundamental  concepts  of  metaphysics, 
Heidegger  adopts  the  most  salient  starting  point:  a  comparative  analysis  of 
metaphysics and other academic disciplines. He suggests that it could be possible to 
account  for the  distinct  lack of  concord amongst  philosophers  by considering it  to 
simply be less mature than the other sciences: 'philosophy moves on an inferior level'.9 
The path forward for philosophy, when confronted with this discord in its findings, 
would be to carry on regardless and continue to pursue parity with the sciences. In 
assuming  the  'secure  path'  of  a  science  it  would  only  be  a  matter  of  time  before 
philosophy  (and  thus  metaphysics  as  its  central  discipline)  can  be  clearly  and 
adequately  determined.10 Heidegger  suggests  that  such  a  comparison  with  science 
8 As aforementioned,  there is  remarkably little  written about the  opening itself.  Krell  selects  certain 
claims from these sections, as does Beistegui (see sections on Boredom), but little in the was of detailed 
analysis is to be found.
9 FCM, §1. a).
10 Ibid.
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might in fact be erroneous in its entirety.
What if it were a prejudice that metaphysics is a fixed and secure discipline of 
philosophy, and an illusion that philosophy is a science that can be taught and 
learned?11
This thought naturally opens up a further question:
Yet if philosophy in general and fundamentally is  not  science, then what is it 
doing?12
Heidegger's response is to state that comparisons with other disciplines and sciences 
can  only  result  in  a  negative determination  of  philosophy,13 as  all  that  can be  said 
positively of it is that it 'cannot be fitted into such frameworks'. If this is the case, then 
the task confronting any endeavour that seeks to learn what philosophy is is that of 
tackling the incomparability of philosophy itself, wherein it must be understood not as 
an absolute science (which Heidegger claims is characteristic of philosophy’s own self-
relation throughout its modern inception with Descartes) but as absolute.14 In order to 
understand the fundamental concepts of metaphysics, we first have to understand what  
metaphysics is. As Heidegger puts it, '[h]ow are we to experience what philosophy itself 
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Negative determinations return when Heidegger, in the later sections on world, asks after the essence 
of life. Here, as I will show, Heidegger offers up the same problematic, attempting to grapple with the  
possibility of moving beyond a privative, or negative determination of the world of the animal, and the 
essence of the living. I will ultimately claim that Heidegger does not achieve this latter task, as he never 
attempts to genuinely enter into an encounter with the essence of life, but rather is attempting to show 
that such an encounter must first involve an encounter with metaphysics itself.
14 The  possible  productivity  of  a  comparison  with  something  other  than  science  is  also  forwarded. 
Heidegger points out that the comparison with science functioned in a more fundamental manner, as it  
took the form of an attempt 'to determine it [philosophy] as science'(§1,b). It would seemingly always 
constitute a 'debasement' of philosophy's essence for it to be defined not just negatively, but privatively  
as a lesser science. On the other hand, it can generally be taken as being clear that art and religion are  
not held as maintaining the same structures and concerns (at least in terms of approach) as philosophy.  
However, Heidegger forwards two problems with this approach. The first is that equality and parity 
do not equate to identity, and following from this, a comparison amongst equals would still require an 
initial positive definition of philosophy if it were to yield anything other than a negative description. 
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is, if we have to forego all detours?'.15 
1.2. Allowing the Question of Metaphysics to Unfold: From Everyday 
Awareness of Philosophy to Philosophy itself
The intended result of the 'Preliminary Appraisal' is not the provision of a functional 
definition  of  metaphysics,  but  rather,  a  way  of  seeing  the  matter  with  regards 
metaphysics in an appropriately philosophical light.  Throughout,  Heidegger adopts 
the standpoint of his students, which is to say, a non-philosophical standpoint from out 
of which he seeks to develop an understanding of what philosophising is.16 Heidegger 
continually refers to what everyday consciousness and everyday opinion initially take 
philosophy to be. Along these lines, and purely for the purposes of illustration, it could 
be said that Heidegger is conducting his own form of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. 
In the preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel forwards his text as a description of the path 
that ordinary (natural) consciousness takes in its internally driven progression to the 
standpoint of 'Science or knowledge in general', wherein philosophy can begin.17 This 
progression is self-driven because, for Hegel, ordinary consciousness, on the basis of 
its possession of an immediate and unconditioned relation to being, has the right to 
demand that  philosophy  itself  provide  'a  ladder  to  this  standpoint'.18 In  this  way, 
philosophy is  taken to  be  the  end point  of  a  logical  unfolding of  the  structure  of 
ordinary  consciousness,  such that  the  movement  of  ordinary  consciousness  up the 
15 Ibid.
16 See esp. FCM, §5, where Heidegger examines the ambiguity of a lecture course itself being capable of 
instigating philosophy.
17 Hegel, G.W.F,  Phenomenology of Spirit trans. Miller, A.V (OUP, Oxford: 1977). Preface, paragraph 26 – 
'Pure  self-recognition in absolute otherness, this aether  as such,  is the ground and soil of Science or 
knowledge in general. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or requires that consciousness should 
dwell in this element'
18 Ibid.
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ladder to philosophy is not taken to be something extant to philosophy, but the very 
'movement of its becoming'.19 For Hegel, this initiation into philosophy is necessary for 
the following reasons.
When natural consciousness entrusts itself straight away to Science, it makes 
an attempt, induced by it knows not what, to walk on its head too, just this  
once; the compulsion to assume this unwanted posture and to go about in it is 
a violence it is expected to do to itself, all unprepared, and seemingly without 
necessity.20
Here  we  see  the  relevance  of  Heidegger's  reference  to  the  “inverted  world”  of 
philosophy in  §7  of  FCM,  and the  true  similarity  of  his  efforts  in the  'Preliminary 
Appraisal'  to those of the  Phenomenology.21 The task of entering into philosophy, for 
both thinkers, requires a particular mode of preparation which is first and foremost a 
matter  of  grasping the  necessity  of  philosophy,  and becoming  oriented within  the 
seemingly upside-down world thereof. For Hegel, this orientation starts by taking the 
most basic and immediate form of consciousness and allowing it to progress under its 
own  volition,  rung-by-rung,  up  the  ladder  to  philosophy  until  it  has  become 
something of the order of philosophical consciousness.  If  this progression does not 
remain 'immanent', i.e., is not purely ordinary consciousness' becoming philosophical 
consciousness,  then  the  tasks  of  preparing  for,  and  orientating  oneself  within 
philosophy will not have been achieved. In seeking to open a path to philosophy itself 
by first allowing a preparatory definition of metaphysics to unfold under the power of 
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 In this section Heidegger, when analysing Plato and Heraclitus' use of the language of sleeping and 
waking, suggest that Hegel was right when he claimed that philosophy presents an “inverted world”, 
as  philosophical  awareness  demands  a  peculiar  readiness  and  relation  to  the  world  that  appears 
completely  foreign  to  everyday  awareness.  Heidegger  emphasises  this  stark  division  between 
everyday awareness and philosophy, and yet the easy hanging together of everyday awareness and 
scientific awareness throughout both FCM and NIII.
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its  own failure  to  fully  grasp  what  it  initially  takes  philosophy to  be,  Heidegger's 
attempt to prepare for  an encounter  with philosophy is  equally as  committed to a 
notion of immanence as Hegel's,  and thus potentially equally as open to criticisms 
regarding the purity of his immanent method.22 
Heidegger is not committed to the same starting point as Hegel, namely consciousness 
in its most immediate form. He consistently states that consciousness (either of the self 
or as intentional), does not constitute the basic character of man's relationship to being. 
As such, that philosophising pertains to consciousness (that a fundamental attunement 
can be ascertained by consciousness for example) is taken to be one of the positions  
that  overcome themselves along this  path to philosophy.  Heidegger cannot rest his 
own ladder to philosophy on the bedrock of certainty (sense-certainty, self-certainty or 
other). His starting point is the very possibility of certainty itself, drawing philosophy's 
status as knowledge of any order into doubt.23 In taking up doubt in this renewed and 
heightened  manner  Heidegger  is  commandeering  the  language  and  procedures  of 
22 Such criticism would point out the places where the immanent unfolding of the question is violated, 
thus highlighting any interruption of the progressive process of philosophy's own becoming by means 
of  recourse  to  a  pre-established  determination  of  philosophy  itself.  If  it  were  the  case  that  an 
interruption of this order was in evidence, then it would indicate one of two things, either that the task 
of entering into philosophy is completely hermetically sealed, or that Heidegger has committed himself 
to  an  erroneous  path,  and  thus  generates  an  improper  understanding  of  how  to  prepare  for 
philosophising itself.  This is what Hegel refers to as the 'path of doubt' and 'the way of despair' in 
paragraph 78 of the  Phenomenology,  where doubt is not taken to be a mere distraction on the way to 
maintaining a belief in what was originally the subject of doubt, but to be the process whereby what 
was originally taken to be the case is transformed and uncovered as that which it is in truth. This is an 
area of great debate: whether the Phenomenology does indeed unfold immanently, or is, alternatively, 
teleological. There are multiple places where pressure can be put on Heidegger's adherence to this  
method of allowing the question of metaphysics to unfold of its own accord. The circumstances of his 
derivation of the fundamental concepts themselves (world, finitude, solitude) is one such place. Whilst 
the explication of the concepts themselves is relatively salient, the source from which they are first  
encountered, namely Novalis' poetic pronouncement on philosophy, is distinctly arbitrarily selected.  
However, this criticism – that Heidegger is arbitrarily selecting an initial definition of philosophy that  
will  grant  him  grounds  to  further  determine  what  philosophy itself  is  without  having  genuinely 
argued for either the necessity of this determination, or its development from out of the question of 
metaphysics itself – only has purchase if Heidegger is committed to the exact same type of immanent 
methodology as Hegel.
23 Heidegger characterises modern metaphysics, from Descartes onward as a philosophy of doubt that 
does not doubt certainty itself, as it is always grounded in the certainty of a knowing subject.
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modern  metaphysics  in  order  to  generate  an  understanding  of  metaphysics’ own 
internal confrontation and oscillation between certainty and uncertainty. 
Heidegger's commitment to the path of philosophy initially involving the unfolding of 
the  question  of  metaphysics  is  not  the  same  as  a  commitment  to  an  immanent 
derivation  of  the  fundamental  concepts  of  metaphysics  themselves.  Where  the 
'Preliminary  Appraisal'  mirrors  the  Phenomenology's progressive  movement  from 
ordinary consciousness to philosophical consciousness, it also mirrors Hegel's  Science  
of Logic in as much as it attempts a derivation of (rather than just a clarification of) the 
fundamental concepts of philosophy. Houlgate provides an informative description of 
the aim of the Logic which will help to shed light on precisely what is going on in the 
'Preliminary Appraisal'.
Hegel’s philosophy proper begins with the  Logic  which seeks to provide an 
immanent, presuppositionless derivation of the basic categories of thought and 
being. This derivation of the categories is ‘presuppositionless’ because it takes 
for granted no specific rules of thought and, indeed, is preceded by the act of 
setting aside all our familiar determinate assumptions about thought and being 
24
Whilst, in FCM, Heidegger clearly seeks to unfold the 'basic categories of thought and 
being' in some manner (providing we replace the word categories with concepts), he 
does so in a way that takes up 'our familiar determinate assumptions about thought 
and  being',  rather  than  setting  them  aside.  He  is  not  doing  this  as  a  matter  of  
24 Houlgate, S. An Introduction to Hegel, Freedom, Truth and History. (Blackwell, Oxford: 2005) pp. 106-8. To 
reiterate:  these  comparisons  with  Hegel  are  by  no  means  intended  as  a  commentary  on,  or  an 
evaluation of Hegel's contribution to the matter. They are simply intended as brief illustrations of the 
originality and philosophical intent of Heidegger's embarkation into the matter of the fundamental  
concepts of philosophy “from the ground up”, so to speak. If successful the comparison will serve to 
provide a previously unrecognised context for this 'Preliminary Appraisal'.
53
ignorance. Rather than attempting to be presuppositionless, Heidegger's derivation of 
the fundamental  concepts  of  metaphysics  is  entirely based upon (and is  thus only 
possible  following  the  acceptance  of)  the  idea  that  philosophy  is  not  a  trivial 
enterprise, and thus has a character of its own. This presupposition is both the ground 
of his account of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics and also the starting point 
of his attempt to access the inner essence of philosophy from a standpoint outside of 
philosophy itself. The 'Preliminary Appraisal' can thus be understood to pursue two 
matters  at  the  same time:  becoming oriented to  philosophy itself  and deriving the 
fundamental concepts of philosophy.25
In  FCM  Heidegger  is  not  attempting  an  entirely  original  task  with  regards  to 
philosophy. Rather, he attempts to stage an encounter with philosophy itself from out 
of the way in which it stands with regard to philosophy here and now. This requires a 
commitment to engaging with philosophy in a way that  both accesses its  essential 
character, but at the same time recognises and operates from out of its situatedness 
within  determinate  and  pre-established  rules  of  thought  and  assumptions  about 
thought  and being.  Heidegger's  efforts  in  the  'Preliminary  Appraisal'  constitute  an 
orientation towards the peculiarly historical and hermeneutically problematic status of 
philosophy, namely, that philosophy is at once essential, and therefore a seemingly a  
priori  activity,  and yet at the same time it  is  concretely determined by its historical 
provenance. It concerns man in as much as man exists as man – not limited to factical 
25 Both of these enterprises accept the difficulty and uncertainty of their task, that is, as I shall show, 
Heidegger does not permit himself recourse to certain grounds, as this would relinquish philosophy's  
claim to its own unique essence. Despite his starting point being somewhat arbitrary in both matters, it 
is  not  the  case  that  philosophy  is  completely hermetically  sealed  or  inaccessible.  Rather,  it  is  not 
straightforwardly accessible in the Hegelian manner: on Heidegger's terms, one does not have the right 
to  demand that  philosophy itself  provide a  ladder to  itself.  The task of  preparing for  philosophy 
involves a readiness, but this readiness is not something that can be lightly assumed.
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provenance, yet at the same time inextricably caught up in historicality. Initially this 
appears to be a simple problem, as all that we need do is extricate analysis from its 
factical-historical  situation  and  concentrate  on  the  ontological/essential  level.  This 
move, indeed, the desire to conduct a move of this order, runs counter to the problem 
at hand. It repeats a problem identified by Heidegger in section §12, wherein some 
more originary grasp of metaphysics must be attained prior to establishing what it is 
that  is  precisely  arbitrary,  contingent  or  merely  factical  about 
metaphysics/philosophising  as  “we”  find  it  today.  As  Heidegger  points  out  in  the 
opening  sections  of  'Part  One',  figuring  out  exactly  who  this  “we”  is,  is  not  as 
straightforward as it may seem.
A similar  issue  is  raised  in  §14,  this  time  regarding  philosophical  novelty.  Here 
Heidegger will claim that an understanding of the peculiarity of modern metaphysics 
relies  on  the  recognition  of  something  “new”  emerging  from  within  metaphysics 
today. This, itself, requires an initial understanding of metaphysics' essence in order to 
grasp  the  key  moments  of  historical  continuity  and  discontinuity  that  allow for  a 
recognition of the “new” as that which is different from, yet connected to, that which 
has  gone  before.  Accordingly,  Heidegger  does  not  consider  his  task  to  be  the 
eradication of the matter of philosophy's provenance in order to access its a-historical 
grounds: he is not seeking to do something new. 
55
1.3 Facing up to metaphysics
1.3.1. Homesickness
The 'Preliminary Appraisal' appears to address the same problem of history which the 
mature  notion  of  Auseinandersetzung was  designed to  address:  how to  generate  an 
appropriate method of approach to the history of philosophy. This is not a mere matter 
of coincidence: where  Auseinandersetzung was posited as a mode of engagement that 
adopts  the very movement of thinking itself,  FCM is  directed toward precisely the 
same problem. In asking how to face metaphysics directly, without detour, Heidegger 
is attempting to prepare for a confrontation of sorts, a-facing up-to metaphysics itself.  
Initially, an historical approach is presented as potentially capable of providing a path 
towards philosophy, but is ultimately rejected for the same reasons as other 'detours', 
namely that it will only operate at the level of 'opinions about metaphysics', remaining 
on  the  outside  of  'metaphysics  itself'.26 In  the  'Preliminary  Appraisal',  Heidegger 
maintains that an alternative route towards an encounter with philosophy itself must 
be sustained. I will follow this route in order to fully bring into view the manner in 
which the 'Preliminary Appraisal' does not maintain a purely external likeness to the 
issues associated with Auseinandersetzung as a technical term, but in fact directly points 
towards  and  calls  for  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  fundamental  character  of 
philosophy as confrontational. As Auseinandersetzung is “cut” for an engagement with 
Nietzsche, this endeavour will begin to draw out Nietzsche's presence in FCM. 
Whilst  the appraisal  of  comparative  analyses as  a way into an investigation of  the 
character  of  metaphysics  has  produced  no  positive definition  of  metaphysics  itself, 
26 FCM, §1. c)
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Heidegger contends that it has furnished his investigation with 'perhaps [an] essential 
insight into what is peculiar about metaphysics: that we ourselves avoid confrontation 
with it'.27 The nature of this avoidance is ambivalent, it is initially unclear whether it is 
the case that metaphysics is elusive or that 'we' are not prepared to 'look metaphysics in  
the face'.28 If philosophy itself allows no comparison and needs to be understood from 
out of itself, then it can only be understood as accessible when in operation: 'philosophy  
is philosophizing'.29 If philosophy only is as philosophising, then it is clearly essentially a 
human activity. As such, it seems impossible for philosophy to withdraw from those to 
whom it is bound. Directly responding to this quandary, Heidegger picks a guiding 
statement from Novalis, wherein philosophy is proclaimed to be a 'homesickness, an 
urge to be at home everywhere'.30 It is through this proclamation that Heidegger for 
the  first  time  unfolds  a  positive  determination  of  metaphysics  in  terms  of  its 
fundamental  concepts.  This  determination  unveils  the  fundamental  concepts  of 
metaphysics, but only in as much as they are the fundamental questions that structure 
metaphysics as a human enterprise. 
1.3.2. Derivation of the Fundamental Concepts
In wanting to be at home everywhere it follows that man must first be taken as not 
being at  home.  Heidegger  takes  “everywhere”  not  to  mean a  continuous  series  of 
27 FCM, §2. a)
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid, §2.b). In his translation notes McNeill suggests that this quote has special prominence because the  
use of  Trieb  (urge) and its cognates holds an important position throughout the text. However, this 
selection is curious, and appears for seemingly no other reason than for its illustrative power (i.e., it is 
not somehow internally necessitated by what has gone before in the 'Preliminary Appraisal'), however,  
Heidegger attributes this to two matters, first, the essential ambiguity of all genuinely philosophical 
beginnings, and secondly, the intimate relationship between art and philosophy that allows for art to 
illuminate philosophies path in some respect..
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discrete places, but to be all places taken “as a whole”. All places, when taken as a 
whole, constitute world. As such, philosophy is a desire to constantly be within the 
whole; to ask after  world as being as a whole. Hence the first concept as a question: 
'What is that – World?'.31 Accordingly, in being driven towards being as a whole, man is 
neither  fully  within  the  world  nor  fully  outside  it,  else  there  would  be  no 
homesickness:  man  is  in  transition between  the  two  positions.  For  Heidegger,  this 
oscillation constitutes finitude. Finitude as transition is not “worldly”, but rather on the 
way toward the world. As such it is not some-where to be occupied, and therefore not 
something which contains other beings in some way: it is a way of being.32 Philosophy 
and its concepts speak from out of and about man's essence. Thus finitude is not one 
way of being amongst others but is 'our fundamental way of being',  hence the second 
concept/question: 'What is that – Finitude'.33
Finitude, properly understood as our fundamental way of being, is not a fixed position 
but  some sort  of  process.  Rather  than being  a  process  which  realises  our  genuine 
character in a resolution of its movement in one of the aspects between which it is 
stretched (in either becoming somehow fully at home in the world, i.e., as a being of 
the same order as those we find ourselves amidst, or as fully transcending beings as a 
whole  in  the  direction  of  pure  individuality),34 finitude  'only  is in  truly  becoming 
31 Ibid.
32 Later I will examine Heidegger's etymological account of the concept of world – the movement from 
κόσμος to mundus, which he presents in On the Essence of Ground. Here, via an engagement with Kant, 
he shows that there has been a form of metaphysical confusion wherein finitude and world have been 
conflated, i.e., to be finite is to be of the world, and to be of the world is to be finite. In what remains of  
the “preliminary appraisal”, Heidegger expands upon this problem at length. Ultimately, his above 
mentioned Kant analysis is forwarded as a companion to the comparative analysis of world presented 
in Part Two of FCM.
33 Ibid. §2. b).
34 These two alternate possibilities could perhaps be envisioned as the promise of a philosophy of life in  
the first instance and a promise of the pure origins of the subject on the other (e.g., Fichte's I=I ). This is  
clearly an attempt to ward off the notion that Heidegger is establishing a dichotomy of possibilities for 
the investigation of the essence of man: the embodiment, so to speak, of man (man as fully part of the 
whole as or the same order as the beings it finds itself amongst), or the pure self-identical subjecthood 
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finite'.35 In becoming truly finite we are becoming truly who we are (Heidegger himself 
uses this peculiarly Nietzschean terminology): we are individuated. Heidegger clarifies 
this  by  pointing  out  that  this  individuation  is  not  thought  in  terms  of  an  ego  in 
confrontation with the world, but moreover as a 'solitariness in which in which each 
human  being  first  enters  into  [...]  a  nearness  with  world',  hence  the  third 
concept/question 'What is that – Individuation?'.36
The  fundamental  concepts  of  metaphysics  (world,  finitude,  solitude)  are  thus 
presented as questions. They are fundamentally interrelated, such that each in its own 
way  inquires  into  the  whole,  but  nonetheless  maintains  an  internally necessitated 
relationship to the others. Throughout  FCM, Heidegger will return to this structure. 
His boredom analysis and his comparative analysis of world are fully understandable 
only from within an understanding of this structure and the technical way in which 
Heidegger  is  deploying  the  words  “world”,  “finitude”  and  “solitude”. Heidegger 
suggests  that  the  rigour  required  for  the  comprehension  of  these  questions  and 
concepts necessitates a different attitude from that of the sciences, where indifference 
and impartiality are demanded. For Heidegger, 'it is not sufficient for us to know such 
questions. What is decisive is whether we really ask such question, whether we have 
the strength to sustain them right through our whole existence'.37 In what then does 
this difference consist? According to Heidegger, we first have to have 'been gripped by 
of man.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. Once again it is clearly the case that these concepts have not been derived from a pure unfolding 
of  the  question  concerning  metaphysics,  but  have  been  derived  from  the  statement  by  Novalis. 
Heidegger does not try to avoid the obvious problem regarding 'the authority and significance of this 
witness', but he also does not provide any further justification beyond the cryptic thought that 'art is 
the sister of philosophy'. As discussed above this would only constitute a problem for Heidegger if he  
were attempting some purely immanent unfolding of the question “What is Metaphysics”.
37 Ibid.
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whatever  they  [the  concepts]  are  supposed  to  comprehend'.38 This  term  and  its 
cognates will be employed in order to describe the appropriately philosophical activity 
that can be undertaken in the face of a need to be (in some way)  passively gripped, 
namely, philosophy must concern itself with awakening 'such being gripped'.
Heidegger  goes  on  to  clarify  that  all  such  “being  gripped”  has  its  ground  in  an 
attunement,  and a  “fundamental  attunement” at  that.39 A fundamental  attunement  is 
precisely what its name suggests, it is an all encompassing attunement that operates at 
an even more basic level than an individual attunement, wherein it has the character of 
'constantly, essentially and thoroughly' attuning human beings. Philosophy necessarily 
happens from within a fundamental attunement as, given philosophy is an  essential 
activity of man, it  is  the most fundamental way in which we are gripped. Thus,  it 
locates philosophy at the most appropriate level, which is 'in the ground of human 
Dasein'.40 
We ask anew: What is man? [...] We do not know. Yet we have seen that in the 
essence of this mysterious being, philosophy happens.41
Facing up to metaphysics thus involves a certain a confrontation with ourselves.
38 Ibid. As McNeill points out in his translation gripped [ergriffen] constitutes a play on the German term 
for Concept [Begriff]  and comprehend [begreifen].  This is  a theme which is  repeated and expanded 
throughout the text. 
39 The concept of attunement [Stimmung] (also commonly translated as mood) has a rich philosophical 
background, having been a central component of Division I of  BT. Whilst this exegetical account of 
FCM is intended to operate independently of readings of other Heideggerian texts, some knowledge of 
the significance of this term and also of the basic character of attunement/mood as it appears in  BT 
must be assumed if sufficient ground is to be made. A deep analysis of precisely what is meant by 
attunement would constitute  a divergence from the thrust  of  the  text,  i.e.  Heidegger is  seemingly 
happy to simply mention the ontological structure of attunement and suspend a deeper analysis until  
later on in the text (and in a less technical way than might expected). Chapter 3 of this thesis will focus  
on 'Part One' of FCM, and will therefore examine attunement in greater detail.
40 FCM, §2, a).
41 Ibid.
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1.4. Philosophy as Readiness
A fundamental concept occurs within a fundamental attunement. As such, it does not 
function  in  the  same  manner  as  standard  concepts  of  logic.42 Standard  concepts 
(Begriff),  i.e.,  not  fundamental,  but  universal,  general,  particular  etc.,  function 
according to a representative schema whereby we present “individual items” before us 
according to their common aspects, always representing and determining a particular 
thing according to its  identity with,  or  difference from, other things with which it  
shares  properties.  The  difference  between  the  concepts  of  logic  and  fundamental 
concepts of metaphysics lies in the different comportments that pertain to that which is 
comprehended therein: in being gripped 'we do not represent before us that which we 
conceptually  comprehend  (begreifen)'.43 Fundamental  concepts  of  metaphysics  are 
comprehensive rather than determinately representative: they relate to the singularity and 
uniqueness  of  that  which  they  comprehend,  rather  than  functioning  as  tools  for 
categorisation  and  identification.44 That  which  the  fundamental  concepts  of 
metaphysics comprehends, as has been expounded, is the whole. Comprehending the 
whole, in being a non-representational affair where an object or field of objects is not 
'represented before us', is comprehensive in a further direction:
[T]hey  also  in  each  case  always  comprehend  within  themselves  the 
comprehending human being and his or her Dasein- not as an addition, but in 
such a way that these concepts are not comprehensive without there being a 
42 Once again assuming some knowledge of Division I of  BT where attunements/moods are shown to 
operate at a pre-theoretical, pre-representative level. They are disclosive of Dasein as much as they are 
of entities. 
43 FCM, §3
44  Ibid. Heidegger uses the term Inbegriff to name the type of concept that fundamental concepts are. 
Inbegriff,  most  commonly  translated  as  epitome  or  embodiment  –  as  in  “he  was  the 
epitome/embodiment of physical perfection” - according to its standard German usage, can also be 
translated  as  “incept”  in  order  to  maintain  its  proximity  to  “concept”  (Inbegriff  –  Begriff).  For  a  
discussion  of  the  varying  possibilities  of  translation  as  well  as  the  notion  itself  see  Polt,  R,  The  
Emergency of Being: on Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy. (Cornell University Press: 2006).
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comprehending  in  this  second  sense,  and  vice.  No  concept  of  the  whole 
without the comprehending of philosophizing existence.45 
For Heidegger, the matter of metaphysics is therefore not fixed and stabilised in the 
same  manner  as  scientific  fields.  Whereas  zoology  has  fundamental  concepts  that 
identifies the field of  objects that it will relate to (i.e., it will have a concept of what 
constitutes an animal as opposed to some other thing), the matter of metaphysics is 
non-objective, not representable and therefore un-categorisable.46
In  identifying  a  different  matter  for  metaphysics,  Heidegger  is  identifying  an 
alternative rigour. Heidegger confirms that the task of understanding philosophy from 
the inside, so to speak, must first start with a wholesale remove from the standpoint of 
the sciences. This constitutes an utter rejection of the ultimately 'indifferent expectation 
of  something  that  can  be  more  or  less  penetratingly  acquired  as  knowledge'.47 
Philosophy then, or at least entering into philosophy, 'is a matter of a certain readiness'.
48 At this point the investigation is not only lacking a positive definition of philosophy, 
but has now, under its own steam, completely rejected the need and/or desire for a 
definitional determination of philosophy and its activity. Rather,  the task is  now as 
follows:
[...]  to  summon  up  enthusiasm  for  the  adventure  of  human  existence,  an 
appetite for the entirely enigmatic nature and fullness of Dasein and of things, 
an independence from schools of thought and learned opinions, and yet in all 
45 FCM, §3
46 I return to this idea in the latter sections of Chapter 5 of this thesis, where Heidegger discusses the  
“field  propositions”  of  the  sciences  in  relation  to  the  interpretations  of  being  that  metaphysics 
conducts.  In chapter  4,  I  discuss the notion that  “life”,  as a potential  designation that  can sustain 
philosophising, is, in Heidegger's understanding, ultimately a term which engenders form in relation to 
a field of phenomena. Philosophy, at its heart, does not relate to a field in this way. 
47 FCM, Chapter Two, opening statement.
48 Ibid.
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this a desire to learn and listen49
This readiness involves a remove from its identification as a science: a distancing that 
must include the rejection of the 'exterior form of science' within which philosophy 
remains.50 This process of distancing from the sciences is taken up as being constitutive 
of  philosophy  as  a  human  activity,  itself  belonging  to  'the  positive  essence  of 
metaphysics'.51 Being  initially taken as a science, but requiring differentiation from it, 
Heidegger proclaims this “dissimulation” as characteristic of the  essential ambiguity of 
philosophy  itself.  As  essentially ambiguous,  it  is  impossible  to  provide  a  positive 
definition that would allow the production of a rule by which philosophy and non-
philosophy could be identified, thus reaffirming the necessity of a “certain readiness” 
as 'philosophy can be recognized only by whoever becomes intimately acquainted with 
it, i.e., takes trouble over it'.52 
Continuing his methodological commitment to allowing the question of metaphysics 
to  unfold  from  within  its  own  situated presuppositions,  Heidegger  contends  that 
“everyday awareness” takes philosophy in its most minimal and unproblematic form 
to be 'an extreme ultimate pronouncement and interlocution'. As such, 'philosophy is 
something  that  concerns  everyone'.53 As  concerning  everyone,  it  is  not  purely  a 
personal matter, 'our general awareness tacitly concludes that what concerns everyone 
49 Ibid. Whilst the term “enthusiasm” is not repeated throughout FCM, it does make an appearance at the 
close of the text, where Nietzsche is forwarded as “the last of the great philosophers”, as someone who 
spoke with ἐνθουσιασμός.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Whilst this statement may seem like a psychological understanding of philosophy – an essentialisation 
of the factical appearance of philosophy without any reference to a possible deeper origin and form – it  
is intended to be the most minimal and therefore basic presupposition regarding philosophy, inasmuch 
as philosophy is  something worthy of  investigation whatsoever.  Were one to  reject  philosophy as 
ultimate or as concerning everyone then it would be the case that this question would no longer be able 
to unfold, however, if this were the case then Heidegger's response may be to ask why philosophy 
would be of any interest at all.
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must be understood by everyone'.54 As mathematical knowledge is straightforwardly 
accessible, clear and indubitable (being of the order of “supreme certainty”), Heidegger 
suggests that it is initially recognised by everyday awareness, and later confirmed by 
philosophers themselves,  as being knowledge of the highest order.55 This raises the 
following question:
What  does  it  mean  to  uphold  mathematical  knowledge  as  the  measure  of 
knowledge and as the ideal of truth for philosophy? It means nothing less than 
making  that  knowledge  which  is  absolutely  non-binding  and  emptiest  in 
content into the measure for that knowledge which is the most binding and 
richest in itself, i.e., that knowledge which deals with the whole.56 
Heidegger  is  at  pains  to  show  that  his  rejection  of  this  mathematical  ideal  is  not 
performed on the basis of philosophy's inability to generate truth of this order, as, in 
principle, it is possible that this type of certainty may be attained in the future. Rather, 
54 FCM, §6. a)
55 Here  Heidegger  quotes  Plato's,  Descartes'  and  Leibniz's  attestations  regarding  the  primacy  of 
mathematics with regards to metaphysics and truth. Heidegger returns to this very same topic when 
discussing  Nietzsche's  “alleged  biologism”  in  NIII.  There  he  claims  that  the  movement  between 
everyday  awareness  and  scientific  knowing  comes  by  way  of  a  smooth  transition,  whereas  the 
movement from both everyday awareness and indeed scientific knowing to metaphysical questioning 
requires  a  leap.  Equally,  for  everyday  awareness,  Philosophy,  as  concerning  everyone,  'must  be 
accessible  for  everyone  straight-away'  (§6).  The most  common example  of  something that  is  easily 
graspable in this manner is  basic arithmetic,  e.g.,  that 1+1=2. In general such a statement lies fully 
within  the  calculative  powers  of  anyone  and  everyone,  requiring  little  effort  or  education  to 
understand. Whether or not everyone can indeed grasp this is of no consequence, what is important is 
that  the  standard for  philosophical  truth (as  that  which is  immediately  graspable  by everyone)  is 
determined according to how little work is required for an understanding thereof: an understanding 
for  which  'no expenditure  of  human substance  is  required'  (§6).  In  conclusion  to  this  discussion, 
Heidegger  points  out  that  a  direct  implication of  this  “everyday  criterion” is  that  'what  concerns  
everyone contains in itself the manner and way in which it is understood by everyone' (§6). As a result 
this “everyday criterion” dictates what counts as truth, in advance of philosophy's own activity. This is 
precisely the bone that Nietzsche wishes to pick with Plato, so to speak. Here in FCM we find the same 
issue that, as I will show in Chapter 5, persists throughout NI and NII, namely, the problem of truth's 
subordination to the mathematical ideal (or later the platonic ideal, where this ideal, as non-sensuous 
certainty is initially formulated as precisely that of Platonism and not necessarily that of Plato himself). 
In  (Heideggerian-)Nietzschean terms  this  is  the  issue  of  the  non-sensuous,  or  here  the  non-finite, 
becoming the measure for the sensuous, or finite. Whilst this has not yet become an explicit problem of 
history,  it  is  clear  that  Heidegger  is  wrestling  with  the  same  issue  –  how  to  think  the  finite  
independently of the mathematical/platonic ideal of truth as certainty. At this stage in FCM, as has  
been shown, it turns on the matter of generating a readiness for fundamentally metaphysical questions. 
See Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
56 FCM, §6. b), α)
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the  rejection  is  based  upon  the  discoveries  of  the  investigation  so  far:  philosophy 
(essentially) dissimulates as a science, yet at the same time it requires a different rigour 
due to the demands of  its  proper subject  matter,  namely the whole.  Concepts  that 
attempt  to  grasp the  whole  do not  operate  within the  same conceptual  schema as 
standard concepts of logic, as they do not function in a representational manner. As a 
result, grasping the fundamental “being gripped” by the whole demands the utmost 
expenditure of human effort, and grips and binds man at the most fundamental and 
essential level. As such, non-binding, non-essentially determinative knowledge cannot 
provide the ideal for philosophy, unless philosophy itself becomes something trivial 
and unworthy of investigation.
1.5. Putting Man into Question – Toward an Auseinandersetzung
Heidegger thus concludes that 'We are uncertain about philosophizing'.57 This uncertainty 
must be taken as belonging to philosophy itself. Heidegger expands on this thought as 
follows:
Philosophy has a meaning only as a human activity. Its truth is essentially that of  
human  Dasein.  The  truth  of  philosophising  is  in  part  rooted  in  the  fate  of 
Dasein.  This  Dasein,  however,  occurs  in  freedom.  Possibility,  change,  and 
predicament are obscure. Dasein stands before possibilities it does not foresee. 
It is subject to a change it does not know. It constantly moves in a predicament 
it does not have power over. Everything that belongs to the existence of Dasein 
belongs just as essentially to the truth of philosophy.58
Determined  to  follow  the  implications  of  this  re-location  of  the  ideal  of  truth  for 
philosophy, Heidegger is keen to move the investigation beyond its current operation 
57 FCM, §6. b), α)
58 Ibid.
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at the level of 'apodictic propositions'. As such, the above statement is forwarded as 
being merely probable, rather than certain. However, “probability” only has meaning 
within an understanding of the mathematical ideal of truth as absolute certainty, i.e., as 
its  “conceptual  counterpart”.59 Accordingly,  the  uniqueness  of  philosophy's  (and 
man's)  vacillation  between  certainty  and  uncertainty  is  only  mitigated,  and  never 
expressed, in reference to probability. The ideal of truth for philosophy, then, cannot be 
thought to lie within the schema of certainty-probability-uncertainty. Referring to this 
schema  as  the  'illusion  of  apodictic  propositions',  which  elides  the  ambiguous 
movement  of  philosophy  by  securing  it  as  knowable  according  to  these  easily 
understandable (everyday) concepts, Heidegger forwards the following description of 
how it stands with philosophy's if we are to no longer be deluded:
Philosophy is the opposite of all comfort and assurance. It is turbulence, the 
turbulence into which man is spun, so as in this way alone to comprehend 
Dasein without delusion. Precisely because the truth of this comprehension is 
something  ultimate  and  extreme,  it  constantly  remains  in  the  perilous 
neighbourhood  of  supreme  uncertainty.  No  knower  stands  so  close  to  the 
verge of error at every moment as the one who philosophizes. Whoever has 
not yet grasped this has never yet had any intimation of what philosophizing 
means.60
Without this  readiness and recognition of the 'intrinsic perilousness of philosophy', 
Heidegger claims that no 'confrontation that is a philosophizing' can occur. The 
original German reads as follows.
Solange  diese  elementare  Bereitschaft  für  die  innere  Gefährlichkeit  der  Philosophie  
fehlt, so lange wird nie eine philosophierende Auseinandersetzung geschehen.61
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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Heidegger is, here, consistent with his later reading of Auseinandersetzung, and indeed 
the notion of philosophy that he will espouse in the later sections of  FCM,  where he 
will  claim that  philosophy is  only ever  preparatory.  In this  sense what philosophy 
prepares for is the very possibility of a philosophical Auseinandersetzung: philosophy is 
a matter of readiness. But readiness for what? It is clear that in FCM philosophy is a 
readiness for a face to face confrontation with metaphysics. In Chapter 1, I claimed that 
Auseinandersetzung, as a terminus technicus, names the movement of thinking itself. This 
movement  was  shown  to  take  in  the  whole  of  metaphysics,  as  it  involves  a 
confrontation with the very “beginnings” of all thinking. This confrontation was not a 
matter  of  repudiation,  but  of  overcoming  from  within.  As  confrontational, 
philosophical Auseinandersetzung is a mode of relation that does not stand fully within 
those beginnings, but is also not freed from them. It remains intrinsically bound to it,  
but also operates in the name of another beginning. In this sense,  Auseinandersetzung  
was  taken  to  name  the  very  movement  of  the  self-becoming  of  thought.  This  is 
precisely the case with FCM. 
On  my  reading,  FCM  is  entirely  engaged  in  a  critical  process  of  overcoming  the 
everyday, historically pervasive “prejudices” that bind philosophy to the mathematical 
ideal of certainty. Heidegger himself continually indicates that this movement is aimed 
at generating a genuinely philosophical Auseinandersetzung. As my reading progresses 
through the FCM I aim to show that throughout, Heidegger unfolds a presentation of 
philosophy as an essentially historically rooted activity, which at the same time realises 
an essential  freedom.62 Expounding upon this  notion in order to show the intimate 
62 In  this  regard  my  interpretation  of  these  opening  sections  requires  a  certain  familiarity  with  the 
remainder of  the lecture course.  The full  weight and importance of these sections is  perhaps only 
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connections between this text and the  Nietzsche Lectures will bring to light the deep-
rooted  centrality  of  Auseinandersetzung with  regard  to  Heidegger's  notion  of 
philosophy, showing that being cut to fit Nietzsche does not undermine its scope: it 
remains  the philosophically  responsible  response  to  the  contemporary situation for 
philosophising.
Philosophy  can  now  be  understood  as  a  readiness  for  an  Auseinandersetzung:  a 
confrontation whereby the Dasein of man is thrown back into its originary state of  
terror and agitation in the face of its finitude. This is to say that the task of FCM as a 
whole is initially set out as aiming towards a confrontation with man's finitude that 
must, according to an essential necessity, avoid all the 'comfort and assurance' afforded 
by the mathematical ideal of truth as certainty.  Any effort at  sanitising the daunting 
task  of  philosophy  will  miss  out  on  something that  is  essential  to  philosophising. 
Heidegger puts it as follows:
Thus man in the ground of his essence is someone in the grip of an attack, 
attacked  by  the  fact  'that  he  is  what  he  is',  and  already  caught  up  in  all  
comprehending questioning. Yet being comprehensively included in this way 
is  not  some  blissful  awe,  but  the  struggle  against  the  insurmountable 
ambiguity of all questioning and being.63
How this task is to be achieved, and indeed that it even can be achieved is yet to be 
determined within FCM. What remains equally as ambiguous is the relationship of this 
particular  notion  of  Auseinandersetzung to  the  historical  Auseinandersetzung that  has 
Nietzsche  at  its  core.  It  is  to  these  questions  that  I  now  turn,  via  a  continued 
graspable once their development throughout the whole of the text has been witnessed. As such my 
claims here will be continually developed, justified and elucidated throughout the remainder of this 
chapter and the following two chapters devoted to a reading of FCM.
63 FCM, §7.
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engagement with the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. 
2. The History of Metaphysics
2..1. The whole of the FCM
Heidegger initially suggests that attempting to determine the essence of metaphysics 
via  an  historical  approach  would constitute  a  detour.64 Without  having confronted 
philosophy itself, such an endeavour would forever be dealing with 'opinions  about  
metaphysics  and  never  with  metaphysics  itself'.65 Contending  that  the  initial 
understanding of philosophy generated by the 'Preliminary Appraisal' can provide the 
basis from which the word can be  first given its meaning, Heidegger returns to the 
possibility of an historical approach.
Musing on the manner in which ambiguity regarding the essence of philosophy has 
played out in the history of philosophy itself, Heidegger claims that, with Descartes 
and the post-Cartesian epoch, the pursuit of philosophy as absolute science has been 
undertaken with increased tenacity and explicitness. Whilst this movement has sought 
the removal of ambiguity from the essence of philosophy, the entire project 'begins 
with doubt, and it seems as though everything is put into question'.66 For Heidegger, 
Descartes presupposes that everything can be absolutely grounded, yet therefore only 
doubts  knowledge itself.  That  in which everything is  grounded (man as subject)  is  
64 FCM, §1. c), i.e., first inquiring into the original meaning of the word “metaphysics”, then moving from 
a definition of the term to a definition of what is defined as metaphysics, and consequently pushing  
through 'to the matter itself that is named therein'.
65 Ibid.
66 FCM, §6. b), γ)
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never genuinely put into question.67 Contrasting this modern metaphysical impulse 
with the story Heidegger has told thus far opens up the following question:
Yet  with  what  right  do  we  then  still  claim  the  title  'metaphysics'  for 
comprehensive questioning thus characterized?68
The opening sections of the 'Preliminary Appraisal' focus on revealing contemporary 
presuppositions regarding metaphysics as it is here and now, thus showing the need 
for a more circumspect and authentic approach to philosophy. Heidegger has, thus far 
in  FCM,  attempted to  free  metaphysics  from its  presupposed  association  with  the 
sciences.  In the following sections,  he attempts a similar task:  to free the originary 
Greek terms from the flattening effect of their romanization.69 Here, Heidegger will 
articulate  the  problem of  both  measuring  philosophy and accessing  philosophy in 
historical terms. In what follows he provides an account of the origins of philosophy as 
“metaphysics”, at once opening up a path for philosophy as the continued practice of 
metaphysics, but also putting in peril all thinking that operates from within a title that, 
as he will show, has ostensibly trivial origins. 
From the perspective of Auseinandersetzung, the history of metaphysics is not conceived 
as having been in error, so that metaphysics will never be used by Heidegger as a 
67  “A fundamental  Cartesian  stance  in  philosophy  cannot  in  principle  put  the  Dasein  of  man  into 
question at all; for it would thereby destroy itself at the outset in its most proper intention. It, and with 
it all philosophising of the modern era since Descartes, puts nothing at all at stake.” [Ibid]
68 FCM, Chapter 3 introduction.
69 By this I mean that the process of the romanization of Greek terms opens up a certain distance, which 
is  often negotiated using concepts that have atrophied in their original  ground. When it  comes to 
exegesis,  aiming  to  generate  certainty  regarding  whether  or  not  he  is  'right'  or  'wrong'  in  his 
interpretation is of little importance. In order to begin to understand Heidegger's thoughts on life in 
FCM,  my  exegesis  will  remain  precisely  that:  I  will  not  endeavour  to  evaluate  the  veracity  of  
Heidegger's claims regarding the word of the Greeks, but rather generate an understanding of what 
Heidegger takes them to say.
70
straightforwardly  derogatory  term.70 In  FCM Heidegger  does  not  attempt  to  “do 
metaphysics”: he is not engaged in an out and out attempt to redeem the word. Rather, 
he is attempting to access the essence of metaphysics from within its own historical 
determinations.  In  this  regard  he  is  neither  optimistic  nor  pessimistic  about  the 
prospects of the term, rather, he is aiming to illuminate the situation as it stands with 
metaphysics  in  such  a  way  that  we  can  hold  its  promise  as  a  continued  title  for 
philosophy out for decision. This point holds throughout FCM. 
On my reading,  the  key  thought  for  the  whole  of  FCM, is  that  where it  names  a 
meditation  upon  the  originary  unity  of  fundamental  orientations  towards  φύσις,  
“metaphysics” is  still  capable  of  being  a  title  for  genuine  philosophising.  An 
understanding  of  the  structure  of  philosophy  that  Heidegger  establishes  in  these 
sections of the 'Preliminary Appraisal' is indispensable when attempting to generate a 
proper understanding of the later tasks. His analyses of boredom and world (where he 
discusses life and animality) simply repeat the structures elaborated here, albeit from 
different perspectives. Where the majority of scholarship focuses on these individual 
parts, identifying the global theme of FCM allows for the unification of these ostensibly 
independent components of the lecture course into a whole. Reading the text as a whole  
will generate a more appropriate understanding of the position of  FCM  within the 
70 This  ostensibly  presents  a  different  case  from  the  Nietzsche  Lectures,  where  Heidegger  has  been 
understood to use metaphysics as a term of repudiation for all thought that thinks being on the basis of 
beings. However, as I will argue in chapter 5 , this is not straightforwardly the case. In NIII Heidegger 
will come to a decision about the possibility of continuing the Nietzschean project of philosophy, which 
he conceives of as being within the history of metaphysics in as much as he takes Nietzsche to be  
attempting  restore  certain  meanings  of  φύσις.  Therefore,  Heidegger's  final  decision  regarding 
metaphysics as a fruitful  title  for philosophising is  to be found,  as I  will  argue, in the concluding 
sections of NIII. There, at what I will claim is the high-point of his meditation on life, Heidegger will  
claim that Nietzsche closes down all possibilities of thinking φύσις under the title of metaphysics. He 
considers this to be the case precisely because Nietzsche ultimately interprets φύσις as life (NIII, p156-
7).  In order to even begin to understand both the connections between FCM and this  notion, and 
further, the fundamental profundity of this statement for Heidegger, it is necessary to first understand 
how Heidegger understand things to stand with the origins of metaphysics as an interpretation of 
Φύσις.
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Heideggerian corpus,  challenging those readings that  consider it  to be aberrant,  or 
internally  piecemeal.  In  turn,  this  will  form  the  ground  of  a  more  appropriate 
projection of the core themes of  FCM out into Heidegger's subsequent work.71 This 
chapter will focus on the identification and elucidation of this remaining productive 
possibility of metaphysics.
2..2 The Breadth of Nature as φυσικά - φύσις
Heidegger  starts  his  analysis  of  “metaphysics”  by  stating  that  as  a  title  it  is  a 
foreshortening of the phrase τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά,  and is not an  Urwort.  The various 
components of this original phrase-form become the subject of enquiry, starting with 
φυσικά. Within the word φυσικά lies φύσις, which is normally translated as “nature”. 
“Nature” comes from  natura-nasci  which means to be  born,  to  arise,  to  grow.  This 
meaning  is  closer  to  φύσις,  which  Heidegger  takes  to  be  'that  which  is  growing, 
growth, that which itself has grown in such growth'.72 In order to capture the broader 
sense of this term (i.e., to move away from the narrow, modern sense of growth as 'an 
isolated process' associated with plants and animals), Heidegger translates φύσις anew 
as “self-forming prevailing of beings as a whole”.73 
Joining his pursuit of metaphysics' essential ambiguity with this historical orientation, 
Heidegger intends to show that, for the Greeks, φύσις is fundamentally 'ambivalent in 
71 I will argue that a major promontory of  FCM is a renewed interest in life, but not as a result of the 
possibilities  presented by the sciences  for  thinking life  anew, but rather  as  an investigation of  the 
possibility of following Nietzsche who is the supreme representative of life, and the key figure for  
contemporary philosophising.
72 FCM, §8. a)
73 Ibid. 
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itself'.74 This  fundamental  ambivalence  takes  the  form  of  φύσις maintaining  two 
distinct meanings  which  are,  nonetheless  equiprimordial,  and  non-hierarchically 
related. As that which prevails, φύσις refers to both 'that which itself prevails' and also 
the 'prevailing of what prevails'. Φύσις emerges as a “regional concept” when it is first 
wrested from unconcealment, when 'that which itself prevails' first becomes manifest. 
As  this  is  'a  consequence  of  the  incisive  confrontation  (Auseinandersetzung)  with 
whatever prevails', that which is manifest is positioned in opposition to a counterpart 
meaning,  namely  τέχνῃ ὄντα,75 as  a  region  of  what  is.  In  this  sense  φύσις means 
“nature” as we would understand it in opposition to what is artificial or man-made. 
Accordingly, that which is man-made is still entwined with what is natural, and what 
is  natural  is  not taken to have been created;  is  not understood as having a similar 
structure  to  man-made  things.76 In  this  sense  Heidegger  wishes  to  show that  it  is 
broader than a modern notion of nature. 
The second distinct meaning of Φύσις present in Heidegger's translation is 'prevailing 
as such'. In this sense φύσις means “nature” not as a region of beings but as essence, 
what we would understand as being “the nature of something”, e.g., human nature. 
The key point here is that that which prevails (nature taken as everything that is, or 
beings-as-whole) and prevailing as such (nature taken as essence, or being-as-such) are 
distinct senses of Φύσις which are contained within it in such a way that neither is fully 
expressive of it, such that the concept (or originary Greek experience) “Φύσις” remains 
in excess of either of them. 
74 FCM, §8. d), α)
75 Ibid.
76 To this end Heidegger quotes Heraclitus'  Fragment 30 “neither a god nor human created it  ...  this 
φύσις always was, always is and always will be”.
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As a broader concept than “nature” thought of as the object of the natural sciences,  
φύσις, as the prevailing of beings as a whole, fully incorporates and permeates man:
The events which man experiences in himself: procreation, birth, childhood, 
maturing, ageing, death, are not events in the narrow, present-day sense of a 
specifically  biological  process  of  nature.  Rather,  they  belong  to  the  general 
prevailing  of  beings,  which  comprehends  within  itself  human  fate  and  its 
history.77
In belonging to the general prevailing of things, the life of man is entwined with φύσις. 
This means that when φύσις is taken at its broadest, it encompasses all of man's own 
possibilities  (both in  terms of  his  relations with things  and his  own self-relations). 
Heidegger goes on to say that man, 'insofar as he exists as man, has always already 
spoken out about  φύσις, about the prevailing whole to which he belongs'.78 This, for 
Heidegger, constitutes man's proper place within φύσις. What man speaks out, is the 
'prevailing of the prevailing whole' - which means the manner in which beings are, or 
what Heidegger refers to as 'their ordering and constitution'.79 Speaking (the verb) in 
Greek is  λέγειν, and what is spoken out (what has 'become manifest in speaking') is 
the λόγος.80 These three aspects of φύσις (beings as a whole, being as such, and their 
ordering) represent the ur-form of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics, world, 
solitude and finitude. How and why this is the case will emerge as my analysis of FCM 
progresses.
Heidegger therefore points out that, when understood in an originary way, the λόγος 
77 Ibid.
78 FCM, §8. b)
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid. 
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belongs to and occurs within φύσις.81 This point is effectively pre-empting the idea that 
man occupies a region of being that stands outside of, or opposed to nature in some 
way, whereby the essence of man, what is properly human, is something derived from 
extra-natural resources. Equally, Heidegger is resistant to the idea that nature is merely 
a  region,  a  privative  dimension  of  an  overlying  realm. This  point  goes  some way 
toward contextualising precisely what Heidegger is claiming when, later in  FCM, he 
ostensibly defines the essence of life in a privative fashion. This move (as discussed in 
Chapter 1) is taken to be a re-inscription of the transcendent structures of ontotheology, 
wherein  Heidegger  fails  to  come  to  terms  with  man's  ultimate  finitude  and 
worldliness. For Heidegger, the key to thinking man's relationship to life, nature, the 
world etc. is to understand the manner in which this entire discourse sits within the  
history  of  various  flattenings  of  the  originary  Greek  experience  of  φύσις.  This  is 
precisely the task that he pursues in the latter sections of FCM.82 
81 Heidegger turns to Heraclitus in order to justify these claims about φύσις. Heidegger does not limit the 
power of this testimony to what we might understand as “Heraclitus' view”, but rather, to what can be 
tentatively called “the Greek world”. In fragment 93 (“The master whose oracle is at delphi, neither 
speaks out, nor does he conceal [κρύπτει] but gives a sign [signifies]”) the oppositional concept to  
λέγειν can be found, namely the verb κρύπτειν (from which we get cryptic and crypt etc.), which is, 
according to Heidegger 'keeping concealed and in concealment' [FCM, §8. b)]. Accordingly, λέγειν, as 
speaking-out or 'bringing to word', can be first taken to mean 'taking out of concealment', resulting in 
the λόγος being further clarified as the site where 'the prevailing of beings becomes revealed, becomes 
manifest' [FCM, §8. b)]. Heidegger presents Heraclitus' fragment 112 in order to show that the Greek 
concept  of  truth  emerges  from  within  this  relation  of  speaking  out  and  concealing.  Heidegger's 
translation is as follows: “The highest that man has in his power is to meditate [upon the whole], and 
wisdom [lucidity] is to say and to do what is unconcealed as unconcealed, in accordance with the  
prevailing of things, listening out for them.” [FCM, §8. c)]. From this fragment Heidegger draws the 
fundamental  relationship between philosophy, as pursuit of  wisdom, and truth. Truth, here,  is not  
presented as 'the business of proving propositions',  but as ἁλήθεια. Philosophy (wisdom – σοφίν), 
which represents  the highest possibility for  man,  speaks out  about  φύσις  within the  λόγος.  In so 
doing, φύσις is brought out of concealment and into ἁλήθεια, which is to say spoken as truth (as 
unconcealment). On this basis Heidegger claims that ἁλήθεια can be understood to be stolen from, or 
wrested from φύσις,  wherein it  lays  primordially  covered over.  To this  end he quotes  Heraclitus' 
fragment 54, “Higher and more powerful than the harmony lying open to the day is the harmony 
which does not show itself.”[FCM, §8. c)]. Ἀλήθεια, however, is not wrested from φύσις in a way that 
takes what is revealed (i.e., the truth/ἁλήθεια) away from or outside of φύσις by means of recourse to  
some other realm or region of being.
82 One of the key connections I will subsequently draw out is the direct contextualisation of Heidegger's  
comparative analysis of world (wherein he discusses animality and life) within his historical account of 
world as presented in OTG. Here he specifically attempts to define the finite in a way that does not  
reduce it to a privative realm of the infinite: for Heidegger man is not other to nature (understood as 
φύσις), or in excess of it as a result of a capacity of transcend the finitude of the world. This takes the 
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2.3. Aristotle's Founding Interpretation of φύσις
Heidegger considers Aristotle's thinking regarding the separation and unity of these 
two  meanings  of  φύσις to  be  the  pinnacle  of  Greek  philosophising.  From  within 
questions of  the whole there emerge further avenues of questioning regarding that 
which  has  been  taken  from  concealment.  As  Heidegger  puts  it,  '[b]eings  impose 
themselves  as  a  whole  in  their  manifold  character  and  fullness  and  attract 
investigation'.83 These investigations result in particular areas and domains of beings 
being divided up and delved into with an increased focus. Each of these individual 
investigations into particular and specific domains of being come to be understood as 
sciences, but in their inception they are developments of philosophies and philosophy 
itself (rather than being the converse as is the modern prejudice). They only become 
understood, and even named as, sciences with Aristotle. As sciences, or more properly 
ἐπιστήμη,84 these investigations are,  as with the concept of  φύσις,  broader than the 
modern  sense.  The  science  of  physics,  the  ἐπιστήμη φυσική,  'has  as  its  object 
everything that in this sense [φύσις as a whole] belongs to  φύσις'.85 As such, those 
investigations  that  become  developed  from  within  ἐπιστήμη φυσική,  e.g.,  those 
pertaining  to  the  question  of  what  life  is  (biology)  etc.,  are  initially  developed 
according to the “supreme question” that asks 'of what this whole of φύσις is in itself 
as this whole'.86 This question – the central question of Aristotle's Physics – is forwarded 
as being the question of the prime mover. Prime mover, here, means the character of 
form of an analysis of Kant's understanding of how matter, form and their totality operates. These are 
further modes of the structure of φύσις that Heidegger is expounding in FCM.
83 FCM, §9
84  Ibid. 
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
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movement in terms of what movement is, what that which moves is as a whole (rather 
than that which created movement from nothing, it concerns 'the ultimate determinant' 
of  φύσει ὄντα).  Heidegger  states  that  Aristotle  names  this  determinant  θεῖον. 
Accordingly, what has been taken to be Aristotle's natural philosophy, a physics, is in 
some manner a theology.87 Physics then, can be understood as an investigation into 
φύσις understood in its first sense, as that which prevails, as nature taken as beings-as-
whole. This is the origin of “ontotheology”.
The second sense of  φύσις,  as  essence,  or being as such, is  not  lost  with Aristotle.  
Aristotle  names the  essence  of  a  being (being as  such –  'that  which makes  beings 
beings') οὐσία.88 According to Heidegger, οὐσία is not thought against φύσις, or outside 
of it, but indeed as φύσις within Aristotle's philosophy. In fact, he argues that the two 
senses are 'explicitly amalgamated by Aristotle [...] there are not two disciplines', which 
means  that  they  are  retained  as  distinct  meanings  that  are  somehow  unitary.89 
Heidegger explains:
Philosophizing proper asks after φ σιςύ  in this dual sense: after beings and after 
being. 90
Philosophy thus conceived is termed πρώτη φιλοσοφία, which Heidegger translates as 
“First  Philosophy”  (philosophy  proper).91 According  to  Heidegger,  the  intrinsic 
87 That there is a fundamental recognition of the origins of onto-theology ( i.e., the origins of thinking 
ontology  as  theology) at  the heart of  Heidegger's  appraisal  of  φύσις in its  Aristotelian conception, 
slightly  problematises  Krell's  criticism of  Heidegger  unthinkingly  repeating  the  decisions  of  onto-
theology.  As Heidegger's understanding of, and relationship to, Aristotle's account of  φύσις unfolds 
(both in  FCM but also in the  Nietzsche Lctures as I shall show in Chapter 5) we can take it that his 
understanding of onto-theology is also unfolded.
88 FCM, §9
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid. Heidegger points out the following: “Philosophising proper is for Aristotle this dual questioning:  
concerning the ὂν καθόλου and concerning the τιμιώτατον γἑνο.” In recognising the originary task of 
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connection and relation between the two different senses of φύσις is not developed any 
further by Aristotle. Heidegger takes there to be no 'Aristotelian system', but rather, a 
series of 'ever new approaches and attempts at philosophizing proper'.92 In this regard 
the project of πρώτη φιλοσοφία went unrealised in the Aristotelian corpus. Returning 
to the the origin of the word “metaphysics”, Heidegger claims that when scholars first 
became concerned with the actual texts of Aristotle (the 1st century BC, after some 200 
years of the decline of Greek thought) the disciplines of logic, physics and ethics had 
become  firmly  established.93 Therefore,  when  ordering  the  remaining  materials  of 
Aristotle's work, the texts where Aristotle deals with what he calls πρώτη φιλοσοφία 
could  not  be  included within  the  three  disciplines.  As  Heidegger  puts  it,  'what  is 
essential in philosophy cannot be accommodated'.94 Due to a certain similarity to the 
foundational work of physics as a discipline, the meditations on first philosophy were 
categorised as being alongside and behind physics. The Greek for behind, or following 
after is, of course, μετὰ. 
What we call 'metaphysics' is an expression which arose from being at a loss as  
to what to do, the title for an embarrassment, a purely technical title which 
says nothing at all as regards content. τ  μετ  τ  φυσικὰ ὰ ὰ ά are πρ τηώ  φιλοσοφ αί .95
metaphysics (inasmuch as there is any such thing) as the hanging together of ontology as ontotheology, 
and ontology as a categorial  project,  Heidegger problematises (in advance) attempts by Heidegger 
scholars to determine his endeavours as ultimately being of the order of one of these types of ontology  
alone.  This  is  equally  important  for  the  issue  of  Heidegger's  relationship  to  metaphysics,  as  it 
potentially disrupts readings that see FCM as a continuation of attempts to conduct metaphysics in the 
name of  the  latter  (determining the ὂν καθόλου),  or,  alternatively  those that  characterise  his  later 
attitude  toward  the  overcoming  of  metaphysics  as  being  associated  with  some  type  of 
straightforwardly ontotheological response to the presumed failure of earlier attempts at continuing 
the categorial projects of Brentano and Husserl, i.e., a turning away from prior, differentiable concerns.
92 FCM, §10.
93 The matters with which Aristotle's philosophy was concerned, namely, φύσις; man (whose stance in its 
distinction  to  nature  is  termed ἦθοζ); and  their  speaking  out  in  the  λόγος,  became scholastically 
conceived. This means that the scientific character of each distinct investigation was pursued to the  
detriment of their philosophical character (where both notions are still  conceived in an Aristotelian 
sense,  not as modern divisions).  Living questioning thus became fixed as scientific investigations - 
ἐπιστήμη λογική, ἐπιστήμη φυσική and ἐπιστήμη ἠθική, which later developed into three distinct 
disciplines – logic, physics and ethics. 
94 FCM, §11. a)
95 Ibid.
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2.4. Metaphysics and the Suprasensuous
This phrase-form of metaphysics, as a technical title referring to the doctrinal position 
of  work  pertaining  to  πρώτη  φιλοσοφία,  becomes  contracted  with  time.96 The 
contraction does not occur in Greek, but in its Latin translation –  metaphysica. In this 
translated form, the technical meaning of μετὰ, as it refers to a categorisation of textual 
materials, becomes transformed into a title for the content of those textual materials. 
This is founded on the multivalent character of μετὰ, which in other forms (Heidegger 
uses the example of  μεταβολή – changeover) connotes a 'turning away'.97 Heidegger 
draws  the  distinction  between “meta” as  meaning “post”,  in  the  first  instance,  and 
“trans”  in  the  second. This  contraction  and  shift  in  meaning  results  in  πρώτη 
φιλοσοφία becoming understood as “metaphysics”, where metaphysics is a 'turning 
away' from one domain of being (namely those understood as being natural [φύσει  
ὄντα]) and toward another. As such, being is first divided up into distinctly separate 
realms and a domain beyond (trans) the natural is posited. 
Metaphysics becomes the title for knowledge of that which lies out beyond the 
sensuous, for the science and knowledge of the suprasensuous [..] This changeover 
is by no means something trivial. Something essential is decided by it – the fate  
of philosophy proper in the West.98
The initial titling was based on a misunderstanding, and this second meaning of title 
“metaphysics” incorporates the central character of this mistake; philosophy proper is 
positioned  as  a  discipline  alongside  others.  Without  an  understanding  of  history 
generated 'from out  of  a  living  problematic  of  metaphysics',  the  same problem of 
96 On  Heidegger's  understanding,  the  exact  moment  and  the  circumstances  surrounding  this  
compression are unknown.
97 FCM, §11. b)
98 Ibid.
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treating philosophy as one discipline amongst others would remain. A productive and 
properly philosophical philosophising is bound up with the generation of a certain 
historical attitude which itself must first be somehow oriented toward history. In terms 
of the investigation at hand, this marks the limit of historical orientation, but also the 
limit  of  a  non-philosophical  historicising.  If  metaphysics  is  to  remain  a  title  for 
philosophising,  then it  must first  be shown that  an understanding of  the originary 
meaning of πρώτη φιλοσοφία can be developed. This is problematic for the following 
reasons:
We can show the first [that an originary understanding of πρ τη φιλοσοφ αώ ί  can 
be developed], however, only if we ourselves have already developed a more 
radical problematic of philosophy proper. Only then do we have the torch with 
which  to  illuminate  the  concealed  and  unexcavated  foundations  of  πρ τηώ  
φιλοσοφ α  and  thus  ancient  philosophy,  so  that  we  may  decide  what  isί  
fundamentally  happening  there.  Yet,  we  are  supposed  to  first  enter  such 
philosophizing proper via these lectures.99
Heidegger's way around this hermeneutic conundrum is to show that the traditional 
concept  of  metaphysics,  rather  than  being  an  interpretation  of  πρώτη  φιλοσοφία 
according to its content in any way, remains locked throughout history (at least up to 
Kant) in an engagement with the arbitrary word-formation of the title “metaphysics”.
100In  this  way  Heidegger  can  show  the  deficiencies  of  the  traditional  concept  of 
metaphysics without having to offer his own fully fleshed out “philosophical” reading 
of Aristotle. 
In  summation,  Heidegger  offers  up  three  points  regarding  the  deficiency  of  the 
99 FCM, §12
100  Heidegger does this in a brief and minimal fashion,as a result of the demands of the task rather than a  
lack of space. Hence my own lack of detail regarding this sketch of history.
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traditional  concept  of  metaphysics.  The  first  point  is  that  metaphysics  becomes 
trivialised. In pursuing First Philosophy as a theology, medieval metaphysics posits the 
divine as both occupying a different domain of being to that of nature/the sensuous, 
and as being a being, albeit one of a different order, namely supra-sensuous. Pursued as 
a doctrine, metaphysics is thus developed as the science that pursues knowledge of the 
suprasensuous. In this way the intent and profundity of both Aristotle's conception of 
the divine and First Philosophy is trivialised in a way that characterises the whole of 
the  history  of  the  West's  relationship  to  the  Greeks  up  until  Nietzsche.  This 
trivialisation  is  constituted by  First  Philosophy  (and accordingly  the  divine)  being 
brought alongside all other sciences, the divine being reduced to the status of a being, 
and the suprasensuous becoming both a separate domain and a matter of knowledge.
The second point concerns the confusing of the two directions of questioning laid out in 
Arisotle's First Philosophy. Citing Aquinas, Heidegger claims that the second mode of 
questioning – regarding essence, the being of beings - was also taken up by medieval 
metaphysics. This line of thinking took μετὰ up in terms of its supposed reference to 
content, but this time in terms of the development of the unsensuous. When considering 
the being of beings the natural step is to consider beings in general – 'to pass  over  
beyond each individual  being',  'to the most general determinations of beings'.101 The 
beyond associated with beings in general (general concepts like unity, difference etc.), 
is clearly of a different order of the beyond of the divine. These two different senses of  
the  beyond,  the  unsensuous  (as  most  general  being)  and  the  suprasensuous  (as 
supreme being), are not properly separated off and recognised in distinction to one 
another.102 As a result, what constituted the original problem of “metaphysics”, namely 
101 FCM, §12. b)
102 See footnote 28 above.
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the unity/relation of these two ways of questioning, is  confused.  The third point is a 
direct  continuation  of  the  second:  due  to  the  trivialisation  and  confusion  of  Greek 
philosophy  in  its  uptake  by  medievals,  what  was  originally  a  problem  within 
“metaphysics”  is  rendered  unproblematic.  This  results  in  the  failure  of  modern 
philosophy up to Kant to 'make metaphysics itself a problem'.103 
2.5. Contemporary Possibilities for Metaphysics
The 'Preliminary Appraisal' closes by questioning where “we” stand with metaphysics, 
asking  what  it  might  mean  to  continue  to  conduct  philosophy  in  the  name  of 
metaphysics  given  the  arbitrariness  of  its  origins.104 There  is  a  sense  in  which 
Heidegger wishes to retain the notion of μετὰ as it pertains to πρώτη φιλοσοφία, in 
spite of the complete rejection of its traditional meaning. If μετὰ indicates the peculiar 
turning that is demanded by philosophy proper, the type of turning that results in the 
world of philosophy appearing as though inverted, then there is a sense in which it 
grasps  and  names  something  of  philosophy's  essence.  However,  taken  as  a  title 
representing  Aristotle's  First  Philosophy,  a  title  for  that  philosophising  itself,  it 
represents  a levelling down of  the problem that  was raised in that  philosophising. 
Regardless,  “First  Philosophy”  does  not  necessarily  provide  a  more  apt  name  for 
philosophy. This is the case for two reasons, the first being that Heidegger does not 
consider his initial encounter with Aristotle to be born from a “living questioning”, 
103 FCM, §12. c)
104 Heidegger, by way of conclusion to the 'Preliminary Appraisal', conducts brief analyses of a number of 
moments in the history of traditional metaphysics in order to provide “historical evidence” for his  
claims. This takes the form of an interpretation of certain concepts in Aquinas and Frank Suarez. His 
analysis of Aquinas shows how the “limit-concepts” from both modes of questioning taken from first 
philosophy – the most general being and the supreme being – are fused in a 'the vague concept of the  
universal'. The Suarez analysis is designed to show how this structure of thinking was secured and 
passed on to “modern metaphysics”. As I am focused on laying out precisely what it is that Heidegger 
is intending with the lecture course as a whole, I will not engage with these analyses.
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such  that  it  would  allow  for  a  genuine  encounter  with  Greek  thought.  Secondly, 
because '[s]o far as we know, Aristotle did not become aware of the disharmony and 
the problem that lies in this dual orientation of philosophising',105 which is to say, the 
matter  of  the  ὂν  καθόλου  and  τιμιώτατον  γἑνο are  pursued  in  distinction  to  one 
another,  with  only  a  latent  implication  of  their  unity.  There  is  no  explicit 
problematisation of their (dis)unity, but also no confusing of their difference.
A further reason why Heidegger retains the title of metaphysics for philosophising, or 
at  least refrains from fully rejecting it,  is  because of  the situation as it  stands with 
modern metaphysics.  In spite  of  the direct  continuation of  the misinterpretation of 
Aristotle's  First  Philosophy  and  the  subsequent  arbitrariness  of  the  pursuit  of 
metaphysics, Heidegger considers modern metaphysics to have a character of its own. 
Its own peculiar and fundamental trait is as follows:
Modern  metaphysics  is  determined  by  the  fact  that  the  entirety  of  the 
traditional  problematic  comes  under  the  aspect  of  a  new  science,  which is 
represented by mathematical natural science. 106
His claim is that the investigation into the most general meaning of beings and thus the 
ultimate  being  undergoes  a  turn,  wherein  it  is  demanded that  the  grounds of  the 
investigation itself are 'commensurate with what is asked about'.107 Which is to say, the 
type of knowledge being pursued is knowledge of the highest order, namely absolute  
certainty. Heidegger posits the result of this thus:
[...]  in  modern  metaphysics  a  quite  specific  comprehensive  questioning 
105 FCM, §13
106 FCM, §14.
107 Ibid.
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manifests itself, an inclusive comprehending of the questioner in the negative 
sense,  in such a way that the I  itself becomes the foundation for all further 
questioning.108
On this note Heidegger ends the historical orientation and turns directly to the issue 
currently  being  treated,  why  still  maintain  metaphysics  as  a  title?  In  directly 
addressing this question, his main answer is clear.
We are  taking  over  the  expression  'metaphysics'  as  the  title  of  a  problem, 
better, as a title for the fundamental problem of metaphysics itself, which lies in the 
question of what it,  metaphysics, itself is. This question:  What is metaphysics  
what is philosophizing?, remains inseparable from philosophy and is its constant 
companion. The more properly philosophy happens, the more incisively this 
question is posed.109
The result of Heidegger's  initial historical investigation of “metaphysics” is  thus an 
elucidation  of  the  originary  problematic  that  “metaphysics”  denotes.  Heidegger 
indicates that this originary problematic refers to the dual character of philosophy as a 
meditation on the unitary structure of two two different aspects of φύσις; two different 
ways in which being is unconcealed. This dual character of philosophy itself, perhaps 
the fundamental ambiguity of metaphysics can be characterised as follows:
• “Beings as a whole”: that which prevails; living things, natural things, physical 
things, namely φύσει ὄντα.
• “Being of beings” - the prevailing of that which prevails, essence, the nature of 
things, namely οὐσία.
108 Ibid. In his historical orientation so far, Heidegger has only alluded to the matter of metaphysics in 
modernity by way of Frank Suarez's re-engagement with Aristotle at the end of the scholastic period 
and his subsequent influence on Descartes (the founder of modernity in Heidegger's eyes). 
109 FCM, §15.
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According to Heidegger's  account of the  fundamental  concepts of metaphysics the first 
aspect  of  being,  beings  as  a  whole,  is  associated  with  the  fundamental  concept 
“world”, and the second, being of beings is associated with the fundamental concept 
“individuation”. 
There  is  an  extreme-point  associated  with  (metaphysical)  investigations  into  each 
separate  aspect.  Investigations  into  beings  as  a  whole  have  achieved  a  point  of 
metaphysical confusion wherein a supreme being, an ultimate source of all movement 
and change,110 is posited as the goal of enquiry into φύσις. When φύσις is interpreted 
solely in terms of this aspect, we come to determine all things in accordance with the 
source of their movement, as theology in a quasi-Aristotelian sense. In this regards as I 
will attempt to show throughout the thesis, this type of investigation into “φύσις” as 
“nature”, or as “life” produces various notions of what constitutes the living, i.e., what 
constitutes  “beings  as  a  whole”  qua  φύσει  ὄντα,  e.g.,  vitalism,  organicism  or 
mechanism. In his comparative analysis of world, Heidegger will attempt to show how 
these accounts of life rest in various interpretations of “world”, given their emphasis 
on merely one of the dual aspects of φύσις. It is toward a deeper, more metaphysically 
informed reading of this that this thesis is working.
The oppositional  counterpart  to  these  types  of  investigation  are  those  that  seek to 
uncover the highest category of being, in order to pursue οὐσία to its farthest point. In 
this  sense,  these  accounts  enquire  into  “individuation”  in  terms  of  metaphysical 
abstractions formed on the bases of the logical structures of subjectivity. 
110 As aforementioned φύσις means something like growth, or change in its standard translation.
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It is Heidegger's clear contention that both of these endeavours posit an ultimate end 
point to the “terrifying” nature of the human condition: they cover over the originary 
ambiguity of their origins and offer respite in the form of a fixed position; a certainty of 
either the highest possible being or the highest possible category of being. The ground 
of the terror of the human condition is, in Heidegger's terms, “finitude” thought as a  
fundamental  concept  of  metaphysics,  i.e.,  Dasein's  oscillation  between  world  and 
individuation/solitude;  or  the  peculiarity  of  the  unitary  structure  of  world  and 
individuation; or classically thought, the unitary structure of beings as a whole and 
being  as  such.  These  claims,  raise  a  number  of  issues  regarding  the  ontological 
character  of  Dasein,  (e.g.,  does  this  mapping  of  metaphysical  concepts  onto  the 
ontological  character  of  Dasein  indicate  an  irreducible  anthropocentrism  on 
Heidegger's part, or this practice merely partaking in the necessary completion of the 
historical trajectory of metaphysical interpretations of the Greek experience of φύσις?) 
issues  that  need to  be  further  established and contextualised  in  order  to  not  only 
understand the  philosophical  intent  of  Part  Two of  FCM and  FCM as  a  whole,  but 
equally to assess Heidegger's response to the confusions of metaphysical responses to 
the Greek experience of φύσις as that which holds together two distinct and opposed 
senses.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  at  this  stage,  wherever  metaphysics  is  at  stake,  the 
underlying matter  is  the future (and history)  of  meditations on this  dual  aspect  of 
φύσις, namely the ambiguity and duplicity of being.
To recall chapter 1, this provide an in initial insight into why Nietzsche's account of 
Apollo,  Dionysus,  and  their  relationship  may  be  so  informative  for  contemporary 
philosophy.  Given that  this  is  clearly  Heidegger's  aim for  the  whole  of  FCM,  it  is 
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towards a greater clarification of this point, and a deepening of this newly interpreted 
philosophical vocabulary of world, finitude and individuation that this thesis will now 
move. 
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Chapter 3. 'Part One': Nietzsche, History and 
Fundamental Attunements.
Introduction
Heidegger  concedes  that  the  result  of  his  'Preliminary  Appraisal'  is  not  clarity 
regarding what metaphysics itself is. He recognises the ambiguous way in which this 
preliminary appraisal has come to a close, re-iterating the problem that he started out 
with, claiming that 'we have shirked in the face of philosophy', have not yet begun to 
speak 'from out of it' and still remain at the level of speaking about philosophy. Where 
then,  does  this  leave  the  lecture  course?  Heidegger's  attempt  to  orient  the  lecture 
course has resulted in a distinct disorientation regarding how to proceed. We have the 
central questions: What is world? What is finitude? What is individuation? Yet, as it 
stands, they have not been raised such that they press on us in the requisite manner, as  
Heidegger states, 'they appear arbitrary'. To counteract this, he considers it necessary 
to 'set about awakening a fundamental attunement of our philosophizing', such that 
these questions first 'arise in their necessity and possibility'.1 Thus the task for 'Part 
One' is forwarded as the direct continuation of the 'Preliminary Appraisal'.
The  'Preliminary  Appraisal'  shows  that  philosophy  must  become  ready  for  a 
philosophical  Auseinandersetzung.  Philosophy,  as  metaphysics,  is  stuck  within  a 
historical problem, wherein it has become lost and confused in relation to its origin 
and essence. In this regard, Heidegger pursues philosophy as it is “here an now;” how 
it  stands for  philosophising within the  contemporary situation.  Within this  context 
1 FCM, §15.
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Nietzsche and his thought are explicitly raised. Heidegger posits Nietzsche as the arch 
thinker of the contemporary epoch. In, what I argue is, an attempt to first open up a 
space  within which Nietzsche,  as  the  epochal  thinker of  the  contemporary,  can be 
properly  encountered  and  confronted,  Heidegger  forwards  his  famous  analysis  of 
boredom (awakening a “fundamental attunement” from out of which we can begin to 
philosophise). In this regard, Heidegger clearly indicates that Nietzsche is the place 
where a genuine Auseinandersetzung with the contemporary situation must occur. The 
profundity of this statement cannot be overlooked. It is only via a reading which has a 
heightened sensibility for the importance of the 'Preliminary Appraisal',  and thus a 
keen eye for the importance of both history and Auseinandersetzung within FCM, that 
the profundity of the comments on Nietzsche provided in the opening sections of 'Part 
One' can be understood. Equally, only on the basis of a prospective Auseinandersetzung 
with  Nietzsche  can  the  remaining  tasks  of  the  FCM be  understood to  be  directed 
toward a unified goal, and consequently be understood in their genuine philosophical 
intent. 
This chapter will focus on three tasks. First, mapping the trajectory of the 'Preliminary 
Appraisal'  into  the  sections  devoted  to  Heidegger's  boredom  analysis  in  order  to 
follow  the  central  thread  of  enquiry  followed therein,  establishing  Nietzsche  as  a 
central figure. Secondly, to take up this historical  context for the boredom analysis in 
order to emphasise the historical nature of said analysis. Thirdly, to identify the manner 
in which a comparative analysis of world is called for by the boredom analysis. These 
“three bridges” will carry this thesis out toward the supposed “Biology Lectures” in a 
manner that  will  dissipate their perceived extancy. Re-incorporating 'Part  Two' will 
thus allow for the philosophical trajectory of  FCM  to be more distinctly understood, 
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and  accordingly,  more  appropriately  projected  beyond  itself  in  the  direction  of 
Heidegger's Nietzsche reading. 
1. Who are we? The possibility of self-determination for  
Contemporary Man
1.1. Sleep and Awakening
The  first  step  that  Heidegger  takes  in  approaching  an  analysis  of  a  fundamental 
attunement itself is a justification of the use of the language of “awakening”.2 These 
sections  on  waking  have  been  entirely  overlooked  regarding  their  importance  for 
situating  Heidegger's  infamous  “three  theses”,  wherein  he  seemingly  speculates 
regarding the essential being of animals, stones and men. Heidegger shows that it is 
only on the basis of there being a specific historical interpretation of φύσις  in play 
throughout the history of metaphysics that any categorisation of different forms of life 
can be advanced. Here, in 'Part One', Heidegger first gets to grips with the issue of  
anthropocentrism and life that will persist throughout 'Part Two' of FCM, as he seeks 
to  undermine the  anthropological/psychological  conception of  man that  posits  him 
(and his  moods)  as  objectively ascertainable  alongside other living entities. With his 
account  of  attunement  Heidegger  seeks  to  reclaim  forgotten  resources  within  the 
history  of  metaphysics  for  both  an  understanding  of  the  essence  of  man,  and 
accordingly, an understanding of how man stands in relation to other living things.3
2 FCM, §7 - For Heidegger, the language of waking and sleeping has a philosophical precedence and 
profundity  –  both  Heraclitus  and  Plato  specifically  use  the  concepts  of  waking  and  sleeping  to 
distinguish  the  philosophical  person  from  the  non-philosophical  person.  This  is  something  of  an 
underlying theme throughout the text,  as to be capable of  sleeping indicates a certain relationship 
between two structures: the individual and the world. I will elaborate on this point in this first section 
of chapter 3 and at staged throughout chapters 4 and 5.
3 This question of life reaches its zenith in NIII, as Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche simply ignores  
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Heidegger forwards “awakening” as opposed to “ascertaining” as the suitable goal for 
an inquiry into fundamental attunements, because the character of attunement itself 
demands  a  peculiar  approach.  Seeking  a  fundamental  attunement  in  “our” 
philosophising, Heidegger is  points out that he does not take there to be only one 
possible way of being fundamentally (comprehensively and philosophically) attuned. 
If there are multiple possible attunements then it would appear as though an element 
of  choice were  in play.  However,  if  this  were  the  case then attunements  would be 
understood as a matter of whimsy, rather than a way in which we are taken over or 
find ourselves. As such, an investigation into fundamental attunements cannot bring 
about  the  attunement  in  the  first  instance  and cannot  subsequently  grasp  it  in  an 
“objective” way; attunements are not objects to be observed: 
'[I]t  pertains  to  ascertaining  an  attunement  not  merely  that  one  has  the 
attunement, but that one is attuned in accord with it'.4 
This thought leads Heidegger to suggest the following:
Thus we shall not speak at all of 'ascertaining' a fundamental attunement in 
our philosophising, but of awakening it. Awakening means making something 
wakeful, letting whatever is sleeping become wakeful.5
Heidegger  expands  upon  his  characterisation  of  an  attunement  as  “sleeping”  by 
stating that, as such, it confutes the law of non-contradiction - sleeping indicates that it 
the essential difference between living entities and man. Precisely why Heidegger takes this to be the 
case can only be understood from within the context of 'Part Two' of FCM. On my reading, in these 
opening sections, Heidegger lays the foundations for both 'Part Two' and subsequently his ultimate 
decision regarding Nietzsche and “life”.
4 FCM, §16.a)
5 Ibid.
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is  in one way there and another way not there,  which, according to the 'venerable 
principle of metaphysics', means it is 'intrinsically impossible'.6 In order to press home 
the distinct lack of binding power that the law of non-contradiction has over matters 
associated with man, Heidegger points out that man does not experience himself in 
this objective, at-hand [vorhanden] manner. 
A stone either has a property or does not have it. We, on the contrary, can have 
something and at the same time not have it, that is, not know of it. We speak, 
after all, of the unconscious.7
Heidegger is  here offering us an explanation of his point  from within existent and 
operative notions, he is not positing the difference between a stone and a man on the 
basis of his own philosophical systems and ontological structures. His comparison at 
this point is not between Dasein and a stone, but simply between an ordinary notion of 
consciousness and non-consciousness. This recourse to basic and salient divisions (to 
the concepts of everyday awareness) at once opens up the deeply embedded everyday 
distinction between the being of man and the being of a stone and draws the matter of 
sleeping and awakening into tighter focus. Heidegger suggests a parallel between the 
notions  of  consciousness/unconsciousness  and  waking/sleeping  in  terms  of  their 
peculiar being-there and not-there, but is quick to dismiss the matter of sleeping as 
operating at the level of consciousness:
[...] sleep is not simply the absence of consciousness. On the contrary, we know 
that a peculiar and in many cases extremely animated consciousness pertains 
precisely to sleep,  namely that  of  dreams [...]  Waking and sleeping are not 
equivalent to consciousness and unconsciousness. 8
6 Ibid.
7 FCM, §16.b)
8 Ibid.
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Heidegger's  analysis  of  sleeping  and  waking  has,  as  he  will  say  of  Aristotle's 
meditations on the matter, a “metaphysical intent”. This has two implications, the first 
is that his investigation does not seek to become conscious of, and in this matter merely  
aware of an attunement: it will not be a matter of pointing out how they operate. The 
second is that the manner of man's difference to other entities is not a matter of having 
consciousness  or  self-consciousness.9 As  he  will  point  out  explicitly,  he  is  not 
establishing an investigation wherein man is studied according to his distinction from 
other animals, yet nonetheless grasped as a living being alongside them, which is to say 
as being “alive” in the same way. This would fall foul of Heidegger's classic objection 
to the straightforward acceptance of the definition of man as a rational animal:
The conception of man as a living being, a living being that in addition has 
reason, has led to a complete failure to recognise the essence of attunement.10
The question concerning sleep (and thus  its  counterpart,  awakening)  has  a  similar 
structure to the question concerning metaphysics, namely, that in order to understand 
the fundamental character of these phenomena, they 'cannot be addressed extrinsically 
as  one  particular  question'.11 This  is  because  the  prevalent  concepts  of  traditional 
metaphysics do not have the capacity to grasp the phenomena of sleep and waking in 
an  essential  way  (the  matter  as  it  stands  with  the  law  of  non-contradiction  is  an 
example  of  this).  Repeating  the  method  of  the  'Preliminary  Appraisal',  Heidegger 
9 The  difference  between  consciousness/unconsciousness  and  waking/sleeping  lies  in  the  form  of 
exclusion that operates within each schema. That which is unconscious is merely that of which we have 
not become aware, we have not brought to our consciousness: this is psychological because it posits the 
relationship between what is absent and what is present purely in terms of our perceptions. Waking 
and  sleeping  are  intended  to  operate  at  a  different,  more  fundamental  level,  such  that  what  lies 
dormant is there in a way that that which we are unconscious of is not.
10 FCM, §16.b)
11 Ibid.
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maintains that the method required to grasp awakening in its essence must also start 
with  everyday  awareness.  Here,  Heidegger  provides  a  clear  rationale  for  the 
subsequent generation of the “three theses” that have caused so much controversy, and 
served to destabilise subsequent attempts at incorporating FCM into the Heideggerian 
corpus.
Rather, such clarification can occur only on the presupposition that we possess 
a  fundamental  conception of  how a being must  be  structurally  determined 
such that it can be asleep or awake. We do not say that the stone is asleep or 
awake. Yet what about the plant? Here we already are uncertain. It is highly 
questionable  whether  the  plant  sleeps,  precisely  because  it  is  questionable 
whether it is awake. We know that the animal sleeps. Yet the question remains 
as to whether its sleep is the same as that of man, and indeed the question as to 
what  sleep  in  general  is.  This  problem  is  intimately  bound  up  with  the 
question concerning the structure of being pertaining to these various kinds of 
beings: stone, plant, animal, man.12
This categorisation is not performed on the basis of a prior systematic investigation 
into the causes of differentiation in 'kinds of beings'; Heidegger is not performing a 
theoretical-biological or onto-biological taxonomy of living entities. He is taking up the 
pre-existent,  everyday divisions that persist for us,  here and now.  This is precisely the 
same procedure that he uses in the 'Preliminary Appraisal' to approach the question of 
metaphysics. His approach is premised upon, and only possible on the grounds that, 
we are already grasping beings in an essential manner (according to their being) when 
we experience them as waking and sleeping in various modes.13
12 Ibid. Interestingly enough this is the only place that Heidegger will discuss the plant as a peculiar form 
of what lives. In 'Part Two' he only returns to man, animal and stone. As I will show (esp. Chapter 4),  
Heidegger is not attempting to provide a positive, determinate account of the essence of life, therefore 
his later non-inclusion of plants in his comparative analysis of world does not indicate a paucity in his 
work. These comments here are enough to show that he is aware of the plants interesting position 
within the world of living things.
13 Rather  than  tackle  sleep  head-on,  Heidegger  intends  to  go  down  “another  path”  towards  an 
understanding  of  awakening,  citing  'fundamental  metaphysical  reasons'.  Heidegger  claims  that 
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This point is relevant for  NI,  where Heidegger reads Nietzsche as having completely 
undermined  an  anthropocentric  notion  of  the  essence  of  life  that  would  posit 
differences  between  beings  according  to  the  representational  schemas  of 
consciousness/non-consciousness,  animate/inanimate,  organic/inorganic.  In  NI 
Heidegger suggests  that Nietzsche provides a notion of  life that  includes stones as 
living entities (a thought which modern biological and zoological sciences could not 
incorporate). In prefacing his engagement with boredom with these comments on the 
underlying historical issue of sleep, I take Heidegger to be explicitly establishing the 
overall orientation for FCM. That these comments on anthropocentrism, anthropology, 
and life frame the coming phenomenological analysis of boredom has most certainly 
been overlooked. This has resulted in the continued reading of FCM as a fractured text. 
1.2. Letting Be
Discussing  the  specificities  of  investigating  a  fundamental  attunement,  Heidegger 
dismisses the possibility of accessing such an essential phenomenon as though it were 
presentable 'at  hand'.14 Using the example of  someone who is  overcome with grief, 
Aristotle's account of sleep [On Sleeping and Waking,  (περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως (peri hypnou kai 
egregorseos)] penetrates further than the consciousness/unconsciousness distinction, as here, sleep is 
considered to be a peculiar way in which both our perception and essence are bound, such that they 
'cannot take in other beings which [they themselves] are not' [Ibid]. This would imply that being awake 
involves  taking  in  (being  open  to)  other  beings.  Accordingly,  how  we  understand  sleep  directly 
pertains to the fundamental manner in which an entity maintains an openness to other beings in such a 
way that it at once relates to other beings and at the same time maintains its own essence, that is, holds 
fast to its essence in terms of being what it itself is. 
14 Re-iterating  the  paucity  of  the  distinction  between  'awakeness  as  conscious  life  in  contrast  to 
unconscious life (sleep)', Heidegger points out that the phenomenon of consciousness does not fully 
encompass the possibilities of man's being-there and being-not-there [FCM,  §16. c)].  He claims that 
there is a manner in which one can be not-there, but still be operating consciously: 'think of the extreme 
case of madness, where the highest degree of consciousness can prevail and yet we say: The person is 
de-ranged, displaced, away and yet there'. Heidegger extends this analysis to attunements: 'if indeed 
attunement belongs to the essence of man', they cannot be taken as though they are ascertainable (via 
consciousness)  at-hand [ibid.].  Taking  up the  thread of  the  paucity  of  psychological  analysis,  and 
aligning attunements with “feelings”,  Heidegger points out that an analysis of feelings has always 
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Heidegger points out that it is possible for someone to be entirely present in the same 
manner  as  always,  yet,  as  a  result  of  their  mood  –  their  grief  –  they  become 
“inaccessible”:
The manner and way [Art und Weise] in which we can be with him, and in 
which he is with us, has changed. It is the grief that constitutes this way (the 
way in which we are together). He draws us into the manner in which he is, 
although we do not necessarily feel any grief ourselves.15
In thus describing attunements and their effect,  Heidegger shows that attunements, 
further  than  not  being  at  hand  (simply  there  or  not  there),  are  not  confined  to 
someone's interior, nor are they distinctly external, i.e., merely for others. Moreover, 
'attunement imposes itself on everything'. Far from being of the order of experience, 
namely  something  external  or  internal  towards  which  we  turn  our  conscious 
awareness,  the  basic  character  of  attunements  is  that  they  are  ways of  being.  The 
particular way in which we are may fluctuate and be subject to change, but nonetheless 
we are always in some way or another attuned. 
As  being  attuned in  this  way  or  that  is  the  fundamental  way in  which  Dasein  is  
(negatively  conceived  as  not  merely  at  hand),  it  cannot  be  a  matter  of  directing 
consciousness  towards  particular  attunements,  observing  them  and  thus  gaining 
knowledge of their properties. Rather, the specific grasping of attunements named by 
been  relegated  and  deprecated  in  the  face  of  an  analysis  of  both  thought  and  will,  and  their 
interactions.  He suggests that this  is,  once  again,  due to  the  inconstant,  ambiguous and uncertain 
nature of moods and their characteristic fluctuations. When taken 'on the basis of a conception of man 
as a rational living being', feelings/attunements are not given any primacy as they are not the most  
determinative and fundamental character of man's essence, i.e., he is not determined as that which he 
himself is on the basis of his being attuned [ibid.]. This has two implications. First, a recognition of the 
essentiality of attunement will disrupt the traditional conception of man as a rational living being, and 
secondly, an investigation into attunements requires a distinct methodology, and cannot be studied 
from within the existent paradigm of man's essence. 
15 Ibid.
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“awakening” is understood by Heidegger to be operating in-situ. He puts it as follows:
[...] awakening attunements is a manner and means [...] of grasping Da-sein as 
Da-sein, or better: of letting Da-sein be as it is, or can be, as Da-sein.16
The task of awakening an attunement,  a fundamental attunement,  is  that of letting 
Dasein be as Dasein. It is not a matter of simply describing the properties of man and 
his  affects.  In  attempting  to  speak  from  out  of metaphysics,  rather  than  about 
metaphysics, Heidegger's task has transformed itself into an attempt to let Dasein be. 
This is not presented as speaking from out of an attunement, but more so as acting in 
accordance with one.
1.3. Becoming (Who We Are) – First presentation of Nietzsche
1.3.1. Nietzsche and the Contemporary Situation
As the direction of the course has now been concretely ascertained, the only remaining 
question, prior to going out towards an attunement itself, is 'which attunement?'. This 
is  clearly  not  a  straightforward  matter  of  choice,  as  though  the  awakening  of  an 
attunement  were  'like  picking  a  flower',  and  Heidegger's  initial  phrasing  of  the 
demands of “acting in accordance” points out the first difficulty:17
[..]which  attunement  are  we  to  awaken,  or  let  become  wakeful  in  us.  An 
attunement that pervades us fundamentally? Who, then, are we?18
16 Ibid.
17 FCM, §18.
18 FCM, §18. a)
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There is a clear ambiguity regarding the “we” to whom Heidegger refers, he suggests 
that “we” could refer to either the class gathered to hear the lectures, or to any other 
collective all the way up to the whole of the West and perhaps even beyond. The first 
issue to be dealt with, then, is the process of the  demarcation and delimitation of the 
situation within which “we” are, such that “we” can be understood situationally as 
“we ...  Moderns” or “we...  Westerners” etc. This twofold process of  delimitation and 
demarcation inevitably involves a pay-off between inclusivity and determinacy. 
The broader the perspective we have on this situation, the fainter our horizon 
becomes, and the more indeterminate the task.19
In order to interpret the contemporary situation (“our situation”), from within which a 
fundamental attunement can become wakeful, Heidegger takes up four contemporary 
(to the late 1920s) interpretations of the situation as it stood, namely Spengler, Klages, 
Scheler  and  Ziegler.20 In  summarising  each  of  these  four  thinker's  interpretations, 
19 Ibid.  Heidegger phrases this  play in terms that,  as I  show in Chapter  5,  will  later  become of  key 
importance to his reading of Nietzsche. The interaction and relationship of a perspective and a horizon 
is taken up by Heidegger as being one of the fundamental structures of Nietzsche's metaphysics in  
NIII.  It is, according to Heidegger, how Nietzsche himself understands life, and thus all beings, to  
delimit and demarcate themselves, such that they remain open to other entities that they themselves 
are not, and at the same time determine themselves as that which they are. This resonates with the 
Aristotelian language of  sleep as Heidegger sees  it.  In  NIII  Heidegger will  align perspectives and 
horizons  with  the  notions  of  chaos  and  fixation,  art  and  truth  and  ultimately  life  and  spirit.  His 
analysis  of  these matters in  relation to anthropocentrism,  and as I  have previously suggested,  the 
ultimate direction of  metaphysical  interpretations on  φύσις is  clearly presaged in these sections of 
FCM. 
20 There is a clear, yet only implicit, selection process. Whilst he admits that there is an arbitrariness to his 
selection, he does not see this as being a problem, claiming that 'in such cases the choice is never free 
from arbitrariness'. [FCM, §18. a)] Barring Spengler, each of the other thinkers published the texts that 
Heidegger refers to in the year that he composed the lecture course.[Heidegger refers to these thinkers 
in relation to their following works:
Klages, L. Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele (Leipzig: 1929); Scheler, M. Philosophical Perspectives Trans. 
Haac, O.H. (Beacon Press, Boston: 1958). Originally published in 1929;
Spengler, O.  The Decline of the West. Trans. Werner, H. (OUP, New York: 1991). Originally published 
between 1918 and 1922; Ziegler, L.  Der Europäische Geist (Darmstadt: 1929)] Also, each of the thinkers 
explicitly formulates their interpretations of the modern world in terms of a play between life and 
spirit – which is of major interest for Heidegger. Whether or not he is being 'selective' in the sense that  
he  is  only  looking at  thinkers  who fit  the  bill  so  to  speak,  and working  within  a  pre-established 
understanding of how the contemporary is understood, is not important. The matter of Heidegger's 
historical-intellectual integrity is not at stake in this section, as he is not directly concerned with these 
thinkers' influence on modern thought. This is at once taken for granted (that they are influential) and  
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Heidegger is keen to emphasise two matters. First, that they each provide an historical 
interpretation that thinks the contemporary in terms of its location within the play of 
particular  historical  processes,  and  secondly  that  they  all  think  the  contemporary 
situation  in  terms  of  'a  relation  between  life  and  spirit'.21 Heidegger  takes  the 
prevalence and centrality of this opposition between life and spirit to be indicative of 
something fundamental  and unitary  lying at  the  heart  of  what  he  considers  to  be 
“stereotypes”  of  modern  ways  of  thinking.  If  life  and  spirit  are  taken  as  being 
“fundamental  orientations”  of  man,  and  if  the  source  of  these  interpretations  is 
correctly located, then, according to Heidegger:
All  four  interpretations  are  only  possible  given  a  particular  reception  of 
Nietzsche's philosophy.22
Rather than attempting to denigrate the four thinkers and suggest that they might be 
passing off Nietzsche's thought as their own, Heidegger states that his claim 'is merely 
intended to indicate the place and source where the confrontation proper must occur'. 
The exact character of 'a confrontation proper' (eigentliche Auseinandersetzung) remains 
ambiguous, but it is clear that it pertains to an historical  Auseinandersetzung with the 
contemporary.  This  indicates  that  Nietzsche  is  the  proper  place  to  confront  the 
contemporary, not these four thinkers, and that a confrontation with the whole that 
philosophy itself is, is somehow caught up with Nietzsche's concepts of life and spirit 
at the same time trivialised as being something of merely factical significance. The reasons for this 
become clear as Heidegger presses on.
21 FCM,  §18.  a).  He considers  Spengler  to  think  the  contemporary in  terms  of  decline,  where  life  –  
represented by culture – has been forced into decline at the hands of spirit – represented by reason's 
promotion of technology and economics. Klages is taken to consider life and spirit to be adversaries, 
and thus sees spirit as a sickness. Here life is 'taken in the sense of the simmering of obscure drives'  
and 'grasped as the breeding ground of the mythical'. Alternatively, Scheler does not consider there to 
be a decline, and thinks life and spirit in terms of balance, rather than strife. Finally, Ziegler takes there 
to be a current struggle between life and spirit that requires a mediating period wherein the struggle  
will attain a balance.
22 Ibid.
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(Dionysus and Apollo) as “fundamental orientations”. 
In this sense the overarching task for FCM as a whole is left under-determined. It could 
be figured as a propaedeutic on the basis of which a more authentic interpretation of, 
and  relation  to  history  will  be  undertaken.  Equally,  in  an  effort  to  minimise  the 
borderline aporetic nature of historical orientation in all its hermeneutic circularity, it 
could be figured as an attempt to put historical issues on hold in favour of conducting 
positive work from within metaphysics. Regardless of this initial under-determination,
23 as a result of the importance of Auseinandersetzung and the clear historical intent of 
FCM  from  the  outset, these  sections  regarding  Nietzsche  must  be  understood  as 
having a proper place within the lecture course, rather than as merely constituting an 
aside.
1.3.2. Apollo and Dionysus as Fundamental Orientations
Heidegger  moves  onto  a  brief  clarification  of  Nietzsche's  position  with  regards  to 
Dionysus and Apollo. These comments show that Heidegger takes Nietzsche's own 
position on the dominant contemporary concepts of life and spirit to be a fundamentally  
metaphysical  one,  as  they  approach  life  and spirit  as  dual  orientations towards  the 
whole that are at their highest when thought in their unity. Understood in the context 
of the unrealised original project of metaphysics (the meditation on the dual aspects of 
φύσις, beings  as  a  whole  [what  is  that  World?]  and  being  as  such  [what  that 
Individuation?], in terms of their unity [what is that Finitude?]), as shown in chapter 1,  
the  deep  philosophical  importance  of  Heidegger  elaboration  of  the  structure  of 
23 Which I  will  show becomes fully determined as a need to understand Nietzsche's word regarding 
world
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Nietzsche's thought becomes clear.24 First, Heidegger shows that towards the end of his 
productive  life,  Nietzsche  posited  the  Dionysus/Apollo  opposition  as  being 
determinative for his thought. Heidegger quotes aphorism 1005 of WP:
I understood that my instinct was headed in the opposite direction to that of 
Schopenhauer:  toward  a  justification  of  life,  even  in  its  most  frightful,  most 
ambiguous, and most deceptive aspects:- for this I held the formula 'Dionysian' 
in my hands.25
This offers up the notion that the Dionysus/Apollo opposition is a matter that pertains 
to a justification of life and indeed an engagement with life that seeks to grasp it as it  
is, on its own terms, i.e., in all its ambiguity. He goes on to quote another aphorism 
from the same section:
Apollo's Illusion: the  eternity  of beautiful form; aristocratic legislation 'thus it  
shall be always!'
Dionysos:  sensuousness  and  cruelty.  Transitoriness  could  be  interpreted  as 
enjoyment of productive and destructive energy, as constant creation.26
Here, Heidegger is forwarding Nietzsche's most basic understanding of the character 
of each pole in terms of their opposition. On the one side order and eternity, and on the 
other chaos and transience. By way of a development of this thought, Heidegger then 
forwards  an  aphorism  wherein  Nietzsche  further  determines  each  pole,  but  also 
characterises their interrelation. In WP 1050 the Dionysian is conceived of as expressing 
24 Which takes the form of a series of long quotations taken from The Will to Power. Heidegger recognises 
the incomplete, or rather non-intended, form of this text, but nonetheless cites exclusively from the 
fourth book thereof. This is consistent with his later, more intense reading of Nietzsche, which focuses 
heavily on WP whilst recognising the problematic nature of the collection.
25 Ibid, 1005. As these translations quoted here differ from those found in the above referenced English  
translation of  WP, these translations are seemingly McNeill's own translations of the quotes as they 
appear in the original manuscript of  FCM. I will cite McNeill's translations for the sake of continuity 
with the English text of FCM. All quotes appear in FCM, §18. b)
26 Ibid, 1049.
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'an  urge  for  unity'  wherein  the  forms  of  individuation  ('the  person,  the  everyday, 
society, reality' and even death) are reached beyond in the direction of more lingering, 
pre- and un-individuated states.  Rather than a denigration of life,  this striving is a 
revelling in life's creative and destructive powers. In distinction to this, the Apollonian  
is understood as 'the urge for complete being-for-oneself',  wherein the individuated 
and unambiguous is sought after,  this is  further understood as 'freedom under the 
law'. These two oppositional urges are understood, together, to form the fundamental  
opposition of nature and art, wherein their unity and interrelation relation represents 
their highest possibilities. This unity is described as being 'The fullness of power and 
moderation'. This clearly shares the structure of metaphysical homesickness, where the 
desire to be at home everywhere, this urge for unity, necessitates an equiprimordial 
solitude as the source of not being at home. 
Following the presentation of these thoughts on the nature of the components of the 
opposition  and  the  character  of  the  opposition/antagonistic  unity  of 
Dionysian/Apollonian divide, Heidegger interrupts the aphorism to point out that its 
next part offers a word on the Greek origins of Nietzsche's interpretation, and, as such, 
represents 'his most profound analysis of the Greek world'.27 The most important part 
of this quote is as follows:
[...] the Dionysian Greek needed to become Apollonian: that is, to shatter his 
will  for the immense, for the multiple, the uncertain, the horrifying, upon a 
will for measure, for simplicity, for classification in rules and concepts [...] the 
courage of the Greek consists in the struggle with his Asiatic nature: beauty is 
not bestowed upon him, just as little as logic, or as the naturalness of moral, -it 
is captured, willed, fought for – it is his conquest.28
27 FCM, §18. b)
28 WP, 1050.
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Nietzsche presents the peculiar unity of these two aspects, once again not components 
but  fundamental orientations of man, as consisting of the maintenance of a strife-like 
interrelation of measure and classification on the one hand and the horrific, multiple 
and  uncertain  on  the  other.  The  Dionysian  urge  for  unity  is  an  embracing  of  the 
horrific  and the  multiple,  representing  life/nature.  The  Apolline  urge  for  complete 
being-for-self is an embracing of measure and law, representing spirit. The “conquest”, 
the product of this struggle and the highest point of its interrelation “the fullness of 
power  and  moderation”  is  not  forwarded  as  being  an  expurgation  of  one,  or  the 
domination of one over the other, but as a holding of the two orientations together in 
both their fullnesses.29 This is the precise structural relation that Heidegger seeks to 
explore throughout FCM. In order to come to an understanding of Nietzsche's word, to 
encounter philosophy itself, we first require situating. 
In his comments here, in FCM, Heidegger is not yet engaging with Nietzsche by way of 
an  Auseinandersetzung,  and  is  therefore  not  holding  Nietzsche's  thoughts  out  for 
decision.  Rather,  he  is  pointing  toward  the  historical  profundity  of  Nietzsche's 
meditation on life and spirit, and at the same time indicating that a full examination of 
it, indeed a proper Auseinandersetzung with them is not yet possible. For this to occur 
the  more  proximal  tasks  of  FCM must  first  be  undertaken,  namely  negotiating  an 
29 This is the precise thought (the way in which Apollo and Dionysus, truth and chaos, spirit and life are 
joined) that both NI and NIII attempt to grasp. In NI Heidegger pursues this from the perspective of 
art, and in NIII from the perspective of truth (or knowledge). In both cases Heidegger posits the stakes  
of his meditation as being a decision regarding Nietzsche's ability to overcome the dominance of the 
history of truth as certainty.1 Between these two lecture courses, as I will show in chapter 5, Heidegger 
will  present  the  strongest  possible  case  for  establishing  life  as  the  horizon  for  thinking  in  his 
commitment to the “new-interpretation of sensuousness” at the close of NI,  and also the strongest 
possible case for its rejection in his closing comments of NIII as mentioned above. I will argue that this 
is the very hub of his Auseinandersetzung – the point at which he is both closest to Nietzsche and at 
the same time most starkly confronting him.
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initial encounter with philosophy on the basis of which a more genuinely historical 
confrontation with metaphysics can be established.
Rather  than  simply  project  an  understanding  of  Nietzsche  to  come,  this  analysis 
gathers the  force  of  the  'Preliminary  Appraisal'.  Therein,  φύσις  in  its  most 
philosophically originary sense was forwarded as the structural unity of two aspects of 
its own unconcealedness: Beings as a whole (associated with the question of world as 
that which we find ourselves within and amongst); and the being of beings (οὐσία, the 
classification  of  essence,  seeking  the  highest  category,  and  is  associated  with 
individuation  in  the  fundamental  metaphysical  sense).  With  the  Apollo/Dionysus 
division, we are furnished with an indication of the possibility of the structural relation 
of two fundamentally opposed, fundamental orientations towards the whole: the two 
find their ultimate strength together, in their opposition. This relation is precisely that 
which is promised by Aristotle's unfulfilled metaphysical project: thinking the unity of 
two aspects of being that have heretofore been confused and ordered according to a 
structure of subjugation. In this regard, Heidegger is presenting Aristotle-Nietzsche as 
a  transect  in history within which we have to  take  up our own position.  It  is  my 
contention within this thesis that FCM establishes the need for this task from multiple 
angles (which are not separable), and that, ultimately NIII concludes this task. 
1.3.3. Nietzsche and History
Heidegger states that his aim in presenting these Nietzsche quotes was not to generate 
a superior understanding of Nietzsche within which the four interpretations of the 
contemporary situation could be assessed with regards to their veracity. Whether or not 
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these interpreters are right about Nietzsche or the contemporary is neither here nor 
there,  as 'in such cases most things always tend to be correct'.30 What Heidegger is 
more interested in is their diagnostic character. In presenting a diagnosis (in these cases 
a diagnosis of how it stands with modern culture) these interpretations, and any other 
diagnostic proclamations, seek to 'pass through and beyond world history in a single 
stroke'.31 This is  an idiosyncratic,  yet prevalent historical  methodology whereby the 
contemporary  is  situated  within  'world-historical  determinations'  that  posit  a 
movement  of  history  or  underlying  cultural-historical  force,  as  operative  and 
determinative for the present. These interpretations conduct a symptomatic assessment 
of  history,  wherein  a  “correct”  grasp  of  the  current  situation  is  achieved,  and the 
present is thus understood in terms of its factual coherence with a preceding series of  
factual  events.  As a symptomatology,  diagnosis  is  only concerned with the outward 
appearance,  of  prior  events,  i.e.,  concerned  with  “what  actually  happened”.  An 
implicit extension of and counterpart to this diagnosis is, of course,  prognosis, wherein 
the future situation is  projected as  being equally  as  determined by the past  as  the 
present is. Once again, Heidegger points out that correctness and accuracy are not the 
rigours that he associates with a proper grasp of/Auseinandersetzsung with, the present.
This philosophy of culture does not grasp us in our contemporary situation, 
but at best sees only what is contemporary, yet a contemporaneity which is 
entirely without us, which is nothing other than what belongs to the eternal 
yesterday.32
Later, in NIII, Heidegger will suggest that learning to read Nietzsche well consists in 
30 FCM, §18. c)
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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avoiding everything  “fatally  contemporary” in  his  thought.33 This postponement,  yet 
clear  framing,  of  the  importance  of  the  issue  of  history,  positions  the  matter  of 
generating an authentic historicality at once at the heart of FCM, and, at the same time, 
outside of the immediate concerns thereof.  What can be said with certainty at this 
point is that Heidegger is not looking to generate a diagnosis and subsequent prognosis 
of how it stands, has stood and will stand with regard to metaphysics. The relation to 
history, and thus to time, that Heidegger is seeking in  FCM is not  calculative in this 
manner. 
Heidegger states far from being an essential grasping of man, this type of historical 
analysis (what he would come to designate as Historie rather than Geschichte) does not 
grip  us,  involve  us,  and,  most  importantly,  does  not  'attack  us'.34 This  results  in  a 
peculiar  situation,  wherein  there  is  a  correct  and  accurate  determination  of  the 
contemporary that, nonetheless, fails to grasp man essentially, that is,  fails to grasp 
Dasein as Dasein,  but merely grasps man as a symbol, and in terms of the 'eternal 
yesterday'  (Hence  “symptomatology”:  'a  philosophy  of  culture  concerned  with 
expression, with symbol, with symbolic forms'). These diagnostic methodologies only 
manage  a  “setting-out”  of  man.35 In  order  to  articulate  his  own  approach  to  the 
contemporary, in answer to the question “who are we?”, Heidegger once again invokes 
33 This  peculiar  form  of  reading,  which  takes  the  form  of  historical  Auseinandersetzung,  is  clearly 
prefigured here, yet not fully carried through.
34 Ibid.  At  this  point  it  is  worth  re-iterating  that  Heidegger  is  not  engaging  with  Nietzsche  in  any 
meaningful fashion – he is not attempting to genuinely read Nietzsche, but rather showing that there 
are a series of tasks that must be conducted before the profundity of Nietzsche's word can be accessed.  
This itself comprises the problem of the contemporary situation, namely that it finds itself too deeply 
bound up in a trivial conception of history. Nietzsche cannot appear as a resource unless, as Heidegger 
emphasises  in  his  comments  in  NIII  regarding  the  danger  of  only  seeing  that  which  is  fatally 
contemporary  in  Nietzsche,  he  is  first  approached  from  out  of  a  readiness  for  the  genuinely  
philosophical.
35 The  term  Heidegger  uses  is  Dar-stellung,  which,  as  Darstellung,  means  to  depict,  to  describe,  to 
illustrate, to portray. 
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the notion of semblance and ambiguity, stating that there cannot be any certainty with 
which his investigation is differentiated from a setting-out. This problem, rather than 
an impasse, is taken as essential.
The more proper our beginning is, the more we shall leave this ambiguity in 
play, and the harder the task will be for each individual to decide for him- or 
herself whether he or she understands or not.36
Beginnings are ambiguous according to their very essence. Where this ambiguity and 
possibility for some form of self-relation in philosophising is removed, philosophy (or 
that which dissimulates as philosophy) 'unties us from ourselves in imparting us a role 
in  world  history  [...]  unties  us  from  ourselves,  and  yet  does  so  precisely  as 
anthropology'.37 In making “man” the centre of a meditation on world-history, wherein 
history is understood from within the calculative stance of diagnosis and prognosis, 
man is not grasped in essential terms, but only through the filter of and by dint of, his 
role in  that  world  history.  Heidegger  characterises  such  a  relation  to  both  world, 
history,  and  man  as  being  determinative  of,  and  located  within  'our  flight  and 
disorientation' and our 'lostness'.38 Heidegger takes this lostness itself, and the desire to 
counteract it by locating man's meaning and significance in non-manly determinations, 
as an indication of the direction of his own investigation. 
Must we first make ourselves interesting to ourselves again? Why must we do 
this? Perhaps because we ourselves have become bored with ourselves? [...] Do 
36 Ibid.
37 FCM, §18. c)
38 Ibid. Lostness becomes an important term later on in the 1930s, as Heidegger explores this particular 
character of our contemporary situation in a more historical (and less phenomenological) manner in his 
1936 lecture course The Basic Problems of Philosophy: Selected Problems of Logic . This text, unsurprisingly, 
features an analysis of Nietzsche's position as the/at the end of metaphysics. As such, lostness and 
disorientation – perhaps only implicitly at this stage – directly implicate our relation to the thought of 
Nietzsche. This aspect is a continued feature of Heidegger's Nietzsche reading.
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things ultimately stand in such a way with us that a profound boredom draws back  
and forth like a silent fog in the abysses of Dasein?39
Thus Heidegger draws in focus the fundamental attunement that he seeks to awaken, 
or prepares to let become awake in us, via a phenomenological investigation.  Prior to 
taking boredom up in this way, Heidegger offers a few last words on the matter of the 
orientation of this forthcoming task.
Yet  how  are  we  to  find  ourselves?  -  in  some  vain  self-reflection,  in  that 
repugnant sniffing out of everything psychological which today has exceeded 
all measure? Or are we to find ourselves in such a way that we are thereby 
given back to ourselves, that is, given back to ourselves, so that we are given over 
to ourselves, given over to the task of becoming who we are?40
Becoming who we are is bound up with letting Dasein be as Dasein (accessing this 
fundamental attunement). The task of becoming who we are is not one which stands 
before us as virgin territory. Moreover, it is configured as arising from being given back  
to ourselves, finding ourselves again. There is a peculiar element of return, a form of 
repetition, which lies at the heart of what is, in other terms, expressed as an  a priori 
matter, a matter of uncovering and relating to the essence of man. If we set all of this 
back into its most immediate context, and of course pay attention to the unmistakably 
and decidedly Nietzschean turn of phrase, this return to ourselves as 'becoming who 
we are' finds its most proper place in a philosophical  Auseinandersetzung  (ultimately 
with Nietzsche).
This  Auseinandersetzung must  first  come  about  as  a  result  of  an  awakening  of  a 
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
108
fundamental attunement. This fundamental attunement is no longer unknown, it is an 
attunement wherein our flight, disorientation, and lostness are brought into view. As 
such, the task ahead has the character of preparing the way for a reorientation with 
regards to ourselves that has its immediate source and location within an engagement 
with Nietzsche,  and beyond this,  an orientation with regards to the matter of  first  
philosophy,  the  Greeks.  Heidegger  will  take  this  lostness  as  characteristic  of  the 
contemporary situation to such a deep extent that he will suggest that indicates our 
having become bored with ourselves. It is this direction that he will take up boredom 
as the fundamental attunement of our times, a time that is epochally formed by the 
thought of Nietzsche.41
1.4. Toward the remainder of FCM
As  I  have  shown,  Heidegger  is  operating  from  within  familiar  determinate 
assumptions  about  metaphysics.  In  fact  it  is  only  on  the  basis  of  these  familiar 
determinate assumptions that an investigation into philosophy can begin. This does 
not  detract  from the  idea that  metaphysics  can operate  in  excess  of  its  trivial  and 
mistaken origins. Heidegger is trying to formulate a conception of metaphysics that is 
sustained  by  its  historically  determinate  character  and  yet  still  takes  up  this 
determinacy  in  a  manner  that  projects  itself  beyond  its  origins.  He  is  not 
straightforwardly continuing the work of metaphysics, but has not yet generated (or 
predicted the generation of) any resources for the complete rejection of this term. This 
displays  a  commitment  to  thinking  the  circularity,  or  reflexive  complexity,  of 
metaphysics  as  a  distinctly  human  endeavour:  one  which  is  always  underway.  To 
41 Boredom, I will argue in more detail in chapter 5, is an ur-form of the “nihilism” as it is formulated in  
Heidegger's Nietzsche reading. 
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return  to  the  earlier  Hegel  comparison  and  a  general  comparison  with  modern 
philosophy, Heidegger is not advocating an endpoint for philosophising, metaphysics 
will never achieve absolute certainty and will not effect its own dissolution. This does 
not mean that it becomes a trivial enterprise which must be rejected on these grounds.
42
In  this  way,  the  'Preliminary  Appraisal'  provides  the  most  fundamental  point  of 
orientation  for  the  forthcoming  tasks  (especially  'Part  Two'  and  the  comparative 
analyses of world). In 'Part Two' Heidegger does not present an ontology that starts 
from the most basic possible point of enquiry, i.e., it seeks neither a priori grounds nor a 
presuppositionless starting point: the three theses are not presented as representing 
basic ontological categories. As his comments regarding sleep in Aristotle are designed 
to imply, there are already determinations of thought and being that are in play, and, in 
so  being,  they  are  not  confused,  but  are  expressive  of  the  manner  in  which 
contemporary metaphysics has grasped the whole, and are thus fully determinative for 
how “we” relate to phenomena. These determinations cannot simply be eradicated or 
reified by means of a corrective to the history of philosophy.43 To do so, or wish to do 
so, would constitute a movement away from the essence of philosophy as heretofore 
espoused, a movement that would be operating in accordance with a mathematical 
42 This marks the point of greatest difference between FCM and the Nietzsche Lectures, as, as I will show in 
Chapter 5, Heidegger considers Nietzsche to ultimate bring a complete closure to the possibilities of 
conducting philosophy as metaphysics. Rather than being a “different opinion” I will argue that this is 
merely a decision made upon the basis of the decisive spaces opened in FCM.
43 What is  intended here  is  not  to  ultimately  find a determination of  being upon which the  task of 
dividing being up, or classifying being can be undertaken. Heidegger presents the narrow vision of 
this type of task in his account of the traditional concept of metaphysics, claiming that this is only one 
way  of  taking  up  the  whole,  namely  ousiology,  or  the  pursuit  of  the  highest  category.  As a  non-
categorial task, Heidegger's intention with his analysis of the phenomena of sleep and waking is not to 
provide a richer conceptual structure upon which he can more securely, certainly, and correctly divide 
beings up. Rather, he intends to come to a deeper understanding of the structures within which we 
already divide beings up according to type. Heidegger is not concerned with deriving pure categories of 
being.
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ideal of absolute certainty, rather than the properly metaphysical ideal that Heidegger 
is seeking. It is only from within these metaphysical determinations that an attempt at 
retrieving a properly philosophical attitude and philosophical grasp of philosophy and 
its historicality can begin and proceed.
The 'Preliminary Appraisal'  of the  FCM must be understood as propaedeutic to the 
later tasks wherein both the proper structures and rigours of thinking philosophically, 
and the path into philosophising itself are laid bare. The remaining tasks of the lecture 
course are framed as attempts to follow this path and delve further into the possibility 
of  philosophising  here  and  now  (Part  One),  and  subsequently  the  possibility  of 
philosophically engaging with one of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics, i.e.,  
world  (Part  Two).  These  endeavours  are  further  determined  as  attempts  to  first 
encounter  the  essence  of  metaphysics,  such  that  a  proper  confrontation 
(Auseinandersetzung) with the present situation can be entered into. On my reading, the 
site of this confrontation is Nietzsche, who is understood as the philosopher of “life”, 
not in terms of “life philosophy” (i.e. philosophy as meditation on lived experience) 
but  in  terms  of  conceiving  of  “life”  as  a  fundamental  orientation  of  being.44 The 
projected  result  of  these  tasks  is  the  generation  of  the  capability  to  conduct  a  
philosophical relation to the originary character of philosophy – to shine light upon the 
origin of metaphysics. As such, the 'Preliminary Appraisal' posits  FCM as a peculiar 
44 Heidegger,  whilst  not explicitly pointing this out at this  stage,  is clearly presenting Nietzsche as a  
thinker of life.  It  is important that this  not taken to mean that Nietzsche is a life-philosopher,  i.e.,  
concerned  with  promoting  philosophy  as  meditation  on  “lived-experience”.  Deeper  than  this,  
Heidegger is laying the foundations for erecting Nietzsche as the supreme representative of life: the  
thinker who, in  NIII, he will claim 'advances [φύσις] through the extreme point of the fundamental 
position of modern metaphysics' when he interprets φύσις, and thus being, as life.[NIII, p156.] In order 
to fully grasp both the magnitude of these statements, and indeed the reasoning behind the decisions 
contained  therein,  one  has  to  understand  the  specific  grounding  that  these  thoughts  have  in  the 
matters dealt with in FCM - both in 'Part Two' where the possibility of an ontology of life is dealt with,  
but  also  in  the  'Preliminary  Appraisal'  where,  as  I  have  shown,  the  originary  possibilities  of  
metaphysics as a title for an interpretation of φύσις are laid out. 
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form of historical engagement, one that paves the way for a philosophical-historical 
attitude.  This  attitude  becomes fully  realised  as  the  so-called historical  “turn”  that 
Heidegger effects in the mid-thirties. On my reading of  FCM, this is not so much as 
turn as a completion of the historical tasks laid out therein.
In thus representing the FCM, it can be understood as engaging in the same practice as 
Heidegger's broader Nietzsche reading, namely attempting to historically engage with 
the contemporary situation for philosophising in a manner that does not fall foul of 
what is merely “fatally contemporary”.45 FCM proves to be only preparatory for this 
encounter, whereas the Nietzsche Lectures genuinely hold metaphysics out for decision. 
In this regard  FCM  is directly preparatory for the confrontation with Nietzsche and, 
through him, metaphysics, conducted in NI and NIII.  That these later lecture courses 
and the FCM both contain central meditations on “life” is no accident. Precisely what 
the connection is, and precisely how  FCM  prepares for, what I take to be, the high-
point of Heidegger's meditation on “life” will be the subject of the remainder of this 
thesis.  This  chapter  has,  thus  far,  provided  the  basis  upon  which  FCM  can 
subsequently be read in this fashion. 
2. Boredom and History
Heidegger  explicitly  states  that  the  site  of  an  authentic  Auseinandersetzung is  the 
45 The  main  difference  between  the  two  endeavours  is  the  status  of  the  “genuinely  philosophical 
confrontation”. In  FCM Auseinandersetzung is  not determined through and through as an historical 
confrontation (in this regard it remains under-determined). In some instances, e.g. §6, Heidegger uses 
the term to name the most essential and innermost relationship that Dasein has with world/beings as a 
whole, thus using  Auseinandersetzung  as an ontological notion. Elsewhere, most notably in §18, it is 
used as a name for a distinctly historical-philosophical mode of relation to the contemporary. In this 
sense it takes on the entirety of its later meaning. Accompanying both these meanings is the sense that 
the entirety of the FCM is aimed towards a confrontation with metaphysics itself.
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philosophy of  Nietzsche,  as  Nietzsche's  thoughts  on life  and spirit  govern modern 
thought, but are at the same time never genuinely conceived therein. This was shown 
to  be  due  to  the  anthropological46 stance  of  modern  Kulturephilosophie (a  series  of 
world-views that semble as philosophy), which posits the fundamental orientations of 
life and spirit as world-historical forces, wherein Man is merely “set-out” as a symbolic 
entity. Counter to this, in an effort to grasp man in his essence,  Heidegger seeks to 
awaken a fundamental attunement for philosophising. Within this context, boredom 
comes forward as the fundamental attunement of the contemporary precisely because 
the modern  Dar-Stellung of man fails to even attempt to grasp the essence of man: it 
represents  a fundamental  boredom with man himself.  Boredom is therefore deeply 
connected to Nietzsche, perhaps even as the ur-form of Nihilism, because it underlies, 
or  is  perhaps  the  product  of,  the  fatally  contemporary  response  to  Nietzsche's 
fundamentally metaphysical thought.47 I intend to show that the analysis of boredom 
operates as a philosophical mode of access to an  Auseinandersetzung  with Nietzsche 
himself.48
46 By “anthropological” I mean, investigating the species “man”, drawing on resources (methodological 
as well empirical) of the sciences (as an amalgam of psychology, biology, history etc.). For Heidegger 
this will always fall within the “worldview” category, and will always operate at the level of a “setting 
out” of man.
47 Nietzsche's  thought  is  considered,  by  Heidegger,  to  be  metaphysical  through and  through –  this 
should not be taken to be disparaging, or even counter to Nietzsche's own self conception. In being 
fundamentally metaphysical, I am claiming that Nietzsche's thought is genuinely philosophical, as it 
functions as an interpretation of φύσις that meditates on the originary unity of its dual aspects. I will 
greatly expand on this notion in chapter 5.
48 As has been suggested throughout this thesis, the general treatment of FCM has been one of neglect. 
However, where work on FCM has been undertaken, the most popular topic is attunement and thus 
Heidegger's analysis of boredom (This is not to say that it has been forwarded as the characteristic and 
essential part of FCM - that position is almost universally reserved for the analyses contained in 'Part 
Two'). Much of the work on this topic has been sufficiently scholarly, but, in a similar manner to that of  
the  treatments  of  'Part  Two',  operates  from  within  an  alternative  philosophical  agenda  to  that 
presented in the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. Generally, in the secondary literature, Heidegger's analysis of 
boredom is approached in order to further flesh out the account of attunement, provided in  BT. As 
such, FCM is seen as an addition to previous philosophical contributions (from both Heidegger and the  
tradition in general) to the problem, or matter, of affectivity. This has resulted in Heidegger's thoughts 
on boredom being read according to a number of cross-disciplinary interests, and within the context of  
issues developed in his earlier writings. These angles of reading ignore both the specific context within 
which the account of boredom first arises, and the matter to which it directly gives way. There are a  
number of readings which stand out from this generally philosophically (or at least hermeneutically) 
uninteresting collection (see especially Michel Haar and Parvis Emad), the most illuminating of which 
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In suggesting that there is an historical dimension to attunement, my reading resonates 
with that of Beistegui, which, as I will show, captures the historical tensions present in 
Heidegger's boredom analysis, but does not emphasise the role that Nietzsche has to 
play.  In  this  regard,  the  boredom analysis  is  once  again  read as  something extant 
within FCM as a whole. Accordingly I will establish the intended role of the boredom 
analysis within FCM as it has been forwarded in my reading thus far. In so doing, the 
necessity of Heidegger's subsequent comparative analysis of world will emerge, thus 
establishing the genuine intent of his investigation into the essence of life.
2.1. Beistegui
Beistegui concentrates on 'one of the two original aspects' of the text, the first being the 
account of  boredom in terms of  its  potential  to unveil  'the truly existential  soil'  of  
possible  philosophising,  and the  second being  'the  question  of  metaphysics  as  the 
radicalisation of  fundamental  ontology.'49 Having set  the  limits  for  his  engagement 
with  FCM,  Beistegui  further  orientates  his  discussion  with  an  initial  comparison 
between the  analysis  of  boredom (and thus  mood in  general)  in  FCM and that  of 
anxiety in  BT and “What is  Metaphysics”.  He establishes the basics of Heidegger's 
account of mood by taking up his analysis of disposition (Befindlichkeit) in BT, staking 
out the following:
is Beistegui's chapter on boredom in Thinking with Heidegger. I will briefly turn to his work in order 
to  establish  what  distinguishes  this  particular  account  of  mood from other  similar  endeavours  in 
Heidegger's work. In so doing, I will show that Beistegui opens up grounds for genuinely engaging  
with FCM by recognising the historical intent of the sections on boredom.
49 Thinking with Heidegger, p62.
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First  of  all,  disposition  discloses  Dasein  in  its  facticity;  then  disposition 
discloses  being-in-the-world  as a  whole;  finally,  disposition discloses  world 
from a specific angle.50
Beistegui  explains  that  anxiety  stands  out  amongst  other  moods  because  'what  is 
disclosed is the sheer facticity of existence, the raw fact of human existence.' 51 What 
initially emerges from this account is the individualising power that Heidegger ascribes 
to  anxiety,  wherein  anxiety  refers  Dasein  'back  to  itself  as  a  solus  ipse',  but  only 
inasmuch as, in so doing, it also always refers Dasein 'back to the world within which 
it  is  thrown'.52 Whilst  this  anxious moment of  individualisation is  disclosive of  the 
throwness of Dasein, and thus disclosive of Dasein's temporal structure, it remains just 
a moment. As such, Beistegui offers the following thought:
[...  ]  Heidegger will  reproduce this  thesis  in his  analysis  of  Boredom – the 
phenomenon  of  disposition  provides  the  ground  from  out  of  which  the 
resolution and the instant can emerge, but in itself does not suffice for Dasein 
to become transparent to itself and assume its own being.53
In the terminology of FCM, the individualising power of a mood provides a moment 
wherein the matter of becoming what we are can be glimpsed, but not fully sustained. 
Having suggested this commonality amongst the accounts of anxiety and boredom, 
Beistegui  sets  about  identifying the  differences between accounts.  Anxiety in  BT is 
investigated  as  a  part  of  the  larger  investigation  into  the  ontological  structure  of 
Dasein. In 'What is Metaphysics', anxiety is once again taken up, but is approached in a 
50 Thinking with Heidegger, p64
51 Ibid.  Famously Heidegger suggests that in anxiety, one is anxious without regard to a specific being 
(which would more properly constitute fear). As such one comes face-to-face with being-in-the-world 
as  such.  As  aforementioned  earlier  in  this  thesis  I  will  have  to  assume that  the  reader  has  prior 
knowledge of Heidegger's analysis of mood in general. 
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid, p65
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manner similar to that of boredom in FCM, which is to say, 'it is developed not with a 
view to investigating further one of Dasein's existentials, but with a view to providing 
an access  to the question concerning the nature and essence of  metaphysics'.54 The 
difference between these two orientations yields a different relation to the matter of 
fundamental ontology in general. The first orientation approaches anxiety from within 
the clear tasks of fundamental ontology, whereas in the second, 'anxiety is inscribed 
within the problematic of fundamental ontology'.55 This “problematic of fundamental 
ontology” - revealed in anxiety - is understood to be Dasein's 'confronting beings as a 
whole in the very withdrawal of beings', or, 'Dasein's existence as transcendence, or as 
metaphysics'.56 
Moving to  FCM,  Beistegui  frames the account of  boredom within a problematic  of 
history. He does this by laying-out the meaning of boredom's distinct characterisation 
as  not  just  a  Stimmung,  but  as  a  Grund-stimmung.  As  a  fundamental,  or  indeed  a 
grounding attunement,  “ground” maintains three senses.  The first has been touched 
upon – 'the  Stimmung is fundamental in that it reveals the ground of Dasein who, as 
transcendence, is its own groundlessness, its own abyss'.57 The second sense 'coincides 
with  the  explicit  intention  of  the  first  part  of  Heidegger's  lecture  course  [the 
Preliminary Appraisal]', which concerns the rootedness of philosophizing itself within a 
Stimmung. Clearly, Beistegui is also concerned with the historical implications of this 
sense of the fundamentality of a fundamental attunement. 
In principle,  many more attunements [other than profound boredom] could 
54 Ibid, p66
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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claim to open onto metaphysics. Yet,  in fact [...]  it would seem that we are 
always historically disposed, that the dispositions of existence are themselves 
primarily rooted in the history of Dasein, and that the possibility of a turn to 
beings as a whole is always a matter for decision that has exceeded that of 
existence.58
Beistegui lays out the third sense of ground, which he considers the most important. 
The direct implication of the rootedness of philosophizing itself within a fundamental 
attunement is the seeming necessity and inevitability of 'recourse to a philosophy of 
history'.59 Anxiety was shown to radically individualise each and every Dasein on the 
basis of the disclosure of its 'concrete and singular' existence, which is to say that in BT, 
disposition  was  grounded  and  understood  from  out  of  the  ecstatic,  horizonal 
temporality  of  Dasein,  or what Beistegui terms “the time of  existence”.60 Reformed 
from within an alternative orientation toward fundamental ontology, one wherein it is 
first  and  foremost  experienced  as  a  problem,  being  attuned  potentially  refers  this 
radical individualisation back to a 'deeper time and more originary ground', namely, 
history.  In  further  deepening  the  ground  of  Dasein's  attunement,  the  matter  of 
individualisation becomes subject to a 'more general and shared context', which is, of 
course, the 'epoch'.61
In  identifying  the  distinct  character  of  attunement  in  FCM  as  bound  up  with  an 
implicit  philosophy of  history,  Beistegui  has  clearly  recognised the  specific  context 
58 Ibid, p67
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid, p68
61 Ibid.  Beistegui  summarises  this  point  and  brings  it  to  its  apex  as  follows:  “We  are  indeed  always  
concretely caught up and situated in the world. We always relate to it in a particular way. But this relation, this  
situatedness,  are  they  of  Dasein's  own  doing,  or  is  Dasein  always  thrown and disposed  on  the  basis  of  a  
foundation other than that of its own transcendence, and which determines its destiny? Is this not what we need  
to understand by “epoch”: this world configuration that happens to us, this presence of the world that is our  
share and that we inherit, this inheritance that delimits and limits the field of possibilities for us?”
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within  which  the  analysis  of  profound  boredom  arises.62 In  further  clarifying  the 
epochal character of profound boredom, Beistegui suggests that a potential failure of 
Heidegger's  account  lies  in  the  nature  of  his  approach  to  the  identification  of  the 
contemporary situation. 
In the end we shall have to wonder the extent to which the identification of 
profound boredom as the attunement that is proper to “our today” differs from 
this philosophy of culture which Heidegger is so eager to overcome, and the 
extent to which anthropology is simply avoidable, when, leaving the neutral 
descriptive shores of fundamental ontology, it becomes a question of venturing 
into the turbid waters of historical diagnosis.63
In  transitioning  from  an  orientation  wherein  the  task  of  philosophy  is  purely 
descriptive  (namely  BT),  to  one  wherein  the  path  of  philosophy  becomes  fully 
embroiled in the potentially crippling problematic of history, Heidegger opens himself 
up to failure. Failure would constitute a brute repetition of the structure of historical 
worldviews. The question at the heart of FCM must then be understood as this: in what 
manner,  on  what  grounds  and  in  which  direction  does  the  investigation  in  FCM 
achieve a distance  from  other  historical  analyses  or  analyses  of  the  problematic  of 
history? What is, and what is the strength of Heidegger's philosophy of history as it 
arises in, and is projected out from, FCM? 
For Beistegui 'the decisive question then becomes: Where does it [boredom] all come 
from?'.64 In response to this, he suggests that Heidegger postpones this question, and, 
perhaps in preparation for a response, analyses “boredom for itself”. My contention is  
62 Although he does not offer a detailed account of the nature of the Preliminary Appraisal, or its direct 
relation to this matter, due to the object of his inquiry.
63 Thinking with Heidegger, p69
64 Ibid, 70
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that Heidegger directly answers this question as he identifies the proper source of the 
contemporary situation as Nietzsche. The task of becoming who we are within this 
epoch has its proper place within an Auseinandersetzung therewith. This possibility is 
overlooked by Beistegui. In a footnote on the matter of his analysis of what constitutes 
the contemporary situation, he states the following:
One can only remain perplexed before Heidegger's choice of references which 
he captures, all too easily perhaps, under the name “philosophy of culture”: 
Why these? Why only four? Why only German? True, if Heidegger considers 
thus Kulturephilosophie, it is only to dismiss it instantly, precisely as that type of 
philosophy  which  is  unable  to  distinguish  between  Zeitgeist  and 
Grundstimmung. Yet it is precisely this “philosophy” that provides him with his 
clue, and ultimately with his diagnosis, concerning the Stimmung of the time.65
As I have indicated, Heidegger recognises the arbitrary character of his selection. He 
recognises the possibility that what he says can be taken as being merely correct (or 
incorrect), i.e., of the order of factuality, and thus diagnosis, wherein man is taken up 
in terms of his being caught up in the concrete unfolding of history. He fully recognises 
the inessential character of his engagement with Kulturephilosophie, and in its stead, he 
posits a more originary engagement and relationship to Nietzsche, one that requires a 
distance from the fatally contemporary. Rather than being a point where Heidegger 
allows  an  implicitly  historical  problematic  to  ambiguously  unfold  into  a  purely 
descriptive, phenomenological account of boredom, there is an explicit situating of this 
analysis within a formulation of a historical problematic that recognises contemporary 
lostness in relation to Greek origins – a lostness which has Nietzsche at  its  centre. 
Beistegui points to a key issue in FCM as a whole, recognising the tension between the 
65 Ibid, p 69, footnote 13 (found on p 191).
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“trans-historical”  and  “historically  rooted”.66 Beistegui  sees  this  in  terms  of  the 
problematic  transition  from  an  analysis  of  the  purely  individualising  nature  of 
attunement (the trans-historical), to its communally and epochally binding nature (the 
historically rooted), which is the movement from the analysis of attunement in BT to 
that of FCM.67 
As indicated in  my reading  of  the  'Preliminary  Appraisal',  Heidegger  is  explicitly 
attempting  to  lay  out  the  peculiar  historical  problem  of  reconciling  the  a  priori 
character of philosophising and its historical origins or situatedness. Beistegui himself 
concludes his dealings with boredom by suggesting that the more complete response 
to these issues raised in FCM will be formulated under the title “truth and history” as 
the centrality of an analysis of everyday existence comes to be replaced by an analysis 
of 'the great metaphysical and poetical texts'.68 
Heidegger, on my reading, has this movement fully in view in FCM. The confrontation 
of  the  a priori and the rooted is  one such iteration of  the oppositional  structure  of 
metaphysics itself, where metaphysics has been presented as the unfulfilled meditation 
of  the  unitary  structure  of  divergent  meanings  of  φύσις in  light  of  Aristotle's 
pronouncements. According to Heidegger, and §18 of FCM, with Nietzsche our epoch 
becomes characterised by Apollo and Dionysus. Rather than seek an a priori account of 
66 Thinking with Heidegger, 74
67 Beistegui claims – in my opinion correctly – that the analysis of boredom in FCM confirms that of BT 
inasmuch as it reveals time as the meaning of meaning of being. The difference in orientation lies with 
the  ultimate  deployment  of  the  analysis  in  FCM,  namely  the  framing  of  this  revelation  of  the 
fundamentality of temporality as being the ground of “us” “today” (p 74).
68 Ibid, p80. Beistegui, despite his claim that this tension is the central matter of the account of boredom,  
recognises that this tension remains unresolved throughout FCM. In fact, he goes as far as to suggest 
that this tension is 'the source of transformation of Heidegger's thought' [Thinking with Heidegger, p74]. 
The central issue of my own thesis can be understood as an examination of both the extent to which  
this is true, and in what manner this is true, i.e., in what way this is explicitly the case, and how the  
matters raised in FCM are explicitly taken up and resolved in the Nietzsche Lectures.
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history  that  escapes historical  rootedness,  or  vice-versa,  Heidegger  will  attempt  to 
group this dichotomy in a deeper way (as Beistegui points out in his analysis of time 
and boredom). In terms of fundamental attunements, this is born out when (as I shall 
show in what follows) boredom reveals itself to be structured in the same oppositional 
manner, revealing world and individuation to have a structural unity which cannot be 
grasped via investigation into one side of the opposition alone. 
Following this  thread, and further grasping the position of Nietzsche within  FCM, 
identifies it as part of Heidegger's broader Nietzsche reading. As such, the concerns of 
FCM will  be  shown  to  persist throughout  Heidegger's  readings  of  the  “great 
metaphysical texts”, rather than give way to them. This is the aim of this thesis: the 
continued establishment of  FCM as a part of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. 
Or,  an examination of  how the  FCM explicitly calls  for a deeper engagement with 
Nietzsche, such that this eventual Nietzsche reading offers a completion of the tasks 
begun in FCM. 
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3. Boredom
3.1. Profound Boredom
For Heidegger,  the aim of interpreting boredom is  to render its  essence clear,  thus 
generating transparency regarding its possible status as the fundamental attunement 
of our times: one which is characterised as standing within a lostness and removal  
from the questionableness of Dasein in its ground. This transparency is necessarily a 
questioning of Dasein, a being open to the very ground of Dasein itself, such that, in 
conducting  this  questioning  itself,  Dasein  can  “become  what  it  is”.  This  ultimate 
questioning  of  Dasein,  which  is  essentially philosophical  (i.e.,  not  essentially 
determined by the ideal of truth pertaining to that of the sciences), must be sustained 
by  a  fundamental  attunement.  In  order  to  await  the  awakening  of  a  fundamental 
attunement,  a  particular  “questioning  attitude”  has  to  be  achieved.  Ultimately,  the 
purpose of the boredom analysis is, as Beistegui shows, not merely descriptive, as was 
the case with the analysis of anxiety in BT. Rather, it is directed toward the generation 
of  an  essentially  philosophical,  questioning  attitude,  which  is  a  disposition  that 
represents a readiness for a philosophical Auseinandersetzung.
Read in this light, the philosophical product of Heidegger's analysis of boredom is not 
merely a deepening of  our understanding of  attunement.  Access  to the underlying 
structure  of  metaphysics,  indeed  of  all  possible  contemporary  investigations  into 
φύσις itself,  is  also  at  stake.  In  my  reading  of  these  sections,  I  seek  to  clarify 
Heidegger's conception of the relationship between world and solitude. In so doing, 
the specific context for his comparative analysis of world will be provided, and the 
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philosophical soil from out of which his broader Nietzsche reading grows will also be 
established. By this last point I mean that the basis for an understanding of the specific 
structure and content of his Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche will be established, such 
that it can be subsequently explored in chapter 5. 
3.1.1. The “forms” and “moments” of boredom
Boredom is not approached as though it were an object to be examined, but taken up 
phenomenologically, in terms of 'the way we move within it'.69 The investigation into 
boredom takes up the way in which we first and foremost grasp boredom itself, i.e., as 
something to be driven away. As such, there are two distinct elements of boredom 
phenomenologically grasped, namely 'the reaction and that which it reacts against'. 
Heidegger treats these two elements as the initial “forms” of boredom, naming them 
“becoming bored by” and “being bored with”.
the  first  form of becoming bored by something comes to meet  us from the 
outside as it were, while the second points to the fact that boredom arises out of 
Dasein itself.70
The main point of difference between “becoming bored by” and “being bored with” is 
how we stand in relation to  passing the  time  (our manner of  driving these types of 
boredom away). “Being bored with” is marked out by the intertwining of being bored 
and passing the time,71 whereas in “becoming bored by” there is a clear distinction 
69 FCM, §22.
70 Ibid, §29.
71 Heidegger  gives  the  example  of  being  bored  during  an  evening's  social  engagement  in  order  to 
illustrate  the  matter.  He claims that  during such an engagement,  it  is  nothing specific  that  comes 
forward as being that which bores us: none of the particular activities, like polite conversation, that we 
undertake, or the social engagement itself , despite our being bored with it. Heidegger puts it thus: 'the  
individual details of the situation are of no consequence; they are only coincidentally that with which 
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between what is boring and how passing the time might counteract this boredom.72 In 
passing the time we are not occupied with time itself, as this would mean bringing 
time before us as “at hand” in some manner,  but rather the  dragging of  time.  This 
objectless  dragging  of  time  is  identified  as  the  first  “structural  moment”,  or 
characteristic, of boredom and referred to as “being held in limbo”. As Heidegger puts 
it 'becoming bored is a being held in limbo by time as it drags over an interval of time'.73 The 
effect of being held in limbo is some form of  paralysis,  in being held in limbo we 
attempt to pass the time in order to counteract the paralysing effect of this dragging of  
time. The second structural moment, “being left empty”, is experienced as the desire to 
pass the time by occupying ourselves with something. Being “occupied” is 'a way in 
which [...] we deal with things', wherein our 'activities and exploits' are given 'direction 
and fullness'.74 As such, 'being left empty is eliminated when things are at hand, at our 
disposal',75 accordingly,  being  left  empty can be  understood as  a  moment  wherein 
nothing is at hand. 
Being  left  empty  thus  involves  a  peculiar absence  of  things,  because,  as  factically 
existing, we are always in the world in such a way that we are surrounded by other  
beings at hand. Rather than an “annihilation” of things at hand, in becoming bored by 
something, and being left empty by  something, 'things must be at hand such that they 
we  ourselves  are  bored,  they  are  not  that  which  bores  us'  [Ibid,  §24,  b)].  To  borrow  a  Kantian  
terminology, the situation itself only occasions the experience of our boredom. As such, passing the  
time becomes difficult to discern, as we do not attempt to pass the time in the face of that which bores 
us, but rather the whole situation becomes characterised as passing the time, and yet, nonetheless,  
remains boring – hence Heidegger's claim that 'boredom and passing the time become intertwined' 
[Ibid, §24, b)].
72 In its first form, boredom is encountered as being driven away in passing the time. Giving the example 
of waiting for a train, it is not the train itself that causes boredom, but rather the waiting for the train. 
In  this  manner  boredom itself,  and what  we are specifically  bored by,  come to  rest  on a  peculiar 
relationship to time – namely the desire to move time on.
73 Ibid, §23, c).
74 Ibid, §23, d).
75 Ibid.
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leave us empty'.76 In this way, being left empty means being abandoned to ourselves by 
that which we are becoming bored by. This abandonment is in fact a refusal of things at 
hand: in being left empty by something, we project an expectation of the things at hand 
that  we  are  becoming bored  by  that  is  not  fulfilled  by  them.77 This  refusal  is  not 
disappointment,  because  when  disappointed  with  something  we  are  no  longer 
concerned with  it  and therefore  leave  it  alone.  By  contrast,  in  becoming bored by 
something we are continually occupied by it in a way that leaves us empty. In being left 
empty by something that is at hand, yet somehow at hand in a way that it itself refuses 
us  any  dealings  with  it,  we  remain  occupied  by  whatever  is  at  hand,  neither 
disappointed nor satisfied, but held in limbo in being left empty.
This connection indicates that the two structural moments of boredom are not fully 
separated  in  their  distinction  from  one  another,  but  are  indeed  “structurally 
interwoven”.78 This  structural  interweaving,  or  the  nature  of  the  unity  of  these  two 
distinct structural moments, is unclear at this point, but Heidegger concludes from an 
initial analysis of the first form of boredom that 'what is at issue here in the possibility 
of boredom is an as yet obscure relation of the dragging along of time to the things that 
refuse  themselves'.79 The  two  moments  sustain  each  other  and  are  thus  mutually 
interdependent. As structural moments of boredom itself, these characteristics 'must in 
themselves accord with one another from out of the essence of boredom'. Heidegger is  
concerned with 'seeing the original link [Fuge] between these two moments', such that 
the  “intrinsic unity” and “whole structure” of becoming bored can be brought into 
76 Ibid.
77 Note that Heidegger is not concerned with the manner in which this refusal or inability to meet our 
expectations is caused, i.e., if we are to blame of the situation is to blame, but rather, investigating what  
it is that bores us in a boring situation. As such, causes are not of concern.
78 FCM, §23, d).
79 Ibid. 
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3.1.2. The meaning of “profundity”
The next step along the path toward rendering the essence of boredom transparent, 
and thus properly generating this questioning attitude, is to interpret profound boredom: 
a third form of boredom that constitutes the ground of the the previous two as their 
most  essential  form.81 This  profound  boredom  is,  of  course,  the  fundamental 
attunement of boredom that has been forwarded as the grounding attunement of our 
epoch.  This  marks a change in  the nature  of  the interpretation.  The previous two, 
“superficial”,  forms  of  boredom  were  taken  up  as  particular  attunements  wherein 
particular situations were disclosed. What marks out this third form of boredom in 
terms of its increased profundity is its indeterminacy with regard to a specific situation 
– it does not arise within or as a response to a particular situation or occasion, but  
rather, “irrupts” into situations 'whenever we do not expect it at all'. Heidegger names 
this form of boredom “it is boring for one”.82
The movement of increased profundity, then, can be understood as the movement from 
a  more  determinate  form  of  boredom  into  an  indeterminate  form83,  wherein  what 
80 Ibid, §24, a).
81 Through his analysis of the initial forms of boredom, the path to this questioning attitude shows itself 
to lie in the direction of an engagement with the essence of time. In this way the account of boredom 
overcomes itself in the direction of time, as it is now time that becomes the object of investigation and 
not boredom as such. This does not mean that boredom becomes left behind, as 'the essence of time 
cannot be illuminated at all in any other way, i.e., it cannot be illuminated by speculating about time' [Ibid, 
§29.]
82 “It is boring for one” is McNeill's translation of Es ist einem langweilig. This is one of his more inventive 
translations as he is attempting to convey something of the etymology, and thus inherent temporal 
references of langweilig lost in English.  Langweilig  is literally “long while”. “It is a long-while” would 
make no sense in English, neither would “it is a boring”.
83 The previous forms being determinate as they relate to determinate situations, first form being the type 
of boredom experienced in waiting for a train, and the second form the type experienced in being 
bored at an evening dinner party.
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comes to the fore is the deep embeddedness of the structural moments of boredom 
within  the  time  of  Dasein  itself,  or  'the  manner  in  which  our  own  temporality 
temporalizes itself'.84 The  structural  unity  of  “being  left  empty”  and “being  held  in 
limbo”  is  the  manner  in  which  Dasein  'has  its  time',  but  this  connection  is  not 
satisfactorily elucidated merely as a result of a recognition of where the essential unity 
lies. Where the first division in the character of boredom was structured according to 
action and reaction, this third form of boredom places this opposition into question. As 
Heidegger claims, when it comes to gaining access to “original time”, 'the essence of 
subjectivity must be put into question in advance'.85 
3.1.3. The disclosive power of profound boredom
Divorced from any determinate situational reference point,  the self involved in this 
third  form of  boredom cannot  be  recognised as  maintaining the  same determinate 
character: the “it” (the self that bores) is not “myself” 'of this particular standing and 
age, with this name and vocation and fate', but rather, myself as an 'undifferentiated no 
one'.86 The abstraction from a particular situation and the resulting lack of possible 
exemplification of this form of boredom, is reflected in the absence of any passing of 
the  time.  Rather,  we  respond  by  not  permitting  such  activity,  and thus  allow  our 
response  to  'manifest  the  character  of  boredom  itself',  such  that  there  is  no 
counteraction of boredom, but a letting be of it. Heidegger characterises this as 'being  
compelled to listen' to what boredom has to say, whereas in the other forms of boredom 
we pass the time in order to avoid listening to, and experiencing, boredom as such. 
84 Ibid.
85 FCM, §30
86 Ibid.
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Given the factical absence of any passing the time in this third form of boredom and 
thus the indeterminate character of the situation, “being left empty” (the 1 st structural 
moment) is neither constituted from a particular emptiness that arises in relation to the 
unfulfilling character of a situation (as in the first form), nor a self-forming emptiness 
that arises from a letting go of oneself to be fully given over to whatever presents itself  
in the situation. In this “it is boring for one”, Heidegger claims that we are 'relieved of 
our everyday personality'; 'elevated beyond the particular situation'; and also 'beyond the 
specific beings surrounding us there'.87 In this moment of undifferentiatedness, there is 
an indifference in relation to the situation, both in terms of the things at hand, and 
ourselves. Heidegger puts this as follows:
Beings have – as we say – become indifferent  as a whole, and we ourselves as 
these people are not expected. We no longer stand as subjects and suchlike 
opposite these beings and excluded from them, but find ourselves in the midst 
of beings as a whole, i.e., in the whole of this indifference.88
Upon initial investigation, this “indifference as a whole” does not seem to be graspable 
in terms of an emptiness, as 'being left empty is always possible only where there is  
some claim to be fulfilled, where the necessity of a fullness exists'. 89 When divorced 
from the  specific  fullness  or  emptiness  of  a  situation  wherein various  determinate 
possibilities for acting and doing are offered up, it must be the case that we are indeed 
indifferent to whether or not we are satisfied or left empty at all. Rather than denying 
specific possibilities of acting and doing for the determinate everyday personality (the 
87 FCM, §31, a).
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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“I” that is me with this specific history and name etc...),  in profound boredom 'the 
beings  that  surround  us  offer  us  no  further  possibility  of  acting  and  no  further 
possibility  of  doing  anything'.90 In  offering  up  no  possibility  of  any  practical 
engagement  whatsoever,  Heidegger  takes  the  situation  to  be  defined  by  a  “telling 
refusal” of beings as a whole. 
What is being told?91 In this form of being left empty, Dasein is 'suspended among 
beings' in such a way that beings as a whole are pointed toward, but only in terms of 
their  refusal. In so doing they do not refuse dealings (possible acting and doing) in a 
determinate way, i.e., obstruct a particular endeavour, or dissatisfy with regard to a 
specific expectation, but rather 'indicate indeterminately the possibilities of Dasein'.92 
What is told in this telling refusal then, is that there are 'possibilities  [of Dasein] left  
unexploited':  there is an implicit  reference to a fullness of possibilities that is in some 
manner interrupted in the refusal (qua breakdown) of beings as a whole. This is an 
indication  that  the  first  structural  moment  (“being  left  empty”)  'has  in  itself  a 
structured relation to something else on account of the reference contained in such 
telling  refusal.'93 This  “something  else”  is  of  course  “being  held  in  limbo”(the  2nd 
structural moment). Here we find the most profound presentation of the relationship 
between world and solitude presented in FCM thus far.
The telling refusal of beings as a whole does not point to any arbitrary and determinate 
90 Ibid.
91 It  should be noted that  Heidegger uses  Versagen, the  substantive form of the  verb  versagen,  which 
connotes refusal in the sense of a breakdown, or a refusal to work, rather than, say, the refusal of an 
invitation. McNeill translates this as “telling refusal” because of the status of Versagen as a cognate of 
sagen –  to  tell.  It  is  only  by recognising  this  connection  to  telling  [sagen]  that  it  makes  sense  for 
Heidegger to continue his interpretation by asking about what is being told in this telling refusal.
92 Ibid, §31, b).
93 Ibid. §31, a).
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possibilities of Dasein, but to the very ground of all possible determinations of Dasein.
Whatever is utmost and primary in making possible all possibilities of Dasein 
as  possibilities,  whatever  it  is  that  sustains  Dasein's  potentiality  for  being 
[Seinkönnen],  its possibilities, is affected by this telling refusal of beings as a 
whole.94
In so being attuned there is nothing particular that emerges, there is no content as such 
to point to, but rather the singular character of Dasein is  pointed toward. It  is this  
being “impelled” in the direction of Dasein's potentiality for being, this contentless, 
indeterminate  relation  to  the  ground  of  all  potential  determinate  relations,  that 
constitutes “being held in limbo” in this third form of boredom.
“Being held in limbo” and “being left empty” cannot be understood as fully distinct in 
their specific determinations belonging to this third form of Boredom. Their structural 
interweaving is not merely external, but also contains internal references to the other. 
As such, Heidegger defines boredom in its most profound form as being an “expanse” 
into the “limit of beings as a whole” that intensifies 'the extremity of Dasein in the 
direction of what is originally singular in whatever makes Dasein itself possible'.95 In 
thus understanding boredom as ultimately attuning Dasein as an  oscillation between 
beings as a whole and the singularity (solitude) of what makes Dasein itself possible, 
its metaphysical importance becomes clear. The fundamental concepts of metaphysics 
have now been presented with greater clarity through this interpretation of boredom: 
World:  enveloping  limit  of  beings  as  a  whole;  Solitude:  the  singular  extremity  of 
whatever originarily makes Dasein possible; Finitude: being attuned. 
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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3.2. The metaphysical structure of boredom
The structural moments of boredom have been detailed and 'made [...] visible in their 
structural unity',96 but their precise relationship to time has not yet been established, 
thus the nature of this unity requires further elaboration. In order to bring this aspect  
into view, Heidegger points toward the temporal ramifications of the refusal of beings 
as  a  whole:  'everything  –  in  every  respect,  retrospect  and  prospect,  beings 
simultaneously  withdraw'.97 These  “perspectives”98 are  clearly  connected  to  the 
present, past and future, indeed, Heidegger states that they “distribute themselves” 
[verteilt sich] out as these temporal dimensions. However, their temporality is initially 
experienced as a perspective on, or aspect of, 'all  doing and activity  of Dasein', rather 
than as theoretical dimensions, or elements of perception.99 Heidegger defines these 
perspectives as a “simultaneous totality” 'in which Dasein constantly moves'100 – there 
is never a point at which one of these aspects, one of these ways of seeing,101 is isolated 
96 Ibid, §32
97 Ibid, §32, a). Whilst there is a clear etymological chain connecting these terms in this English rendering, 
the temporal character of these terms (and the phenomena to which they relate) is somewhat lost.  
Hinsicht (respect), Rücksicht (retrospect), and Absicht (prospect) are all cognates of sichten, which means 
“to sight” something, “to spot” something, and sometimes even “to classify”. Hin, rück, ab (there, back, 
from - as in abfahren, to leave from). The temporal characters of present, past, and future are clearer –  
for example, “respect” has seemingly no temporal or spatial character in English.
98 McNeill translates Sichten as “perspectives”. “Aspects” might have been more fitting with his rendering 
of  Hinsicht  etc.  I  point  this  out  because  “Perspektive”  has  separate  connotations  of  its  own  –  an 
important one being a seemingly inexorable connection with Horizont, which is a matter that will be 
investigated in the later stages of this thesis.
99 FCM, §32, a). Whilst Heidegger does not need to import his previous analysis of time and equipmental  
horizonality from Being and Time, it is worth noting that this thought is developed at length therein - in 
part as a development of and response to Husserls notion of time-consciousness. As such, Heidegger is  
concerned  with  the  non-perceptual  basis  of  time  –  to  be  phenomenological  is  not  to  start  with  
perceptions but dealings etc.
100 Ibid.
101 In his own book Mcneill, M. The Time of Life (SUNY, New York: 2007), McNeill focuses heavily on the 
role of sight - conceptually, historically and etymologically – in FCM, yet he loses this aspect of seeing 
and sighting by using “perspective”. Perspective carries with it a particular relation to a viewpoint or a 
state, whereas  Sichten has no point – it would just be “view”. Whilst I intermittently use “aspect” I 
recognise that the existence of both “ansicht” and indeed “aspekt” mean that it is by no means a perfect 
translation of this term, nor an improvement, but rather a way of drawing out a connotation that is 
more appropriate for this project. 
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from its counterparts; they are only ever maintained in varying configurations wherein 
one aspect may be dominant over the others. As such, 'these three perspectives are not 
lined up alongside one another, but originarily simply united in the horizon of time as 
such'.102 Heidegger  takes  this  temporal  elaboration  to  point  toward the  ground (in 
terms of that which makes it possible) of the refusal of beings as a whole.  It is only on 
the basis of there being a “simultaneous totality” and “originarily simple unity” of the 
three aspects of Dasein's dealings, that a refusal  as a whole (which is to say in every 
respect, retrospect and prospect) can occur. This is not to say that the three aspects are 
unified in a way that dissolves their identity.
With the refusal of beings as a whole, comes the withdrawal of beings as a whole. In this 
withdrawal  the  everyday  dimensions  of  time  lose  their  determinacy  and  their 
distinction,  their  non-theoretical,  proximal  determinations in the everyday dealings 
and activities of Dasein (respect, retrospect, prospect) withdraw along with beings as a 
whole. This is characterised as a being left empty, but, as Heidegger states, 'this telling 
refusal as a whole arises on the side of beings'.103 This means that there is no longer a 
specific situation, activity or context which determines the ground of this boredom, as 
Heidegger puts it: there is 'nothing, in the telling refusal of beings as a whole, which 
could “explain” this entrancement to it.104
Here, a certain distance becomes manifest between Dasein and beings as a whole, one 
which allows this  emptiness  of  any determinate relationship to beings “a space in 
102 FCM, §32, a).
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.  As Heidegger  states:  –  '[Dasein  is]accustomed to  being  acquainted  and  concerned  only  with 
beings, and indeed this or that being in each case'.
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which to play”.105 The temporal ramification of this space and emptiness is that Dasein 
is no longer anchored within time by reference to “determinate time-points” which 
occur  within  the  dimensions  of  time  as  experienced  with  the  activities  of  Dasein. 
Rather than being 'specifically articulated or delimited according to past and future', in 
this profound boredom the “time of Dasein” maintains itself in an “unarticulated unity”. 
The key aspect of this unarticulated unity is that, in boredom, the dimensions of the 
time of Dasein (not the dimensions of time itself) are not amalgamated or dissolved into 
a higher order unity, but held in 'the simplicity of this unity of their horizon all at once'.
106 Precisely how this is so, and precisely what this means are, at this stage, given over 
to the “enigmatic and concealed” power of the entrancement of the horizon of time. 
In  the  telling  refusal  of  beings  as  a  whole  Dasein  is  given  over  to  what  is  
'uncircumventable if [it], in keeping with its possibilities, is to be what it can be as it  
can be'.107 In telling of the uncircumventable, this refusal must also tell of the freedom 
of Dasein, such that it points to the ground of Dasein's possibilities for being, the very 
possibilities  that  are  refused when beings  as  a  whole  refuse  themselves.  This  dual  
orientation, in profound boredom, is shown to be maintained in some form of unity, as 
it is nothing other than “entrancing time” itself that 'essentially makes Dasein possible'.
108
Delving deeper into this notion of “that which properly makes possible”, Heidegger 
states that what time 'tells of' as being refused (i.e., what it 'gives to be known [...] as 
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid
107 FCM, §32, b).
108 Ibid.
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something possible' and, as such, 'gives to be free') is the 'freedom of Dasein as such'.109 In 
this profound boredom, the movement of the analysis “beyond the public individual 
subject”  has  been shown to  be  a movement  beyond the level  of  self-cognition:  the 
investigation  is  now  asking  after  the  selfhood  that  underlies  all  (situationally) 
determinate instances of “me”.
Mirroring the mechanics of anxiety's disclosive powers as laid out in  BT,  Heidegger 
forwards the idea that the freedom of Dasein as such is not given by an external entity, 
rather it is a mode of “self-liberation”[Sichbefreien], wherein Dasein frees itself from its 
factical and specifically situational determinateness by disclosing 'itself for itself as Da-
sein'.110 The  hyphenation  of  Dasein  here  emphasises  the  there  character  of  Dasein, 
where Dasein is not simply 'present-at hand alongside other things', but in the midsts 
of beings. Being “amidst”, but not alongside, indicates that man maintains an essential 
difference from those beings that he finds himself  amongst.111 This is  the key point 
regarding  the  relationship  of  the  fundamental  concepts.  This  difference  is  what 
Heidegger  will  refer  to  as  the  “abyss  of  essential  origins”  in  NIII.  'Part  Two'  will 
constitute an advanced elaboration of  this  point.  In  NIII  Heidegger will  claim that 
Nietzsche's  extreme  anthropomorphism  arises  from  his  ignoring  this  abyss.  For 
Heidegger,  in  mistaking  the  world  of  Dasein  for  the  world  of  life,  Nietzsche 
universalises  the unique ontological  position of  Dasein.  In this  regard the essential 
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111  This difference is what Heidegger will refer to as the “abyss of essential origins” in NIII. 'Part Two' will 
constitute an advanced elaboration of this point. In NIII Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche's extreme 
anthropomorphism arises  from his  ignoring  this  abyss.  For  Heidegger,  in  mistaking  the  world of 
Dasein for the world of life, Nietzsche universalises the unique ontological position of Dasein. In this 
regard the essential otherness and discontinuity of life (the abyssal bodily kinship of man and animal), 
is erased in favour of a continuity. This forms the basis of Heidegger's rejection of “life” as a translation 
of “φύσις”  in its most originary form. Life must remain other, else the  finite tension that constitutes 
Dasein is released, in which case the terror of existence, and attack of being, are mitigated in favour of 
comfort and assurance. 
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otherness and discontinuity of life (the  abyssal  bodily kinship of man and animal), is 
erased in favour of a continuity. This forms the basis of Heidegger's rejection of “life” 
as a translation of “φύσις” in its most originary form. Where “life” names those other 
beings which we find ourselves amongst  in the world,  what essentially constitutes 
“life” must remain other, else the  finite tension that constitutes Dasein is released, in 
which case  the  terror  of  existence,  and attack of  being,  are  mitigated in  favour of 
comfort and assurance. 
The self-disclosure of Dasein does not involve an opposition to beings as a whole, or a 
movement beyond them, but rather, occurs within the very ground of the manifestness 
of  beings  as  whole:  the  horizon  of  time,  in  binding  Dasein  to  itself,  presents  the 
uncircumventability  of  beings  as  a  whole  at  the  same time  as  allowing  Dasein  to 
disclose itself  for itself  as  the ground of  its  own possibility for being.  In profound 
boredom the entrancement of time presents an emptiness of all possible dealings, a 
suspension of all temporal dimensions of engagement, thus announcing the essential 
jointure of Dasein to beings as a whole. But, at the same time, this emptiness speaks of  
unexploited possibilities, of the freedom of the possibility to be there, as maintaining a 
threefold perspective as a simple unity within the full horizon of time, rather than the 
threefold perspective as seemingly divided within concrete situations.
This is a clear repetition of the structure of Aristotle's notion of first philosophy, and 
indeed the structure of Nietzsche's meditation on Apollo and Dionysus. This identity is 
not  trivial.  The  task  of  the  self-becoming  of  Dasein  has  been  shown  to  lie  in  a 
meditation  upon the  fundamental  unity of  the  opposed orientations  of  what  would 
classically be taken to be freedom and determinacy, self and other, man and nature, but 
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in Heidegger's thought comes to be world and individuation.
3.3. The movement of Philosophy: A reprise.
3.3.1. Conclusion of the boredom analysis
What has been achieved by this examination of boredom as a fundamental attunement 
is not some form of definition that can be 'taken as an assertion in which something is  
supposed to be established', but rather, 'a more incisive direction for questioning'.112 Whilst 
the  task  is  still  to  question  the  manner  in  which  the  two  structural  moments  of  
boredom are structurally linked, Heidegger states the following: 
[This]  proves  to  be  something  we  will  correctly  understand  only  if  we 
comprehend boredom in the unity of its essence, if we comprehend that which is 
structurally linked in terms of the linkage belonging to this structural link.113
Prior to genuinely understanding the peculiar, idiosyncratic, and most proper nature of 
a matter, we must understand what it would mean for something have an essence, we 
have to know what we are looking for.114
If philosophy is knowledge of the essence - and this is what it is in the correctly 
112 FCM, §34
113 Ibid. “aus der Fügung der Fuge das Gefügte begreifen” - this is an important phrasing for the comparison 
of  FCM  to  the  later  Nietzsche  Lectures.  Bambach will  focus  on  the  manner  in  which  Fug  becomes 
Heidegger's  translation of  the  ancient  Greek  Dike  (Justice),  which he opposes  to  Nietzsche's  more 
subjective translation as Gerechtigkeit. See chapter 5.
114 Heidegger still collects the insights of his analysis of boredom under a definition of sorts: 'Boredom is  
the entrancement of the temporal horizon' [FCM, §34]. As a definition, this summary of the investigation 
does not grasp boredom in an “empty” manner, such that the most universal account of boredom is 
developed in order to match all three different forms equally as essentially. This definition is clearly 
tailored towards the third form at the expense of  the others.  This does not mean that it  is  not an 
essential definition, it simply means that essentiality is not, here, understood in line with universality. 
The  notion  of  essence  operative  within  philosophy  is  not  guided  by  the  ideal  of  certainty  –  an 
investigation into the essence of  a matter does not seek the 'emptiest as the sole and most proper 
essence' [ibid]. In order to “get close” to the essence of a matter, we first need to grasp its essentiality. 
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understood sense – then its possibility is grounded in the first instance, and 
decisively where everything is concerned, in the essentiality of its questioning 
and in the power of its questioning to be essential.115
This is not a matter of method, but one of engagement [Einsatz] and of the 
possibility of engagement pertaining to a philosophizing existence.116
In  thus  attempting  to  conclude  his  extended  analysis  of  boredom,  Heidegger  has 
returned to the initial issue confronted at the beginning of the text: what is philosophy 
and how does it proceed? What is the absolute character, the essence, of Philosophy. 
The whole of  FCM  thus far can be understood to be a meditation on the manner in 
which philosophy itself can begin. Heidegger points to a fundamental issue faced by 
all attempts to come face to face with the essence of philosophy itself: 'we are never 
sparing  enough  with  such  talk  about  philosophy,  never  active  enough  in 
philosophising'.117 This  is  a  clear  word  of  warning  for  those  who  would  see  the 
question regarding the essence of philosophy as in some way “metaphilosophical”. 
Heidegger is not concerned with getting toward a definition of philosophy, but with 
philosophising itself: 'only if we experience its essence from out of philosophizing itself 
will we become intimate with the essence of philosophy'.118 
Heidegger progresses this matter beyond the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. Following from 
the previous quote, he states that the essence of philosophy cannot be experienced by 
'reading and reviewing philosophical  literature,'119 we must,  first,  be  attempting  to 
philosophise.  At  the  closing  stages  of  the  account  of  boredom,  an  account  which 
115   Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
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opened with  an  indication  of  the  importance  of  Nietzsche  thought  for  modernity, 
Heidegger returns to the thoughts he started his boredom analysis with: the movement 
of philosophy in relationship to philosophers and their work. Following this rejection 
of  philosophy  as  mere  reading  and  reviewing,  he  does  not  reject  the  idea  that 
philosophising is essentially caught up with those philosophers than have gone before. 
Indeed, as an effort  to philosophise for ourselves,  Heidegger claims that 'this must 
bring  us  to  the  point  where  we  can  understand  a  philosopher  better  than  he 
understood himself'.120 Echoing both his  earlier  comments  on Nietzsche's  standing, 
Heidegger states the following:
This does not mean, however, that we should rebuke him and point out to him 
which  precursors  he  is  dependent  upon,  but  that  we  are  in  a  position  to 
concede him more than he himself was in possession of. If someone does not 
summon up the inner freedom as a philosopher to be such a person to whose 
essence  it  necessarily  belongs  to  be  better  understood than he  understands 
himself  –  then  philosophy  has  passed  that  person  by,  in  spite  of  all  
philosophical erudition. Philosophy is only there to be overcome.121
On my reading this is a direct reference to the 'last of the greats', as Heidegger calls  
him in §76.  The implicit regard for Nietzsche, and further, the basis for Heidegger's 
later formulation of  Auseinandersetzung  is  evidenced not only by the preceding and 
succeeding references for a need to read Nietzsche,122 but also by the remainder of this 
meditation on philosophy:
Yet it [philosophy] can only be overcome if it stands in the first place, and can 
be overcome all the more essentially the more profound the resistance is that it 
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid. Italics are mine.
122 As indicated by the closing statement of FCM in §76.
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summons up through its being there. Overcoming, however, does not occur 
through refutation in the sense of demonstrating mistakes and things that are 
incorrect.  Whether  we  regain  this  intrinsic  freedom  of  philosophical 
confrontation  [philosophischen Auseinandersetzung]  and  discussion,  to  what 
extent it can ever be realised in this era: this no one can say objectively.123
The concept of Auseinandersetzung is here presented as relating to the intrinsic freedom 
of the movement of philosophy itself: the movement of overcoming. The movement of 
philosophy it  is  always one's  own (it  is  an essential  activity of Dasein after all),  but  
equally  it  requires  an  internal  relationship  to  that  which  it  overcomes:  there  is 
necessarily something other that is overcome in all overcoming. With philosophy, that 
which  is  overcome  is  philosophy  as  it  stands,  it  is  philosophy  itself:  it  is  a  self-
overcoming.  If  my  reading  is  correct,  then  the  self  to  be  overcome  is  that  of 
philosophising in the contemporary epoch: precisely the epoch of Nietzsche. The task 
of  FCM thus  remains  the  preparation  for  a  philosophical encounter,  an 
Auseinandersetzung, with history... with Nietzsche.
The  analysis  of  boredom ends  in  similar  position  to  where  it  began,  with  the  the 
thought that 'essential knowledge is  possible only from out of and in an originary 
questioning'.124 This  originary  questioning  must  operate  from  within  the  “intrinsic 
freedom  of  philosophical  confrontation  [Auseinandersetzung]”.  However,  prior  to 
working  from  within  this  freedom,  the  type  of  engagement  needed  to  enter  into 
philosophy requires a certain response to the varying prejudices of a non-philosophical 
attitude or disposition. Philosophy is not the removal of all prejudice, as there is no 
possibility of a purity of beginnings at any level. Starting philosophy anew, without 
123 FCM, §34
124 FCM, §37
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being caught in a response to how its  stands/stood with philosophy is  to think of  
philosophy  in  a  non-philosophical  way,  namely,  as  a  perfectable  science  seeking 
absolute certainty. Heidegger is not advocating a presuppositionless, a-historical, non-
prejudiced  stance  toward  philosophy.  On  the  contrary,  Auseinandersetzung as  an 
authentic mode of philosophical engagement, must come to stand in a particular way 
with  regard  to  its  prejudices  and  history,  it  must  identify  them  and  locate  them, 
perhaps even overcome them, but it cannot become freed from them.
3.3.2. Repetition of the structure of metaphysics
This “historical rootedness” of Dasein, as Beistegui puts it, is not something to be left 
behind or to become detached from: overcoming the matter of  how it  stands with 
philosophy is not directed towards a trans-historical position. The tension between the 
historically rooted and the trans-historical is structured in the same manner as the two 
structural moments of boredom, the two orientations toward φύσις in Aristotle's first 
philosophy,  and  the  fundamental  orientations  of  Apollo  and  Dionysus.  They  are 
fundamentally  opposed,yet  their  struggle  is  not  a  struggle  for  independence,  but 
moreover a vital struggle that represents a certain unity. 
The recurrence of the basic structure of metaphysics as originally and authentically 
conceived by Aristotle,  and the subsequent relevance of  Nietzsche's  thought as  the 
genuinely  contemporary  (thus  epochal)  repetition  thereof,  has  been  overlooked  in 
other readings of FCM. As Heidegger explicated in the 'Preliminary Appraisal', when 
thought as Prote Philosophia, metaphysics is a meditation on the unity and interrelation 
of a dual orientation toward φύσις. This dual orientation (on the one hand  φύσις as 
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beings as a whole, and on the other thinking φύσις as the being of beings) has been 
trivialised and confused by traditional metaphysics to the point where one aspect is 
explicitly subjugated to the other, or the distinction between the two is missed entirely.  
The unfulfilled task of Aristotlelian philosophy was the elaboration of the structural 
unity  of  these  two  orientations.  Rather  than specifically  take  up  the  possibility  of 
thinking  this  unity  from  out  of  a  direct  engagement  with  Aristotle. An  historical 
engagement  was  in  fact  suspended  in  the  name  of  first  acquiring  the  proper 
philosophical disposition from within which the genuinely philosophical intention and 
profundity of Aristotle could be recognised.125 
Surveying the continuity between 'Preliminary Appraisal' and 'Part One' in this way 
allows for the recognition of the importance of Nietzsche with regard to boredom and 
its epochal character. When defining the contemporary situation, Heidegger pointed 
toward Nietzsche as the 'place and source where a the confrontation proper [with the 
contemporary] must occur'.126 In his, albeit brief, elaboration of this point, Heidegger 
suggested that this was the case because Nietzsche's notions of Apollo and Dionysos 
were essentially and explicitly thought as fundamental orientations of man. In distinction, 
contemporary thinkers thought these very concepts as world-historical determinations, 
wherein the historical-methodologies of  diagnoses  and  prognoses “set man out” in an 
inessential manner, only grasping him in an extrinsic, “symbolic” manner. This itself 
was  taken  as  indicative  of the  deep-rooted  boredom  with  which  “we”,  as 
125 Interestingly, Heidegger does not point to the potential accomplishment of this task in other texts or 
lecture courses of his own, e.g., he does not refer to his reading of Aristotle in the  Basic Problems of  
Phenomenology, which was written during the same period. Where he does take there to be a strong 
connection with his other endeavours he does not shy away from cross reference – such is the case at 
the opening of 'Part Two' where he directs the student/reader to his historical examination (note not 
Auseinandersetzung) with the concept of world as conducted in On the Essence of Ground. 
126 FCM, §18.
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contemporary,  approach  ourselves:  the  main  idiosyncrasy  of  modernity  is  the 
persistent lack of questioning regarding the essence of man. Rather than mediate the 
word of Nietzsche, Heidegger allowed Nietzsche to speak for himself by presenting 
quotes with minimal supplementary interpretation (this is  also how Heidegger will 
draw  FCM  to a close). The crux of these thoughts was that the high-point of Greek 
civilisation (and therefore also humanity) was the drawing together in opposition of 
these two fundamental orientations – on one hand the eternal, individuated, beautiful 
form  of  Apollo,  and  on  the  other  the  unindividuated,  creative,  chaotic  excess  of 
Dionysus,  described  as  the  “fullness  of  power  and  moderation”.127 Heidegger 
understands Nietzsche to have thought the manner in which the two orientations are 
fundamentally  and  essentially  unified.  He  points  to  the  epochal  character  of  this 
thought, and hints toward its identity with the unfulfilled project of Aristotle, yet holds 
back  from  elaborating  and  interpreting  it  fully  because  of  the  historically-
hermeneutically circular problems elaborated in the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. 
3.3.3. The trajectory of Heidegger's boredom analysis
On my reading, one aspect of the task of FCM as a whole is the attempt to understand 
what it would mean to properly question the essence of man in his boundedness.128 This 
is what the question of  finitude asks: how is it that man, as pure  Seinkönnen  can be 
127 Ibid, §18, b) – Nietzsche, N. WP 1050.
128 The importance of such a statement for the overall task of the FCM is deepened when referred back to 
Heidegger's  claim  that  the  metaphysical  intent  of  Aristotle's  treatise  on  sleep  has  not  yet  been 
ascertained. If we recall, Heidegger states that this intent lies in the direction of the generation of an 
understanding of how it is that a being can be bound in such a way that it either refuses other things  
that it is not (sleeps), or opens itself up to other things that it is not, whilst remaining that which it is 
(wakes). In these comments it is clear that the questioning unfolding in the FCM is developing a deeper 
grounding for the full opening of the question of the essence of time and man's essential relationship to 
it.  The  development  of  this  task  within  the  account  of  boredom  is  the  claim  that  Dasein,  when 
fundamentally attuned by boredom, is somehow bound to the horizon of time. Further, Dasein is bound 
to the horizon of time in such a manner that it cannot access beings as a whole in order to have any 
dealings with them. 
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understood to be bound to beings? Heidegger is attempting to ask after finitude in a 
way that does not equate the finite with world alone (beings as a whole), but rather, 
sees finitude as the originary horizonal structure of beings and being, or as ontological 
difference.  This  represents  the  same terminal  point  as  the  comparative  analysis  of 
world, namely that an analysis of the structure of the differentiated manifestness of 
beings  as  a  whole  (world)  maintains  within  itself  an  intrinsic,  yet  enigmatic, 
relationship  to  undifferentiated  manifestness  as  such  (Individuation  or  truth as  the 
truth of essence). In this regard Heidegger would not consider his world analysis to 
surpass his boredom analysis in terms of its penetration into the fundamental concepts 
of metaphysics, as the latter represents an approach to finitude from the perspective of 
world  alone.  The  central  stakes  of  this  matter  –  thinking finitude  itself  –  becomes 
clearer at the close of the analysis of boredom, and in this regard, elaborates upon the 
basic  conceptual  structure  within  which  Heidegger  will  come  to  evaluate  the 
appropriacy of “life”, as word, a rubric, and a mode of interpretation of this originary 
unitary structure of beings as a whole and being as such.
Heidegger will examine this matter in great detail under the rubric of the Grand Style 
in  NI,  and further, in  NIII in terms of the mode of interrelation of perspectives and 
horizons. It is my contention that this  NIII reading represents the culmination of the 
thoughts  contained  here  in  FCM.  Heidegger  will  ultimately  consider  Nietzsche's 
thought to bring to a close the possibilities of interpreting φύσις as “life”, because life 
will be considered as inescapably caught up in the history of metaphysic's confusion of 
beings as a whole (world-life) and being as such (individuation-spirit[truth]). At the 
very point at which it  looks as though Nietzsche will  come to repeat the originary 
Greek  experience  of  φύσις in  an  essential  way  (the  “new  interpretation  of 
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sensuousness” in  NI)  Heidegger understands him to ultimately think being on the 
basis of beings: he will conflate beings as a whole and being as such. This is the high-
point  of  Heidegger's  meditation  on  the  possibility  of  taking  life  as  the  horizon  of 
thinking: life ultimately cannot bring to word the originary experience of  φύσις. The 
bases for Heidegger's reasoning - the conceptual structures that he will use to establish 
this claim, and ultimately demarcate the space for this decision regarding “life” as a 
translation  of  φύσις –  are  formed where  he  lays  out  the  fundamental  problem of 
attempting to think the originary unity of world and individuation in his analysis of 
boredom. The end-point is Heidegger's insistence that perspectives and horizons are 
peculiarly  human,  as  they are  part  of  the  ontological  structure  of  Dasein,  not  life,  
which will constitute the main thought of 'Part Two'. This metaphysical thread must be 
followed from its inception in the 'Preliminary Appraisal',  through its development 
both in 'Part One' and 'Part Two', to its completion in NIII. 
4. Conclusions - The Repetitive Tasks of Philosophy: the Fundamental 
Concepts and History
At the close of the sections on boredom, we are left with the question of the underlying 
unity of two orientations towards being. These two orientations themselves form the 
following questions:
• What is world? In response to 'the expanse of this “as a whole”, which manifests 
itself in profound boredom, as world [...] we must ask: what is world?'129
129  FCM, §39
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• What  is  Individuation?  The  moment  of  vision  is  'the  look  of  resolute 
disclosedness of Dasein for its Da-sein, a Da-sein that in each case is as existing 
[...] which is always singular and unique'.130
As experienced from within profound boredom, these two questions are maintained in 
their opposition and original unity (ursprungliche einheit) by a “structural link” (Fuge): 
they are internally referred to each other. These aspects were shown to be  essentially 
graspable  only in  terms of  their  linkage:  'what  kind of  “and” is  it  that  links  these 
terms?'131 The  character  of  this  link,  the  oscillation  between the  extremity  of  what 
makes Dasein possible and the expanse of beings as a whole within Dasein finds itself, 
is the ground of the third fundamental question of metaphysics, 'What does finitude  
mean?'132 
Returning to a discussion of these fundamental concepts, Heidegger points out that the 
introduction  of  these  metaphysical  questions  in  the  'Preliminary  Appraisal'  was 
'arbitrary  and  violent'.133 In  so  doing,  he  is  not  belatedly  justifying  their  initial 
inclusion, but rather, pointing toward the impossibility of their being understood in 
their  essential  importance  without  the  development  of  an appropriate  context  and 
mode of approach. Regarding their origin, he claims the following:
These  questions  do  not  arise  from  books,  they  have  not  been  culled  by 
adaptation from a variety of philosophical schools, nor have they merely been 
repeated in obeisance to a trivialised metaphysical tradition.134
130  Ibid. 
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 FCM, §39.
134 Ibid.
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From whence do they arise then?135 Heidegger provides the following account:
Only when these questions are rooted in the place from which we now see 
them  arising,  and  only  when  they  remain  rooted  there,  do  they  represent 
genuine questions. Yet if they are genuine in this way, then they are not new. 
However if they are not new, they are not old either. Neither old or new these 
questions are essential questions.136
What is genuinely philosophical is not novel. In being “rooted in place” within the 
fundamental attunement of boredom, the questions are seemingly placed back into the 
transhistorical,  ontological  structures  of  Dasein.137 Boredom  is  the  fundamental 
attunement  of  contemporary  man,  and  as  such,  it  is  epochal  and  therefore  not  a 
transhistorical ground for thinking, but an historically rooted one. Boredom ultimately 
implicates  the  temporality  of  Dasein,  which  means  that  underlying  the  three 
metaphysical questions developed from boredom is the question of the essence of time: 
'the  question  concerning  the  essence  of  time  is  the  origin  of  all  the  questions  of  
metaphysics and of their potential unfolding'.138 Whilst this may seem to suggest that it 
is in fact a transhistorical matter, Heidegger states the following:
Whether in fact the problematic of metaphysics must always be developed on 
the basis of the temporality of Dasein, however, cannot be objectively decided 
for the whole of world history, as it were. The possibility of a different kind of 
135  It should be clear from the work of Beistegui, presented in the previous chapter, that, in emerging 
from within the account of boredom, these questions have a peculiar historicity. Initially, and perhaps 
without this background of Beistegui's reading, it would appear as though Heidegger were presenting 
these questions as thoroughly transhistorical - as, following from the negative account of their origin. 
136 FCM, §39.
137 Whilst this is to some extent true, it is clear from Beistegui's analysis that it is not the whole story. The 
major  difference  between  previous  phenomenological  analyses  in  Heidegger's  oeuvre  and  that  of 
boredom in FCM was shown to be the manner in which history comes to the fore.
138 Ibid.
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necessary grounding for metaphysics must remain open.139
This is a recognition of the historical embeddedness of the attempt to open essential 
questions. In this sense, metaphysics operates from within an entirely different and 
more  profound  temporality  than  simply  “transhistorical”  or  “historically  rooted”. 
Philosophy can at  no point  posit  itself  as  capable  of  producing,  or  engaging with, 
universally valid knowledge. How then are we to understand its peculiar historicality, 
temporality and indeed identity?
In  repeating  the  demands  and  directions  first  expressed  at  the  end  of  'Part  One', 
Heidegger continues to use a language of repetition and recall:
Man must first resolutely open himself up to this demand again [...]
[...] this liberation [of the Dasein in man] is the task laid on us to assume once  
more our very Dasein as an actual burden.
It is a matter of Dasein first becoming transparent to itself again.140
This  is  what  is  at  stake  in  asking  questions  of  a  genuinely  metaphysical  nature: 
repeating something essential, repeating the Dasein in man. Heidegger returns to the 
theme of the 'Preliminary Appraisal' and suggests that the task of philosophy itself is 
'not  to  describe  the  consciousness  of  man  but  to  evoke  the  Dasein  in  man'.  Philosophy, 
according  to  its  own  rigours,  is  primarily  concerned  with  'sober  conceptual 
questioning',  but only ever with an eye to maintaining a particular openness – the 
openness of an “interrogative space”. In thus defining philosophy, Heidegger delimits 
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid. Italics are my own. My emphasis.
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its powers, stating that it is not philosophy as such which can take up this burden of  
existence and transform it.  Philosophy can only be preparatory:  it is  the questioning 
process through which Dasein is gathered and projected onto the 'brink of possibility, 
the possibility of restoring Dasein to its actuality, that is, its existence'.141
Heidegger does not expand upon precisely what this means, he merely indicates that 
in being properly “penultimate” in this sense, philosophy has to project itself onto, and 
begin to form an understanding of, what it is preparatory for. The actual activity of 
moving beyond philosophy, so to speak, is described by Heidegger as “individual action 
itself”, wherein the line between philosophy as preparation and that which it prepares 
for cannot be navigated in another manner than a leap. This is the precise matter of  
Auseinandersetzung:  the  process  of  self-determination  as  it  is  caught  up  in  a 
confrontation  with  its  unrelenting  identity  with  that  which  went  before. In 
Auseinandersetzung the  preparation,  and  that  which  is  prepared  for,  are  brought 
together.  To  Auseinandersetzung  there  belongs  a  critical  movement  which  serves  to 
identify the initial lying together of that which confronts and that which is confronted. 
It is only on the basis of this initial togetherness that a separation can be effected. This 
line  of  separation  and  identity  is  the  central  matter  of  Heidegger's  Nietzsche 
interpretation.142 As such, the line of thinking developed in FCM achieves its fruition in 
this engagement.
Heidegger  develops  his  notion  of  the  historicity  of  the  history  of  philosophy  as 
141 FCM, §40.
142 In my reading of the movement of Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation between NI and NIII,  on the 
matter of life, I will show how Heidegger fleshes out the thought raised here in FCM In this regard I do 
not consider FCM to house a pre-figuration of later thoughts, but to be intentionally opening up issues 
that will be directly taken up in later, more directed readings of history.
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repetition, again, turning to the absolute character of philosophy (separate from the 
rigours  of  the  sciences  and  thus  from  the  ideal  of  certainty).  Returning  to  the 
opposition between the demands of “everyday awareness” (alltäglichen Bewußtsein) and 
those  of  philosophy,  Heidegger  suggests  that  everyday  awareness,  using  its 
counterpart “common sense”,  considers  the activity of philosophy to be secondary, 
trivial and self-evident. On this basis, the activity of philosophy throughout history 
(the history of philosophy itself) appears to common sense to be 'perennially the same'.
143 This representation of philosophy as “philosophia perennis” denotes common sense's 
inability  to  properly  grasp  the  self-sameness  of  genuine  philosophising,  thus  its 
attempt at organising 'the history of philosophy from a standpoint outside philosophy 
itself'.144 It is indeed the case that '[a]ll great and genuine philosophy moves within the 
limited sphere of a few questions',  however,  these questions are in fact 'necessarily 
different in every instance of philosophizing'.145
Different not in any merely external sense, but rather in such a way that the self-
same is in each case essentially transformed once more [...] This transformation 
lends  a  properly  primordial  historicity  to  the  occurrence  of  the  history  of 
philosophizing, a historicity which makes its own demands (sacrifice,  being 
overcome).146
Philosophy is not a purely transhistorical enterprise, but one which takes place from 
within its own historical occurrence, but always with recourse to a primordiality and 
an  essentiality  (an  ownmost  difference).  The  identity  of  any  occurrence  of 
philosophising itself is only maintained within a certain relation to that which is self-
same in all philosophising. In this sense the originality of any philosophy has to be 
143 FCM, §41
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
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understood in terms of its  reproduction of the originary character of philosophy: a 
repetition of the same, that nonetheless, involves essential difference. Philosophy is not 
engaged in a process of self-surpassing, wherein it moves outward toward the goal of 
its  own perfection.  Self-overcoming posits  a  different model,  one which discounts  a 
straightforward concept of progress, a concept which is salient and evident within the 
history of the sciences. The character of philosophical-historical interactions is thus not 
posited by Heidegger as being based on oppositions,  refutations and supersedings. 
Such a  view of  the  history of  philosophy remains trapped within common sense's 
conception  of  philosophy  as  subordinate  to  the  ideal  of  certainty.147 The  matter  of 
philosophy's  relation  to  itself,  the  matter  of  starting  to  philosophise  for  ourselves 
rather than merely effect a brute repetition or destruction of that which went before, is  
a matter of confrontation, overcoming and transformation, but not a matter of going 
merely contra to that which has come before, or offering a corrective to those thoughts 
that precede our own.
147 Unable to understand the essential difference between various occurrences of genuine philosophy, and 
yet unable to successfully gather all philosophy under a single idea (i.e., as a result of an inability to 
neither understand the identity nor the difference), common sense is forced to 'regard the history of 
philosophy as a kind of madhouse in which everyone attempts to obliterate his opponent and produce 
some new opinion of his own'. FCM, §41.
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Chapter 4. FCM Part Two: The Comparative  
analysis of World
Introduction
The treatment of  FCM  by Heidegger scholars has been one of exclusion. Those that 
posit  FCM as  an  exception  in  the  Heideggerian  corpus  do  so  on  the  basis  that  it 
contains  an  attempt  at  “theoretical  biology”.  Having  established  the  philosophical 
context for the latter parts of this text,  in this chapter I  aim to further develop my 
reading  of  FCM as  a  whole,  establishing  the  position  of  FCM within  Heidegger's 
movement toward an intense engagement with the matter of history itself, specifically 
as an encounter with Nietzsche. 
In  chapter  1,  “life”  was  established  as  a  rubric  beneath  which  various  problems 
associated with anthropology, anthropomorphism and the animal other were collected. 
Krell,  took 'Part Two' of  FCM as defining the being of living entities in a privative 
manner on the basis of a prior working out, and subsequent privileging, of the being of 
Dasein. Krell, and those he has influenced, consider this to be an unthinking return to 
onto-theological  structures of  man's  transcendence in the name of  rescuing meaning 
from the nihilistic, chaotic and meaningless forces of life. Heidegger is understood to 
resist the possibility that Dasein is a being of the same order as all others in nature, in 
order to  retain an inviolable ground for meaning. Here, there is an implicit historical 
challenge  presented  to  Heidegger's  work.  Heidegger's  response  to  Nietzsche's 
breaking-down of the transcendent foundations of thought is represented as the brute 
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repetition of,  and thus  return to,  these  very structures.  In  this  sense,  Heidegger is 
positioned as directly, simply contra Nietzsche.
I  will  not  claim  that  Krellian  inspired  critiques  are  wrong.  Heidegger  does  make 
recourse to the structures of Man's transcendence in order to combat the manner in 
which contemporary “philosophy” 'unties us from ourselves', and does so 'precisely as 
anthropology'.1 However, it is my contention that this is not the result of ignorance 
regarding the power of the challenge that the problems of life pose. Rather, it arises 
from an account of the manner in which thinking man under the rubric of life is itself  
grounded in deeply problematic interpretations of world, finitude and solitude. Read 
in context, the sections on animals and stones are clearly not attempts at surpassing the 
problems of life in the direction of a better, and as yet unrealised, ideal for thinking 
(i.e., Being vs. Life), but rather, an attempt to gather these problems in a way that will 
access  the  more  vital  tensions  covered  over  by,  what  Heidegger  terms,  the 
anthropological approach. Rather than representing a forgetting, or side-stepping, of 
the  deeply  profound challenge  of  Nietzsche  regarding  both  history  and life,  FCM 
explicitly demands an engagement with Nietzsche, and, as such, can be understood to 
be propadeutic for precisely this most philosophical of tasks.2
This chapter will proceed by first showing that Heidegger's comparative analysis of 
world (which contains his claims about life) is an overridingly historical exercise. By 
this I mean that he is at once doing history, and at the same time aware of the historical  
1 FCM, §18, c).
2 Beyond its archival relevance, in eradicating the exceptionality of this intense engagement with life, I  
will  present  NIII as  the  ultimate  culmination of  the  project  of  FCM as  a whole,  thus  providing a 
privileged point of access to the matter of life between Nietzsche and Heidegger. Allowing for a deeper 
understanding of Heidegger's Nietzsche, and thus a deeper understanding of Heidegger's discussion 
of life in FCM.
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status of his own claims. To this end, I will indicate the specific notion of history that 
Heidegger is working within, as established in FCM and chapter 3 of this thesis. Once 
this methodological context has been determined, I will provide an exegetical account 
of his historical analysis of world in OEG in order to further deepen the specific context 
within which the comparative analysis of world arises. This will serve to disrupt the 
connections between BT and FCM, thus allowing for Heidegger's thoughts regarding 
the  status  of  a  potential  ontology  of  life/theoretical  biology  to  be  more  genuinely 
grasped.  Finally  I  will  examine his  comparative analysis  of  world and establish its 
genuine  nature  as  contextualised  within  FCM  as  a  whole.  This  potential  re-
configuration  of  ideas  and  contexts  will  allow  for  an  alternative  trajectory  of 
Heidegger's handling of life to emerge from my reading of his comparative analysis of 
world. 
1. The History of 'Part Two': Repeating the question of World. 
It is evident that FCM, along with BT is an unfinished project. 'Part Two' is devoted to 
the  question  of  World,  but  also,  later,  to  developing the  remaining two questions. 
Asking after one aspect of metaphysics (i.e., the question of world), cannot involve an 
abstraction from the other aspects with which it is intrinsically connected. In taking the 
first  question  first,  asking  “What  is  world?”,  the  other  two  questions  “What  is 
Individuation?”  and  “What  is  finitude?”  must  not  be  left  behind.  However,  these 
remaining two questions are not forwarded in their own right within the confines of 
FCM. They  are  only  accessed  via  a  foray  into  “world”.  This  does  not  indicate  a 
hierarchy.
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Our questions were posed in the following order: [1.] What is world? [2.] What 
is  finitude? [3.]  What is individuation? We have developed them in such a 
way, however, that finitude emerged as the third and pressing question. Yet 
third in what sense? As the unifying and original root of the other two [...]  
however, we shall only be able to engage with this one in third place.
World is not privileged over and above its counterpart: there is no intention to separate 
the question of world off from its ultimate realisation in a subsequent questioning of its 
structural linking with its structural counterpart (its jointure and that to which it is 
joined). In the “Editor's Epilogue”3 there is no mention of the unfinished nature of the 
project. There is, however, a strangely direct connection made between 'Part Two' and 
§12 of BT. In BT Heidegger states the following with regard to the biological notion of 
environment (Umwelt):
Yet,  even as an  a priori  condition for the objects which biology takes for its 
theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been 
conceived beforehand as a structure of Dasein. Only in terms of an orientation 
towards the ontological structure thus conceived can 'life' as a state of Being be 
defined a priori, and this must be done in a privative manner.4
In pointing to this section, Herrmann claims that ‘Part Two’ is an attempt 'to determine 
the essence of life' that seeks to take up and fully expound the above claim. 5 Using 
McNeill,  I  will  show  that  this  is  not  the  case.  The  efforts  of  'Part  Two'  directly 
problematise the above statement rather than pursue its same ends. This point is the 
crux of Krellian criticisms of Heidegger's handling of life. As Beistegui showed, there 
are profound differences between the scope and approach of BT and FCM. In thinking 
'Part Two' as continuous with the thoughts of §12 of BT, the intent, and indeed content, 
3  by F.-W. v. Herrmann.
4 BT, §12 (p84-85)
5 FCM, “Editor's Epilogue”, p372
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of Heidegger's world analysis is characterised from a standpoint outside of that which 
it tries to develop. Heidegger does make direct reference to his efforts in  BT  at the 
outset of his world analysis in FCM, but, the connection he makes is not as strong as 
Herrmann maintains. Heidegger points toward his attempt to think world from our 
everyday world in  BT, claiming that, following this everyday analysis of world, 'the 
task is to press on and point out the phenomenon of world as a problem',  a problem 
that re-invokes the metaphor of the inverted world.6 In this sense, what has preceded 
the prospective world analysis of FCM (i.e., the 'Preliminary Appraisal' and 'Part One') 
can be understood as a process of its differentiation from the mode of analysis of BT as, 
precisely, its problematisation. The seeming claims towards universality and a priori 
methodologies of BT must be suspended accordingly. In the conclusive sections of this 
chapter I will return to §10 and §12 of BT in order to fully articulate the difference in 
stance with regard to an “ontology of life”.
Aside  from  BT,  in  FCM Heidegger  also  points  toward  a  less  problematic,  more 
contemporary  engagement  with  world,  that  of  OEG Heidegger  indicates  that  the 
analysis contained therein focused on the history of the term “world”, suggesting that 
it  is  necessary to be familiar with this text in order to clearly understand what the  
problem of world is, such that it can be properly understood as a fundamental problem 
of  metaphysics.  As  such,  it  is  important  to  understand  FCM  as  in  some  way  a 
continuation of the work of OEG rather than BT.
6 FCM,  §42.  With regard to  the  inverted world metaphor Heidegger says  the  following in order to 
distance the methodological approach taken by Division One of  BT from the efforts of  FCM:  'That 
which is so close and intelligible to us in our everyday dealings is actually and fundamentally remote 
and unintelligible to us [...]  It  never occured to  me,  however,  to  try and claim or  prove with this 
interpretation that the essence of man consists in the fact that he knows how to handle knives and forks 
or use the tram.' From…..
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2. Approaching World in FCM – Section II of OEG
2.1 The History of “World”
By means of a summary of OEG Heidegger gives 'a very general indication' of how the 
'problem  of  world  initially  arises'.7 Here  Heidegger  indicates  the  depth  of  his 
indebtedness to Nietzsche.8 He informs us that the notion of world as passed down 
from the Greeks through the Christians locates man in a specific position: 
man is not simply regarded as a part of the world within which he appears […] 
man also stands over against the world.9
The character of this “standing over” maintains man in a position of servitude but also 
masterhood of the world. Heidegger states that it is precisely this “ambivalent position” 
which is named by the term “world”, and suggests that his historical analysis brings 
these  positions  into  'sharper  focus'.  One  of  Heidegger's  major  concerns  regarding 
Nietzsche is the extent to which, when attempting to re-naturalise man, he maintains a 
call for mastery over nature itself, a move which bolsters the conception of finitude as a 
mere privative form of the infinite. The manner in which world is bound up with this  
confusion of what properly constitutes finitude is tackled in OEG, which in turn clears 
a path toward a deeper understanding of Heidegger's claims about world and finitude 
in FCM.10
7 FCM, §42.
8 And of course the whole history of German philosophising of which Nietzsche marks the latest and 
highest point
9 FCM, §42.
10 To re-iterate,  this  is  the  connection  and  the  context  that  Heidegger  himself  points  toward  at  the 
opening of 'Part Two'.
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2.2. Transcendence
Arising within an analysis of the “essence of ground”, i.e., what constitutes the proper 
being of a ground (Grund),  Heidegger addresses the most basic and broad sense of 
λόγος: that it is an ontological concept. It is an understanding of being that 'guides and 
illuminates in advance all comportment towards beings', but in so doing, is neither a 
'categorial-metaphysical'  grasping  of  being,  nor  a  conceptual  understanding  of 
whatever  is  in  fact  grasped/unconcealed  by  this  initial  comportment.11 This 
unconcealment is the ground of all ontic truth (predicative truth). Rather than being 
merely the ground of ontic truth at an ontological level, unconcealment is 'always truth 
of the being of beings'. It is truth of a particular order, and therefore points toward the 
essence of truth. In this sense ground and truth are brought together. Here, Heidegger 
is  claiming  that  there  are  two  distinct  and  diverse  aspects of  truth  which  'belong 
essentially together on the grounds of their relation to the distinction between being and  
beings  (ontological  difference)'.12 The  ground of  all  truth  then (and the  truth  of  all 
ground), is the originary unity of two orientations towards being:
The essence of truth in general, which is thus necessarily forked in terms of the 
ontic and the ontological, is possible only together with the irruption of this 
distinction.13
The  nature  of  this  irruptive  distinction  between  being  and  beings  (ontological 
difference itself) is formulated as a problem of ground and of truth for the following 
reasons:
11 OEG, 104.
12 Ibid, 105.
13 Ibid, 105-106.
157
The ambiguous nature of this distinction: in terms of what has gone before, a 
step toward its overcoming, and yet a fateful link back to it that obstructs every 
path toward the originary “unity” and hence also to the truth of the distinction
14
The ground of  this  moment of  the grounding of  ontic  truth is  the  transcendence of 
Dasein, as the λόγος itself is not a part of that which is cleared, but the movement of 
clearing itself.15 In line with this the question of the essence of ontic truth (the essence 
of ground), the question of ontological truth (the essence of truth) and the question of 
ontological  difference  (transcendence)  lie  together  in  the  same manner  that  world, 
individuation and finitude do in  FCM, which is to say, two diverse aspects and their 
unity. To question one aspect of this triad is to question all of them. Committing the 
remainder of his treatise (OEG) to an examination of the question of the essence of 
ground as the problem of transcendence (and thus the matter of the unity/conjunction of 
truth, ground and transcendence), gives rise to the discussion of World towards which 
Heidegger points in FCM. 
Heidegger  turns,  first  of  all,  to  a  terminological  analysis.  Transcendence,  as  an 
occurrence, is a surpassing: passing from something to something; passing towards 
something  and  away  from  something.  As  transcendence and  not  merely  “the 
transcendent” or “the transcended”, Dasein cannot be thought of as a surpassing in 
spatial  terms.  Thinking  Dasein  in  terms  of  a  boundary  or  a  gap  becomes 
methodologically  problematic,  as  ontic-spatiality  is  dependent  upon  ontological-
spatiality, wherein the concepts of boundaries, horizons and gaps remain ambiguous 
14 Ibid, 105.
15 Ibid, 106.
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and indistinct.  Reducing the  issue  of  transcendence  to  an intentional  problem that 
focuses  on  the  character  of  the  'subject-object  relation'  covers  over  ontological 
difference by only ever referring to ontic structures. If we accept that the λόγος is the 
ground of ontic truths (facts), an investigation into the λόγος cannot begin within the 
divisions which it grounds. To think  transcendence in opposition to  immanence, is, on 
Heidegger's terms, to misunderstand the ontological character of transcendence as an 
occurrence of Dasein's essence. If structured by such a schematic opposition, the truly 
positive  character  of  transcendence  will  not  be  grasped,  and,  accordingly,  as  an 
essential activity of Dasein, nor will the essence of Dasein as transcendence. This is the 
precise issue that faces Heidegger at the end of the boredom analysis: how to access 
the  essential unity  of  two  diverse  aspects,  how  to  understand  transcendence  as  a 
unifying rather than surpassing or separating movement.
It  is  only  when  thought  in  terms  of  the  subject-object  divide  that  Dasein's 
transcendence would either be constituted by the surpassing of a boundary (wherein 
“immanence”  would  be  to  remain  inside  this  boundary)  or  the  production/pre-
existence of a gap that separates it from objects. This distinction holds true for that 
towards which Dasein transcends as well as that which it is transcendent of: objects are 
not that which is transcended, rather it is 'precisely and solely beings themselves, indeed 
every being that can be or become unconcealed for Dasein, thus including precisely that 
being as which “it itself” exists'.16 Heidegger goes on:
In this surpassing, Dasein for the first time comes toward that being it is, and 
comes toward it as it “itself.” Transcendence constitutes selfhood.'17 
16 Ibid, 108. In the language of FCM, this would be beings as a whole that Dasein transcends.
17 Ibid.
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Only from within this peculiar form of self-transcending/surpassing can those beings 
which Dasein is not (as well as the being that it is) be distinguished. This distinction 
does not occur as an epiphenomenon of a pure self-relation that is transcendence, but 
occurs equiprimordially, meaning that Dasein does not first exist within beings as one 
alongside others (immanence).
Although it exists in the midst of beings and embraced by them, Dasein as 
existing has always already surpassed nature.18
2.3 World as a Transcendental Phenomenon
2.3.1 The meaning of “World”
Nature is not an 'aggregate' of beings (or a specific region of beings such as 'natural'  
beings) that Dasein transcends, but rather, beings as a whole. Transcendence, then, is 
further  clarified as  surpassing  occurring  as  a  whole,  which  is  to  say,  it  is  never  a 
surpassing of this or that, and never a surpassing that occurs at certain times and not 
others,  but  a  having  always  already  surpassed  in  advance.  Heidegger  names  this 
structure (the structure of transcendence)  being-in-the-world.  World is understood as 
that  towards  which  Dasein  transcends  and  that  which  it  transcends,  'world  co-
constitutes the unitary structure of transcendence'.19 Attempting to draw out, and draw 
upon  Kant's  establishment  of  the  transcendental  as  an  expressly  ontological 
problematic rather than a purely epistemological one, Heidegger sets the agenda for 
his  ensuing  examination  of  world,  by  pursuing  an  account  of  its  'transcendental' 
18 Ibid, 109.
19 Ibid.
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character.
Continuing the discussion of why being-in-the-world would be not just constitutive, but 
distinctive of Dasein's essence, Heidegger clarifies the meaning of “world”. If “world” 
were to designate the totality of beings, and thus indicate that Dasein's being-in-the-
world was as a being that happens to 'crop up' amongst other beings that are 'already 
there as present-at-hand', then it could not be said to be an essential (and therefore  
distinctive)  ontological  characteristic  of  Dasein,  as  it  would  also  hold  for  all  other 
beings that are present within this totality. Such an understanding would be operating 
at the factical level, i.e., taking as its “decisive criterion” 'whether factical Dasein exists 
or not'.20 Taking the issue of transcendence to persist at the ontological level, Heidegger 
states  that  Dasein's  transcendence  is  not  grounded  in  its  factical  existence:  its 
ontological character does not derive from its occurrence  alongside other beings, but 
moreover, its ability to exist in varying ontic situations is itself grounded in its essential 
constitution as a transcendence. Seemingly moving in circles, Heidegger summarises 
his  progression by claiming that  he  has  shown the  issue of  transcendence  to  be  a 
problem that requires a more originary/ontological understanding of the phenomenon 
of world, as the path of assertion and statements relating to ontic states of being has 
proven to be ungrounded. By inquiring into ground in such a manner, the meaning of 
“world” becomes expressly taken up in order to set the context for the discussion of 
world as a 'transcendental phenomenon'.21 
This examination starts with brief references to Melissus and Parmenides in order to 
show that κόσμος (the original Greek term for “world”) does not refer to a totality of 
20 Ibid, 110.
21 Ibid 111
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objects as a distinct realm that stands opposed to a realm of entities of another order. 
Rather, world denotes a certain structuring of beings, or way of being, namely, world-
order (eon as kata kosmon). “World”, in its broadest and most primordial sense, denotes 
a state of affairs, 'i.e., how beings, and indeed beings as a whole, are'.22 World itself exists 
prior to any delimitation, it is not opposed to or limited by beings in some manner, it is 
itself a limit and  measure of beings. Any delimitation, ordering, or fragmentation of 
world does not pertain to anything outside of itself (another being or set of beings) and 
does not  indicate a state  of  decay from a pre-established,  pure  unity.23 Rather,  any 
fragmentation is grounded in this 'how as a whole'.24
Whilst recognising that these dimensions of κόσμος are present in its Greek conceptual 
instantiation, Heidegger turns to a narrower meaning of the word. Most often used as 
the term for those beings that are experienced from out of this underlying state of  
affairs (i.e., world as the sum total of worldly beings), the specific way in which the 
relation between man and world is thought in this narrower manner is considered with 
reference to Christianity's uptake of the term as denoting a specifically human mode of 
existence. According to Heidegger, “world”, with  The Gospel according to St John, is 
reduced to an anthropological concept that places worldly being opposite godly being, 
22 Ibid. – this is taken from Parmenides Fragment 4 not 2 as indicated in the text. 
23 Such is the teaching of Anaximander according to Heidegger.
24 Ibid. In an interesting turn for my claim that Heidegger is specifically attentive to, and attempts to  
think from within, Greek thought regarding waking and sleep, the discussion turns to Heraclitus in 
order to show how world is essentially relative to man. To those who are awake there belongs a single and  
therefore common world, whereas whoever is asleep turns toward a world of his own.  [Ibid, 112. Original: ὁ 
Ἡράκλειτός φησι τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσµον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιµωµένων ἕκαστον εἰς 
ἴδιον  ἀποστρέφεσθαι.  More  common  translation:  The  waking  have  one  common  world,  but  the 
sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own]. Once again, the two basic modes of Dasein's relation 
to world are forwarded as being waking and sleeping, where sleeping is a mode of being in which the 
world  becomes  entirely  relative  to  each  particular  Dasein,  echoing  the  previously  mentioned 
Aristotelian notion of sleep being a form of boundedness wherein other entities that we are not cannot  
be  encountered.  The  key  connection  here  is  the  continued  relevance  of  sleep  and  waking  to  the 
structures within which beings as a whole are limited and given measure, i.e., the interconnectedness 
of the concepts of waking, sleeping, world and limitation.
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thus instantiating “world” as a term which designates a region of being (that of being 
merely human). Through Aquinas and into Baumgarten, Heidegger tracks the manner 
in  which  this  contradistinction  of  world  and  God  becomes  sharper.  Quoting 
Baumgarten's definition of world as 'that series of actually existing, finite things that is  
not equivalent to anything else',  the concept of world becomes 'dependent upon an 
understanding  of  the  essence  and  possibility  of  proofs  of  God.'25 In  this  manner, 
investigations  into  world  become  subordinate  to  classical  ontology  and  theology 
(hence  ontotheology),  and  world  is  limited  to  the  status  of  a  regional  term  that 
designates the 'highest unity of association in the totality of created beings.'26 It is only 
with  Kant  that  the  term's  originary  meaning  attains  something  of  a  conceptual 
articulation  within  metaphysical  investigations  once  again.  Accordingly,  Heidegger 
conducts a brief examination of Kant's thoughts on this matter.27 
2.3.2. Kant's metaphysical interpretation of world
Heidegger  starts  by  picking  out  an  early  definition  of  “world”  from  Kant's  1770 
'Dissertation',  where  world  is  determined  as  something  akin  to  a  synthesis  of  the 
following moments: Matter, Form and Totality. These are understood transcendentally 
(in a Kantian sense) as substances, their coordination and the absolute totality of their 
conjoining. Kant, himself, notes that the perspicacity of this totality is deceiving, and, 
upon closer inspection, is problematic. In the ensuing analysis of how this problem is 
both articulated and resolved in the Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger concentrates on 
25 OEG, 114
26 Ibid, 115
27 Heidegger's examination of Kantian metaphysics in OEG is grounded in his lecture course of 1927/8, 
[Heidegger, M. Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (GA 25). Trans. Parvis 
Emad and Kenneth Maly (Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1997)] allowing him to present his 
thoughts in OEG in a more thematic fashion. 
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the manner in which the transcendental is continually referred to as the totality of all 
finite entities that does not itself partake in finitude, which is to say, the unconditioned 
condition of all conditions. In explaining the formation of ideas, Heidegger shows that 
the  unity  of  finite  objects  (world)  is  not  derived  from  the  character  of  their  ontic 
actuality, but ontologically, according to the principles of ground (i.e., according to the 
structures of the finite knowing which determines finite objects in their finitude, as 
appearances). The concept of the unity of all appearances is only conceivable as itself 
complete (as the unity of a manifold of appearances) if no longer referred to finitude , 
i.e., not considered to be empirically knowable where it would be reduced to being 
factically contingent. This generates a notion of world as the whole of appearances as 
provided by reason alone: world is not arbitrarily or contingently determined, but is as 
a result of its very nature. This means that world, eventually defined as the idea of the 
unity  of  all  appearances,  relates  to the entirety of  understanding,  but as  its  higher 
unity, its transcendental unity, and thus as the condition of possibility of there being 
any givenness.  Ideas are inferential (purely operating from out of the procedure of 
inference), whereas the understanding is always referential, caught in the movement of 
incompleteness that characterises givenness/contingency.
With  the  establishment  of  “world”  as  an  idea  of  reason,  it  still  refers  to  a 
transcendental state of affairs rather than an ontic relating of things, but it no longer 
denotes  a  coordination, as  was  the  case  with  the  κόσμος of  Parmenides,  but  a 
subordination:  'the  increasing  series  of  conditions  of  synthesis,  up  to  the 
unconditioned'.28 The remaining unity of both matter and its  ordering is no longer 
undetermined  and  lacking  perspicacity,  but  is  'determined  as  an  idea  [...]  and  is 
28 OEG, 118
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distinguished from concepts of the understanding'.29 In the Dissertation, Kant ascribed a 
universality  to  this  unity:  as  a  totality  it  spoke  of  the  totality  of  the  universe  (i.e.  
mundus thought as κόσμος), but with CPR this character is passed over to a yet higher 
order of ideas: the transcendental ideal. Heidegger claims that, ultimately for Kant, the 
concept “world” sits between possible experience and the transcendental ideal, as the 
transcendental ideal is completely divorced from givenness/finitude, whereas world is 
still related to finite objects as their non-finite totality.
Transcendence  is  ambivalent,  as,  in  the  context  of  world,  it  represents  the 
transcendence of  experience from 'within  experience,  exceeding that  which is  given 
within it  as  such,  namely the manifold of  experiences'.  Yet  from the context of the 
transcendental  ideal,  it  means  'stepping  out  of  experience  as  finite  knowledge 
altogether.'30 The  overarching  result  is  the  presentation  of  world  as  the  totality  of 
human knowledge, understood in contradistinction to, and as the restriction of, infinite 
knowing. Accordingly, knowledge of the world (thought as a secondary existentiell) is, 
for Kant, not knowledge of man's physiological being (his appearance alongside other 
living beings), but knowledge of 'what he makes, or can, or ought to make of himself  
as a freely acting being' (governed by ideas). As such, worldly knowledge does not 
pertain to abstract relations, but seeks to grasp man as anthropological, as he exists as a 
player within the “game of life”.31
In thinking world in this way, Kant recalls the originary meaning of  κόσμος with a 
renewed,  and  arguable  more  perspicacious,  conceptual  articulation.  Kant's 
29 Ibid, 118
30 Ibid, 119
31 Ibid, 120
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understanding of world pertains to both the totality of natural things, and the personal 
world of the human being.32 Kant shows that 'world belongs to a relational structure 
distinctive of  Dasein as  such'  and that  investigations into the meaning of  the term 
“world” are 'directed toward an interpretation of  human existence  in its  relation to  
beings-as-a-whole.'33 In  this  sense,  as  indicated  in  the  'Preliminary  Appraisal',  the 
comprehender  is  comprehended  in  the  comprehension  of  the  whole.  Hence 
Heidegger's perception of Kant as metaphysical in a non-derogatory manner.
The  issue  of  subjectivity  and  transcendence  is,  by  way  of  conclusion  to  the  Kant 
exegesis, further clarified. Whilst an analysis of world is bound up with thinking about 
transcendence,  the relational structure of Dasein and world does not pertain at the 
level of subjectivity as conceived in terms of a subject-object schema, as world is not a 
being to which Dasein as another being relates. This does not remove the peculiarly 
subjective status of world, i.e., the fact that it is bound inextricably to Dasein, but it  
does dismiss the idea that world is subjugated to a purely internal sphere of Dasein.  
The task at hand is to elucidate this issue of transcendence/world, in such a manner 
that subjectivity itself is more thoroughly determined.
With  Kant,  on  the  basis  of  the  certainty  of  knowledge  grounded  in  the  subject,  
knowledge  of  the  human  becomes  sufficient  for  knowledge  of  the  world.  World 
becomes, in all aspects, grounded in the subject, at the transcendental level and the 
anthropological level. This means that all other entities within the world are thought 
on the basis  of  the structures of  subjectivity and the specific  manner in which the 
32 But he does not fall foul of Heraclitus' teaching in Fragment 89: world is not restricted to being one or  
the other.
33 Ibid, 121
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subject transcends, which, in Kant is the complete transcendence of the finite. Within 
the  recognition  of  ontological  difference,  transcendence,  for  Heidegger,  cannot  be 
thought of as a transcending of world from  out of world, but transcending  within it. 
Kant subordinates the matter of world to the manner of its ordering, thus installing the 
structure of transcendence as that which moves away from a boundary. Heidegger is 
clearly  aware  of  the  dangers  of  re-establishing  onto-theological  structures  of 
transcendence, i.e., thinking the finite as a restricted mode of the infinite.
2.4. Return to FCM
In  FCM,  Heidegger's  discussion of  “life”  emerges  within his  investigation  of  what 
constitutes world. The essence of life is raised as matter of establishing the manner in 
which other entities have world, yet not perhaps in the same way as Dasein. Krellian 
critiques  of  FCM accuse  Heidegger of  thinking “life”  (as  the  realm of  other  living 
entities  that  we find ourselves with in the world)  privatively as  a result  of  the re-
inscription of the structures of the transcendence of the subject. If Heidegger is offering 
an interpretation of the living as a domain of beings thought simply privatively in 
relation to Dasein in terms of a hierarchy of world, it would be farcical, as he would be 
simply re-inscribing this Kantian position that he goes to great pains to recognise. If 
FCM is to remain at all interesting, there must be a way of reading it that problematises 
Krellian-style criticisms. Such a reading has to have an eye for life-philosophy not as 
the  perpetually  unthought  in  FCM  (wherein  it  structures  the  entire  argument  and 
seeps in unwanted), but as being the explicit subject of an attempt at philosophically 
thinking the essence of life as it is forwarded within the contemporary.
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FCM  operates  from  within  the  peculiar  movement  of  philosophy's  historicity  (as 
overcoming), which retains an ambiguity in relation to the prospective completion of 
metaphysics.  Rather  than  thinking  life  privatively,  in  an  anthropocentric  manner, 
Heidegger, in FCM, presents life (and our privative grasping of it) as a problem, one 
that he does not claim to be capable of resolving. I  will contend that it is precisely  
because of the perceived impoverishment of contemporary scientific  conceptions of 
life,  and beyond them, the anthropocentric character of their ultimate metaphysical 
source (Nietzsche), that Heidegger does not conduct his philosophy in the name of life. 
He refuses to bring life under the structures of anthropocentrism. In short, to interpret 
φύσις  as “life”, is to conduct a metaphysics of life, never an ontology thereof. I will 
show that this recognition of the problematic nature of life-ontology lies at the heart of 
'Part Two'.
'Part Two' of FCM is an attempt to show how contemporary accounts of the essence of 
life operating within the sciences remain within the confused divisions of the history 
metaphysics: they can never provide a genuine insight into what world is. Heidegger 
will conduct this task as an examination of the life-sciences because it is precisely there 
that  world,  and subsequently  life,  have been most  exactingly thought,  albeit  in  an 
inessential manner.34 Precisely how and why the question of the essence of life emerges 
34 Beistegui claims in Thinking with Heidegger (esp. p 118) that Heidegger turns to the sciences in order to 
open up a dialogue therewith. In so doing, Heidegger posits a certain proximity with the life sciences 
(which represents a unique moment in Heidegger's  oeuvre). Whilst it is most assuredly the case that 
Heidegger goes into great detail with regard to the findings of biology and zoology, I consider this not  
to be a dialogue in the sense of a conversation, but more so the sense of “working through”. Heidegger  
will come to show the necessity of a deeper meditation on world and life for the life-sciences, but will  
not consider the life sciences to be somehow generating knowledge which outstrips the metaphysical 
structures on which they are based. The detail of his engagement with the sciences can be viewed as an 
attempt to enter into their position regarding life. At no point does he accept the notion that they are 
capable of doing the work of philosophy. Indeed I take Heidegger to consider the work of philosophy 
to be perennially the “as yet to come” of FCM. I analyse this matter further in chapter 5 in reference to 
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's alleged biologism.
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via an analysis of world, as well as how this account of life plays out, will be the focus 
of the remainder of this chapter.
3. World Analysis - Comparative Analysis
Taking an  alternative  approach  to  the  matter  of  world  from  that  of  OEG  and BT, 
Heidegger  opts  for  comparative examination.  Along  with  Herrmann,  McNeill  and 
Walker,  in  their  translator's  preface,  suggest  that  this  comparative  examination  is 
directed toward the grounding of an ontology of life, as an examination of the essence 
of  life  itself.  As I  have shown,  albeit  briefly,  this  is  not  Heidegger's  express  intent.  
Whilst the possibility of an ontology of life is raised as an issue, the analysis of world is  
not primarily directed toward this matter. 'Part Two' is the most famous, and thus most 
thoroughly examined, element of FCM. 35
3.1. The Three Theses
The comparative analysis takes the form of a comparison between the varying ways in 
35 Where excellent scholarship has been conducted in relation to FCM I seek to stand on its shoulders as it 
were. McNeill's reading in the The Time of Life is around 45'000 words in length, and concentrates on 
merely 20 sections (around 100pages) of  FCM. It would be impossible for this thesis to replicate the 
depth of  this  analysis  generated therein.  As such,  I  will  forego much of  the  detail  of  Heidegger's 
account of the organism, and attempt to discuss the more general and essential thoughts contained 
therein. Equally, this is not the decisive issue, I am not expressly concerned wit unpacking a positive 
conception of life from within  FCM. In this regard, my thesis is not intended to exhaust all possible 
engagements  with  FCM,  but  rather,  open up possible  modes  of  reading.  See  The  Time of  Life  and 
McNeill, W.  Heidegger: Visions of animals, Others and the Divine.  (CRPL, University of Warwick: 1993). 
McNeill simply seeks to follow the arguments in their subtlety and complexity, as opposed to engaging 
from within a seemingly pre-established horizon of critique. Derrida is also interesting on the matter of 
Heidegger's comparative analysis, but he is less textually thorough. See Derrida, J. Of Spirit: Heidegger  
and the Question trans. Bennington, B (UCP, Chicago: 1991). He also returns to FCM in order to compare 
it with Defoe's Robinson Crusoe in a posthumously published seminar entitle The Beast and The Sovereign  
(UCP, Chicago: 2011). I briefly examine this analysis at the close of Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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which other beings which are also part of the world (those which we find ourselves 
amongst),  “have” world.  To  structure  this  investigation,  Heidegger  generates  three 
guiding theses.36 These theses are designed to provide an initial characterisation of the 
manner in which we take entities to have world. The theses are as follows: The stone is  
worldless;  the animal is  poor in world;  man is  world-forming.  The choice of  these 
entities in particular is based upon the basic divisions between entities that presides 
throughout  the  history  of  metaphysics.37 Heidegger  points  out  the  most  salient 
problem with attempting such a comparative examination:
In  order  even  to  negotiate  the  problem  we  must  accordingly  have  at  our 
disposal certain essential distinctions between these three realms.38
As essential distinctions are being sought, one cannot have recourse to the continuity 
between man and animal, 'whether or not man is descended from the ape' is not of 
interest, as such a question does not grasp the individual essence of either animal or 
man, but thinks the two together as an amalgam. In this respect, the matter of world-
comparison becomes a meditation directed toward 'a fundamental conception of life',39 
as the stone is a material object which  is as not alive, and man is considered to be a 
living being through and through.40 At this point “life” or “the living” are broadly 
36 This itself is a remarkable occurrence, as, to my knowledge, nowhere else in his entire corpus will  
Heidegger offer up a thesis. As I attempt to show, this is precisely  not  his thesis, but the underlying 
thesis that structures all metaphysical investigations into world and indeed life. 
37  When, in the 'Preliminary Appraisal', Heidegger suggests that sleep is not a matter of consciousness, 
but a matter of boundedness of essence,  his first reference was to the manner in which we would  
ascribe an ability to sleep to other entities, Animals, plants and stones. Interestingly enough the plant 
seems to have been left out of the comparative analysis. Perhaps this indicates that its having no status  
of its own, as living, aside from that of the animal. Alternatively it could be a result of Heidegger's  
wishing to only engage with Biology and Zoology. Generating the depth of knowledge in the botanical 
sciences that Heidegger displays regarding biology would constitute a large effort, one that would not 
seemingly offer up greater insight into how contemporary scientific investigations think world.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. 
40 On this issue Heidegger will never come to say that the matter of man's belonging to life is resolved. 
The “abyssal bodily kinship” is continually conceived as problematic.
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conceived as animals and plants (and indeed, in some way, ourselves). Precisely what 
animates all “life”, any deeper or positive definition of this term remains as yet under-
determined.
Here Heidegger recognises the circularity of his projected examination: the divisions 
which are  to  be  sought  from an essential  standpoint  do  not  have their  ground in 
anything outside of the salient character of the divisions themselves. There is nothing 
other than these theses themselves to guide an investigation into “life”, as the matter of 
life's accessibility, the manner in which its essence is graspable, is precisely what is in 
question. This circularity is, of course, a hermeneutic circularity, wherein the manner in 
which  one  enters  into  the  circle  is  less  important  than the  accomplishment  of  'an 
insight into the centre of the circle as such'. This notion of the hermeneutic circle repeats 
the insights of the 'Preliminary Appraisal',  wherein there is  no possible  position of 
entry into the matter of essences without prejudices and presuppositions of varying 
distinctions. The hermeneutic circle is not something to be left behind, but something 
to be embraced. As a meditation on life (that which lives), rather than an attempt to 
eradicate  all  possible  presuppositions  and  prejudices  with  regard  to  the  matter, 
Heidegger  is  proposing  an  investigation  that  starts  with  a  recognition  of  its  own 
arbitrariness. As such, the investigation maintains a constant openness to its opening 
prejudices, maintains a heightened sense of intellectual conscience with regard to its 
own operation.
3.2. Problematising the Seeming Hierarchy of Life
McNeill provides a detailed account of why Heidegger mobilises these controversial 
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theses and how they operate.
Only if one isolates the analyses of animal Being from their proper context, as 
tends to happen in contemporary debate,  does the thesis  that the animal is 
“poor  in  world”  appear  to  merely  reinscribe  a  fundamentally  traditional, 
metaphysical  “theory”  distinguishing  the  animal  from  the 
human.41problematise
He begins his exegetical account of the theses by focusing on the manner in which they 
construct  divisions  between  the  human,  animal  and  stone.  Divisions  which 
commentators  like  Ansell-Pearson  (drawing  from  Krell)  consider  to  be  'carved'  by 
Heidegger and fraught with unthinking repetitions of anthropocentric mysticism.
The  three  theses  recall  the  possibility  and  perhaps  even  the  necessity  of 
distinguishing  between  humans,  animals,  and  inanimate  objects  as 
fundamentally different kinds of entity.42
The grounding of these divisions in a thesis, rather than an axiom or statement must be 
taken seriously.  Correctly,  McNeill  does  not  see  these  theses  as  new-found  divisions 
created by Heidegger in order to expound his understanding of what makes a human 
a human or an animal an animal etc. They are not first thought of as endeavours in 
“theoretical biology”. Limiting himself to this initial production of a certain ambiguity 
surrounding the wherefore of the theses, McNeill takes up the content of the animal 
thesis. Krell was shown to have interpreted the animal-regarding thesis (poor in world) 
as  a  denigration,  a  setting the  animal  world apart  and below.  McNeill  clouds  this 
somewhat simple depiction.  
41 The Time of Life, p50
42 Ibid, p19
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Yet may we simply understand poverty here as being intrinsically of lesser 
significance with respect to richness? Is the human a higher being than the 
animal? The reverse might well be true, notes Heidegger...All of which initially 
indicates  only that  “the criterion according to which we talk of  height  and 
depth in this connection is obscure” (286).43
McNeill makes the point that these theses are, intentionally, not clear and determinate.  
From  the  outset,  they  are  maintained  in  proximity  to  their  own  obscurity  and 
impossibility. This obscurity of division and positioning is purposive, and clearly sets 
up  (or  knowingly  repeats)  a  classic  form  of  insurmountable  perspective-bound 
anthropomorphism (the impasse that Ansell-Pearson maintains lies unthinkingly at the 
heart of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche on the matter of life). However, at the same 
time, such a division still  seeks to engage with the  distinct otherness of the animal 
other, which is to say, an otherness that nonetheless operates from within a minimal 
sense  of  identity,  what  Heidegger  would  later  define  as  our  'scarcely  fathomable, 
abyssal bodily kinship with the animal'.44 The thesis itself borders on the ridiculous, 
not, as Krell would have it, because it is a simplistic account of the impoverishment of 
the animal perspective, but more-so because it seems to contradict itself.  
Our thesis that the animal is poor in world is accordingly far from being a, let 
alone  the, fundamental metaphysical principle of the essence of animality. At 
best  it  is  a  proposition  that  follows  from  the  essential  determinations  of 
animality, and moreover one which follows only if the animal is regarded in 
comparison  with  humanity  […]  if  these  considerations  are  unassailable, 
however,  then  in  the  end  we  must  not  only  substantially  reduce  the 
significance of our thesis,  but must repudiate it altogether.  For the thesis is 
misleading  precisely  with  respect  to  the  essence  of  animality  itself,  i.e.,  it 
encourages  the  mistaken  view  that  the  being  of  the  animal  in  itself  is 
43 Ibid, p19 (McNeill's reference is to p300 of his and Walker's translation of FCM.)
44 Heidegger, M.  Letter on Humanism, in  Basic Writings. Edited by David F. Krell (Harper & Row, New 
York: 1977).
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intrinsically deprivation and poverty.45
This structure characterises Heidegger's engagement with life and the animal: there is 
an ineliminable separation in the ways in which animals and humans have a world. 
This separation speaks of two things, first, that there are different ways of being: any 
engagement with animals and stones etc. cannot start out with the notion that these 
entities are all identical in structure, i.e., all present at hand; and secondly, that there is 
no possibility  of  a  distinct  hierarchy:  taking the manner in which these beings are 
separated  to  be  hierarchical  is  (saliently)  problematic.  McNeill  points  out  that,  
ultimately,  there  is  no  'homogeneous  order  of  living  things'  within  Heidegger's 
thought, thus rendering any determination and subsequent comparison of the human 
and animal on a scale of perfection or complexity impossible.46 Whilst this clearly has 
destabilising  repercussions  for  Krellian  inspired  criticisms,  my  aim  here  is  not  to 
provide  an  account  of  how  Heidegger's  thought  overcomes  the  problems  of 
anthropomorphism. Rather, I aim to show that understanding Heidegger's response to 
the challenges of life requires an engagement with the full depth and power of his 
thinking on these  matters.  In  order  to  say  anything meaningful  about  Heidegger's 
intellectual conscience, for Krell, Heidegger's avoidance of a head-on encounter with 
life, we must first generate a genuine intimacy with his thinking. In this sense I am 
neither siding with Krell nor Heidegger on the matter of the latter's engagement with 
life, but merely pointing toward the richness and subtlety of his thought.47 
45 FCM, §63. Or, as McNeill puts it, “When we say that the animal “has world” then we mean world as 
the accessibility of beings, as some kind of openness for encountering other beings in general. This 
sense of world would therefore encompass both humans and animals as living beings. When we say 
that the animal does not “have world,” we mean that it does not have access to other beings in the way 
that humans do or in the way that “we” do. Yet this makes it highly problematic as to whether the 
thesis that the animal is poor in world can be a coherent thesis at all.” (Time of Life, p26).
46 The time of Life, p26
47 To re-iterate the quotation with which this thesis started, 'the most monstrous danger in philosophy is 
cheating', in this case, the danger is taking a philosopher on their weakest showing. Krell, and perhaps 
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In  response  to  the  problematic  and  potentially  incoherent  thesis  regarding  the 
possibility of engaging with animal otherness via the mode of comparative analysis, 
McNeill asks the most obvious question:
From what perspective do we make such comparisons?
The question of our perspective upon each of the beings referred to in the three 
theses is primarily concerned not with the danger of anthropocentrism, [...] but 
with a question of principle regarding transposability.48
How then, is the question of transposability structured such that it is not simplistically 
anthropocentric? McNeill continues:
Insofar as we ourselves are human beings,  and exist  in our own particular 
manner of Being, the question is whether we are able to transpose ourselves in 
each case into an entity that is other.49
McNeill  seems to suggest that this discussion of transposability,  a concept which is 
determined by Heidegger to mean something more along the lines of "going along 
with" in a way that allows the other to maintain itself as other, is more fundamental  
than a discussion of anthropocentrism, in that it engages with and challenges the very 
grounds  of  possibility  of  an  anthropocentrism  by  setting  into  question  classic 
representational understandings of world and the individual that has world. McNeill 
even more-so Ansell-Pearson, raise genuine question marks with regard to the power and the intent of  
Heidegger's response to the problems of life. Pointing out the paucity in Krell's reading of this matter  
does not dismiss his  challenge, but rather,  provides a more challenging opponent.  Summarily,  my 
intention  here  is  to  flesh  out  the  manner  in  which  McNeill's  reading  throws  the  question  of 
anthropomorphism and life back into the matter of Heidegger's thought, rescuing it somewhat from 
the criticisms and potential historical dead-ends laid out in Chapter 1.
48 Ibid, p21
49 Ibid, p21
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further clarifies what the question of transposability demarcates:
The very term transposition is misleading because it suggests that the beings in 
question  are  in  the  first  instance  isolated  spheres,  each  with  their  own 
interiority, between which a relation of access and mutual interaction would 
subsequently  have  to  be  established.  Among other  things,  such  a  model—
essentially  a  variant  of  the  subject–object  schema  so  central  to  modern 
representation—leaves unthought the possibility that a relation to the Other 
(however the latter is determined) may precede and even be co-constitutive of 
the so-called self and the possibility of its relation to itself.
This  point  is  salient  when set  against  the  discussion  of  world  as  a  transcendental 
phenomenon  as  presented  in  OEG.50 In  the  same  way  in  which  the  account  of 
“fallenness” in  BT, for example, was not intended to have disparaging connotations, 
but simply be a way of describing a particular ontological structure within a new-found 
philosophical  framework  that  lies  outside  the  classic  prejudices  and  quasi-moral 
evaluations  of  representational  understandings  of  self  (and  world),  McNeill  is 
suggesting that the language of poverty or poorness of world does not function within 
a structure that admits of any moral or evaluative discrimination. 
There remains a mode of anthropocentric prejudice at play in Heidegger's theses. From 
the perspective of a reading, such as Ansell-Pearson's, that looks to 'map out the non-
human  becomings  of  life'51 within  Nietzsche  (wherein  Heidegger  is  figured  as  an 
interlocutor  who  can  help  release  this  perspective  from  anthropomorphism)  the 
continual  re-affirming of  a  polarity,  or  at  least  the  reinscription  of  the  problem of 
polarity, comes to light as evidence of a limitation in Heidegger's thinking rather than 
50 Aristotle's formulation of the fundamentally metaphysical question of sleep is also recalled, as thinking 
the animal's (or indeed stone's) world is a matter of drawing and opening up a horizon such that we 
can let the other in.
51 See Chapter 1.
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evidence  of  an  insurmountable  problematic  within  thinking  itself.  However, 
Heidegger's  thesis-analysis  does  not  emerge  straightforwardly  as  just  an  account, 
namely his account, of the structural divisions between beings, i.e., one that forwards 
itself as a theory, designed to do head-on battle with all other possible and pre-existent 
accounts, surpassing each in turn. The historical standing of these theses means that 
they cannot be dismissed as impoverished in the face of less anthropocentric accounts 
of life where anthropocentrism is defined in line with extra-Heideggerian concerns, 
intentions  and  historicisings.  As  has  been  shown  throughout  this  thesis,  FCM is 
explicitly  directed  toward  the  production  of,  or  at  least  the  preparation  for,  a 
philosophical historicity. 'Part Two' is no exception in this matter.
The thesis-analysis is forwarded as an account that stands within a specific historical 
rootedness. In this manner, its configurations are historically determined outside of, 
and  in  advance  of,  Heidegger's  thought:  these  polarities  and  divisions  are  deeply 
embedded throughout the history of metaphysics. This thought provides Heidegger 
with  a  peculiar  hermeneutic  space:  that  of  allowing  particular  determinations  of 
history to come to be as they are, that is, to explore the divisions that are ever-present 
in metaphysics from a more fundamental perspective. On this account, the opposition of 
“anthropocentrism  vs.  life”  itself  stands  within  a  series  of  particular  historical 
determinations. Heidegger is not advocating a structured division, or even forwarding 
one,  he  is  simply  formulating  it  in  its  most  philosophical  and  indeed  properly 
historical configuration.
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3.3. The Three Theses and History
Initially,  Mcneill presents Heidegger's discussion of the theses as though they were a 
direct engagement with an ever-present problematic. The entire account is one that is 
seemingly  speculative  and  the  product  of  a  particular  analysis  of  "principles  of 
transposability".  McNeill’s  reading  thus  echoes  the  way  that  Krell  has  presented 
Heidegger's arguments.
Can we go along with the way in which the animal sees and hears things? It is  
self-evident for us in asking this  question that the animal indeed relates to 
other things such as its food, its prey, its young, and so on. When we ask this,  
Heidegger remarks, we are assuming without question that “in relation to the 
animal something like a going-along-with, a going along with it in its access 
and  in  its  dealings  within  its  world  is  possible  in  general,  and  does  not 
represent an intrinsically nonsensical undertaking”(299)52
That we can ask after the possibility of transposition in the case of the animal requires 
no great deal of justification. Heidegger assumes the phenomenally salient nature of 
thinking the connectedness of the two ways of being. Such an assumption is not  simply 
made on the basis of there being self-evident divisions between types of beings, where 
the grounds of this self-evidence lie in some type of 'real' or trans-historical division.  
That this is the case becomes more explicit when McNeill approaches the matter of 
transposition and the stone:  'Can we transpose ourselves into a stone? The answer 
quite  clearly  seems  to  be  “no,”'.53 The  answer  is  only  “seemingly”  no because  the 
impossibility of going-along-with the stone is not absolute and clear cut. Heidegger 
introduces  a  caveat,  one  that  is  critically  important  for  my  conception  of  the 
historicality of FCM:
52 Time of Life, p22 (pagination in brackets refers to FCM)
53 Ibid.
178
Note that Heidegger adds a qualifier: there are nonetheless ways in which we 
are able to regard purely material or “inanimate” things not as such, but rather 
to “animate” them, namely via myth and art ... The current investigation, we 
are reminded, is to remain within the bounds of the possible truth belonging to 
“scientific and metaphysical knowledge”(300)54
This is something that has gone unconsidered by Krell. There is a specific context to the 
task at hand within Heidegger's lecture course: the limits of scientific and metaphysical 
knowledge. Heidegger is not commenting on, and attempting to add to, the scientific 
theories of the time. Rather, he is attempting to think within them in a manner that puts 
on hold other possibilities of thinking  beyond them, i.e.,  myth and art.  Heidegger is 
conducting a specific task that he considers salient within,  and indeed proper to,  a 
specific mode of thinking (that of metaphysics and science). McNeill takes this thought 
up with regard to the animal thesis:
But first let us pause to consider, within a somewhat broader perspective, the 
implications of this characterization of the Being of the animal ... Heidegger’s 
analyses appear to be conducted  at a certain limit of scientific and metaphysical  
inquiry; more precisely, they appear to take such inquiry regarding this theme 
to a certain limit. In so doing, they not only problematize the mechanistic and 
physicalist  conceptions  of  life,  which  reduce  life  to  mechanistic  or  purely 
material  processes,  but  also  complicate  a  certain  naivity  in  prevailing 
Darwinist and neovitalist approaches.55
It  is  clear  that  Heidegger is  not  engaged in  a  direct  setting out  of  current  debate, 
showing how it is erroneous in order to subsequently add his own musings as a form 
of  corrective.  He  is,  moreover,  engaging  with  contemporary  scientific  knowledge 
54 Ibid, p22 (pagination in brackets refers to FCM)
55 Ibid, p27. Italics are mine.
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pertaining to the field of theoretical biology in a manner that seeks to problematise it 
and take it to its limits from within its own given horizons. In these specific chapters on 
world, Heidegger is staging a confrontation with the prevailing modes of metaphysical 
and scientific thought.
On its own terms, separate from any contextualisation within the lecture course as a 
whole, the chapters on world explicitly deploy a peculiar or particular methodology. 
McNeill develops this point, but does not set it back into the context previously given 
within the lecture course itself.  The importance of Nietzsche as  the historical figure 
who  is  under  consideration  in  the  confrontation  between  Heidegger  and  the 
contemporary has  no space  to  emerge.  As such,  McNeill  presents  a  picture  of  the 
sections  under  examination  that  cannot  fully  avoid  the  thrust  of  Ansell-Pearson's 
criticism that Heidegger doesn't fully open himself up to Nietzsche's agitation. The 
historical situation for Heidegger, as forwarded by McNeill, involves modern debate 
(which is divided into neo-vitalism and mechanism) being delineated, then set back 
into, and eventually superseded by lost facets of Aristotelianism. 
[T]he present  inquiry is  “for the  moment” to  remain within the bounds of 
scientific and metaphysical truth—kinds of truth that, he adds, “have together 
long since determined the way in which we conceive of truth in our everyday 
reflection and judgement” (300).  In the 1929–30 course,  Heidegger not  only 
engages with contemporary scientific theory of animal life, but seeks to ground 
such  theory  philosophically:  on  the  one  hand,  showing  some  of  the 
fundamental  presuppositions  of  such  theory  (ontological  presuppositions 
concerning the very concept of biological life, and which are not accessible to 
the science of biology as such, but only to philosophizing); and on the other 
hand, grounding such presuppositions in a more fundamental experience of 
“world”.  In  so  doing,  however,  the  1929–30  course  not  only  retrieves  in  a 
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critical  and  transformative  manner  a  fundamentally  Aristotelian, 
ontotheological  framework;  it  also  problematises  the  foundational  primacy 
attributed to theoretical contemplation as our originary mode of access to the 
world.56
In presenting the argument from Heidegger as always “for the moment” and within a 
specific context, McNeill provides space for moving beyond Ansell-Pearson's criticism. 
However,  his  straightforward  characterisation  of  the  manner  in  which  Heidegger 
resolves his historical problematic immediately closes this space down as it relies too 
straightforwardly on the notion that Heidegger seeks to set history back against a lost 
notion  of  Aristotelian  organiscism.  The  charge  that  this,  albeit  methodologically 
peculiar,  engagement  with  life  is  still  representative  of  a  straightforward 
anthropomorphism is strong, but not fully convincing if  we look beyond McNeill's 
reading. Ansell-Pearson is right in claiming that Heidegger thinks that there exists an 
impasse when it comes to both Nietzsche and the possibility of non-human horizons, 
i.e., attempting to have life as the horizon of thought, as opposed to being. McNeill  
echoes this, albeit in different terms:
If the animal is truly other, will not any attempt on our part to define its Being 
necessarily reduce and erase its otherness? The question of access to the animal 
and  to  living  beings  that  are  non-human  thus  proves  uncircumventable; 
moreover, the prospect of our knowing what it is like to be an animal seems 
doomed from the outset. Yet perhaps such objections, which raise themselves 
repeatedly in contemporary debate, are themselves historically conditioned by 
the epoch of  subjectivity … Not  only  are these presuppositions  historically 
determined,  they  are  also  phenomenologically  and  ontologically  reductive 
with respect to the essence of life in general, whether human, animal, or other.
57
56 Ibid, p35
57 Ibid, p17-18
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McNeill is suggesting that Heidegger does not close down the possibility of thinking 
the being of animal/life from a non-human perspective (or, perhaps more accurately, 
the  possibility  of  accessing  being  outside  the  specific  structures  of  human  being 
[Dasein]). The point that Heidegger makes is that this is a task that cannot leap outside 
of the history of subjectivity with any clear ease or lack of historical-methodological  
labouring. For Heidegger, without setting the predominant modes of thinking life back 
into their proper historical determinations, such that their limit can be thought and 
thus their reductive phenomenological and ontological positions brought out into the 
light, there can be no overcoming of their seeming polarity. McNeill is convinced that 
Heidegger is not simply affirming his position as superior to all of history heretofore,  
but is instead, pursuing the problem of life in a manner that properly understands its 
own  historicity.  McNeill  takes  this  historicality  to  have  merely  one  protagonist, 
Aristotle. However, given my reading of FCM so far, McNeill's story does not quite fit. 
The  type  of  historical  methodology  being  discussed,  but  never  fully  analysed  by 
McNeill, fits perfectly with my account of Auseinandersetzung: an account which shows 
that  FCM  is  a  work  directed  toward  an  historical,  genuinely  philosophical 
Auseinandersetzung  with  the  contemporary.  McNeill,  too,  is  guilty  of  treating 
Auseinandersetzung in the same manner as the other critics dealt with in Chapter 1, he 
excludes it.
4. How World Analysis Calls for a Reading of Nietzsche
4.1. A Note on Life in FCM
Life comes forward in a very specific way in FCM. When biology seeks the essence of 
182
the living/the organism as a mechanism or as an expression of an inner vitalism (two 
modern scientific trends which are subtly juxtaposed in Heidegger's analysis of the 
organism),  it  conducts  its  task  from  within  the  structures  world  as  previously 
established by varying metaphysical enterprises. Thinking life in this manner, modern 
science58 does not generate the appropriate attunement to/method of inquiring into, 
life. Life remains a determination of  the other,  of the other that Dasein itself is in as 
much as it  shows up as a biological entity.  The relation to otherness itself  must be  
thought  before  this  relation  of  identity.59 Within  these  fundamental  tasks  of 
metaphysics, if life emerges as a issue at all (as a concept capable of bringing about 
meditation  on  beings  as  a  whole)  it  does  so  in  a  broad  form that  corresponds  to 
original Greek determination of  φύσις, not in terms of its modern determination as 
Bios,  a regional concept.60 As has been suggested, the issue of life/otherness is dealt 
with  through  Heidegger's  analysis  of  the  concept  of  world.  In  determining  (in  a 
trepidatious manner and always aware of the methodological pitfalls) the animal as 
self-refusing, Heidegger is seeking a way of relating to the otherness that it represents. 
A way of seeing it, encountering it and relating to it, that does not operate from within 
the subject-object schema so grounded. This means that Dasein's identity with other 
entities  becomes  problematic,  as  its  own  self-identity  as  a  transcendence  is  itself 
problematised as subject to a line of history, subject to prejudices. Where FCM attempts 
to  understand world,  and thus enter  into  metaphysics,  by attending to  that  which 
appears as other (the animal), it ultimately returns to the otherness upon which this 
58 At least modern science as contemporary to Heidegger in 1929/30. For an interesting discussion of this 
see Thinking With Heidegger chapter 3.
59 This is not to say that the met-ontological or fundamental-ontological structure of inquiry as laid out in 
BT  still  holds sway. On my reading Heidegger does not actually postpone an ontology of life,  but 
rather points to its essentially abyssal status. 
60 Of course, in a move which does not get discussed, bios originally connotes a different sense of life (See 
chapter 5) , a more human notion of life – it is the bio of biography etc. Zoe would more appropriately 
render life in the sense of a region. However, zoology is seen as a subset of biology rather than the 
inverse, which would appear to more appropriately be the case. 
183
seeming  other  is  grounded:  world  itself,  as  that  towards  which  we  are  always 
underway. 
4.2. What World Analysis Points Towards
The conclusion of Heidegger's comparative analysis of world relations is that the major 
line of separation between the merely living and Dasein is the “as structure” of Dasein. 
The culmination of his analysis of the world of animals is the idea that the animal is 
bound to other beings in such a way that it conducts a wholly other relationship to 
them.  Not  necessarily  one  of  brute  impoverishment,  but  a  qualitatively  different 
relationship. In  comparison to this Dasein is not characterised by a freedom, he is not 
unbounded, but rather seen to be bound to beings in a different manner. The animal 
world is an environment in the sense of a habitat, Heidegger calls this a “disinhibiting 
ring”, wherein the animal has a certain proximity of relation to those things that go to 
make up its  environs.  Not forgetting that Heidegger takes his  leave from scientific 
thought,  this  proximity  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  animal's  comparative 
sensory  acuteness  (in  Darwinian  terms  the  animal's  sharpened  adaptation  to  its 
environment). Within this ring, the animal is at once close to its habitat in a manner 
that Dasein has no access to (cannot transpose itself into), but is also locked into its 
environment in such a way that it  is  incapable of circumspection. In so far as it  is 
locked  into  this  environment,  it  is  precluded  from  the  possibility  of  experiencing 
something  as  something.  What  Heidegger  is  essentially  pointing  to  with  the  as 
structure is the ability of Dasein to experience something with regard to its possibilities 
for  being.  The animal,  by comparison,  operates  in  accordance  with a  set  of  drives 
which propel it into particular and fixed world-relations. The as structure, the essential 
structure of Dasein's world relation, ultimately points toward Dasein's being able to 
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point things out, to make assertions – to say and experience “this rock as a rock” etc. 
This point of differentiation provides the basis for a more fundamental investigation 
into world.  The world of the animal is left  behind in pursuit of the world of man.  
Accordingly, Heidegger's investigation into world, forms itself into, and necessitates, 
an analysis of the λόγος, the place where Dasein speaks out about beings. 
As  McNeill  points  out  in  his  Foreword  to  FCM,  this  'concluding  analysis  of  the 
apophantic λόγος' represents a major contribution to Heidegger's work on discourse.61 
In  essence  the λόγος  refers  to  the  wresting  of  beings  from  their  concealedness 
(repeating the 'Preliminary Appraisal' analysis). Heidegger recapitulates his analysis of 
boredom in order to draw out a 'provisional delimitation of the concept of world'.62 In 
this recapitulation Heidegger emphasises  the concept of  world as pertaining to the 
specific “being borne out” to the manifestness of “beings as whole” such that 'we are  
manifest to ourselves as disposed in the midst of these beings'.63 The investigation into 
boredom failed to fully articulate this phenomenon. Equally, this “problem of world” 
persists through the comparative analysis. The comparative analysis considers world 
from the perspective of man as a world-forming being, revealing world-formation to 
be  an  activity  involving  man  from  the  bottom  up.  Herein,  the  problem  of  world 
persists in the following formation:
How can man even come to a subjective conception of beings, unless beings 
are already manifest to him beforehand? How do things stand concerning the 
manifestness of beings as such? If the 'as a whole' indeed already belongs to 
61 The  details  of  this  section  have  to  be  foregone  in  order  to  generate  the  breadth  of  investigation 
intended in this thesis, once again I will attempt to glean the most general and essential components of 
Heidegger's analysis, and do not posit my account as a terminal one.
62 FCM, §68.
63 Ibid.
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this manifestness, is it not then withdrawn from the subjectivity of man, and 
that means here from his momentary caprice in each case?
In posing these questions Heidegger considers his world analysis to have operated in 
parallel with that of Boredom.64 By way of conclusion to the entire project, Heidegger 
suggests that he attempted a “dual approach” to metaphysics, wherein the attempt at 
awakening a fundamental attunement comprised an open approach, not subject to 'any 
particular metaphysical question', and the examination of world approached the same 
matter from within the metaphysical question “What is World”.65 Both these paths are 
considered  to  have  merged  at  the  point  at  which  a  preparedness  to  enter  into 
philosophy comes into view. With regard to the latter, this preparedness is drawn into 
into view via an analysis of the manner in which the λόγος' rootedness in the “pre-
logical  manifestness  of  beings”  has  come  to  be  suppressed  by  the  traditional 
interpretation of λόγος as ratio (the effect of which is similar to the analysis of OEG). In 
this regard, both boredom and the analysis of world point in the direction of the need 
for a “liberation” from the tradition.  This  liberation is  understood as an 'ever  new 
appropriation of its newly recognised strengths', and is, as such, as much a return to 
and redemption of philosophy as metaphysics, as it is a departure from it.66 In this 
regard,  philosophy is  not  just  having to  negotiate  its  history in  one direction,  i.e.,  
surpassing it, but also has to find a point of entry into the depths of history. It has to 
hold the contemporary situation out into a confrontation with itself and what went 
before, such that “we” can open onto ourselves, and open ourselves up to ourselves - 
we can become what we are. 
64 Ibid, §74. The sections on λόγος, which are described as a detour, were no different in this regard.
65 Ibid, §74.
66 Ibid.
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As with boredom, the problem of world shows itself to persist in the division between 
the ground of the possibility of the manifestness of beings, the undifferentiated pre-
logical manifestness, and the 'manifold and differentiated comportment to beings' that 
goes to make up beings as a whole.67 The former is precisely what Heidegger takes to 
be οὐσία, being as such. In this regard, the conclusion returns to the determinations of 
the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. In thinking world as beings as a whole, its relation to its 
seeming opposite can never be reduced or removed from the scene, as being as such 
has to be thought alongside and within the concept of beings as a whole. The matter of 
their unity,  their “originary” unity,  that is  the way in which both aspects  of  φύσις  
participate  in  'intrinsically  forming  and  sustaining  this  articulated  unity',  remains 
unarticulated  at  the  close  of  FCM,  but  nonetheless  stands  as  that  which  must  be 
thought  in  a  confrontation  with  the  tradition.68 This  is  the  central  problem  of 
Heidegger's entire corpus: the articulation of the difference between being (being as 
such) and beings (beings as a whole), or ontological difference itself. 
As  a  confrontation  with  the  whole  of  history  via  the  contemporary,  this  must  be 
understood as a demand to confront Nietzsche's thought.  FCM does not maintain an 
exceptional status, as life does not disappear in Heidegger's corpus. Rather than as the 
life of the sciences, life as bios or zoe, Nietzsche thinks life (and world) metaphysically, 
not on the basis of a prior metaphysics but precisely as metaphysics thought as the as 
yet unfulfilled promise of Aristotelian first philosophy. Nietzsche will come forward as 
the supreme representative of life for Heidegger, because Heidegger will claim that 
Nietzsche thinks life as the originary unitary structure of beings as a whole and being as 
such (world and individuation), and not simply as a region of φύσις. On these grounds I 
67 Ibid, §75.
68 Ibid, §76.
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will claim that NIII marks the high-point of Heidegger's meditation on life, not FCM. 
Only on the basis of a close reading of FCM as a whole can the genuine matter of life as 
it stands for Heidegger become clear.
4.2. Nietzsche's Conclusive Appearance
At the close of FCM, the inner connection of world, finitude and solitude has not been 
articulated,  and  world  is  the  only  concept  of  the  three  fundamental  concepts  of 
metaphysics to be treated. The precise relationship to be established with history, and 
indeed FCM's status as part of an Auseinandersetzung with the contemporary remains 
under-determined.  The full  completion of  these  philosophical  tasks  remains  yet  to 
come.  If  FCM defers  its  own tasks,  in what direction does it ultimately point? For 
Heidegger, it looks out towards the supreme representative of life, the genuine place 
where contemporary thinking is located, the thinker within whose thoughts world is 
experienced from out of a wakeful manner: Nietzsche.
In what remains of this thesis I will show how these tasks are not replaced by other 
concerns in Heidegger's Nietzsche engagement, but go to make up the context from 
within which this engagement must be thought. Where  FCM is classifiable as a text 
concerning  biology,  it  is  so  only  on  the  basis  of  its  concern  with  thinking  the 
boundaries between the human and the animal: the horizons from out of which an 
other can be both encountered and refused. This is beyond the very limit and ground 
of biology itself, at best, in line with Heidegger's claims regarding biologism it is the 
basis for biology transform itself into metaphysics.  The comparative analysis which 
drew on scientific notions proved to be incapable of generating concepts fundamental 
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enough  to  ground  an  essential  understanding  of  its  constituent  parts:  life,  world, 
Dasein. As such, FCM represents the very exhaustion of an attempt to think life from 
within philosophically atrophied divisions and classifications of what constitutes life. 
When  discussing  Nietzsche's  alleged  biologism  in  NIII,  Heidegger  will  claim  that 
Nietzsche's  thinking  is  precisely  not  biological  but  metaphysical,  because  in  his 
conception of life, as an interpretation of  φύσις, the very ground of the biological is 
itself determined. This is the fundamental difference between the approaches of FCM 
and NIII: FCM precludes a genuine philosophical decision regarding a determination 
of the essence of life via thinking life from within the biological sciences, whereas NIII  
decides  with regard to  life's  possibility  of  bringing  φύσις  to  word from out  of  an 
Auseinandersetzung with the very metaphysical ground of the biological itself.69
The last words of the lecture course, reserved for Nietzsche, reveal his contemporary 
importance when it comes to life and metaphysics. McNeill recognises the proper place 
of Nietzsche amidst this debate, but only in a glancing fashion:
[T]he  ultimate  issue  is  to  understand  what  language  is,  how  it  allows  for  
recognition of otherness, how to understand the sameness that opens up and accesses  
otherness. We are reminded of what Zarathustra asks his animals: 'are words 
not illusory bridges [Schein-Bruecken] between things eternally separate?'70
Elucidating upon this in the passage's corresponding footnote:
What  is  the  eternity  that  the  animals  point  to?  The  eternity,  Heidegger 
69 For example, the world structure of the stone is not taken to be a matter for biology as it has no world.  
In NIII, Heidegger will show that Nietzsche's interpretation of life eradicates the taxonomical power of 
the organic/inorganic (animate/inanimate) division to the extent that the stone is part of what lives as it 
maintains world-relations of the same order as all other living entities. 
70 Heidegger: Visions of animals, Others and the Divine, p42.
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emphasizes (NI), of the Augenblick. The Augenblick of world, of a world 'deeper 
than day', a world of desire [Lust]. (GA 29/30, p.532).71
In concluding FCM, Heidegger allows Nietzsche to speak without mediation. He does 
so because he,  as  the last  of  the great  philosophers,  achieved a “wakefulness” that 
opens  up  a  space  for  us  to  'experience  what  world  is',  a  task  which  Heidegger 
considers  to  have  gone  unfulfilled  in  FCM.72 Throughout  his  engagement  with 
Nietzsche,  Heidegger  takes  up  the  essence  of  the  work  conducted in  FCM,  whilst 
rejecting its substance as a treatise concerning modern science and animality: for him 
life must be thought metaphysically, not biologically if an Auseinandersetzung with the 
contemporary is to be achieved. Life as a name for  φύσις in its broadest sense is not 
taken up in FCM. As such Heidegger's meditation on life, and life's potential as a term 
which can bring the whole of φύσις to word, has not been addressed. 
Leading to the closing words of FCM, Heidegger proclaims that man is a transition, a 
transition between the throwness of possibilities and subjection to the actual. It is man, 
as  Dasein,  that  is  'transition  as  the  fundamental  essence  of  occurrence',  where 
occurrence  is  the  genuinely  finite.  Heidegger  once  again  recalls  his  'Preliminary 
Appraisal'  when he states that, as this transition between the actual (the world, the 
past/having been, beings as a whole) and the possible (solitude, the future/yet to be, 
being as such), Dasein is subject to an attack of being, he is 'seized by terror' in the face 
of the world. Having merely brought the historical situation as its stands with regard 
to metaphysics (its possible redemption or overcoming) to the edge of our view, where 
the path of history remains in need of proper illumination, Heidegger only points in the 
71 Ibid. This reference is to the closing words of the lecture course: Zarathustra's roundelay.
72 FCM, §76.
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direction in which the light lies. In this regard, he is unable to speak for himself, and so 
turns  to  Nietzsche  to  announce  Zarathustra's  roundelay.73 In  that  song,  Nietzsche 
suggests that the world, experienced in wakefulness, in the light of day, and therefore 
turned outward to beings, is pure transience: 'The world is deep [...] deep is its woe [...]  
woe says: fade! Go!'. In contrast to this, the night (sleep as that boundedness such that 
others that we are not are not let in) brings joy, and with it the yearning for eternity. In 
these words Heidegger points back toward his earlier analysis of Dionysus and Apollo 
as two fundamental orientations of man: the differentiated, manifold, transience of life 
and the individuated/solitudinous, singular, eternity of spirit. In Heidegger's Nietzsche 
this metaphysical forgetting of the genuine activity of philosophy, namely the posing 
of the question of being as the originary unity of being and beings (which is to say  
their  ontological  difference)  is  brought  to  a  point  of  culmination in  the  conflict  of 
becoming and being as articulated from within the thought of their very unity: life. 
This  will  form the subject  matter of  NI and  NIII,  and accordingly that  of  the final 
chapter of this thesis. 
5. Evaluation of Heidegger's Account of Life in FCM: What, for 
Heidegger, is the possibility of an Ontology of Life post FCM?
The aim of this thesis is not to draw out a conception of life from within Heidegger's 
thinking. However, it would constitute a act of ressentiment to ignore the thrust of the 
majority of work done on FCM.  As such it is needful to address the question “What 
broader conclusions we can draw on the basis of Heidegger's account of life in FCM?”. 
73 Ibid.
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In  attempting  to  awaken a  fundamental  attunement  from out  of  which  a  genuine 
confrontation with the contemporary could be undertaken, Heidegger turned to the 
question of world.  The basic logic  of  this  comparative investigation is as  follows:  In 
order to understand what “world” is, we can look towards other things which not only 
go to make up our world, but appear to have a world themselves.74 What else does this? 
Things that we would say are  alive. Stones expressly don't have a world, animals do 
seem to have a world: they relate to other entities, make decisions, they sleep. But is  
their world the same as ours? What is it that we share that allows us to share in world? 
Life. We and animals are classifiable together in some way as, living, as “life”. As such, 
an attempt to grasp the essence of  that  which lives,  to understand the ontological 
structure of “life”, will tell us something about world; will tell us what world is. It was 
in this light that life, and our ability to grasp its essence, came into view. Read as a 
whole,  FCM is not an attempt to develop a positive definition of “life”.75 'Part Two' 
houses an engagement with the life-sciences wherein their particular mode of thinking 
is pushed to its limit using its own resources.76 The aim of this exercise is not to ground 
an  ontology  of  life,  but  to  show the  paucity  of  thinking  man in  terms  of  life  (as 
74 FCM, §42. “But then what about the other beings which, like man, are also part of the world: the animals and  
plants, the material things like the stone, for example?”
75 I am not alone in thinking this. Buchanan, in his excellent Onto-Ethologies [Buchanan, B. Onto-Ethologies: 
The Animal Environment of Uexkull, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze.  (New York: SUNY, 2008)], is 
following Heidegger's account of animal life- it is his express interest. Despite his aim of developing an 
understanding of the different ontologies of life (or bases for them) presented in various thinkers, he is  
capable of  recognising the  fact  that  he  is  attempting to extract  something from Heidegger's  work,  
rather than follow its intention. He states, “The time for animals had arrived […] We must recall that his  
primary focus is on the concept of world, especially in relation to finitude and temporality. His focus is not on  
animal life specifically; it is of interest only insofar as it fits into the bigger picture.” [pp62-63].
76 As Buchanan states, there is “a bigger picture” regarding Heidegger's engagement with Animal life.  
This equally means that there is “a little picture” which houses a great deal of interesting detail: The 
manner in which Heidegger takes mechanism and vitalism to interact;  the veracity of  Heidegger's  
reading of Uexkull; the precise account of entelecheia drawn out by Heidegger and its relation to pre-
existent  understandings  of  the  organism;  the  accuracy of  Heidegger's  invocations  of  Aristotle;  etc. 
These topics are of great interest, but are mostly of relevance to investigations that seek to develop a 
concept of life and look towards Heidegger for assistance.  I am concerned with the big picture as  
regards FCM, and the big picture as regards Heidegger's engagement with life therein. As such, I point 
towards McNeill and Buchanan as the best readers of Heidegger regarding the “little picture” of life in  
FCM.
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conceived by the life-sciences) and not in terms of Dasein. 
This represents a repetition of the claims made regarding the possibility of an ontology 
of life in BT. There are key differences between Heidegger's positions in BT and FCM, 
differences  that,  when  unheeded,  serve  to  limit  the  nuances  of  the  comparative 
investigation into world. In §10 of  BT Heidegger discusses the value of investigating 
Dasein  via  “Scientific  Theory”,  namely  anthropology,  psychology  and  biology.  He 
understands  the  paucity  of  these  disciplines  to  lie  in  their  inability  to  access 
“ontological  problematics”.  Their  designations,  such  as  “spirit”,  “life”,  “man”,  all 
relate to 'definite phenomenal domains which can be “given form”: but they are never 
used without the notable failure to see the need for inquiring about the Being of the 
entities thus designated'.77 Hence his rejection of any of these terms as a rubric for the 
investigation of Dasein. 
Rejecting these terms as the bases for ontological investigations does not mean that the 
forms that they relate to are dismissed, or that their importance is played down:
In their turn “body”, “soul”, and “spirit” may designate phenomenal domains 
which can be  detached as  themes for definite  investigations;  within  certain 
limits their ontological indefiniteness may not be important.78
Out  of  all  of  these  terms  Heidegger's  sees  the  importance  of  further  clarification 
regarding the inability of “life” to sustain an analytic of Dasein.79 Heidegger briefly 
77 BT , §10.
78 Ibid.
79 Initially Heidegger proceeds with a critical analysis of Dilthey's conception of life. Dilthey's use of the 
term “life” is clearly not the same as a biological determination thereof, but Heidegger's, in this section, 
treats their usages in a similar manner. This provides an indication of the hermeneutic character of  
Heidegger's relation to the term, he is not using “life” in any single determination; there is no positive 
content to the use of this term. This type of usage does not change as we enter into FCM, throughout 
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assesses the possibility of constructing a “general biology” by indicating that any such 
endeavour is always 'founded upon the ontology of Dasein'.80 The following statement 
provides the basis for the majority of criticisms and unfavourable readings of 'Part 
Two' of FCM.
Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being [eine eigene Seinsart]; but essentially it is 
accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a 
privative interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be 
anything like mere-aliveness [nur-noch-leben].81
These comments are clearly the basis for thinking that all of Heidegger's engagements 
with “life” as a phenomenal domain that refers to those other entities that are part of 
our world, and thus as a foundational concept for an understanding of world, function 
privatively. Equally, the language of “poverty” does not initially indicate a break with 
this mode of thinking. In BT an ontology of life is presented as possible, but only on 
the basis of a prior working out of the structures of being pertaining to Dasein (a full 
understanding of the essence of life was conceivable as grounded in an analytic of 
Dasein). On my reading, Heidegger did not straightforwardly retain this view in FCM.
In FCM, any genuine determination of the essence of life was shown to lie beyond the 
grasp of the life-sciences, as the world of the animal entailed a refusal of man's powers 
his comparative analysis of world this term is mobilised in the same way in this passage: as a an open 
term  that  allows  for  a  domain  of  phenomena  to  be  “given  form”.  Hence  the  openness  and 
indeterminacy of the terms usage throughout 'Part Two'. In this regard it should be noted that “life” 
does not retain the same character for Heidegger in BT and beyond as it did previously. There has been 
a great deal of work done on Heidegger's early thinking, where the “facticity of life” was a central  
theme [see Kisiel, T. The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (Berkeley: UCP, 1993) especially Chapter 
3]. These sections in BT represent a determinate split from that mode of thinking, and a “de-reification” 
of the term “life” in Heidegger's thought.
80 BT, §10
81 Ibid. Heidegger repeats this claim in §12: “Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology  
takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived beforehand  
as a structure of Dasein. Only in terms of an orientation towards the ontological structure thus conceived can  
'life' as a state of Being [Seinsverfassung] be defined a priori, and this must be done in a privative manner.”
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of transposition. This refusal is precisely that: man's inability to transpose himself into 
the world of the animal is not seen a  failure on behalf of his powers of transposition 
(the infinite power of thought), but a limit. In the same way that a refusal of world was 
experienced in boredom as telling, so too the refusal of the world of the animal. They 
both tell of the finite structure of Dasein: Dasein as  in transition between beings-as-a-
whole  and  being  as  such.  This  is  a  direct  return  to,  and  furthering  of,  the  idea 
presented in the 'Preliminary Appraisal', that man is constituted by a homesickness: man 
is never fully at home in the world, but equally never capable of being apart from it. In 
this regard, the comparative investigation of world repeats the lessons of boredom. 
This means that man, by dint of his essence,  stands out within beings-as-a-whole and, 
thus, that realm of beings demarcated by the term “life”. This is his transcendence, it is  
the transcendent structure of world; or world's internal unity with solitude: the yoking 
together of the two as finitude itself. 
This transcendence must not be taken in a metaphysically confused sense. As shown 
between the 'Preliminary Appraisal'  and  OEG,  to think of  the world as  a privative 
realm of infinite knowing, is to think world within the confines of the history of a 
confusion of the meaning of “metaphysics”. This confusion constitutes the blurring of 
the  distinction between beings  and being,  or  ontological  difference  itself.  By thinking 
being as such as that which is  beyond beings, being as such is always thought on the 
basis of beings as a whole: Φύσις becomes understood as “nature” in the sense of the 
world,  at  the  expense  of  “nature”  thought  as  being  as  such  (οὐσία).  The  genuine 
difference of the two, and indeed the nature of their interrelation is covered over. The 
originary meaning of  φύσις, and the originary task of metaphysics as meditation on 
the  originary  structural  unity  of  beings-as-a-whole/world  and  being  as 
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such/individuation thus becomes covered over. Seen in the light of this “forgetting of 
being”, the notion of transcendence pertaining to Dasein is not a statement of Dasein's 
higher order of being, is not evaluative, but merely descriptive. Heidegger's comments 
regarding the “abyssal bodily kinship” of animal and man should not be taken as a 
suggestion that man is degraded by such a comparison.82
In  summary,  Heidegger's  position  is  that  man  is  not  capable  of  constructing  an 
ontology of life because of an essential division, and, whilst potentially problematic, 
the  language  of  poverty  is  not  intended  to  indicate  a  hierarchical,  thus  privative, 
relation to life (understood as those entities that also partake in world in some way). 
This  leaves  an  ontology  of  life  in  a  precarious  position.  Much  like  the  boredom 
analysis,  Heidegger  retains  an  historical  ambiguity.  There  are  seemingly  a  priori 
structures and divisions that are presented (boredom seemingly points to the  a priori 
structure  of  temporality,  whilst  attempting  to  indicate  the  deep-rooted  historical 
situatedness of philosophising, and the comparative investigation of world indicates 
an a priori division between “life” and Dasein), but theses structures are presented as 
being the findings of determinately historically situated investigations (boredom is an 
epochally idiosyncratic attunement, and the conclusions drawn about life emerge from 
within an investigation into life as it is “given form” by the life-sciences, i.e., as it is  
presented from within a very specific history).83
This historical ambiguity is one which, as I have shown, plays out continually in FCM, 
from  its  establishment  as  the subject  of  the  text  as  a  whole  in  the  'Preliminary 
82 These claims are clearly going contra to these expressed by my selected interlocutors in chapter 1 of 
this thesis.
83 Heidegger's discussion of the mythos of the stone represents one way in which these claims about life 
are boundto the specific history within which they arise.
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Appraisal'.  The  central  problematic  can  be  conceived  as  how  to  understand  the 
relationship  between  the  historical  and  the  trans-historical.  Genuine  conclusions 
regarding these matters lie not in the direction of the purgation of anything historically 
situated in  order  to  retain  merely  that  which  is  trans-historical,  but  rather,  in  the 
direction  of  an  engagement  with  that  which  is  not  fatally  contemporary.  This  is 
precisely what Auseinandersetzung is designed for, hence its continual presence in FCM, 
and hence the call for a reading of Nietzsche at its close.
In  his  ambiguous  conclusion  to  his  engagement  with  the  life  of  the  life-sciences, 
Heidegger is clearly guilty of conducting negative biology, so to speak. On the basis of a 
positive laying-out of the potentially metaphysical conclusions that can be drawn on the 
basis of biological accounts of the essence of life, Heidegger draws a large caveat by 
presenting a possible in-itself of the world of the animal, that lies potentially beyond 
our powers of determination.
If the world is essentially closed to the animal then we can talk of a not-having, 
but we are never permitted to understand this as a deprivation [...] Our thesis 
that the animal is poor in world is accordingly far from being a, let alone the, 
fundamental metaphysical principle of the essence of animality. At best it is a 
proposition that follows from the essential  determinations of animality,  and 
moreover one which follows only if the animal is regarded in comparison with 
humanity […] if  these considerations are unassailable,  however,  then in the 
end we must not only substantially reduce the significance of our thesis, but 
must repudiate it altogether. For the thesis is misleading precisely with respect 
to the essence of animality itself, i.e., it encourages the mistaken view that the 
being of the animal in itself is intrinsically deprivation and poverty.84
84 FCM, §63.
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If seeking clarity with regards to what life is, and what the fundamental character of 
our relationship to this domain of beings is, then Heidegger's account of the essence of 
life is unsatisfactory. He presents something of a philosophical aporia to the question 
“what is life?”, which is understandably interpretable as an evasion of the demands of 
understanding the phenomenon of life ( e.g.,  as this other that we somehow are). 85 
However, Heidegger is at no point conducting a general, or a theoretical biology. He is 
not attempting to fulfil the unfulfilled promise of the ontology of life as suggested in 
BT .  Moreover,  he is  still  attempting to do the work  initially promised therein,  i.e., 
grasp the world of Dasein. Returning to the claims of chapter 1 of this thesis, if we 
approach Heidegger from within an historical problematic that is not his own, then it 
should come as no surprise that his resources for overcoming such a problematic are 
lacking. 
This is not to say that all criticisms relating to Heidegger's anthropocentrism can be 
dismissed because he has historically caveated his claims about life here in FCM. If one 
desires to follow this line of thinking, as so much of the secondary literature on FCM 
does,  then,  on  my  reading,  then  Heidegger  can  still  be  brought  to  bear  on  these 
85 The claim, as previously expounded, is that the animal has world by way of not having. That this  
“poverty” is somehow other. This presents a raft of problems for Heidegger. Either there is a unity, at 
which point there is a relationship, i.e., we both have world, or there is a dis-unity, and the animal is  
genuinely and wholly other; i.e., “world” describes man's relationship to entities not the animals. The 
two cannot pertain at the same time. The latter is not maintainable for Heidegger less the animal begin 
to operate in a manner akin to certain understandings of Kant's conception of the noumenal, i.e., “life”  
becomes the  name for  that  which in itself  provides  the  conditions  for  subjecthood,  but  cannot  be 
experienced as such. Equally, if there is a relationship, how can this be described in non-hierarchical 
terms if world clearly reaches a certain fullness in the world of Dasein? I maintain that Heidegger is 
aware of this tension, hence his attempt to retain a possible richness of world that persists within the 
enclosed ring of  the animal (the animal's  heightened sensory acuity,  the enhanced memory of  the 
squirrel etc.). Ultimately Heidegger, in FCM, reserves the logos for Dasein, and presents the animal as 
undivided/unseparated from its world. In this sense, the animal can be described as at home in the 
world, as fully contained within beings-as-a-whole in a way that Dasein, by dint of essence, can never 
be. In this sense, whilst augmenting his position in BT, a fundamental element is preserved, namely the 
paucity  of  conducting an analytic  of  Dasein on the basis  of  the  determinations  of  field-dependent 
investigations. 
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matters, but only at the high-point of his meditation on life. In  NIII, Heidegger will 
present the full force of the term “life” to bring to word the originary Greek experience 
of φύσις (the foundation of metaphysics). In this sense, Heidegger offers the ontologist 
of life scant assistance. From the perspective of this particular engagement with the 
essence  of  animality,  and  thus  the  essence  of  life,  Heidegger  offers  the  path  of 
displacement:  progressing  beyond  this  anthropocentric  and  non-metaphysically 
penetrative conception of the animal world requires, first, a metaphysical engagement 
with the world of Dasein in order to escape the anthropocentric circle of comparison. 
The crux of this matter, is whether or not this displacement comes in the face of the 
profound refusal  of  the  animal,  i.e.,  if  in  the  face  of  man's  efforts  to  determine the 
essential structure of the animal (to access the animal's world) the animal withdraws in 
such a way that it speaks of something philosophically essential. On my reading, this 
point itself  is  under-determined, but not as a result of a weakness of analysis.  The 
refusal of the animal and the withdrawal of its world do not arise from out of a deeply 
philosophical  engagement  therewith,  but  from  within  a  staged  analysis  of  the 
proceedings of the life sciences. The basis for the theses are everyday distinctions, so to 
speak,  but  the  investigation  of  them takes  the  form the  uptake  of  these  everyday 
distinctions by the life  sciences themselves.86 Accordingly,  the terminal  point  of  his 
analysis  of  the  animal  says  more  about  his  thoughts  regarding  the  ability  of  the 
sciences to open up and penetrate into metaphysical problems, than it does about his 
notion of philosophy's ability to think the essence of life. This notion would account for 
the absence of any explicit discussion about the practice of, or the grounding of an 
86 This is indicated in the historical contextualisation of these sections, but equally the manner in which 
Heidegger  structures  his  investigation  of  the  organism,  which  is  to  say,  he  follows  contemporary 
biological approaches and attempts to build up a picture of the field from within varying approaches. 
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“ontology of life” in FCM. Read in this light, Heidegger does not postpone an ontology 
of life, and neither does he meaningfully displace the concerns of an ontology of life in 
the  direction  of  a  further  analytic  of  Dasein.87 These  were  not  the  stakes  of  his 
engagement. What is postponed, displaced, and called for, is a genuine engagement 
with “life” as it is metaphysically in play within the contemporary, not as it is presented 
in  its  fatal  contemporaneity.  This  is  to  say,  what  is  called  for  is  a  return  to  the 
metaphysical source of contemporary thought, namely Nietzsche, lest our boredness 
with ourselves continue to attune us in silence. In the Nietzsche Lectures, especially NIII, 
Heidegger will explicitly present this case, firstly in his discussion of biologism, and 
conclusively  in  his  discussion  of  “justice”  as  the  'supreme  representative  of  life' 
Nietzsche's thought.
Final Comments
FCM, is a text centred around the production of an encounter with metaphysics and 
not expressly a text that  meditates on life.  FCM,  therefore,  whilst  still  unique with 
regard to the intimate presentation of various strands of scientific knowledge, does not 
constitute  an  aberrant  entry  into  the  Heideggerian  corpus.  This  is  not  merely  an 
archival  point.  Because  the  presence  of  Nietzsche  has  been  overlooked,  and some 
misconceived  notion  of  an  attempt  to  ground  an  ontology  of  life  (or  worse  still 
87  For  Thacker,  an  Ontology  of  Life  has  traditionally  occupied  a  position  where,  given  its  original 
formulation in Aristotle, it sits between biological reductionism and theological sublimation. As such 
he claims that within philosophy, including contemporary philosophy, 'the structure of the concept of 
life is most often that of negative theology […] the issue is that Life as a concept must always presume 
a  further  question concerning  Being.  The  infamous  question ‘What  is  Life?’ appears  to  be  always 
superseded by the question of ‘What is Being?’ And yet the very idea of Life-without- Being would  
seem to be an absurdity for philosophy'.['Nine Disputations on Philosophy and Horror' in Collapse IV 
(may 2008).]. As such he does not repudiate Heidegger on this matter, but sees his approach as sitting,  
philosophically, alongside others who take “life” up as a question (where he considers Heidegger to 
not articulate it as such). See Thacker's After Life (UCP, Chicago: 2010) for his account of the history of 
philosophy's  treatment  of  the  ontology  of  life.  Also  see  the  conclusion  to  this  thesis  for  a  brief  
discussion of Thacker's claims regarding Heidegger.
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theoretical biology) has been so dominant, the genuine philosophical contribution of 
FCM  to  Heidegger's  thought  has  been  overlooked.  As  a  propadeutic  to  an 
Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, Heidegger's presentation of the problem of life in 
FCM foreshadows his reason for resisting Nietzsche's interpretation of life. He thinks 
Nietzsche falls-foul of the lessons of  FCM, ultimately projecting the world of Dasein 
onto life itself, not heeding the abyssal nature of the kinship of man and animal.
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Chapter 5. FCM and The Nietzsche Lectures
Introduction
In his extensive Nietzsche reading, Heidegger continues to pursue the goals set by 
FCM; he continues his attempt to confront metaphysics head on. I will substantiate my 
claim that FCM operates as a propadeutic for Heidegger's reading of life in the thought 
of Nietzsche, rather than comprising the high-point of his meditation on life. In this 
regard, reading FCM as a whole will provide privileged access to the matter of life in 
Heidegger's Nietzsche reading. Investigating their connection allows for an enhanced 
understanding of Heidegger's response to the issue of anthropocentrism in philosophy. 
In FCM (contrary to the claims of Krell et. al), the essence of life was not taken up as a  
central issue in philosophy: the problem of life emerged within one way of approaching 
the  question  of  world.  In  NI and  NIII, “life”  will  emerge  as  the central  matter  of 
philosophy itself, as Heidegger will consider Nietzsche's conception of life to be the 
final moment of a metaphysical interpretation of φύσις. When viewed through the lens 
of FCM, the justification of Heidegger's resistance to “life” as a genuinely philosophical 
translation  of  “φύσις”,  and  rejection  of  life  as  the  horizon  of  thinking  will  be 
deepened.1
1 Recapitulating the arguments of my introduction, a study of the  interplay of these crucial moments 
allows the very  matter  of life between Heidegger and Nietzsche to come forward. In this regard, the 
omittance  of  a  close  reading  of  Heidegger's  thoughts  in  the  years  between  FCM and  NI  is  not 
motivated by merely practical concerns, i.e., the allotted length of a thesis. I have philosophical reasons 
for the absence of, say, a reading of life and Nietzsche in IM, or a more detailed account of Heidegger's 
movement toward historical thinking: an understanding of the trajectory of Heidegger's thought on life 
and it historical position is most starkly brought into view between FCM (where life is first presented 
as a matter  that,  in  its  Nietzschean conception,  exceeds the levelling effect  of  lebensphilosophie and 
kulturphilosophie's) and NI and NIII (where life is thought at its metaphysical heights). On the basis of a 
mapping out of this trajectory, the spaces in between the starting point and point of termination of this 
thesis  are  not  excluded.  Rather,  they are  set  back into  context  from out  of  which the  presence of  
Nietzsche and life within this period of Heidegger's thought can be re-examined. As such, I present 
this thesis as groundwork for a more extensive engagement with the matter of life between Heidegger 
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Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche, his  Auseinandersetzung therewith, is nothing 
other than a confrontation with life as the horizon for thinking. In this sense, the high-
point of Heidegger's meditation on life (on the viability of life as the basis for thinking 
the essence of man; the possibility of thinking the essence of life;  the possibility of 
thinking φύσις as life) coincides with the most intensely agonic moment in Heidegger's 
reading of Nietzsche, which is the matter of justice. As such, Nietzsche comes to the 
fore in Heidegger's  work of the late thirties as  the supreme representative of life.2 The 
centrality of life in Nietzsche's thought necessitates this confrontation, as claimed in 
FCM, the  modern notions  of  life  adopted by  lebensphilosophie  are  only effusions  of 
Nietzsche's genuinely epochal thoughts.  With the concept of  life  as encountered in 
modern  life-sciences,  Heidegger  not  only intimated their  metaphysical  paucity,  but 
also hinted at their Nietzschean character with his surveying of the field as caught 
between mechanism and vitalism, or life and spirit. In Nietzsche, a genuine encounter 
with the contemporary will be attained, and on Nietzsche's terms this is an encounter 
with the philosophical possibilities of life. 
As intimated throughout my reading of FCM, Heidegger identifies in Nietzsche a more 
profound site for a confrontation with life itself than in the life-sciences. This is because 
of  his  understanding of  life  in  Nietzsche as  caught  within the  interrelation of  two 
orientations to Being (Dionysus/life and Apollo/spirit). In  NI  we find a justification of 
this  initial  advocacy of  Nietzsche's  deep meditation on life,  whereas  NIII houses  a 
and Nietzsche, rather than the final word. I will expand upon this thought in my conclusion to the 
thesis.
2 In calling Nietzsche the supreme representative of  life  for Heidegger,  I  am directly borrowing the 
phrase that Nietzsche uses to describe justice itself in a note of 1844.The note from  KSA volume 11, 
pp140-1, is quoted and interpreted by Heidegger on p142 of NIII.
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rejection of this thinking. In order to conclude the project of understanding Nietzsche's 
presence  in  FCM,  I  will  engage  with  these  two  moments  and  forward  my  own 
understanding of  their  connection.  This  will  establish the  profundity of  my claims 
regarding the role of FCM in Heidegger's Nietzsche reading, and equally of Nietzsche's 
role in FCM.
FCM  does not call  for a further engagement with life. In this sense,  the connection 
between FCM and the Nietzsche Lectures does not lie in their shared examination of life, 
but in their shared pursuit of a genuine Auseinandersetzung with metaphysics. That this 
confrontation regards the matter of life is not the result of the failure or incompleteness 
of  FCM.  Heidegger's  engagement  with  life  is  necessitated  by  its  centrality  in  the 
thought of Nietzsche. This was equally the case in FCM, despite being less explicit. In 
this chapter I will follow Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's thoughts on life in NI and 
NIII, where it takes its most substantial form. In his Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, 
rather than as a subsidiary concern, the possibility of establishing “life” as the very 
horizon  for  thinking  itself  is  held  out  into  a  decisive  space.  With  Nietzsche, 
understanding life becomes the very space for a confrontation with metaphysics itself, 
as, for Heidegger, Nietzsche thinks life as the originary unitary structure of being and 
beings.  He  interprets  “φύσις” as  “life”,  thus  thinking  life  prior  to  its  regionalised 
biological  conception.  For  Heidegger  this  represents  the  highest  possible 
anthropomorphic  conception  of  life,  and  metaphysical  conception  of  φύσις  (where 
metaphysics is no longer thought as capable of sustaining a genuine interpretation of 
φύσις). Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche completes this metaphysical interpretation 
of φύσις as the crowning moment of the confusion of beings and being. In this respect,  
I  intend  to  draw  out  the  manner  in  which  life  emerges  as  the matter  between 
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Heidegger and Nietzsche, but also the mater for contemporary thinking according to 
Heidegger.
1. NI
1.1. Nietzsche and Prejudice
In  his  analysis  of  NI, Krell  identifies  the  emergence  of  Nietzsche  from  within 
'Heidegger's  “turn  out  of  need”  to  the  poetry  of  Hölderlin'.3 In  this  regard,  for 
Heidegger,  Hölderlin  represents  the  possibility  of  a  new  “dawn”,  and  Nietzsche 
represents the 'outermost point in the history of the Occident or evening-land from 
which he descries the dawn'.4 In this context, Krell suggests that Nietzsche's point of 
emergence in the early 1930s is shrouded in ambiguity: 'even if we reduce matters to 
biography there is no obvious reason why the name “Nietzsche” and no other must 
appear here'.5 Building on this idea of Nietzsche as a 'figure of dusk and dawn' (yet 
overlooking the significance of his appearance in FCM as just such a figure who tells of 
the night and day), Krell suggests that only a deeper analysis of the Nietzsche Lectures 
themselves can open up the proper understanding of the necessity of the emergence of 
3 NI, Krell's 'Analysis', p250. Throughout this thesis, Krell's account of Heidegger's relationship to life-
philosophy has been presented in opposition to the reading that I myself have aimed to conduct. That 
this  is  the  case  should  not  be  misinterpreted  as  a  claim  that  Krell,  as  a  reader  of  Heidegger,  is 
perennially on the outside. It is more the case that Krell directly points toward the deepest moments of  
historical conflict that arise within Heidegger's body of work, and on this basis, attempts to generate  
the type of  reading of Heidegger that Heidegger himself  attempts of  other  philosophers.  This far-
reaching task is, by its very nature, both controversial and potentially flawed. However, such a grand 
undertaking is not based in ignorance regarding Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, on the contrary, it is  
grounded in seminal work on this matter: Krell's brief analyses of Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation 
that accompany each volume of the English translations of the  Nietzsche Lectures contain more depth 
than their length would imply. 
4 Ibid – The German for “Occident” is Abendland, which literally translates as evening land. In this sense 
Heidegger is discussing a purely European History where Nietzsche, as he did in FCM, represents the 
most contemporary moment – he represents the place where “we” as Europeans can find our identity 
and locate ourselves within our most essential historical movement.
5 Ibid, p251.
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the  name  “Nietzsche”  and  no  other.6 With  this  necessity  noted,  Krell  hints at  the 
reasons for Nietzsche's emergence, Heidegger suggests that in the face of the history of 
thinking  truth  as  correctness  (the  Platonic  tradition),  Nietzsche's  revaluation  of  all 
values, whilst representing a certain extreme permutation of this tradition, nonetheless 
operates in a way that is “less prejudicial” as a result of having adopted the 'standard 
of “life” itself for the revaluation'.7
In what sense is this a matter of “prejudice” for Heidegger? According to Krell,  'in 
Nietzsche he found the keenest eyewitness to that collapse [of the meaning of being]',  
which lay concealed in 'the very meaning of “body” and “soul”, “matter” and “spirit”,  
“sensuous”  and  “supersensuous”.'8 This  notion  is  supported  by  the  presence  of 
Nietzsche in FCM as the thinker who pushes a certain mode of thinking regarding the 
dual aspects of φύσις to its limit under the banner of a justification of life, and in the 
figures of Dionysus and Apollo. In Heidegger's world analysis in  FCM the refusal of 
the  animal  tells  of  an abyssal  joining,  in  turn,  the  seeming opposition of  will  and 
command with respect to boredom was shown to overcome itself in the direction of a 
need to grasp that which joined them together, namely the horizonality of time. Krell 
suggests that, for Heidegger, 'Nietzsche's fundamental experience of the death of God 
implies the collapse of the ontotheological interpretation of Being'.9 NI, therefore, takes 
up Nietzsche's notion of art as a counter-movement to truth that seeks to rescue the 
6 This notion further justifies my concentration on the interplay of FCM and the Nietzsche Lectures at the 
expense of a closer reading of the work in between. In  FCM Nietzsche's emergence as  the site of the 
contemporary is, although only briefly, explained and justified. It is only through an understanding of 
his critique of Nietzsche's conception of life that his importance for Heidegger, and thus his persistent 
appearance in his work of the intervening period between FCM and NI, can be assessed. 
7 NI,  Krell's 'Analysis',  p253. The place where Heidegger discusses this is actually in:  Heidegger,  M. 
Plato's Doctrine of Truth in Pathmarks ed Mcneill, W. (Cambridge, CUP: 1998) pp155-183. Written in 1931, 
one year after FCM and five years prior to NI.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
206
“sensuous  world”  from  its  platonic  denigration.  This  is  the  direction  in  which 
Nietzsche is less prejudiced. 
As I have argued, it is not a case of removing prejudices in order to philosophise or 
historicise in some “pure” fashion. Purity, thought in this manner, is precisely the type 
of prejudice that Heidegger is thinking about. Rather, prejudice appears as a particular 
relation  to  the  situatedness  and  rootedness  of  any  philosophical  system  or 
investigation.  In  this  instance,  prejudice,  or  Nietzsche's  lower  level  of  prejudice,  is 
understood  in  relation  to  the  platonic  tradition  of  the  forgetting  of  the  body,  the 
schematic separation of binary opposites, and the subsequent repudiation of the world 
(as  witnessed,  for  example,  in  the  Kantian  concept  of  mundus).  From  within  this 
context, Krell posits the potential moment of Heidegger's emergence from Nietzsche's 
thought as arising within his uptake and furthering of the Nietzschean project of “a new 
interpretation  of  sensuousness”.  Thus,  for  Krell,  at  certain  moments,  Heidegger's 
“war” with Nietzsche operates within Nietzsche's battlefield, as a fight over how best 
to  fulfil  Nietzsche's  own promise.  Krell  understands  NI  to  be  the  place  where  the 
deepest unity (or community as Krell terms it) between the two thinkers is established. 
In  this  regard,  commenting  on  the  progression  from  a  discussion  of  Nietzsche's 
metaphysics through to his aesthetics, Krell states the following:
Heidegger  tries  to  pinpoint  Nietzsche's  uncertain  location  on  the  historical 
path of metaphysics. That is the only way he can estimate his own position, the 
only way he can discern the task of his own thinking.10
If  prejudice  is  understood  to  concern  an  openness  to  the  situatedness  of 
10 Ibid, p232.
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philosophising,  as  either  historical  situatedness,  or  perhaps  bodily  situatedness  (in 
Heideggerian  terms  the  recognition  of  the  comprehensiveness  of  philosophy  with 
regards  to  the  manner  in  which  the  comprehender  in  comprehended  in  the 
comprehension of the whole), then Heidegger's efforts in the Nietzsche Lectures, as the 
historical  locating  of  both  himself  and  Nietzsche,  are  clearly  preparatory for 
philosophising  in  much  the  same  manner  as  his  efforts  in  FCM.  When  properly 
understood as a meditation on the preparation for philosophy, via the investigations of 
everyday awareness's stance (i.e., philosophy and prejudice); the need for a grounding 
attunement  (as  some  kind  of  relation  to  the  thought  of  Nietzsche);11 and  an 
investigation of world and the essence of life, then it is clear that the work of  FCM 
reaches its culmination in the Nietzsche Lectures. This connection between the two texts 
remains trivial however, if  it  is purely a rough thematic identity.  In identifying the 
precise terms of Heidegger's work of historical locating in  NI, the deeper connection 
between the two will begin to emerge. 
1.2 Art and the Ideal of Truth as Certainty
In  FCM  Heidegger explicitly stated that the general aim of the text was to achieve a 
position from out of which Greek beginnings could be illuminated. Heidegger did not 
11 Haase points to a section of Heidegger's posthumously published monograph of 1938/39, Mindfulness, 
wherein Heidegger elaborates  further  upon the  movement  of  Auseinandersetzung.  'The dissociating 
exposition [Auseinandersetzung] displaces into a foundational, and in each case, unique attunedness by 
the grounding-attunement [Grundstimmung].  Grounding-attunement is  not a diffused feeling which 
additionally envelopes thinking, but is the silent attuning into the uniqueness of the one particular 
basic thought [...] [d]issociating exposition, therefore, is never the same as calculating the correctness 
and incorrectness  of  doctrines  and  opinions'.  This  1938/39  account  of  Auseinandersetzung has  clear 
connections  to  the  overriding  task  of  FCM.  Here  Auseinandersetzung is  explicitly  presented  as  the 
historical movement through which a fundamental attunement is awoken via an engagement with other 
thought. This is the precise structure that Heidegger was working within in FCM. There, it was shown 
that the efforts of FCM were directed toward the awakening of a fundamental attunement wherein the 
a living philosophising could be undertaken, and the possibility for a genuine confrontation with the  
contemporary opened up.
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decide the fate of the term metaphysics, but rather, attempted to open a space for its 
decision, attempted to prepare for the opening of a space for this decision. The manner 
of Heidegger's handling of the term “metaphysics” does not represent a caesura of the 
seemingly redemptive project of  FCM. Rather, it marks the point of decision, where, 
arguably, the possibility of a redemption of the history of metaphysics is exhausted. In 
NI Heidegger will not repudiate Nietzsche's thought as metaphysical. This is the clear 
crux  of  Heidegger's  Nietzsche  reading.  What  is  not  so  clear,  is  why  this  train  of 
thought culminates in a reading of Nietzsche on life. I will turn to the last few chapters  
of NI in order to show how and why this is indeed the case.
The situation as it stands with NI does not involve a radical dislocation from FCM, in 
fact, it follows directly from that project.  In the latter half of  NI Heidegger elaborates 
upon his  understanding of  the  relationship between the  first  name of  metaphysics 
(Plato),  and the  last  (Nietzsche).  Whilst  he  does  not  think that  the  question of  the 
essence  of  truth  is  genuinely  posited  by  Nietzsche,  he  maintains  that  through 
Nietzsche  the  history  of  truth  thought  as  correctness  can  be  brought  to  a  close.  
However,  Heidegger will  ultimately consider Nietzsche to remain trapped within a 
“metaphysical”  interpretation  of  truth.  For  Heidegger,  Nietzsche's  metaphysical 
interpretation of truth represents the very limit of metaphysics itself. In FCM this limit 
was shown to be the problematic manner in which the history of metaphysical thinking 
approaches its fundamental concepts, namely, World, Finitude and Solitude. The major 
issue  was  shown  to  be  the  misinterpretation  and  mistaking  of  the  “meta”  in 
“metaphysics” as relating to the content of philosophy as such, rather than being a 
classification of the position of certain texts within Aristotle's corpus. 
209
With regard to the first of these concepts, world (which is by no means the primary or 
most  important,  that  is  the  role  of  finitude),  this  mistake  played  itself  out  in  a 
denigration of the term κόσμος, where its Latin counterpart, mundus, came to stand for 
that which lay beneath the transcendent. “Worldly” knowledge, or finite knowing, was 
thought as the privative form of infinite, transcendent, supersensuous knowing. This 
model has not changed from FCM to NI. However, what has altered, is the use of the 
term “metaphysics”. In FCM Heidegger was tacitly engaged in an attempt to redeem 
the  word  metaphysics,  to  find  a  mode  of  philosophising  whereby  the  original 
“metaphysical” intentions of Aristotle could be understood for the first time. It was 
hinted that  this  historical  project  would  need to  come to  an understanding of  the 
manner in which Aristotle understood sleep and waking to be that which bounded an 
entity, the horizon which both opens up and at the same time refuses other entities that 
it itself is not. In laying out the historical ground of the misappropriation of the term 
“metaphysics”  for  Aristotle's  first  philosophy,  Heidegger  did  not  reject  the  term 
outright, but rather, sought to push the word, and thus the entire history that it stands 
for, to its limit.
Krell  points  out  the  deep  connection  between  Nietzsche  and  Plato  as  being  the 
centralising of viewing within the essence of truth. This once again raises the matter 
dealt with in the 'Preliminary Appraisal' - certainty. Heidegger begins his examination 
with a caveat: at this stage he is not directly presenting the case of Plato, but rather 
Platonism,  i.e.,  'the  conception  of  knowledge  that  corresponds  to  that  term'.12 
According  to  Heidegger,  for  Plato,  genuine  knowledge  pertains  to  ideas,  i.e.,  the 
eternal form of an entity. Heidegger understands this to be a matter of looking, a matter 
12 NI, p151. Heidegger will present a more detailed reading of Plato himself in subsequent sections of NI .
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of apprehension, but 'not with the sensory eye of the body, but with the eye of the 
soul'.13 The idea of a thing is the basis upon which any sensuous perception of it can 
occur. It is the idea of a table that makes it a table, not its spatio-temporal properties. In 
this regard, the nonsensuous “stands above” the sensuous:
Knowledge must measure itself against the supersensuous, the Idea.14
Heidegger  approaches  Nietzsche  through  his  claim  that  he  offers  an  “inverted 
Platonism”.15 He denies  that  Nietzsche offers  a simplistic  inversion of  this  Platonic 
theory of knowledge. A direct inversion, on Heidegger's account, would be positivism, 
which inverts  the relationship between the sensuous and the supersensuous whilst 
maintaining  knowledge  as  a  process  of  measurement.  Here,  the  standard  of 
measurement is 'what is constantly placed before us, the positum', 'the latter is what is 
given in sensation, the sensuous'.16 Whilst positivism may initially appear to favour 
apprehension  over  and  above  a  more  metaphysically  abstract  understanding  of 
knowledge,  Heidegger  maintains  that  the  two  are  identical  with  regard  to  their 
structure: 
Here  too  measurement  is  an  immediate  presenting  or  putting  forward 
(“sensing”), which is defined by a mediating interrelation of what is given by 
way of sensation, a judging.17
Both of these theories of knowledge centralise the mode of viewing of the subject, they 
involve  a  process  of  presentation,  understood  as  a  mediating  relation  (either  that 
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid, p154.
16 Ibid, p152.
17 Ibid.
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which 'derives from what is represented',  the idea, or the process of sensing itself).  
Further  to  this,  on  the  bases  of  their  accounts  of  knowledge,  they  both  project  a 
structurally  identical  notion  of  truth.  Platonism  teaches  that  'the  idea,  the 
supersensuous, is the true, true being':
[...]  the  sensuous  must  be  measured  upon  the  supersensuous;  nonbeing 
possesses the shadow and the residues of Being which fall from true being.18
The similarities  between this  basic  Platonism and the relation of  finite  and infinite 
knowing in Kant (as presented by Heidegger in OEG) are apparent. The world is seen 
as a privative, fallen form of the infinite, transcendent, supersensuous realm of being. 
Positivism reverses this “standard relation”:
The sensuous becomes being proper, i.e.,  the true, i.e.,  truth. The true is the 
sensuous.19
Whilst this is the direct inversion of Platonism, qua reversal, and whilst Nietzsche can 
in some senses be understood to be/have been a positivist,  Heidegger suggests that 
Nietzsche's  inversion of  Platonism,  as  an  overturning,  has  to  be  thought  in  a  more 
radical  direction.  It  has  to  be  thought  from  out  of  the  “fundamental  experience” 
[Grunderfahrung]  of  nihilism.  It  is  only  on  this  basis  that  the  historical  intent  of 
Nietzsche's  thinking,  and thus  a  genuine  understanding of  his  thoughts  regarding 
truth, can be grasped. FCM is once more recalled as Heidegger repeats his analysis of 
the need to investigate boredom when discussing nihilism. Where profound boredom 
was  seen  to  arise  from  within  a  distinct  lack  of  a  collective  or  pressing  need  for  
18 Ibid, p154.
19 Ibid.
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contemporary man,  Heidegger understands nihilism in Nietzsche to operate in the 
same manner, saying of nihilism for Nietzsche:
There is no longer any goal in and through which all the forces of the historical 
existence of peoples can cohere and in the direction of which they can develop 
[...]  no goal  of such power that it  can {...}  conduct Dasein to its  realm in a 
unified way and bring it to creative evolution.20
The connection is clear: boredom, with its relation to historical lostness, a lack of need, 
and more  importantly  its  location within a  contemporary  as  defined by  Nietzsche 
(which is  explicitly  the  case  in  FCM),  is  nihilism thought  under  a  different  name. 
Boredom opened up the need to once more take Dasein up as burden, whereby we can 
start to philosophise for ourselves and become who we are via a confrontation with the 
contemporary. At this point in his Nietzsche reading, contra Nihilism, the main task 
opened up is, once again, a confrontation of a certain order - an Auseinandersetzung.
The establishing of goals is in itself confrontation21
Standing  in  the  balance  in  this  confrontation  with  history  as  nihilism,  as  the 
devaluation of the “uppermost values”, is man's ability to generate the power of self-
mastery, to gather the 'basic force that is needed to in order to attain a creative stance in 
the midst of being'.22 This is precisely the same dislocation of man from the “basic force 
of  Dasein”  that  was  experienced  in  profound  boredom.  The  difference  between 
nihilism in this sense, and boredom, does not lie in their historical character, but in the 
resultant  relation to  life.  The problem of  world  delimited and opened up through 
20 Ibid, p157.
21 Ibid, p158.
22 Ibid, p159.
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Heidegger's  investigation into boredom was pursued in the form of  a comparative 
analysis. This comparative analysis initially opened onto the question of the essence of 
life. The question of the essence of life was thought upon the basis of certain scientific  
understanding.  Life  was  always  positioned  as  the  Other  of  Dasein:  from the  very 
beginning  the  possibility  of  thinking  the  essence  of  Dasein  from  within  life  was 
disregarded. The “abyssal bodily kinship” was maintained at a certain distance. 23
The ultimate finding of the comparative analysis was that no comparison as such could 
be maintained. There was a refusal on the side of the animal, whereby we could no 
longer access its essence. This refusal was precisely that, a refusal. It was not on the 
side of a limitation of man's powers of reasoning, it was not a problem of knowledge in 
that sense. When contextualised with the account of world in  OEG,  the problem of 
world  exceeds  the  problem  of  life.  Life  as  encountered  in  FCM is  regional,  field 
dependent, it is the life of bios and zoe, and thus displaced into the overriding problem 
of world. The problem of life understood in the sense of the abyssal bodily kinship, 
was suspended in the direction of a more fundamental thinking of world. Life itself  
was  not  presented  as  a  fundamental concept  as  such.24 This  is  an  indication  of 
Heidegger's insistence that life cannot be thought, or begin to emerge in its full power,  
from within the trammels of scientific-metaphysical thinking. It can only attain its true 
power at the very limit itself of scientific and metaphysical thinking. In his analysis of 
biologism Heidegger' will further discuss this limit.
23 FCM, §63: “Our thesis that the animal is poor in world is far from being a, let alone the, fundamental 
metaphysical principle of the essence of animality, and moreover, one which follows only if the animal 
is regarded in comparison with humanity.”
24 With Nietzsche, as a translation of φύσις, and thus an interpretation of man's finitude, life is forwarded 
as a fundamental concept of metaphysics – is  thought fundamentally metaphysically.  This is  not a 
derogatory statement – it is thought as a repetition of the origins of metaphysics, and thus pushes 
metaphysics to a certain limit.
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What Nietzschean nihilism presents,  is  the problem of  a  lack of  pressing need for 
Dasein as a problem of life itself:
The major debility of the basic force of Dasein consists in the calumniation of  
the fundamental orienting force of “life” itself.25
This  calumniation is  grounded in the 'fact  that  things are posited  above life,  which 
make negation of it desirable [...] [t]he desirable, the ideal, is the supersensuous'.26 As 
such, Heidegger states the following:
It  is  not  the  simple,  almost  mechanical  exchange  of  one  epistemological 
standpoint for another, that of positivism. Overturning Platonism means, first, 
shattering the pre-eminence of the supersensuous as the ideal.27
This is the new interpretation of sensuousness. Heidegger concentrates on Nietzsche's 
proclamation that art is  'the greatest  stimulans of  life',28 thus providing the genuine 
counter-movement to truth. However, as a counter-movement, art cannot be dislocated 
from its discordant relationship to truth:
Art and truth, creating and knowing, meet one another in the single guiding 
perspective of the rescue and configuration of the sensuous.29
At this  point  it  is  worth  recalling the  brief  treatment  of  Nietzsche in  FCM.  There, 
Heidegger claimed that  the  manner in which Apollo and Dionysus  are thought  as 
25 NI, p159.
26 Ibid, p159.
27 Ibid, p160.
28 Ibid, p75, Heidegger quoting from WP 808.
29 Ibid, 161.
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fundamental  orientations  to  being,  and  the  manner  in  which  they,  as  opposing 
orientations, are brought together and held in their opposition, are the most important 
of  Nietzsche's  thoughts.  In  FCM Heidegger  points  to  Nietzsche's  claim  that  this 
thought (the justification of life through the figures of Apollo and Dionysus) sustained 
his entire  life's  work. Heidegger by no means abandons this notion. Regarding the 
confrontation  of  art  and  truth,  the  confrontation  between  knowing  and  creativity 
which houses the power to overcome nihilism, Heidegger forwards the following idea:
[...] the genuine struggle is the one in which those who struggle excel, first the one  
then the other, and in which the power for such excelling unfolds within them.30
Auseinandersetzung is 'the initiation of struggle',31 and therefore deeply implicated in 
the above. In his analysis of “The Grand Style”, presented earlier in the text, Heidegger 
indicates the grounds for such a claim. 
1.3. The Grand Style- Return to the Original Conflict of Life
For Heidegger, the Grand Style represents the 'supreme form' of all 'artistic actuality' 
within Nietzsche's thought, and is, as such, considered to be 'that in which art comes to 
its essence'.32 The Grand Style, as 'triumph over the plenitude of living things', where 
'measure becomes master', is fundamentally structured by the relation of two opposing 
forces:
If art has its proper essence as the grand style, this now means that measure 
30 Ibid, p158.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid, p126.
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and law are confirmed only in subjugation and containment of chaos and the 
rapturous.33
This statement represents a direct repetition of Heidegger's presentation of Nietzsche's 
thought in FCM. In this oppositional structure, the two fundamental aspects of man are 
brought into view. On the one hand, art as counter-movement to nihilism, where new 
goals and new standards of valuation are to be set (measure and law). On the other, art 
as  'physiological  aesthetics'  where  the  plenitude  of  life  is  most  primordially 
experienced in rapturous states brought about in artistic activity. Thus we find a direct 
connection  to  Heidegger's  understanding  of  the  relationship  that  pertains  between 
world, solitude and finitude. Here, “world” can be understood as the rapturous being-
together with the plenitude of life, “solitude” as measure and law, and thus “finitude” 
as  the  grand style  itself:  the  unity  of  these  two oppositional  orientations  to  being. 
Nietzsche is the source of Heidegger's understanding of the history of metaphysics. 
Clearly then, Heidegger's own thoughts on metaphysics are Nietzsche's reformed. This 
is the true extent of the idea that Heidegger needs to undergo some process of self-
emergence, as it is the location of his initial  standing together with Nietzsche. In  FCM 
these  orientations  were  presented  as  originating  in  the  dual  aspect  of  φύσις.  This 
thought is directly repeated in the discussion of the grand style:
Where art is to be grasped in its supreme form, in terms of the grand style, we 
must reach back in the most original states of embodying life, into physiology.  
Art as counter-movement to nihilism and art as state of rapture, as objects of 
physiology (“physics”in the broadest  sense)  and as object  of  metaphysics – 
these aspects of art include, rather than exclude one another.34 
33 Ibid, p126.
34 Ibid, p126.
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This statement figures as a centre-piece of Heidegger's  interpretation of Nietzsche's 
aesthetics,  as  it  is  on the  grounds of  thinking the  physiological  as  “physics  in  the 
broadest sense” that Nietzsche's thought can be opened up in its historical importance. 
This historical importance is covered over when the physiological in Nietzsche, and 
therefore nature and indeed life, are thought from the angle of the biological.35 To read 
Nietzsche's physiology in any other way, i.e., to see Nietzsche as a simple positivist 
and “naturalist”, would represent an inability to 'see beyond everything that is fatally 
contemporary  in  Nietzsche'.36 The  question  still  remains,  how  does  Nietzsche 
understand physics in this broad sense? Heidegger considers him to see it in precisely 
the same terms as he himself does in the 'Preliminary Appraisal' of FCM.
[He]  wants  to put in relief  the original  conflict  of  life  [...]  The “natural” to 
which  Nietzsche's  aesthetics  refers  is  not  [...]  something  accessible  to  and 
calculable for a human reason which is apparently unruffled and quite sure of 
itself [...] On the contrary, Nietzsche means what is bound to nature, which the 
Greeks  of  the  Golden  Age  call  deinon and  deinotaton,  the  frightful  [das  
Furchtbare].37
At the end of  FCM,  Nietzsche was called forward as the  last great witness to have 
opened  themselves  up  to,  to  have  become  wakeful  to,  this  terror,  to  have  truly 
experienced world. In NI, with regard to his fundamental interpretation of φύσις itself, 
35 As so many of his interpreters have. Here, and again in the sections on the overturning of Platonism 
Heidegger references Klages and various other “philosophers of culture” who read Nietzsche with an 
eye  only  for  his  world-historical  importance.  This  is  a  direct  repetition  of  Heidegger's  analysis  of 
Nietzsche's epochal presence and subsequent misunderstanding within the contemporary. The claim is 
that Nietzsche was not read philosophically.
36 NI, p127.
37 NI, p128.The main difference between the analysis of FCM and NI is the terminology used to describe 
man's ultimate being-bound to nature (φύσις). In FCM it was the terrifying [Schrecken], here it is the 
frightful. In FCM the terrifying element of finitude was not a direct translation of deinon as it is here in 
NI, but rather Heidegger's own phrasing for what he considers to be the ground of philosophising, or 
at least the condition of being seized by terror from out of which fervour for philosophy itself, namely 
enthousiasmos, can arise. 
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Heidegger once again forwards Nietzsche as a witness to the original and frightful 
conflict  and  ambiguity  of  life.  At  this  juncture  two  paths  open  up  for  further 
investigation:
a.  What  becomes of  this  interpretation of  nature,  especially  with regard to  
boundedness?
b. What are the implications of the grand style? 
I will come to the matter of φύσις last, as this will be the key move from NI to NIII. 
1.3.1. The Grand Style as unspoken Meditation on dual aspect of φύσις
Rather than one style of art amongst others, the grand style is (as a configuration of 
will to power) “a basic structure of Dasein”. It represents the very condition for the 
generation of any other style which would constitute a certain discernible period of 
artistic production. In this regard, it is not historically conditioned. Heidegger provides 
the following description of the grand style at its most lucid:
[...] the fundamental condition is an equally original freedom with regard to 
extreme opposites, chaos and law; not the mere subjection of chaos to a form, 
but  that  mastery  which  enables  the  primal  wilderness  of  chaos  and  the 
primordiality of law to advance under the same yoke, invariably bound to each 
other with equal necessity.38
The  yoke  is  the  structural  joint  between  law  and  chaos,  between  the  formal 
38 Ibid, p128.
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individuation and eternity of Apollo as spirit and the rapturous excess and transience 
of  Dionysus  as  body and life.  The  equal  necessity  with  which  each  is  bound,  the 
interrelatedness of the oppositional elements,  means that neither is favoured as the 
underlying reality, condition or ground of the other.
For this “physiology” is not something to which everything essential in art can 
be traced back and on the basis of which it can be explained. While the bodily 
state as such continues to participate as a condition of the creative process, it is  
at the same time what in the created thing is to be restrained, overcome and 
surpassed.39
This  process  of  surpassing  without  abandonment,  the  maintenance  of  a  mutually 
heightening opposition, is the movement of will to power at its height, as 'such states 
are what they essentially are when, willing out beyond themselves, they are more than 
they are'.40 Hence art's position as the greatest stimulans to life, but also the highest 
point of law giving. In the grand style, spirit and life both achieve their greatest heights 
in and through being bound to each other in contest. Contra the more Wagnerian and 
Schopenhauerian embracing of the purely rapturous power of art, wherein all law is 
abolished, art must be a free movement of law giving. Heidegger points to  WP 846, 
where Nietzsche  claims  that  'the  cause  of  creativity  is  longing  after  immobility, 
eternity,  “Being”,  or  longing  after  destruction,  change,  Becoming'.  He  takes  this 
statement to be the metaphysical pinnacle of the notion of the grand style, indicating 
the ultimately metaphysical intent of Nietzsche's aesthetics due to the idea that art, in 
this  configuration,  is  the  highest  expression  of  will  to  power.  By  “metaphysical” 
Heidegger means precisely what he meant in FCM, namely a meditation on the whole 
39 Ibid, p129.
40 Ibid, p130.
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(beings as a whole and being as such) that comprehends the comprehender. At this 
“far-flung border” of his aesthetic thought, Nietzsche's thinking is transformed into 
metaphysics as 'for Nietzsche art is the essential way in which beings are made to be 
beings'.41 
In  FCM,  Apollo  and  Dionysus  were  presented  by  Heidegger  as  two  fundamental 
orientations. Essentially, they were presented as the most contemporary form of the 
original Greek experience of φύσις: φύσις as a realm of beings (life, nature, becoming) 
and  φύσις as  nature,  qua  essence  (οὐσία).  This  thought  is  directly  repeated  as 
Heidegger maps being and becoming onto the notions of spirit and life, Apollo and 
Dionysus, Law and Chaos. 
The grand style is the active will to Being, which takes up becoming into itself.
42
Via this mapping, the grand style is presented as a meditation on the two fundamental 
orientations toward  φύσις thought at their individual heights, and at the same time 
thought together, as neither one is separated from the other. The movement of “taking 
becoming into itself” is not that of negation wherein being 'remains dependent upon, 
and lets itself be led by, what it repudiates'.43 Rather, this high expression of will to 
power is described by Heidegger as follows:
[...]  only what assimilates its sharpest antithesis, and not what merely holds 
that antithesis down and suppresses it, is truly great; such transformation does 
not  cause  its  antithesis  to  disappear,  however,  but  to  come to  its  essential 
41 Ibid, p131.
42 Ibid, p135.
43 Ibid.
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unfolding.44
Nietzsche's metaphysics takes on the precise form of metaphysics as proposed, but 
never realised, in Aristotle's first philosophy.45 This “juxtaposition” between being and 
becoming (their  structural  relationship),  is  presented by Heidegger as  the  absolute 
limit of Nietzsche's thought, but in an unusual way. Heidegger makes two clarificatory 
statements  regarding  his  relationship  to  Nietzsche,  and  thus  Nietzsche's  historical 
position. The first statement is issued in two stages:
Our sole concern is to know the basic position of Nietzsche's thought46
and
[...] every great thinker always thinks one jump more originally than he directly 
speaks. Our interpretation must therefore try to say what is unsaid by him.47
Heidegger  presents  his  task  as  bringing  that  which  was  thought yet  unsaid in 
Nietzsche's  work  to  word.  This  exegetical project  is  identified  as  understanding 
Nietzsche's  position with regard to  art.  As  has  been seen,  art  implicitly  references 
truth/knowledge.  In  this  respect,  and still  concerning this  juxtaposition,  Heidegger 
makes a second statement:
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. Interestingly  Krell points this out in a footnote to the translation, referencing  IM  section four, 
where being and becoming are presented as having to be thought together as φύσις. Rather than take 
this an indication of the need for a reading of IM, it confirms my stance regarding the necessity of first 
understanding the interplay of FCM, as genuine start-point of the call for an Auseinandersetzung with 
Nietzsche  on  the  grounds of  a  need  to  enter  into  a  historical  relation  with metaphysics  as  φύσις 
interpretation proper, and the Nietzsche Lectures as the Auseinandersetzung itself.
46 Ibid, p131.
47 Ibid, p134.
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[...] aesthetics is by no means overcome. Such overcoming requires a still more 
original metamorphosis of our Dasein and our knowledge, which is something 
that  Nietzsche  only  indirectly  prepares  by  means  of  the  whole  of  his 
metaphysical thought.48
Nietzsche also needs to be taken up with regard to what he prepares for, rather than 
thinks: a radical rethinking of the relationship between knowing and creating. How 
being  and  becoming  (law  and  chaos,  spirit  and  life,  Apollo  and  Dionysus)  are 
interrelated, marks the point where Nietzsche's thought moves out beyond itself and 
opens up the ground for Heidegger's own thinking to emerge. The first,  exegetical, 
task  regarding  how  Nietzsche  understands  the  grand  style  as  the  fundamental 
condition  of  the  event  of  the  overcoming of  nihilism  (releasing  aesthetics  and the 
sensuous from Platonism) is concluded with the “new interpretation of sensuousness”.
1.3.2. Life as Perspectival and the equation of Being and life
As the centre-piece of his “physiological aesthetics”, for Heidegger, the grand style and 
its structure lies at the heart of Nietzsche's meditation on the event of nihilism and its  
potential opposition. In this regard, the matter of overturning Platonism was shown to 
be key. This overturning, up until the final section of NI, has only been determined in a 
negative fashion. On the basis of the grand style, and resultant notion of confrontation 
and struggle, it is clear that art and knowledge (becoming and being) must be thought 
together and not in terms of a relation of negation, abolition, or brute suppression. 
Heidegger  returns  to  the  physiological  aesthetics  in  order  to  establish  'his 
interpretation of the sensuous in its principal direction'.49 This direction takes it leave 
48 Ibid, p131.
49 Ibid, p211.
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from the quashing of the Platonic distinction between the true and the apparent world, 
i.e.,  true-being  and  mere  appearances.  On  Heidegger's  reading,  in  Nietzsche's 
aesthetics  'the  “physiological”  (sensuous-corporeal)  in  itself  possesses  this  beyond 
itself': chaos moves towards form and form affirms chaos.50 Heidegger suggests that 
from within this aesthetic phenomenon (given its metaphysicality) the essence of the 
sensuous can be grasped in the direction of its constituting “reality proper”. The key is 
the internalisation of  that  which was positioned outside,  i.e.,  the inner relationship 
between chaos and law that goes to make up the sensuous, or life itself. 
Within Platonism, the idea (the ideal of truth) is a matter of vision, but not of sensory, 
bodily vision. True-being is apprehended by the soul, the ground of knowledge is thus 
the nonsensuous. To explain how Nietzsche thought his overturning of Platonism, not 
in terms of a reversal, but as a complete “twisting free” of Platonism, Heidegger turns 
to two concepts: Nietzsche's perspectivalism, and his notion of incorporation. Quoting 
his claim that 'The perspectival [is] the basic condition of all life',51 Heidegger's draws 
into view the entirety of Nietzsche's historical profundity. For Heidegger, Nietzsche 
understands  “what  lives”  to  be  constantly  exposed  to  and  confronted  by  “other 
forces”. In this strifely chaos, forces and organisations of forces (hence the “organic”, as 
that which lives is an organisation of forces) strive against each other in such a way 
that  they  'estimate  them  [each  other]  in  relation  to  possible  incorporation  or 
elimination'.52 This  relation  and  estimation  is  understood  as  a  way  of  looking,  an 
“angle  of  vision”,  wherein  the  “living  creature”  interprets  everything  in  terms  its 
“capacity for life”. This discussion of capacities mirrors FCM, where the organism itself 
50 Ibid, p212.
51 Ibid, p212 – Heidegger quoting NIV, p4.
52 Ibid, p212.
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was  understood  to  be  a  collection  of  organs  that  expresses  its  capacities  as  an 
organism.53 Continuing  this  train  of  thought,  Heidegger  offers  the  following 
explanation of self-formation in Nietzsche:
The  angle  of  vision,  and  the  realm  it  opens  into  view,  themselves  draw 
borderlines  around  what  it  is  that  creatures  can  or  cannot  encounter.  For 
example the lizard hears the slightest rustling in the grass but it does not hear a 
pistol shot fired close by.54 
This  perspectival  play  of  interpretation  as  incorporation  and  rejection  is  the 
“fundamental process of life itself”. The broadness of this conception of life is evident 
in  the  manner  in  which it  offers  a  conception  of  the  sensuous that  allows for  the 
division of organic and inorganic to be thought as internal to the play of life. Heidegger 
explains that it is the 'manifold of perspectives which distinguishes the organic from 
the inorganic'. An organic entity contains and organises a number of forces, each of 
which  has  its  own  perspective  (it  literally  embodies  them  in  the  process  of 
incorporation), the inorganic also has its perspective, but one which operates according 
to “fixed power relations”.55 As such, the notion of mechanism in nature, i.e., the idea 
that that which is “inanimate” is not living (the stone has no world...), is rejected as 
being an essential way of grasping entities. This is the direction in which Platonism is 
thus overturned as 'all being is in itself perspectival-perceptual', is sensuous.56
53 This was the basis of McNeill's claim that Heidegger was seeking a reformed Aristotelian notion of the 
organism based around entelecheia. Also, Mcneill focuses on the role of vision in 'Part Two'. For an in-
depth account of why this is the case see McNeill, Time of Life, Chapter One.
54 NI, p212.
55 Ibid, p213.
56 Ibid, p213. In Chapter 2, I highlighted the importance of FCM §16.c) for understanding the direction in 
which  Heidegger  was  trying  to  think.  There,  sleeping  and  waking  comprised  the  fundamental 
categories that allowed for  differentiation amongst  classes  of  beings – they were  the categories of 
nature so to speak. On this basis, philosophically-historically, Heidegger presented the basic division 
between man,  plants,  animals  and stones.  Enhancing the  ambiguity  of  this  categorisation,  without 
explaining  in  clear  detail,  Heidegger  suggested that  the  notions  of  sleep and waking as  found in 
Aristotle had not been understood in their full “metaphysical intent”. He suggested that sleep was a 
form of boundedness  wherein an entity cannot  let  in  others that  it  itself  is  not.  Nietzsche,  in  this 
225
In Nietzsche the concept of life thus broadens to include the inorganic. In this sense,  
life, the essence of the living, is thought beyond FCM. There, life was thought from the 
perspective of  world,  and world was approached according to the historically  pre-
established  divisions  between  entities.  Equally,  indeed  on  this  basis,  it  was  “field 
dependent”, seeking an understanding of the essence of life that operates from within 
a pre-established conception thereof, i.e.,  the organism. Stones did not live in  FCM, 
they  had  no  world.  In  NI  the  stone  lives.  However,  this  does  not  represent  a 
repudiation of FCM.57 On my reading, FCM was an investigation into the limits of the 
history of a particular mode of scientific knowledge, and a particular metaphysical 
history. As such, “life” was thought from within certain divisions, it was not thought in 
its metaphysical fullness. From the outset life was not entertained as a possible name, or 
indeed  matter,  that  could  sustain  all  thinking  as  such.  In  NIII it  is  precisely  this 
possibility which is held out for decision.
What does this mean for the relation between art and truth? In Platonism, that which 
constituted  true-being,  was  that  which  was  fixed,  constant  and  eternal.  The 
nonsensuous was the measure of the sensuous, where the sensuous, as ephemeral, was 
posited as being of the order of “appearances”, where what appears resembles true-
being.  Within perspectivalism,  truth in the  platonic  sense  is  itself  considered to  be 
semblance,  as  the  fundamental  process  of  life  is  striving,  strife  and  fluid  power 
relations. Truth, in this sense, emerges from within the movement of life itself, as part 
context, is presented both as having repeated and reinterpreted the original conception of metaphysics,  
and also  brought  the  thoughts  of  sleep and wakefulness  to  a  certain fullness,  not  only  under  the 
auspices of noontide and dawn (as suggested above), but also in his drawing out of the metaphysical 
fundamentality of boundedness in a quasi-Aristotelian form.
57 This does not mean that claims about the animal and its world are fully rejected. These comments on  
the lizard show that Heidegger's  understanding of  the products of  biology are still  operative.  The 
correctness of Scientific understandings of the organism are not at stake, merely the ability of these 
fields to penetrate into the essence of things.
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of the play of perspectives:
Being,  the true,  which logic  “firmly locates”  (petrifies),  is  but  semblance;  a 
semblance,  an  apparentness,  that  is  essentially  necessary to  the  creature  as 
such,  which  is  to  say,  a  semblance  that  pertains  to  his  survival,  his 
establishment of self amidst ceaseless change.58
As the petrification of a perspective, truth is not the negation of the perspectival, but 
just a form of it. Heidegger turns back to the grand style in order to draw into view 
how life now fully constitutes the play of being and becoming. In art in the grand style, 
both art as creation and becoming, and knowledge as fixation and being, were yoked 
together by necessity and for their own mutual heightening. The movement toward 
being comes from the overflowing power of the incorporation of a perspective, which 
seeks to maintain itself  in constant relation to the chaos of  becoming.  Thus  art,  as 
including both creation and fixation in their heights, is life enhancing, It allows for the 
play of life to continue without abandoning either one of its  fundamental elements 
(i.e.,  perspective  and its  drawing a  “line  of  horizon”  through  which  it  encounters 
things which it is not). Truth, taken as an unrestrained desire for being “immobilises” life, 
and seeks to reject the perspectival ground of its origin. In this new interpretation of 
the sensuous, truth is not abandoned, but drawn back within life itself. The relation 
between  being  and  becoming  is  thus,  from  the  point  of  view  of  life,  the  relation 
between creation and knowledge as the play of perspective and horizon:
In order for the real (the living creature) to  be real, it must on the one hand 
ensconce itself within a particular horizon, thus perduring in the illusion of 
truth.  But  in  order  for  the  real  to  remain  real,  it  must  on  the  other  hand 
simultaneously transfigure itself by going beyond itself […] and that means it 
has to advance against the truth.59
58 Ibid, p214.
59 Ibid, p217.
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On Heidegger's reading in NI (which is as I have claimed, an exegetical text devoted to 
bringing Nietzsche's thought to word, and not to examining that which lies beyond his 
thought), Being and life are equated. “Life” is the name for being, but a name which 
also houses beings traditional opposition, becoming: '“life” is the term for Being in its  
new interpretation according to  which it  is  becoming',  as  being in  the  grand style 
incorporates becoming without suppressing it. At its heart, life itself is nothing but will 
to power. The historical importance of this concept for Heidegger, given my reading of 
FCM, is most apparent in the following statement:
In that way Nietzsche in will to power attempts to think the original unity of 
the ancient opposition of Being and Becoming.60
Nietzsche conducts metaphysics as it was conceived but never realised in Aristotle, i.e., 
thinking the unity of  φύσις as life (living being,  φύσει ὄντα) and  φύσις as essence 
(οὐσία), or becoming and being. In this sense, Nietzsche attempts to bring the original 
Greek experience of φύσις to word in the concept of life. For Heidegger, in NI, Being's 
equation to life 'is not some sort of unjustified expansion of the biological', but rather, 
the biological is interpreted and transformed from the perspective of life. How this is 
the case, and how this involves φύσις is a matter which is brought fully into view in 
NIII.
1.4. The Postponement of the New Interpretation and Return to 
Epistemological Concerns
In  presenting  Nietzsche's  physiological  aesthetics,  Heidegger  separated  out  two 
60 Ibid, p218.
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matters:  that  which  is  unsaid  but  thought  in  Nietzsche,  namely  the  metaphysical 
profundity of art in the grand style, and that which was indirectly prepared for by 
Nietzsche,  namely  “a  more  original  metamorphosis  of  our  Dasein  and  our 
knowledge”.  If  interpreted as  pointing beyond  NI,  where  art  is  the  focus,  and out 
toward NIII, where knowledge is the focus, then the latter comment informs us with 
regards to the development of Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation. 
Krell  points  out that  in  NI  Heidegger ignores knowledge in order to focus on art, 
postponing an account of the consequences removing '“the true” from the realm of 
knowledge to the domain of art'.61 In his 'Analysis' of NIII, Krell suggests that NI marks 
a high water mark, not just of his Nietzsche interpretation, but also his “grand livre”.62 
The obvious implication of this statement is that there is a division between  NI  and 
NIII. NI concludes with a sense of optimism and community, the new interpretation of 
sensuousness  is  by no means  presented as  merely  “Nietzsche's  thought  that  was”, 
which is to say, as something concluded. Rather, it was presented by Heidegger as the 
future of philosophy. This project is,  as Krell is quick to point out, “postponed” by 
Heidegger, 'who constantly invokes some body who is alive,  yet never pursues the 
matter'.63 If  NI  is a high water mark, then NIII  must represent a decline, either as an 
impoverishment of interpretative proximity, or perhaps as distance from Nietzschean 
community.  For  Krell,  it  is  precisely  this  lack  of  community  that  constitutes  the 
difference between the two moments in Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation. On my 
interpretation of Heidegger's statements regarding knowledge in  NI,  it is seemingly 
the case that life,  between  NI  and NIII,  stakes out both the site for a decision and 
61 Ibid, p236, Krell's 'Analysis'.
62 NIII, p274, Krell's 'Analysis'. This suggestion is made in the form of a rhetorical question.
63 Ibid, p275.
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perhaps even a decision itself, as it marks the community and the starkest difference 
between the two. Krell is aware of this, and at the close of his NIII analysis, he suggests 
that the position we are left in at the end of NIII is to return to the whole of Nietzsche 
and ask, 'Can we [...] envisage self-preserving, self-enhancing  life  at that mysterious 
threshold  where  fixation  becomes  petrification  rather  than  a  fulguration  of  form-
engendering force?'. Whilst he will come to think that Heidegger is incapable of such 
an  activity,  at  this  moment,  Krell  presents  the  situation  as  it  stood  with  life  for 
Heidegger, which is to say, in the balance. It is towards life in NIII that I now turn.
2. NIII
2.1. Biologism – Philosophy and the Sciences
In  NIII,  Heidegger  directly  picks  up  his  interpretation  of  truth  in  Nietzsche  as 
developed in NI. There, in closing, he suggested that the equation of Being and life was 
not  a  radical  extension  of  biological  thinking,  but  the  other  way  round,  that  the 
biological  would have to  be  thought  anew from out  of  Nietzsche's  concept of  life.  
Heidegger extends, and focuses on this thought that 'interprets all appearances as an 
expression of life'64 in a discussion of “Nietzsche's alleged biologism”. For Heidegger, 
the  term  “biologism”  denotes  the  transferral  of  concepts  generated  from  the 
examination of 'the realm of plant and animal life to other realms of beings'.65 This 
represents  a  certain  'unfounded  violence  of  thinking',  and  'transgression  of 
boundaries', wherein the sovereignty of philosophy is cast aside in lack of recognition 
'that biological thinking itself can only be decided and grounded in the metaphysical 
64 NIII, p39.
65 Ibid, p45.
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realm'.66 Heidegger asserts that approaching Nietzsche's thought through the lens of 
biologism and biology poses the “main obstacle” to genuinely grasping his thought.67 
He turns to a brief examination of the key term for both biology, and for this thesis – 
βίος.  Βίος, according to Heidegger, is the Greek term for 'life, the process of life, and 
the course of life'.68 As such, “biology” can be understood as the “study of life” or 
“study of living beings”: 
The name now means the scientific investigation of the appearances, processes, 
and laws of living beings that are determined for the realms of plant, animal,  
and human life.69
In FCM the origin of the sciences was understood to be founded in the original Greek 
experience  of  φύσις as  interpreted  by  Aristotle,  with  each  branch  of  knowledge 
(episteme) dealing with separate domains initially delineated by a more foundational 
meditation on the whole – first philosophy (metaphysics). Heidegger's understanding of 
the structure of the sciences has thus not changed between  FCM  and  NIII.  In being 
directed toward living beings, 'all biology already presupposes a more or less explicitly 
drawn essential delimitation of appearances', which means that there is an underlying 
“preconception” of what 'distinguishes and sets apart living beings as such'.70 In the 
language of  FCM: the question of the essence of life is already thought and remains 
unquestioned, and also unquestionable, from the perspective of biology. Rather than 
originally  opening up the  realm for  questioning itself,  the  sciences,  as  branches  of 
knowledge,  can  only  presuppose,  adopt  and  confirm  their  guiding  “metaphysical 
66 Ibid.
67 The  translation  of  these  passages  suggests  that  biologism  is  a  hindrance  to  a  “discussion”  of 
Nietzsche's thought, yet the term is indeed  Auseinandersetzung, which can be taken to mean that the 
very confrontation between Nietzsche and Heidegger rests on the matter of biologism.
68 NIII, p39.
69 Ibid, p41.
70 Ibid.
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propositions”. This is not to say that the sciences cannot progress their investigations 
to the point at which they indeed pose the need for metaphysical questions or at least 
recognise the importance of metaphysical grounding. It is just that when they do the 
biologist,  for  example,  no  longer  speaks  as  a  scientist,  but  as  a  metaphysician. 
Heidegger  maintains  that  as  a  result  of  the  difficulty  and “alien”  character  of  the 
transition from science to metaphysics, those scientists who overcome their perspective 
and “speak as metaphysicians“ are not just rare, but also fated to being misunderstood. 
In grasping the issue of Nietzsche's “alleged” biologism, Heidegger hopes to draw into 
view the nature of these transitions, and indeed the ground of the modern separation 
and confusion of metaphysics and the sciences. In this regard, NIII directly deals with 
the same issues as FCM. The following statement provides some clarity on this matter:
Science and reflection on the scientific are both historically grounded on the 
actual dominance of a particular interpretation of being71
My reading of FCM showed that Heidegger's engagement with the question of life (his 
alleged theoretical biology) was located within a particular interpretation of Being, one 
which had already decided about the division of the living, and on this basis worked 
backwards and upwards toward an understanding of the essence of the living. At no 
point were stones understood to be alive, but they were nonetheless thought to take 
part  in  “world”  by  means  of  an  absence.  When pushed to  it  limits,  this  mode  of 
thinking, as historically grounded without being historical itself, proved incapable of 
founding an ontology of life. This was seen to be the result of this dependency of the  
underlying conception of  life  on a realm of  phenomena already distinguished and 
71 NIII, p44.
232
formed by an operative conception of that term itself, i.e., the organism. In this way, we 
ourselves were always hovering n the background, yet in a way that could not be fully 
determined  within  the  confines  of  this  comparison.72 This  was  the  status  of  the 
anthropocentrism in play in FCM.
This conclusion regarding contemporary science can either be interpreted as being a 
productive endeavour (a foray into the sciences on Heidegger's behalf, an attempt to 
push them toward their own metaphysical potential), or a merely critical one (an effort 
to show the impossibility or perhaps even perpetual difficulty of transitioning from 
scientific knowledge to metaphysical thinking). On the latter reading, rather than an 
abortive attempt, 'Part Two' of  FCM necessitates a reading of Nietzsche by way of a 
display of the need to approach the living, (βίος or zoe), from out of philosophy itself, 
and not the other way round: the question of the essence of life can only be approached 
from out of a genuine confrontation with philosophy. 
For Heidegger, as hinted at in NI, in thinking both beings as a whole and being as such 
together  as  “life”,  Nietzsche 'grounds  this  apparently  merely  biological  worldview 
metaphysically'.73 Heidegger suggests that, in reversing the polarity of biologism:
The metaphysical foundation of the pre-eminence of life has its ground not in 
an eccentric, far-fetched biological view of Nietzsche's, but in the fact that he 
brings the essence of Western metaphysics to completion on the historical path 
that is allotted to it, the fact that he can bring to words what was preserved 
unspoken in the primordial essence of Being as φ σις. ύ 74
72 To recall  FCM:  “[...]  our  own proper  essence has  emerged in contrast,  even  if  not  in  any  explicit 
interpretation […] for we ourselves have been in view all the time, whether we wanted to be or not.”  
[FCM, §63.]
73 Ibid, p46.
74 Ibid.
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Nietzsche, or rather Heidegger's  Auseinandersetzung therewith, fulfils the promise of 
FCM in a way that that text could not achieve. In looking back toward the original 
Greek experience of  φύσις, in attempting to awaken a genuine, living philosophising 
from which to shed light on the path from  φύσις  to the contemporary, Heidegger's 
efforts in 'Part Two' of FCM fell short because as a comparative analysis of world failed 
to move within metaphysics when it engaged with life. Life in FCM 'Part Two' was not 
that of  φύσις, but  βίος. Life, as living qua organic, was already divided, was already 
regional  and  thus  narrowed.  The  stone  was  not  living,  it  was  worldless,  but  on 
Nietzsche's interpretation the stone would be part of life in the broadest sense,  the 
stone would partake in life, rather than be included by way of absence. This means that 
the essence of life thought as βίος75 is more akin to the question of the animal Other as 
experienced from within the trammels of the history of scientific and a particular mode 
of metaphysical thinking. Deeper metaphysical questions could be sighted from within 
Heidegger's investigation into the essence of life via an analysis of the animal world, 
but not fully articulated, as the original otherness, the foundational distinction upon 
which the otherness of the animal is based (namely the distinction between being and 
beings) was not articulated with regard to its originary unity. With Nietzsche it is life 
as  φύσις, as “physics in the broadest sense”, which comes into view, thus offering a 
genuinely metaphysical and philosophical possibility of interpreting φύσις, rather than 
operating from within a pre- existing one. In this sense life emerges as the very horizon 
for thought itself.
75 As aforementioned there is a certain ambiguity regarding this point. I use bios because Heidegger is 
concerned with biology, but, perhaps there is room to think that this could indeed be zoe – a question 
regarding the pre-eminence of biology over and above zoology could be raised in conjunction with this  
issue. 
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As  FCM  began with a meditation on the fundamental separatedness of the sciences 
and philosophy, yet concluded with a detailed foray into the life-sciences, it may have 
appeared as though Heidegger considered the sciences to be both productive of, and 
productive with regard to, philosophical problems. This was absolutely not the case. 
His examination of the sciences represented merely one way of approaching philosophy 
itself,  alongside  his  analysis  of  boredom.  In  this  approach,  he  posed  a  single 
metaphysical question – what is world? In using the world of the animal, and thus the 
varying  products  of  the  life-sciences,  Heidegger's  investigation  into  world  was, 
nonetheless,  propelled  in  the  direction  of  world's  fundamental  unity  and  thus 
interrelation  with  individuation/solitude.  In  this  regard,  it  was  thrown  back  to 
questions regarding the character of the difference between being and beings – the 
fundamental question of all philosophising. In NIII, Heidegger states that he considers 
the sciences to be incapable of generating their own “field proposition”. This is not a  
statement about the inability of a scientist to philosophise:
[...] if the biologist as this specific person makes a decision about what is to be 
addressed as living, he nonetheless does not make this decision as a biologist, 
nor with the means, the forms of thought, and the proofs of his science; here he 
speaks  as  a  metaphysician,  as  a  human  being  who,  beyond  the  field  in 
question, thinks beings as a whole.76
Heidegger is clearly not disparaging the sciences or, for that matter, scientists. Rather, 
this passage directly repeats the wisdom of FCM, wherein philosophy was shown to be 
absolute, entirely separated in the sense that it gives itself its own wherefore. In FCM 
Heidegger  was  engaged  in  a  struggle  to  begin to  philosophise  –  he  did  not  have 
immediate recourse to a “ladder to philosophy” that would allow ease of access to 
76 NIII, p42.
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philosophy's “inverted world”. The same thought is repeated here, in NIII, where the 
distance between everyday awareness and philosophy is once again problematised, 
and  correspondingly,  the  proximity  of  everyday  awareness  and  the  science  (their 
continuity) is emphasised.
The transition from scientific thinking to metaphysical reflection is essentially 
more  alien  and  thus  more  difficult  than  the  transition  from  pre-scientific, 
everyday thinking to the kind of thinking we do in the sciences. The transition 
to metaphysics is a leap.77
The  movement  presented  in  FCM  as  proper  to  philosophising  was  confrontation, 
confrontation with the narrowing and beleaguering effects of the history of philosophy 
and  science:  Auseinandersetzung  proper.  The  proper  mode  of  this  confrontation  as 
historical, was not clearly laid out, but was projected in the direction of Nietzsche at 
the text's close. Here, in NIII,  the importance, and centrality, of an Auseinandersetzung 
within Heidegger's engagement with life is made apparent in the closing sentence of 
the section on “Nietzsche's Alleged Biologism”. In order to move beyond the  fatally  
contemporary economy  of  biologism  (which  reduces  Nietzsche-interpretation  to 
affirming  or  denying  his  biologism)  and  out  toward  the  genuinely  historical  and 
profound thought of Nietzsche, Heidegger suggests that 'we must learn to read'. Thus 
confirming that, for Heidegger, the task of thinking “life” as the bringing to word of 
φύσις  is intimately bound up (just as it was in  FCM) with overcoming the obstacles 
that  stand  between  him,  and  a  genuine  confrontation  (as  Auseinandersetzung)  with 
Nietzsche.78 
77 Ibid, p43.
78 Ibid, p47.
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In line with the findings of FCM, the path of philosophy does not appear to lie, or at 
least to easily lie, with the path of scientific investigation. In FCM, when read properly, 
Heidegger is not effecting or attempting to effect a “productive” relationship with the 
sciences, as though one could engage with the sciences and thus “push through” to 
philosophy. FCM tells the same tale as the majority of Heidegger's thinking regarding 
the sciences. It does not mark a difference in relation, but stands out in terms of detail. 
In this sense, there is quantitatively more science, but there is no qualitatively different 
understanding of the possibility of engagement with the sciences being espoused.
2.2. The Limit of Life
Art in the grand style presented the case for Nietzsche's physiological aesthetics to be 
considered  an  ultimate meditation  on  the  dual  aspect  of  φύσις.  Given  the  closing 
statements  of  NIII,  this  thought  does  not persist  in  Heidegger's  Nietzsche-
interpretation.  To  understand why this  is  the  case  I  will  turn  toward  Heidegger's 
account of life and justice in NIII.  For Heidegger the history of metaphysics has been 
the history of the forgetting of the question of being. This is the covering over of the 
proper question of philosophy, namely, meditation on the originary unity of beings as a 
whole and being as such (effectively a meditation on finitude as the occurrence of this 
structure). Finitude was presented as a matter in need of further investigation, but was 
also  presented  as  the  horizon  of  philosophising  itself,  in  the  sense  that  the  very 
problem of entering into philosophy is the problem of approaching the question of 
finitude from within the appropriate disposition. In FCM, Heidegger presented this as 
an  issue  of  the  prominence  of  beings:  as  a  result  of  our  everyday  proximity  and 
concern with the specificity of the world of differentiated beings (the busyness of life), 
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the question of the originary undifferentiated manifestness (being as such) becomes 
lost. I will examine why it is that, given what has thus far been said about the demands 
of  philosophy,  and  the  seeming  appropriateness  of  Nietzsche's  response  to  these 
demands, Heidegger maintains the following at the end of NIII:
In  this  interpretation  of  Being,  the  primordial  thinking  of  Being  as  φ σιςύ  
advances through the extreme point of the fundamental position of modern 
metaphysics, thus coming to its completion [...] the question as to where the 
truth of this first and last metaphysical interpretation of Being is grounded, the 
question  as  to  whether  such  a  ground  is  ever  to  be  experienced  within 
metaphysics, is now so far away that it cannot be asked as a question at all. For 
now the essence of Being appears to be so broadly and essentially grasped that 
it is also equal to whatever becomes, to “life”, indeed as its concept.79
The key to understanding this passage lies in Heidegger's claim that Nietzsche not 
only conflates life and Being, but effects an 'equation of the basic words world and life, 
both of which name beings as a whole'.80 On the basis of my reading of FCM it should 
be clear why this would be problematic. The initial equation of life and being in NI is 
not problematic, but rather emblematic of the grand scale of Nietzsche's efforts as an 
attempt at interpreting φύσις free from, and in opposition to, the whole of history (at 
least of history as nihilism). In FCM, metaphysics was left open as a possible term for 
philosophy, for the essential  activity of  man's  comprehending of  φύσις.  Due to the 
unfulfilled promise of  Aristotle's  first  philosophy,  a meditation on  φύσις itself  that 
remained  open  to  both  its  fundamental  aspects  could  still  emerge  under  the  title 
metaphysics. In the above passage, Heidegger sees the history of metaphysics come to 
an end in terms of a completion, such that it is closed down as a possible term and also 
79 Ibid, p157.
80 Ibid, p39.
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path for philosophising. In the continuation of the above passage, Heidegger explains 
this point. 
In  the  consummation  of  Western  metaphysics  through  Nietzsche,  the  all 
sustaining  question  of  truth,81 in  whose  essence  Being  itself  in  its  various 
metaphysical interpretations essentially unfolds, not only remains unasked – 
as was previously the case – but also is totally buried in its character as worthy 
of question. For this reason the consummation of metaphysics becomes an end.
82
This seeming reversal of positions is indicative of “life” having achieved its acme in 
Nietzsche's thought. The very point of its height represents the point at which it must 
fall, as it represents the site of Heidegger's and Nietzsche's greatest proximity (as the 
interpretation  of  Φύσις  as  originary  unity  of  becoming  and  being  /  world  and 
individuation),  yet  at  the  same  time  the  point  of  their  greatest  difference  (as  the 
impossibility of thinking being as “life” – the rejection of “life” as a capable of bringing 
the  originary  experience  of  Φύσις  to  word,  and  thus  as  a  horizon  for  thinking). 
Historically  speaking,  with  this  rejection,  the  question  of  how  this  transitional,  
horizonal, originary unity is constituted, remains open. Heidegger's transition from an 
investigation into time as fundamental occurrence of Dasein to his later concentration 
on the event and history of being, is most often understood as the result of a constant 
war  against  the  anthropomorphism  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  the  history  that 
Heidegger himself finds himself within, and recognises throughout his earlier work. 
Heidegger considers Nietzsche's understanding of justice (as “supreme representative 
81 The  essence  of  truth  as  the  truth  of  essence  is  precisely  the  question  regrading  the  original 
undifferentiated manifestness of beings-as-a-whole, it is this “individuation” which propels us toward 
the  differentiated world of  beings-as-a-whole  a  in  the  fundamental  occurrence of  our  Dasein,  our 
finitude. 
82 NIII, p157.
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of life”)to be the zenith of anthropomorphism, accordingly Nietzsche lies at the very 
heart of Heidegger's struggle with anthropomorphism. Through Nietzsche, it is “life” 
as a name for φύσις, perhaps even φύσις as a word for Being in its originary unity, that 
comes to the fore in this battle: where life is so often invoked as the word most capable 
of annihilating anthropomorphism, for Heidegger,  it  is  indeed a word most deeply 
bound to an anthropomorphic meditation on being. 
Where metaphysics (as the overshadowing of being by beings) ends, so too does the 
“primordial thinking of Being as φύσις”. This marks the point at which Nietzsche is to 
be left behind, where the separation of Auseinandersetzung must occur, thus concluding 
the open ended project of FCM. In that regard the “unexcavated” path of history has 
indeed been illuminated, yet in such a way that it reaches a crisis, as the original Greek 
experience of φύσις was projected back beyond the beginning of metaphysics, beyond 
even  Plato.83 What  lies  beyond  the  history  of  the  metaphysics  of  life,  remains  an 
Auseinandersetzung between Heidegger and Nietzsche, where emphasis must be placed 
on  the  separation  of  the  two,  rather  than  their  lying  together.  However,  if  we 
endeavour  to  think  their  differences  without  recognising  the  depths  of  their 
togetherness,  then  the  stakes  of  this  attempt  at  leaving  Nietzsche  behind  remain 
obscured. In as much as Heidegger stresses the need to view Nietzsche through the 
lens of biologism, and invokes our need to “learn how to read”, the same must be 
demanded of us as readers of Heidegger himself. To this end, it would be remiss to 
view Heidegger through the lens of anthropomorphism and present him as a mere 
83 Heidegger used Heraclitus to open up a discussion of φύσις in FCM. Bambach claims that philosophy's 
task, post Nietzsche, remains thinking the horizonal “jointure” of being and beings, but no longer from 
within a metaphysics of  φύσις, life and subjectivity. These two ideas are thought, by Bambach, to be 
conjoined with Nietzsche's notion of justice as supreme representative of life. This is discussed further 
at the end of this chapter.
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nay-sayer  to  life  and  the  problems  gathered  under  that  term.  Rather,  he  seeks  to 
maintain a  distinction  between life  and Dasein,  in  this  respect  he lets  life  go.  Once 
elaborated and justified, I will evaluate this claim at the close of this chapter.
Mapping  this  struggle  with  life  and  with  anthropomorphism in  Heidegger's  work 
without reference to its engine (namely Nietzsche as the supreme representative of life) 
for Heidegger) results in the direction and the context of the movement of Heidegger's 
thought being mistaken as discontinuous and as a matter of turning.84 In truth, it is a 
fully continuous twisting and turning within the grasp of the thought of Nietzsche. 
That this is explicitly the case has been the subject and the achievement of this thesis.  
What now remains is to understand why it is that Nietzsche's meditation constitutes 
both  “the  overshadowing  of  Being  by  beings”  and  the  highest  possible  form  of 
anthropomorphism (or, why justice and life?).
2.3. Life and Anthropomorphism
The  conflation  of  “world”  and  “life”  was  a  matter  taken  up  and  overcome  by 
Heidegger in  FCM.  In his comparative analysis, Heidegger, using the life-sciences as 
his guide, moved from an analysis of the world of the animal as capable of presenting 
what  world  is,  to  that  of  man.  In  this  regard,  he  maintained  a  constant  division 
between  “world”  and  “life”;  life  was  not  a  concept  capable  of  explaining  world 
84 Zimmerman maps the difference in Heidegger's thinking between the first and third Nietzsche Lectures 
in terms of a shift in Heidegger's understanding of the transformative powers of the political, offering 
Jünger as an engine of change; the movement from an analysis of time to an analysis of history is seen 
as a turn in the mid-thirties; Krell is left pondering the change in heart that Heidegger seemingly has 
regarding  life.  There  are  discontinuities  and  heterogeneities  that  are  incorporable  within  an 
understanding of Heidegger's work if  the presence of Nietzsche is genuinely understood. This is a 
radical claim as it seemingly centralises Nietzsche in Heidegger's thought. However, the evidence in 
terms of the quantity of work as well as what, is indicated throughout , is plentiful.
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(Equally  world  was  not  a  concept  completely  capable  of  positively  grasping  the 
essence of life). World, as the  whole of beings, as the “differentiated manifestness of 
beings”,  is  constantly  maintained by an  internal  relationship  to  the  individual,  the 
undifferentiated  singular  occurrence  of  Dasein,  which  nonetheless  maintains  the 
undifferentiated as distinct. It cannot maintain a relationship of subsumption: world 
cannot  be  thought  separately  from  solitude/individuation.  Turning  to  WP  507,  
Heidegger further investigates Nietzsche's claims that knowledge is in fact organic (as 
established in  NI)  and thus at the service of life.  In claiming this,  Heidegger takes 
Nietzsche to be suggesting that the world is chaos and becoming, and that “being” 
emerges from within becoming as its fixation. Fixation is once more understood to be a 
process at the service of life, it remains necessary for survival, for “our preservation”.85 
Nietzsche's  perspectivalism  is  key  to  understanding  this  matter.  The  relationship 
between  art  and  truth  (creation  and  fixation  etc.)  is  founded  upon  Nietzsche's 
understanding  of  the  perspectival  as  the  condition  for  all  life.  In  NI Heidegger 
approached this matter through the perspective, the horizon itself remained somewhat 
ambiguous. In NIII the situation is reversed, and the analysis focuses on the horizon. 
The horizon is understood to be that which 'stabilizes and limits'.86 It is not a limit 
imposed on a living entity from “without”, and thus not a limit in the sense of an 
impediment to growth. Indeed the vitality of a living being requires a limited scope as 
its very condition. As such, 'forming horizons belongs to the inner essence of living 
beings themselves', as the establishing of an entity amidst chaos. Chaos, here, is not 
jumble and flux, but the very character of  world itself, it is the  structure of becoming 
85 On the subject of this relation between being and becoming, Krell considers Heidegger to “vacillate” in 
his  regard  for  the  ability  of  the  grand  style  to  maintain  the  discord,  i.e.,  yoke  together  art  and  
knowledge in strifely unity.
86 NIII, p86.
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and striving to dominance.  Horizon,  whilst  being a form of  boundedness,  is  not  a 
boundary qua “wall of separation”, because it is “translucent”: it fixes and stabilises in 
a way that brings the possible, that which can become, into view. A 'horizon always 
stands within a perspective', as it is always the fixing of and stabilisation of that which 
looks through to the possible – it requires something chaotic to stabilise. The opposite 
is also the case, as chaos, the world of becoming as pure possibility, is only 'itself  as  
such on the transparent basis of something stable'.87 The two moments, perspective as 
that which moves toward chaos as the looking toward possibilities, and horizon as the 
securing of the possible, are thus fundamentally intertwined. According to Heidegger, 
for Nietzsche, this intertwining is the very occurrence of life itself. In this sense, “life-
occurrence” names the 'more original commencement' of the 'essential unity' of what 
becomes and what is stable.88
Here, a number of issues arise for Heidegger, and the limit of “life” as a concept is 
brought  sharply  into  view.  For  Heidegger,  “The  essential  constitution  of  life”  is 
rendered ambiguous due to an oscillation regarding what it names. Moving between 
“life”  as  a  term  for  beings  as  a  whole,  living  beings,  and  then  just  human  life, 
introduces  a  certain  level  of  ambiguity,  especially  because  Nietzsche  does  not 
'expressly  heed the  boundary between animal and man'.89 Life  as  a  problem itself, 
namely as a question regarding the essential otherness of the animal, is not heeded, 
and man is thus 'posited as animal in essence', but one that is not yet defined. This 
directly contradicts Heidegger's view in FCM, where he attempted to describe how the 
animal and man are not hierarchically related, such that man was a higher form of that 
87 Ibid, p88.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid, p86.
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which lives. Heidegger attempted to understand how the animal had world in an other 
way from man, or at least, he attempted to show that there was a refusal of the animal,  
and thus an ambiguity surrounding our ability to penetrate into the essence of life free 
from anthropomorphism.90 Heidegger understands Nietzsche's commitment to reading 
this interplay of becoming and stability as set back into the movement of chaos' own 
self-becoming due to his emphasis on the bodily origins of knowledge. As in  NI, the 
process of life's embodying movements are writ large as the character of beings as a 
whole,91 but equally as 'the projection of world from the perspective of the animal and 
animality'.92 Contrary to the seeming biologistic character of this thought, Heidegger 
maintains that it is a metaphysical proposition, and thus not subject to the pitfalls of 
thinking life as bios. As such, it represent thinking life anthropomorphically, as it does 
not overwrite the essential structure of man in terms of the animal, but works in the  
opposite direction determining the essential constitution of the animal and life from 
meditation on the 'bodily' perspective of man. 
Alongside  this  problematic  conflation  of  various  meanings  of  “life”,  the  terms 
“perspective” and “horizon” are not clearly determined and separated by Nietzsche on 
Heidegger's count, and are generalised beyond their being founded in 'a more original  
essential configuration  of human being (in  Da-Sein)'.93 In this sense, the conclusions of 
FCM, its insight into world, and the danger of conflating it with life are brought to bear 
on Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. In FCM meditation on the essential difference in 
90  In FCM the animal is continually presented as having world by way of not having. This is to say that it 
does not maintain the same type of openness to a world as man, but that this is not a indication of an 
essential privation. it is, on my reading, an indication of a essential boundedness, which is to say a 
boundedness of essence. The extent to which this boundedness of essence must essentially refuse man 
thus becomes the very matter of the problem of life, and the axis of anthropocentrism.
91 On page 80 of NIII Heidegger points that Nietzsche 'represents the world as a gigantic body as it were, 
whose bodying and living constitutes beings as a whole and thus lets being appear as a becoming'.
92 NIII, p80.
93 Ibid, p87.
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animal and human world structures, whilst initially operating within the confines of a 
particular interpretation and division of being, brought two matters to light: first, the 
essential and abyssal otherness of the animal, of life, and secondly, the necessity of 
thinking world (as manifestness of beings-as-a-whole) as internally related to Solitude 
(undifferentiatedness of being as such).94
That thinking “life” in this manner relates to a fundamental problem regarding the 
essence of truth, as established at the end of  FCM, is the precise direction in which 
Heidegger  pursues  Nietzsche's  thoughts  on  knowledge.  With  the  abolition  of  the 
distinction between true and apparent worlds,  the project of the new sensuousness 
represents a fundamental change in the essence of truth. No longer bound to the idea, 
truth is no longer a matter of the adequation of the nonsensuous and sensuous; the 
nonsensuous is no longer the measure beings. Heidegger asks after the direction in 
which the essence of truth has changed, and concludes that it is 'in the direction that is 
determined by the guiding projection of life'.95 Accordingly, the new standard, the new 
measure for truth and knowledge, is precisely the occurrence of life itself, it is 'life-
occurence' as the original commencement of becoming and stability. Here, “justice” is 
forwarded as the supreme representative of life, and thus the new measure of truth.
2.4 Justice: the Supreme Representative of Life in Nietzsche
The  introduction  of  justice  is  described  by  Krell  as  'an  unexpected  movement'. 96 
Previously, I indicated Heidegger's claim that, on the matter of knowledge, Nietzsche 
94 The latter is, of course, understood as the need to think ἁλήθεια as the essence of truth, to think the 
original undifferentiatedness of being on its own terms, not purely on the basis of beings. 
95 Ibid, p131.
96 Ibid, 258 Krell's 'Analysis'.
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indirectly  prepares  for  the  coming  of  that  which  he  cannot  think.  Heidegger  also 
indicated that perspective and horizon must be understood as essential configurations 
of  Dasein,  rather  than  life  itself.  In  this  regard,  the  introduction  of  justice  is,  as 
Heidegger  admits,  a  form  of  necessary  violence which  brings  out  that  which  was 
prepared for  but  never fully  thought  in  Nietzsche's  work.  The thoughts  on justice 
towards which he turns are not directly connected to the essence of truth in Nietzsche's 
thinking itself, but these connections are nonetheless “made visible” by Heidegger.97 
Here, on the grounds of a certain fabrication of Nietzsche's position regarding truth 
and justice, Heidegger seeks to find grounds to leave Nietzsche behind: to complete 
the Auseinandersetzung. 
In NIII, Heidegger forwards a definition of justice by claiming that, for Nietzsche, 'the 
just is the unified nexus of what is right, [...] what makes sense, what fits'. 98 Further, the 
just  is  what points  in the direction of  what is  right.  When heralding justice as  the 
'supreme  representative  of  life  itself',  on  Heidegger's  reading,  Nietzsche  presents 
justice as the fundamental occurrence of life itself, and thus the guiding direction and 
movement of the commencement of the original unity of becoming and stability. As 
such,  Heidegger  claims  that  '”justice”  is  the  metaphysical name  for  the  essence  of 
truth'.99 Justice is thus the new standard for truth as it provides truth its direction. This 
direction, established as the direction of “that which fits”, as that which is  right and 
just, is understood by Heidegger to be a directing of the interplay of perspectives and 
horizons back toward world as Nietzsche understands it, i.e., back toward chaos. In the 
highest mode of will to power, the artistic and transfiguring play of becoming and 
97 Ibid, p138.
98 Ibid, p141.
99 Ibid.
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stability constantly move over themselves, as Heidegger explains:
Transfiguration creates possibilities for the self surpassing of life at an given 
point of limitation. Knowledge in each case posits the fixated and the fixating 
boundaries so that there can be something to surpass.
In  this  movement,  whilst  presented  as  a  continual  self-overcoming  and  mutual 
heightening, and whilst both aspects 'require each other reciprocally in their essence', 
Heidegger considers 'art to retain its higher necessity'.100 The two are joined together, 
yet knowledge is always translucent, as that which looks toward what can become, 
looks  through a  horizon.  In  their  unity  they  go  to  make  up 'the  assimilation  and 
direction of  human life to chaos'.101 This results  in the thought of  dike,  the obscure 
joining of the two fundamental aspects of being, being brought under the language of 
rights and rectitude, but more importantly, being understood (on Heidegger's terms) as 
ὁμοίωσις. Ὁμοίωσις  means something akin to “likeness”,  to a certain harmony and 
indeed accord. In thus presenting the role that knowledge plays within the “flowing 
stream of life” as in harmony with chaos, the essence of truth is placed firmly within the 
world. This directly contravenes the wisdom of OEG, where Heidegger presented the 
historical problem of world as being that of the reduction and conflation of the world 
and  the  finite,  where  finitude  (the  originary  structural  joining  of  world  and 
solitude/individuation)  is  onto-theologically  conceived  as  a  privative  form  of  an 
infinite,  higher  order  of  knowing.  From this  angle,  it  begins  to  become clear  why 
Heidegger  considers  Nietzsche to  remain within,  yet  bring an end to,  the  platonic 
structuring of truth. In this regard, Heidegger interprets Nietzsche as ultimately being 
100 Ibid, p140.
101 Ibid
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incapable of twisting free of Platonism. To clarify further, in overthrowing the onto-
theological,  broadly platonic  understanding of  truth (wherein finite  knowing is  set 
beneath its infinite counterpart),  Nietzsche has effected a reversal of positions, as it 
appears as though the jointure of two distinct elements has been closed down and the 
sensuous,  embodying  flow  of  life  (the  world)  has  been  forwarded  as  effectively 
subsuming  truth.  To  this  end  Heidegger  claims  that  ἁλήθεια,  being  as  such  (the 
original undifferentiated manifestness of beings) remains unthought:
The thought of “justice” is the occurrence of being's abandonment of beings 
within the thinking of beings themselves.102
Heidegger reads justice as the metaphysical elevating of the peculiarly human mode of 
living: it is the highest possible way of living for man and at the same time life in its 
highest mode (because of its harmonious character, but also for the same reasons as 
stated in regard to the grand style  NI, namely that it furthers life as life's most vital 
movement). In this sense Nietzsche's understanding of truth is anthropomorphic as it 
understands world on the basis of man's world relation. He still posits a difference 
between man's  world  relation  and that  of  the  animal,  which  means,  as  Heidegger 
claims, Nietzsche's world is not the inductive expansion of man's region of the world 
to all others, but rather a deeper metaphysical reading of world. Man thought from 
within the world of life represents the final thought of metaphysics. In bringing about 
an overcoming of the notion of man as the rational animal, i.e., as something living, but 
distinct from life as a result of its relation to that which lies  beyond life (the infinite, 
nonsensuous), φύσις is no longer thought in relation to its beyond. However, it equally 
102 Ibid, p141.
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represents a final and ultimate anthropomorphism, as being is thought on the basis of 
world, the essential constitution of φύσις as life, is read off from man's world relation. 
As  such,  continuing  the  history  of  metaphysics  as  elaborated  in  the  'Preliminary 
Appraisal', the subject is placed beyond question as the ground of truth:
This ruthless and extreme anthropomorphizing of the world tears away the 
last illusions of the modern fundamental metaphysical position; it  takes the 
positing of man as subiectum seriously.103
In  thus  rejecting  “life”  as  fully  interpreting  and  explaining  the  concept  of  world, 
Heidegger still allows for the animal's refusal, in a sense, he lets life be. Invoking the 
essence of man as  living extends a fundamental orientation of man out towards the 
essence  of  life:  it  is  pure  anthropomorphism.  “Life”  is  rejected  as  the  horizon  for 
thinking, not because its potential threat to onto-theological grounds of meaning, but 
precisely for the opposite reasons. Viewed from the historical position of Nietzsche, 
life-philosophy represents the most profound confrontation with the terror of being: 
the refusal to flee from the face of being into the certainty of the nonsensuous. Viewed 
from within Heidegger's projected accomplishments of Nietzsche, what he prepares for, 
“life” (as a horizon for thinking) represents the direct opposite. In Heidegger's eyes, 
through Nietzsche, “life” has come to stand for the ultimate flight into beingness, into 
the haven of thinking being on the basis of beings, as the subject is no longer held out 
into question.  “Life”,  for Heidegger,  is  too metaphysical  a concept,  it  is  too tightly 
bound to thinking being on the basis of beings, and thus represents a closure of the 
historical binding of thought to φύσις.
103 Ibid, p155.
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This opens a potential new historical commencement of the binding of thought to dike. 
In  this  sense,  dike,  not  translated  as  justice,  represents  the  possibility  of,  beyond 
Nietzsche, thinking the originary Greek experience of φύσις not as life or nature or any 
other of its metaphysical cognates, but as jointure, the joining of ontological difference. 
With dike, the path beyond and before Nietzsche becomes hazily determined, and the 
matter of “life” as the between of Heidegger and Nietzsche is seemingly collapsed. The 
matter  of  life  between  Heidegger  and  Nietzsche  is  thus  equally  a  matter  of 
anthropocentrism,  and intellectual  conscience:  at  its  heart,  as  Ansell-Pearson points 
out,  it  is  the  most  profound  issue  of  attempting  to  meet  life's  agitation  head  on, 
without baulking. For Heidegger, the task for philosophy is to find a path toward, and 
maintain  an  encounter  with  the  agitation  of  man's  mode  of  distinction  from  life,  
namely his abyssal kinship and abyssal separation from it. This path, from the moment 
of  its  articulation  in  FCM,  to  NIII and  even  out  beyond  is  the  path  of  an 
Auseinandersetzung  with  Nietzsche,  who  stands  for  Heidegger  as  life's  supreme 
representative, but also perhaps life's supreme shroud.
By this I mean that, for Heidegger, the history of philosophy has not yet reckoned with 
the metaphysics of subjectivity in such a way that life, as a rubric for meditation on the 
Otherness  and  identity  of  Dasein  and  the  living,  can  sustain  philosophising.  The 
question of the essence of the living is thus caught up within the trammels of this 
metaphysical history which finds its culmination in Nietzsche. As such, there are other, 
more historically salient and pressing tasks that present themselves for Heidegger as 
primary. There is certainly an inability on Heidegger's behalf to provide deep insight 
into  the  problem  of  life  itself,  as  long as  the  suspension  of  an  ontology  of  life  is 
considered to be a shunning, and forgetting of the problem of anthropocentrism. Here 
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Heidegger offers a solid dismissal of the language of “life” as a means of overcoming 
the ruthless anthropomorphism that lies at the heart of the metaphysics of subjectivity,  
and thus displaces the metaphysical concerns that persist in the face of the animal. I 
will evaluate this as a response to “Nietzsche's agitation” at the close of this chapter.
3. Evaluations: Justice, Auseinandersetzung and Life
By way of a conclusion to this chapter I will evaluate a number of points relating to 
Heidegger's  reading of  Nietzsche,  and indeed my own reading of  Heidegger.  As a 
result  of  the  scope  of  these  evaluations,  I  offer  this  final  section  of  Chapter  5  as 
something of a conclusion to the entire thesis.104 Three questions remain in need of 
elaboration: Is Heidegger justified in his use of justice in his Nietzsche reading? Am I 
justified  in  not  reading  Nietzsche  in  a  chapter  devoted  to  Heidegger's  Nietzsche 
reading? Is Heidegger's  handling of  life  justifiable as  a response to the agitation of 
Nietzsche?
3.1. Justice
Bambach takes OEG to be the starting point of the particular interpretation of history 
that culminates in, or at least moves steadily towards, the Nietzsche Lectures.105 On my 
104 I have chosen to present chapter 5 in extended form because it contains conclusive material that relates  
to  the  progress  of  the  entire thesis.  To detach this  evaluations  section from the remainder  of  this 
chapter  would only serve to create a artificial  division between the exegetical  and analytical  work 
presented thus far in Chapter 5, and the ramification of these readings. As such I view this section as a  
natural  conclusion  to  the  thesis,  whereupon  the  “Conclusion”  chapter  which  follows  will  be  a 
summative reflection on the thesis as a whole.
105 Bambach,  C.'Translating Justice:  Heraclitus  Between Heidegger and Nietzsche',  in  Philosophy Today  
Summer 2006, pp143-155.Textually, Bambach's stated focus is GA46, which houses Heidegger's notes for 
a 1939 seminar on Nietzsche's second untimely meditation. However, Bambach takes a wider stance, 
looking backward and forward so to speak, taking into account Introduction to Metaphysics (1930) and 
the Parmenides seminar of 1942. 
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reading  of  FCM,  the  emergence  of  Nietzsche  as  the  key  figure  standing  between 
Heidegger and history is explicitly called for. Much of my reading of FCM attempted 
to  show  that  it  can  be  included  in  the body  of  work  which  goes  to  make  up 
Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche. Part of Auseinandersetzung's movement 
is to find a mode of approach that lets a text be, rather than seek to leave it behind. As a 
historian of philosophy, perhaps Heidegger's most powerful gift and message is the 
demand to return to the philosophers themselves, as Bambach puts it with relation to 
Heraclitus, to get 'beneath the palimpsest of [...] doxography'.106 As such, my focus has 
been on the pathways that Heidegger provides for doing precisely this, which means 
that, within this project, I have not attempted to jump ahead and read Nietzsche “for 
myself”. I am interested in first approaching Heidegger's representation of Nietzsche; 
understanding who Heidegger's Nietzsche is. This matter comes to a head in the issue 
of justice between the two.
Bambach  outlines  his  own  investigation  into  justice  by  drawing  a  sharp  line  of 
distinction  between  the  classical  notion  of  justice  and  Heidegger's.  The  difference 
between the two lies  in their translation of the Greek  dike.  Bambach points toward 
Heidegger's claim that Nietzsche chooses to translate dike in Heraclitus as Gerechtigkeit  
[justice]  as  a  result  of  the  concept's  'ethical  moorings  in  Plato'.107 Heidegger, 
alternatively, chooses to translate this term (where he deems translation possible) as 
Fug  [jointure],  in  an  effort  to  retrieve  the  pre-platonic,  and  thus  pre-metaphysical 
determination of dike as it was for Heraclitus. For Bambach, this constitutes an effort to 
break  the  ties  that  bind  justice  to  'a  deep  metaphysical  reading  of  the  ethical',108a 
106 Translating Justice, p145.
107 Translating Justice, p143.
108 Ibid.
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movement which begins both with Nietzsche's “master interpretor” (Heidegger), but 
also,  indeed,  with  Nietzsche  himself.  At  stake  in  this  retrieval  and  alternative 
translation is the notion of justice as the 'very structure of being within and against 
which all things are measured'.109 As this structure, justice as  dike shows itself to be, 
originally, neither ethical nor juridical, but rather, 'that which joins all beings together 
in a peculiar jointure'.110
In the ethical  reading of  justice,  that  which joins all  beings together,  and therefore 
stands  as  “the  measure  of  all  things”,  is  man.  Bambach  points  toward  IM  where 
Heidegger states that  dike, translated as “fugal jointure”, is a word for Being. In this 
sense,  dike  comes to replace  φύσις  as the word for the original Greek experience of 
Being as the originary unity of being as such and beings as a whole.  According to 
Heidegger, it is the case that dike adopts this role for Nietzsche. However, as a result of 
his  unrecognised  ethical reading of  justice,  Nietzsche's  dike is  caught  up within the 
history  of  the  metaphysics  of  subjectivity:  is  too  anthropocentric.  In  this  manner, 
Heidegger  presents  the  history  of  metaphysics  as  the  history  of  the  'notion  of  
subjectivity as the measure for beings in their truth'.111 This chimes directly with FCM 
and Heidegger's presentation of certainty as the ideal for philosophical truth, wherein 
the  absolute  certainty  of  all  knowledge  is  grounded  in  the  subject,  where  it  lies 
unquestioned  throughout  modernity.  According  to  Bambach,  for  Heidegger,  with 
Nietzsche,  justice  [Gerechtigkeit]  becomes  the  metaphysical  name for  the  essence  of 
truth, i.e., the  truth of beings as a whole, or being as such. In its ethical mode, this 
represents an ultimate pronouncement regarding the position of the subject within the 
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid, p144
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whole, a pronouncement that, for Heidegger, constitutes the  end of metaphysics. As 
always, “end” has to be read with a certain subtlety and regard for its multivalence: 
Nietzsche's return to justice (his unthought securing of the subjective as the measure 
for all things), represents the final possible permutation for metaphysical thinking, the 
culmination and highest achievement of all metaphysical thinking, and, as closure, the 
end-point from which an other commencement can potentially be sighted.
Bambach claims that Heidegger critiques 'Nietzsche's concept of justice as something 
built on the scaffolding of a metaphysics of “life” [...] in thinking life as the measure for 
being as becoming'.112 In so doing, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche takes an ultimately 
anthropological stance with regard to life and being, which is to say, 'Nietzsche will 
think of  justice  from a wholly  anthropological  perspective.113 These  are  the  precise 
stakes  of  Heidegger's  engagement  with  Nietzsche,  the  matter  of  life  and 
anthropomorphism  as  the  unrecognised  repetition  of  the  confused  conceptual 
determinations of the history of metaphysics. In assessing Heidegger's relationship to 
the history of metaphysics, either as a history of subjectivity and anthropomorphism, 
or as a history of onto-theology, the central matter is clearly that of Nietzsche. This is 
not merely attested to by the work of the mid-thirties, but as I have shown, by the very 
work which is so often promulgated as the high-point of Heidegger's meditation on 
life,  and therefore,  the  acme of  his  anthropomorphism,  namely,  FCM.  Where  Krell 
suggested that Heidegger's demand to think man in “daseinmässig” terms is indicative 
of an inability to fully come to terms with Dasein's living character, Bambach points  
toward  Heidegger's  claim  that  Nietzsche  is  limited to  understanding  the  division 
between being  and beings  in  terms  that  are  “lebensmässig”,  he  is  restricted  by  the 
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid, p145.
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notion of life.114 For Heidegger, this boils down to an interpretation of φύσις according 
to only one of its two aspects. As I have shown, Heidegger understands Nietzsche to 
think the essence of life purely on the basis of man's world structure, he does not heed 
the lessons of FCM regarding world and life. This leads to a metaphysics of life in two 
senses, first, the essence of life is thought from within metaphysical confusions, and 
secondly,  φύσις itself  is  thought  according  to  a  conception  of  being  as  such  as 
“beingness”: οὐσία is subsumed under beings-as-a-whole.
Here, the division between being and beings is thought in precisely the same direction 
as FCM, namely as a meditation on the horizon from within which, and out of which 
both man and beings can be measured. In this regard, Bambach points toward the 
precise place where this project finds its point of culmination:
Nietzsche's notion of measuring life is in the end, according to Heidegger, a 
measuring  by  life  in  its  subjective  form  [...]  in  this  sense,  horizon  will  be 
thought in a subjective way as “perspective” [...] Heidegger would find in this 
Nietzschean reading of horizon a limit that was wholly anthropological and 
determined by the metaphysics of Cartesian self-positing.115
On  the  matter  of  Nietzsche's  perspectivism  and  understanding  of  horizons  and 
perspectives,  and accordingly Heidegger's  meditation on Nietzsche as  the supreme 
representative of life and thus last metaphysician, the thinking undertaken in  FCM 
reaches  it  culmination.  As  Bambach  suggests,  around  the  notion  of  Nietzsche's 
interpretation of φύσις as life, and justice as Gerechtigkeit, the ultimate possibility of life 
as the horizon for thinking comes into view. Heidegger's  vision of  the potential of 
114 Ibid, p152.
115 Ibid, p152.
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“life” as  a focus for  the retrieval  of  the possibilities  of  “metaphysics” as  a title  for 
genuine philosophising only becomes clear once it understood from within the context 
of  the  connections  between FCM,  NI  and NIII.  This  triad  establishes  a  transect  of 
Heidegger's thought that incorporates  FCM into Heidegger's  Auseinandersetzung with 
Nietzsche, and reflexively maps the movement of this Auseinandersetzung as it unfolds 
across Heidegger's major Nietzsche reading. In turn, the product of this incorporation 
is the recognition that Heidegger's handling of “life” does not represent a flight from 
its challenges, but a continued attempt to face the challenges of philosophising head 
on.
3.2. Auseinandersetzung
These thoughts account for Heidegger's understanding of Nietzsche, but equally, do 
not allow Nietzsche to respond to Heidegger on this matter. As a reading of Nietzsche, 
and indeed when assessing Heidegger as a reader of Nietzsche, the question regarding 
the  fairness of  this  reconstruction  of  Nietzsche's  thought  needs  to  be  explicitly 
addressed.  In  so  doing  I  will  build  upon  my  analysis  of  Auseinandersetzung as 
expounded throughout this thesis and ask if Heidegger does justice to Nietzsche.
Haase, in his essay on justice,116 addresses Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation from 
the perspective of an evaluation of Heidegger's choice of “historial Auseinandersetzung” 
over “Hermeneutic Generosity”. “Hermeneutic generosity” is the classical hermeneutic 
method of presenting a text on its strongest possible reading, pointing out the manner 
in  which it  either  fails  or  succeeds  in  completing its  own tasks,  and subsequently 
116 Haase, M. 'Dike and Iustitia or: Between Heidegger and Nietzsche' in  Journal of the British Society for  
Phenomenology, Vol. 38, No. 1, January 2007.
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offering either correctives or ways to build upon the work. Moving beyond or away 
from the text is straightforward, as a certain stance, or distance, is maintained from the 
text at all times. The counter concept to this, Auseinandersetzung, attempts to 'force the 
text into an opposition from out of which one can find one’s first steps'.117 Both the 
thought contained in the text, and the reader's thought are placed in question, both are 
put in peril. Haase claims that 'the Nietzsche volumes cannot claim to settle the stakes 
of this Auseinandersetzung': Heidegger is not offering the final word on Nietzsche, but 
rather,  when  interpreting  Nietzsche,  preparing  to  think  for  himself.118 This  notion 
allows  Haase  to  present  a  convincing  account  of  the  differences  which  persist 
regarding varying moments of Heidegger's Nietzsche-interpretation. 
From here the development of the Nietzsche lectures from 1936 to 1940 and 
beyond appears in a different light: no longer as a progressive distantiation 
from  Nietzsche  on  the  part  of  Heidegger,  but  as  the  progressively  clear 
intuition that  the aim of  this  Auseinandersetzung  is  disappearing from view, 
which  is  to  say,  that  Heidegger  cannot  find  a  meaningful  distance  from 
Nietzsche’s thought.119
Haase  does  not  think  that  generating  the  appropriate  distance  from  Nietzsche  is 
straightforward, nor does he believe that Heidegger forwarded his reading as fully 
decisive regarding the matter of Nietzsche's thought, it is always preparatory. Haase 
draws out an important implication of the notion of Auseinandersetzung with regard to 
distancing, namely, that '[w]hen speaking of an Auseinandersetzung, that is, literally, 
about a setting apart, we have to presuppose a common starting point.'120 He does not 
117 Ibid, p21.
118 Ibid, p22.
119 Ibid,  p23.  Cf.  Zimmerman's  straightforward  (and  generally  philosophically  impoverished) 
understanding  of  the  development  of  Heidegger's  Nietzsche  interpretation  as  movement  from  a 
optimistic to a pessimistic standpoint. This also challenges the more sophisticated and question based 
meditations of Krell on the same matter, as expounded in his Analyses to the Nietzsche Lectures.
120 Ibid, p24.
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identify a common starting point between the two, but rather, frames his essay as an 
attempt to create one: 
the notion of truth as justice is thus to serve first of all as a preparation towards 
an  Auseinandersetzung between these two thinkers, in that I will try to make 
them speak with one voice.121
For Haase,  justice comes forward as the concept around which the initial standing 
together  of  Heidegger  and  Nietzsche  can  most  be  most  successfully  secured  and 
elaborated. In  'Translating  Justice:  Heraclitus  Between  Heidegger  and  Nietzsche', 
Bambach locates the richest point of the  Auseinandersetzung as their translations the 
Greek Dike as they receive this term from Heraclitus:
I want to locate a profound contest, struggle, or agon between Heidegger and 
Nietzsche over the "proper" way to read Heraclitus and, through him, "to do 
justice"  to  the  power  of  early  Greek  thinking  as  a  way  of  entering  into 
confrontation  with  the  history  of  the  West  and  the  nihilistic  epoch  of 
modernity.122
There is a reflexive element to Bambach's efforts: the notion of what “doing justice” to a 
reading  would  constitute  is  a  matter  which  cannot  be  determined  outside  of  the 
specific reading itself.  For Heidegger the matter of justice is  itself  determined from 
within a  reading of  Nietzsche,  Heraclitus  and history.  This  reflects  Haase's  aim of 
assessing Heidegger's deployment of a “historial  Auseinandersetzung” in favour of the 
pre-established methodology of  classical  hermeneutics.  The initial  stance of  both of 
these readers is  one that  does not pit  Heidegger against  Nietzsche according to an 
121 Ibid.
122 'Translating Justice: Heraclitus Between Heidegger and Nietzsche', P143. 
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objectively  realisable  historical  problematic.  Neither  is  looking  to  “do  justice”  to 
Heidegger, or Nietzsche (or Heraclitus for that matter), rather, they aim to uncover the 
stakes of an  Auseinandersetzung such that hermeneutic proximity, justice and indeed 
historicising itself can be productively questioned.123 
Bambach  and  Haase  are  genuine  readers  of  Heidegger's  Nietzsche  interpretation, 
readers who have an understanding of this matter alone as their target. They are solely 
interested in first grasping the stakes of Auseinandersetzung, attempting to understand 
both the grand aims of this mode of confrontation, and the internal machinations of the 
movement itself. Unlike other readers, they do not fall foul of the precise problem that 
123 This method of approach is quite the opposite of those examined in chapter 1, where Scott was shown 
to locate the problem of life as a rigid problem, towards which Heidegger and Nietzsche both offer 
competing solutions – Krell was also seemingly in this camp. A second camp of readers rigidify the 
encounter  between  Heidegger  and  Nietzsche  in  a  different  manner,  exemplified  by  Zimmerman. 
Zimmerman identifies Nazism and Jünger as the engines of the development Heidegger's Nietzsche 
interpretation. In this context, Zimmerman's aim is to ensure that justice is done to Jünger: “Heidegger  
was not entirely fair to Jünger [...] In regard to many thinkers to whom Heidegger was greatly indebted, he had  
the tendency either to discount their influence upon him or to show that he had thought more deeply than they  
had  about  a  given  topic.  His  treatment  of  Jünger  was  no  exception  in  this  respect.”[Zimmerman,  M. 
Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity.  (Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1990). Pp82-83.]  In 
Haase's terms, this constitutes a demand for Heidegger to be hermeneutically generous in his approach 
to readers of the history of philosophy, which is, in effect, a demand for Heidegger to entirely abandon 
his understanding of  history and indeed the historicity of  philosophy.  Zimmerman is  not alone in 
thinking Heidegger's encounter with Nietzsche to be in need of justification, or to be lacking in justice. 
A brief examination of recent literature on the matter of Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation shows a 
broad array of different demands for justice to be done[For a more in-depth analysis of these works see  
my  review  in  JNS  43:1,  Spring  2012]:  Blond  calls  for  justice  to  be  done  to  the  'thorough-goingly 
philosophical nature of the engagement' [Blond, L.P,  Heidegger and Nietzsche: Overcoming Metaphysics  
(London, UK: Continuum, 2010), p4]; Catanu calls for justice to be done to Nietzsche's philosophy in 
the  face  of  Heideggerian  misappropriation  [Catanu,  P.  Heidegger's  Nietzsche:  Being  and  Becoming  
(Montreal,  Canada:  8th House,  2010)]; Faye (referring to  Heidegger's  Nazistic  thought  and writing 
which directly involves his Nietzsche reading) calls for justice to be done to the survivors of the death-
camps [Faye, Emmanuel. Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished  
Seminars of 1933-1935. Trans. Michael B. Smith (Yale UP: 2009)]. The most productive approaches from 
these recent works, come in the form of Hemmings' response to Faye, and Hodge's invocation to attain 
a certain sensitivity to the practise of reading. Hemming suggests that real justice would be provided 
for victims of l'affaire Heidegger only if we avoid attempts to contrive a terminal point in a discussion of 
Heidegger and the political, and attempt to genuinely engage with his texts. In this regard, Hodge 
points out, learning to 'read well' is determined as an ultimate act of justice, or, reading is itself a matter 
of ethics [Laurence Paul Hemming, Bogdan Costa and Kostas Amiridis, eds. The Movement of Nihilism:  
Heidegger's  Thinking  after  Nietzsche. (London,  UK:  Continuum,  2011),  p  5].  On  my  reading, 
Auseinandersetzung is not a response to an ethical call to read well, but rather to the call of intellectual 
conscience:  it is a response to the demands of thinking, and attempt to face up to the its genuine  
challenges.
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Heidegger is attempting to address, namely, operating from within certain prejudices 
that are themselves left behind, unquestioned and unexamined. In much the same way 
as Heidegger considers metaphysics to fundamentally place the questioner in question, 
so  too  does  Auseinandersetzung.  In  this  movement  of  historical  interpretation,  it  is 
demanded  that  the  reader  (by  this  I  mean  Heidegger)  suspend  their  own  secure 
positions and methods of reading, and perhaps even risk becoming entirely lost in the 
circular, ambiguous movement of philosophising. Haase is clear about these stakes:
Insofar  as  for  Heidegger  the  future  of  his  own thought  as  well  as  that  of  
Nietzsche is at stake in this Auseinandersetzung, we should be more careful 
when  reading  Heidegger  on Nietzsche,  not  in  order  to  salvage Nietzsche’s 
reputation, but in order not to have nothing left of philosophy.
In this extreme direction one can begin to consider what it might mean to come to 
philosophise for oneself. If read in any other manner, Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche 
cannot be attributed its full power: when separated from its historical position as  the  
very moment of Heidegger's  self-emergence from within the trappings of the history of 
the metaphysics of subjectivity, the genuine philosophical and hermeneutic force of the 
reading  is  lost.  Approaching  his  interpretation  of  Nietzsche  with  an  eye  for 
Heidegger's contribution to an overriding philosophical problematic,124 or with an eye 
turned toward the tessellation of Heidegger's thought with other thinkers of his time, 
decides  in  advance  regarding  the  stakes  of  the  interpretation,  it  determines  the 
character  of  the engagement from an external  standpoint.  This  itself  constitutes  an 
unthinking repetition of  the precise problem that  Auseinandersetzung is  designed to 
address, namely, how to start philosophising from within a historically rooted stance: 
124  Meaninglessness in Scott's case, the neo-Kantian problem of transition in Blond...
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how to get on the inside of philosophy.125
My  reading  of  Heidegger's  Auseinandersetzung,  with  its  roots  in  FCM,  offers  an 
understanding of  life  as  the engine of  change in his  broader reading of  Nietzsche, 
wherein his  reading of  justice  can  also  be  figured.  My reading of  the  connections 
between FCM and the Nietzsche Lectures, provides the context for the specificity of this 
encounter, especially regarding the different types of engagement with the term “life” 
that are explicated therein (namely one which is all too contemporary and one which 
attempts to think the essential in the contemporary). Accordingly, this seeming shift 
between  NI and  NIII  no longer reads as a shift or a change, but as components of a 
genuine confrontation with the history of philosophy, where philosophising itself is, 
nonetheless, at stake. My understanding of Nietzsche's presence in FCM, and thus the 
clear emergence of the centrality of the need to generate an appropriate methodology 
to  tackle  history  for  the  sake  of  philosophising  for  oneself,  equally  draws out  the 
genuine philosophical, rather than merely historical, intent of this  Auseinandersetzung 
with Nietzsche.
In looking to philosophise for himself, and move beyond his Nietzschean community, 
Heidegger  must  inherently  conduct  violence  upon  Nietzsche.  This  violence  is  the 
violence of the movement of philosophy itself, as expounded in FCM: the repetition of 
fundamental questions that repeats what was essential in a philosopher, but ultimately 
(if  successful)  does  so  via  a  confrontation  that  overcomes.  Overcoming  cannot  be 
125 Haase's intent is more humble than Bambach's, he simply wishes to attain something of a starting point 
from which to enter into a more detailed engagement with the Auseinandersetzung. Bambach is looking 
to get to the heart of the movement itself. My aims are somewhat more on the side of Haase, as I am 
concerned with how and why life emerges with such force during the time of the Nietzsche Lectures, my 
project is more critical in this sense.
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arbitrary, i.e., merely a piece of novelty placed in opposition, and cannot be understood 
to  obtain  from  any  genuine  heterogeneity.  On  Heidegger's  terms,  it  must  spring 
forward from that which is thought by a philosopher, and that which is prepared for 
by them. As i have shown, Heidegger takes Nietzsche to think the metaphysical height 
of “life”, and in so doing, manages to be genuinely epochal in a manner that very few 
have managed. What is prepared for in this high-meditation, is the overcoming of the 
metaphysics of subjectivity via a rejection of the potential for the language of life, and 
indeed φύσις (as closed down by “life” and its association), as maintaining philosophy. 
In  its  place  is  offered  meditation  on  justice  itself,  freed  from  its  location  as  a 
representative of life,  and as an matter of the ethical.  In conclusion to this issue of 
justice, perhaps Nietzsche's own thoughts regarding the teacher and the student can be 
seen to reach fulfilment here in Heidegger's reading:
The man of knowledge must not only love his enemies, he must also be able to 
hate his friends, One repays a teacher badly if one always remains only a pupil. 
[…] now I bid you lose me and find yourselves.126
Heidegger repays the debt he owes to Nietzsche, which is as Heidegger points out in 
FCM, the debt owed to the genuine teacher who offers a  spur to philosophising, and 
equally the debt owed to Nietzsche as the last of the greats, as Heidegger's orientation 
in philosophy. The debt is repaid in first attempting to speak from out of Nietzsche, 
and present his philosophical mentor at his highest, and subsequently moving beyond 
the haven of this community, out to his own thought.
126 TSZ, Part One, On the Bestowing of Virtues.
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3.3. Life (Recapitulation of the evaluation of Heidegger's response to the 
problem of life)
Having fleshed-out my understanding of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's thoughts 
on life as a metaphysical meditation, it is necessary to return to FCM and reflect on the 
connections between the two engagements with life as found FCM. In so doing I will 
further evaluate Heidegger's own response to the problem of “life” as viewed from 
perspective of contemporary scholarship.
3.3.1. “Life” and philosophy for Heidegger
Focusing on the movement from FCM to the Nietzsche Lectures, I earlier claimed that we 
could identify a potential  displacement and deferral of decision regarding “life” as a 
philosophical  rubric.  Once  the  non-biologistic  character  of  Heidegger's  reading  of 
Nietzsche is understood, this deferral is that of a decision regarding Nietzsche as a 
thinker capable of returning philosophy to its fullness amidst the prevalent boredom of 
our  times.  It  is  not  the  deferral  of  an  ontology  of  life  as  such.  Only  a  fatally 
contemporary  reading  of  “life”  identifies  its  challenge  as  that  posed  by  the 
contemplation  of  the  essence  of  the  organism.  This  was  the  lesson  of  FCM:  a 
comparative analysis of world, one based on the procedure of the life sciences, is not 
capable  of  metaphysical  insight,  as  the  genuine  metaphysical  stakes  of  such  an 
engagement (transposability,  the structure of  world etc.)  are not  articulated therein. 
Heidegger's  engagement  with  the  sciences  in  FCM only  points  in  the  direction  of 
boredom, as it is in the forgetting of man's centrality in the discussion of world that the 
essence of life becomes forwarded as a central component in said discussion. This was 
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shown to work bot ways, i.e., it tells us something about boredom, but equally warns of 
the  dangers  of  attempting  to  essentialise  about  life  from  within  pre-existent 
metaphysical prejudices. Clearing a path to an ontology of life is not the central aspect 
or object of these meditations.
In Nietzsche, Heidegger finds resources to move beyond the structuring of the essence 
of life according to the division of organic and non organic. The ordering of forces that 
go  to  make  up  any  entity,  the  self  retention  and  power  for  self-realisation  that  is 
contained in every perspective, including that of the stone (the in-animate/in-organic), 
exceeds the organic schema. As such, “life” understood as a rubric for a confrontation 
with our abyssal bodily kinship with the animal, is no longer a matter that contains any 
clarity or determinacy. It is subject to the movement of boredom, as realised in Nihilism 
perhaps, which is to say, that positing “life” as a rubric capable of grasping Dasein in 
its  fullness  is  part  of  the lostness  of  history amidst  the confusion the fundamental 
concepts of metaphysics. For Heidegger, far from being the horizon of a meditation 
that holds us out into the terror or φύσις, it is one more safe haven along the path of a 
face  to  face  encounter  with  ourselves.  Only  a  renewed  meditation  on  ontological 
difference itself can bring about an other beginning, beyond the flattening effects of 
this history of this confusion of being and beings (as expounded in FCM). Where, for 
Heidegger, Nietzsche sees “life” writ large in justice, Heidegger himself sees jointure, 
and ontological difference: he sees a new conceptualisation of finitude as the governing 
fundamental  concept  of  metaphysics.  This  represents  an  repetition  of  what  was 
essential  in  Nietzsche,  but  remained  merely  prepared  for.  It  is  the  movement  of 
Auseinandersetzung itself, as delineated in FCM.
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For the sake of clarity,  were we to continue to pursue a positive conception of the 
essence  of  life  within  Heidegger's  work,  or  perhaps  even  attempt  to  extract  the 
resources for doing so, in what direction could we look? Is there any more clarity at 
this point of closure regarding an ontology of life? What can we say of Heidegger's 
response to the agitation of Nietzsche, if this agitation is represented by the problem of 
resurrecting ontotheological structures of transcendence in the face of life's threat to 
meaning?
I  have  clarified  Heidegger's  response  and  defended  him  from  the  claims  that  he 
conducts  a  theoretical  biology  (at  most  he  can  be  accused  of  conducting  negative 
theoretical biology). There is more subtlety in 'Part Two' of  FCM  than Krell or Scott 
would allow, given that they ignore the historical character of the text. The “impasse of 
life”  as  projected  by  Ansell-Pearson  has  also  been  shown  to  stand  as  regards  the 
continuation of Nietzschean  community,  but to be dissolved in the face of achieving 
what was prepared for in that community, i.e., the overcoming of Nietzsche. To move 
beyond the  boredom we have  engendered,  to  counteract  nihilism in  this  way and 
attempt  to  spring  out  of  the  philosophically  reductive  sway of  the  metaphysics  of 
subjectivity Heidegger insists that we have to continue to confront history and read 
well in order to come face to face with the philosophical prejudices that structure all 
our engagements.  We have to  focus  on ourselves.  So what  of  the  animal?  On this 
matter Heidegger remains, characteristically, silent, never returning to this question in 
as much detail. On my reading this silence is not an attempt to escape the pressing 
nature of the “abyssal bodily kinship” but is an indication of the entanglement of that 
thought within a history that offers more immediate questions, those concerned with 
first  untangling  the  problem  of  the  difference  between  being  and  beings.  Is  this 
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acceptable for those wishing to do an ontology of life? no. Is it a powerful conception of 
the difficulty of shrugging off the history of anthropocentrism? Yes.  Heidegger will 
make claims about the animal – in his Parmenides lectures he will claim that animals do 
not have hands, in  Letter on Humanism  he indicates the “scarcely fathomable abyssal 
bodily kinship”, but he does not pursue this as a primary problem in contemporary 
philosophy, hence its “scarce fathomability”.  Where he does speak on the matter, in 
this sense, it is only to repeat the claims made in FCM in relation to the self-regarding 
character of our pursuit of the animal. In a letter to Medard Boss in 1952, Heidegger 
explicitly  repeats  his  analysis  in  FCM  indicating  the  veracity  of  my  reading,  and 
showing that, when confronted with the issue of accessing the essence of animality, he 
considers  FCM  to  be  a  problematisation  of  this  issue,  rather  than  an  attempt  at 
dissolution  of  the  'difficult  question  of  “Animal  and Man”'.  It  is  worth  quoting  at 
length:
Once again, the task of  this  work is  not  to clarify this  question.  After long 
consideration, I found a way out which is not an escape but rather corresponds 
only to what is worth questioning in a sufficiently adequate determination of 
the unfolding essence of  the human being,  animal,  plant,  and rock.  […] an 
animal merely is insofar as it moves within an environment open to it in some 
way and is guided by this environment which itself remains circumscribed by 
the nature of the animal. The animal's relationship to this environment, which 
is never addressed [by the animal itself], shows a certain correspondence to the 
human being's ek-sistent relationship toward the world. Thus, in a certain way 
the human being in his ek-sistent Da-sein can immediately participate in and 
live-with the animal's  environmental  relationship without  ever  coming to  a 
congruence [decken] between the human being's being-with and the animal, let 
alone the other way around. Linguistic usage, according to which one speaks 
of human and animal "behaviour" indiscriminately, does not take into account 
the unfathomable, essential difference between the relationship to a "world" 
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[Weltbezug]  and  to  an  "environment"  [Umgebungsbezug].  According  to  its 
own  proper  and  essential  relationship  to  the  environment,  the  animal's 
situation makes it possible for us to enter into this relationship, to go along 
with it, and, as it were, to tarry with it. [...] It does not matter thereby that the 
immediate apprehension of the environment proper to the animal and, thus, 
also the genuine apprehension of the animal's relationship to the environment 
remain  inaccessible  to  our  knowledge.  The  strangeness  of  the  unfolding 
essence of animals is concealed in this inaccessibility (or something like that).127
The essence of the animal world is not presented as capable of determining the essence 
of life itself. The animal world, and our access to it, remains an issue for Heidegger, as 
he does not  consider himself  to have collapsed this  “difficult  question”.  He clearly 
holds 'Part Two' of FCM to have clarified the reasons for his lack of engagement with 
said  difficult  question,  i.e.,  that  the  phenomenon of  world  is  one  which has  to  be 
approached and understood on the basis of our own relationship therewith, one which 
is covered over by history, lest we “project” ourselves onto the animal. We are not yet 
beyond this boredom with man, such that we could begin to articulate the question of  
our relationship to the animal in anything other than a confused and anthropocentric 
manner.
3.3.2. FCM and Life
Heidegger's self-conception of FCM, and my own reading, are recognised by Derrida. 
Of all the readers of FCM he best understands the intent of this lecture course, but does 
not pursue his own response to it in line with Heidegger's intentions. Krell describes 
Derrida's later reflections on FCM thus:
127 ZS, pp243-4. Heidegger indicates, by way of an asterisk, that he is referring to FCM.
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Heidegger’s  “comparative  method”  may have a  far  less  confident  intention 
behind it  than we might  suspect  […] He situates  the Heideggerian inquiry 
quite carefully, especially with regard to the Grundstimmung, the fundamental 
mode and mood of ontology, and in so doing he avoids all naïve accusations of 
biologism. Above all, he realizes that Heidegger’s “comparative method,” […] 
is designed not to be unkind to stones or animals but to show that we really do 
not comprehend the meaning of “world” for human beings. If the human being 
shapes a world, is  weltbildend, this is not a solution, Derrida suggests, but the 
designation of a problem.128
Derrida offers a similar reading of the status of the “theses” in  Of Spirit.  Whilst he 
recognises  their  methodological  idiosyncrasy,  and  understands  that  they  are  not 
directly aimed at a theoretical biology as Krell will insist (even in this later work Krell  
maintains his understanding of  FCM as generated in Daimon Life),129 he cannot access 
their true intent. Derrida retains the notion that this is indeed some positive account of 
the  animal  being  forwarded  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  determinative  for  our  own 
understanding of our world relation. 
Derrida confesses that what bothers him most about Heidegger’s “comparative 
method,” to repeat, is less what Heidegger claims concerning the essence of 
animality, though that is troubling enough, than what he confidently asserts 
about human being.130
128 Krell, D.F. Derrida and Our Animal Others, Section 3. 
129 Krell  is,  however,  critical  of  Derrida  on  the  same grounds  as  I  am.  He  says,  “Derrida’s  principal 
complaint is that Heidegger is all too confident that human comportment—toward its vision, language, 
world,  and  death—is  separated  from  animal  behaviours  (in  the  plural)  by  an  abyss  of  essence. 
Derrida’s  complaint  will  never,  by any reading  of  Heidegger,  be  made superfluous”[Ibid.],  before 
offering up a reading of the notion of essence from BT that seeks to problematise this position. My own 
approach to this matter clearly posits the idea that Heidegger attempts to head-off this criticism by 
appealing to the historical entrenchment of our notion that we can identify anything of the animal 
essence via a comparison, or indeed identification of our modes of comportment to the world with 
“animal behaviour”. As quoted, the letter to Medard Boss states precisely this.
130 Ibid. Section 4
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Heidegger is clear that the path of comparison is shot-through with anthropocentrism, 
and  thus  incapable  of  providing  metaphysical  insight  into  the  problem  of  world. 
Derrida's  response  is  interesting,  but  still  ascribes  too  much  importance  to  the 
confrontation  with  the  animal.  Ike  Krell,  he  considers  Heidegger  to  place  this 
encounter at the heart  of  an investigation of  “world”,  and to render this particular 
engagement with life at the heart of his investigation of φύσις. Both Krell and Derrida 
recognise the centrality of a conception of  φύσις in  FCM, and indeed in Heidegger's 
thought in general.  However,  both thinkers pursue this line of thought in  FCM via 
world and not  finitude,  in this sense,  and on Heidegger's terms, they would pursue 
φύσις via  its  constant  confusion  with  one  of  its  two  aspects,  namely  world.  Krell 
himself indicates that this is a minor issue in Derrida's reading:
[…]  even  though  finitude,  Endlichkeit,  is  proclaimed  by  Heidegger  the 
underlying and integrating question of  the three (world,  finitude,  solitude), 
Derrida apparently follows Heidegger in pursuing above all the question of 
world. 
In so doing, Krell considers the accomplishment of Derrida's critique of Heidegger, and 
his own engagement therewith, to be as follows:
It demands that we think of the ways in which our animal others—indeed, all 
living things—are essential to what Heidegger called “the worldhood of the 
world,”131
Here “life” and the world of the animal are conflated. Further,  the development of 
Heidegger's  thoughts  on  these  matters  as  found  in  his  Nietzsche Lectures are 
131 Ibid, Introduction.
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overlooked.  The  path  of  comparison  is  not  seen  by  Heidegger  as  essential  for  an 
understanding of world, but, is rather, seen as a rubric that obfuscates as it sits within 
metaphysically entrenched and confused divisions. To centralise the question of the 
animal in Heidegger's philosophy, is to centralise a concern generated from without. 
The issue then is whether Heidegger's seeming evasion of this question is indicative of 
a lack in his own thinking, or indicative of a prejudice on our part – a lack of awareness 
of the problem of accessing philosophy in the first place such that we can decide that 
the  animal  question  sits  at  its  heart  and  demands  a  more  positive  response  from 
Heidegger.  My response to this question, as evidenced by this  thesis,  is  clearly the 
latter.
Derrida  is  concerned  with  the  homogenisation  of  animals  (contra  the  “immense 
multiplicity of other living beings”),132 considering Heidegger to run roughshod over 
the multiplicity of the animal world. He claims that they cannot be limited to their 
character as accessed via a comparative analysis, such that they can be reduced to a  
homogeneous  whole  via  a  claim that  they  have  a  single  essence  (posited  by  their 
poverty of world). This, as I have shown, is not the case for Heidegger, the abyss of 
essence says nothing, initially about the essence of the animal Other, it holds no claims 
on it, only ever speaking out about us. The deep-founded intention of accessing the 
prejudices  that  underlie  the  distinctions  within  which  the  comparative  analysis 
emerges is not witnessed by Krell or Derrida. They do not recognise the trajectory of 
life as  a  matter  of  contention  between  Nietzsche  and  Heidegger  in  a  battle  for 
contemporary philosophising. As such they miss the macro issue with regards life in 
Heidegger's thinking, and thus his account of the paucity of a micro investigation into 
132 Derrida, J. The animal that I therefore am. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). P73.
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it via an analysis of the animal world. By this I mean that Heidegger is aware that the 
animal is never truly engaged with, or capable of being accessed via an analysis of its 
essence  via  an  engagement  with  the  life  sciences.  The  more  pressing  concern  for 
Heidegger in FCM and beyond, is not the manner in which we can learn about world 
via a confrontation with the animal, but what we can learn about world and finitude via 
a  confrontation with philosophy itself.  This  is  eventually  borne out  in  Heidegger's 
metaphysical  reading of  life  in Nietzsche.  The absence of  a reading of  Heidegger's 
Nietzsche reading on this topic is evident in Krell's statement below.
Heidegger would surely  rather  pray at  the  shrine  of  the nothing than to  a 
stone. Yet Derrida would observe that if the stone—like the beast and God—is 
without world-relation, it is doubtless equally difficult to worship at the shrine 
of the nothing.133
This once again takes seriously the positing of the theses, sees them as Heidegger's 
own  attempts  at  theoretical  biology,  and  does  not  recognise  Heidegger's  own 
understanding of Nietzsche's heightened, metaphysical conception of life that exceeds 
Bios,  but ultimately cannot bring the originary experience of φύσις to word. It is as a 
result  of  Krell's  and Derrida's  pre-occupation  with the  animal,  that  they  posit  this 
“difficult question” as an ever-present unthought in Heidegger's work. As such they fail 
to see Heidegger's reasons for moving in a different direction with regards the problem 
of life. This does not mean that Heidegger's articulation of this problem is satisfactory, 
but such an articulation is not his goal. To demand that he satisfactorily deals with a  
problem that he does not consider immediately pressing speaks more of our prejudices 
than it does of his. 
133 Derrida and Our Animal Others, Section 4.
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Perhaps surprisingly, given his interest in ontologies of life, Thacker offers support for 
this line of thinking. As quoted in the introduction to this thesis, Thacker considers 'the 
question of “life” [to be] the question that has come to define our contemporary era'.134 
He suggests that Aristotle's conception of the ontology of life structures all subsequent 
attempts to philosophically pose the question of the essence of life. His entire book is 
therefore focused on drawing out the ways in which all  subsequent attempts at an 
ontology  of  life  fall  within  certain  Aristotelian  decisions.  He  does  not  present 
Heidegger as attempting such a feat, and does not offer a detailed reading of FCM.135 
Heidegger  does  feature  as  a  figure  in  the  history  of  the  ontology  of  life.  In  his 
discussion of this history, Thacker suggests that Heidegger is not directly articulating 
the basis for an ontology of life, neither does he think that, for Heidegger, “life” can be 
adequately thought on the basis of “being”. In this regard, he reads Heidegger well, 
citing §10 of BT, where he reads Heidegger's as providing a description of the need for 
all  potential philosophies of life to get to grips with the being of life prior to their 
investigations,  noting  that  within  the  life-sciences  there  is  a  fundamental  lack 
regarding any problematisation of life itself.
He does not consider Heidegger to reduce life to being. This, in Thacker's view, sets 
him aside from philosophers like Bergson and Whitehead, who, in their process and 
life philosophies, he considers to 'reach a zone in which ‘Life’ becomes convertible with 
Being – even if the name of Life is process or becoming.'136 This is, of course, precisely 
134 After Life, preface xiii.
135 Interestingly, Thacker uses Heidegger's description of φύσις in FCM in order to establish the structure 
and character of Aristotle's presentation of the ontology of life in De Anima. In recognising Heidegger's 
reading of  the  centrality  of  φύσις for  philosophy,  Thacker  does  not  pick up on  the  thread of  his 
thinking on this matter as it moves from FCM into the Nietzsche reading.
136 Nine Disputations, p87.
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Heidegger's position as elaborated in NIII. Whilst he does not see the full resources of 
Heidegger on this point, having not seen the connection between  BT,  FCM and the 
culmination of this thread in NIII, Thacker considers Heidegger to operate in excess of 
these positions in a certain regard. He considers Heidegger's analysis in §10 of  BT to 
have achieved the following recognition of the issue of approaching life itself:
This ‘missing ontological foundation’ is itself what grounds these fields. The 
question that Life is, is displaced by the question of what Life is – or, more 
accurately, what the domain of the living is. The anthropological category of 
man,  the  psychological  category  of  mind,  and  a  general  biology  of  the 
organism all presume a Being of Life.137
In his following comments, Thacker indicates the space within the field that this thesis 
takes up:
Where Heidegger leaves off, however, is at the question of whether Life is a 
species of Being, or whether the ontology of Life in effect transforms Life into 
Being. His last words on the topic are at once suggestive and opaque: ‘Life has 
its own kind of being, but it is essentially accessible only in Da-sein.’138
I have shown that this is precisely not where Heidegger “leaves off”. There is certainly 
an opacity to Heidegger's comments in §10 of  BT, but in light of the findings of this 
thesis the reasons for this opacity have been clarified, and indeed, a great deal of this  
opacity removed. After FCM and NIII, Heidegger can be seen to “leave off” this subject 
in any great detail,  precisely because he considers this question, to a certain degree 
alongside Thacker, to be incapable of being articulated with any real force from within 
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
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the history of metaphysics as caught up with Aristotle's understanding of φύσις. 
Relocating FCM within its broader context has allowed for Heidegger's entanglement 
with the question of life (a non fundamental entanglement which has been generated 
most forcefully by Krell rather than emerging from within Heidegger's thought itself) 
to be untangled; it is not the unthought in Heidegger as Krell and others would have it. 
When the movement of Auseinandersetzung is understood as it unfolds from FCM to the 
Nietzsche Lectures, Heidegger has clear reasons for not taking up the question of life as a 
central issue in his thinking. 
As  such  this  is  a  stark  warning  to  those  who,  in  contemporary  philosophy,  are 
concerned with everything “Bio”,  such that  Heidegger's  thinking on this  matter be 
assessed in line with his ability to provide resources for a philosophical endeavour that 
he  himself  has  abandoned,  having  never  really  attempted  in  the  first  place  (I  am 
referring here to the comments on an ontology of life in  BT  that serve to structure 
readings of Heidegger's thoughts on the matter). As I have shown, then, as now, there 
is a danger that this angle of thinking is captivated by the fatally contemporary, and is  
representative  of  a  profound  boredom with Man himself,  rather  than an attempt  to 
profoundly grasp our nature as a living entity.
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Thesis Conclusion
There are two correlative ways in which this project could be seen to contribute to 
Heidegger  studies.  The  first  contribution  is  a  reading of  FCM that  rehabilitates  its 
supposedly disparate character, relocating it within the wider context of Heidegger's 
Auseinandersetzung in light of the overlooking of Nietzsche's presence within the text. 
In so reading, I counteract the trend of positing FCM as a text that stands out from the 
Heideggerian  corpus  as  an  aberrance,  and  adjust  the  over-emphasis  placed  on 
Heidegger's discussion of “life” therein. The second contribution takes up the genuine 
philosophical product of FCM, which is a staking out of the demands of an historical 
approach  that  can  recover  the  essence  of  philosophy  from  within  an  epoch 
characterised by our boredom with ourselves. This approach, identified as the need for 
an  Auseinandersetzung with philosophy, is intimately bound up with Nietzsche from 
this point of its emergence. In mapping the trajectory of the ideas developed in FCM 
onto  the  Nietzsche  Lectures, the  two  projects  offer  reflexive  moments  of 
contextualisation.  Philosophy  as  first  philosophy,  as  a  meditation  on  the  peculiar 
jointure  of  two  diverse  aspects  of  being  clearly  emerges  as  the  centre  point  of 
Heidegger's  engagements  with  history.  Nietzsche's  understanding  of  art  as  a 
justification of life is there from the start, operating in the background of FCM as that 
which is in need of confrontation. That NIII houses this confrontation, and specifically 
on  the  grounds  of  the  capability  of  Nietzsche's  non-biologistic,  metaphysical 
conception of “life” to guide philosophy back to itself, shows that “life” is not thought 
at its philosophical peak in  FCM.  That this confrontation occurs on the basis of the 
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appropriacy of a translation of φύσις, contextualises the Nietzsche Lectures with FCM in 
a way that allows for a renewed understanding of the development of Heidegger's 
Nietzsche reading, one which centralises Nietzsche in the process of Heidegger's own 
attempt to philosophise for himself. 
Through  these  endeavours  two  distinct  formulations  of  “life”  were  identified  in 
Heidegger's work.1 The first, found in 'Part Two' of FCM is understood as the 'specific 
manner of being pertaining to animal and plant'.2 This is the meaning of “life” as it 
emerges from within the life-sciences, and as such it carries the philosophical tenor 
ascribed to it in §10 of BT, namely that it is a designation that engenders form in a field 
of phenomena. In this iteration “life” is  subject to a field of phenomena as already 
disclosed;  the  matter  of  life  is  determined  in  advance  and  is  thus  not  capable  of 
sustaining genuine metaphysical meditation. The second form, as developed across NI 
and NIII is a non-biologistic, metaphysical conception presented by Nietzsche. In this 
iteration, “life” is offered up as a name for φύσις, as a concept capable of articulating 
the  jointure  of  being  as  such  and  beings  as  a  whole.  Whist  both  conceptions  are 
indicative of a boredom that allows for anthropomorphism to hold silent sway, the 
metaphysical concept handled in NIII closes down a certain path of history that would 
offer  “life”  as  a  rubric  for  philosophising,  and as  a  concept  that  can articulate  the 
essence of man. Here Heidegger rejects metaphysics outright, thus wrapping up the 
thread started in FCM. In its place he offers a renewed conception of justice, one freed 
from the ties to “life” that Heidegger sees in Nietzsche's formulation. 
1 These are by no means exhaustive of all the varying connotations of life across Heidegger's oeuvre.
2 FCM, §45
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In light of this Heidegger has little to offer to modern scholars looking to conduct an 
ontology of life, other than to provide words of warning and an indication of the deep 
entrenchment  of  anthropocentricity  in  the  history  of,  and  this  situation  of,  
philosophising.  Contra  to  the  major  readings  thereof,  FCM does  not  represent  a 
concerted effort to explore the positive essence of life, and does not offer a determinate 
enough  articulation  of  the  question  of  life  to  support  further  investigation.  More 
important to this thesis, however, than assessing Heidegger's success in relation to the 
production of a positive conception of life, is a clarification of the possible success of  
Heidegger as a reader of Nietzsche. A central theme of FCM is the notion of prejudice 
(a concept equally close to Nietzsche's heart).  Throughout this  investigation,  in my 
account of  Auseinandersetzung,  I have expounded Heidegger's attempt to construct a 
heightened mode of philosophical relation to those genuine thinkers that came before 
him.  In  his  Auseinandersetzung  with  Nietzsche,  Heidegger  attempts  to  assess 
Nietzsche's  capability  of  restoring  philosophy  amidst  its  lostness  in  history. 
Heidegger's only available mode of access and orientation to this history is the thought 
of  Nietzsche,  precisely because it  is  epoch making.  At the start of his  own path in 
philosophy, on Heidegger's estimation, they stand together. Thus, Heidegger tries to 
leave Nietzsche behind and think for  himself  only on the basis  that  he is  realising 
something  unrealised  in  Nietzsche's  thinking  –  that  which  is  prepared  for  by  his 
thought. Understanding the complex philosophical context that underlies Heidegger's 
movement away from Nietzsche allows for a recognition that he is not attempting to 
redeem Nietzsche, but simply to follow him. Heidegger is not correcting Nietzsche, but 
attempting to philosophise for himself using Nietzsche as his spur, and taking up his 
agitation. 
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In my investigation Nietzsche's presence in Heidegger's philosophy has been assessed, 
and  deemed to  be  central  in  his  relationship  to  metaphysics,  but  at  no  point  has 
Nietzsche  himself  been  present  in  my  investigation  outside  his  presentation  in 
Heidegger.  However,  if  Heidegger is  in any way right about the genuine power of 
Nietzsche's philosophy, we cannot construct our own position regarding Nietzsche with 
any ease.  In this  regard, I  see Heidegger's  Auseinandersetzung as an example of the 
philosophical  effort  required  to  do  Nietzsche's  thought  justice.  In  his  claims  that 
Nietzsche is the last metaphysician, Heidegger offers a polemic to readers of Nietzsche. 
At no point does he consider his own characterisations to be definitive, indeed this is 
merely one way in which Heidegger realises his  Auseinandersetzung,  he continues to 
engage with Nietzsche's thought throughout his later work.3 As such, he offers a return 
to Nietzsche, but not a return that would see him read alongside his contemporaries, as 
set back within a cultural milieu. Heidegger would ask that we read with an eye for the 
manner in which Nietzsche is untimely in a sense, constructive of the world that he 
occupied.  The  context  that  he  must  be  read  within  is  that  of  philosophy,  which, 
according to FCM, repeats itself in an essential way via the movement of its own self-
overcoming.
This call for a thoroughly philosophical reading of Nietzsche is no more timely than in 
the  present  day,  where  problematics  are  being  divorced  from  the  manner  of  their 
production, and individual thinkers are being mined for resources relating to matters 
that  were  not  of  their  concern.4 Self-reflexivity in  modern  engagements  with 
3 See especially Uber die Linie, and WCT, not to mention NIV.
4 For example a reading of Nietzsche own conception of life and history as formulated in UMII could 
provide  an  interesting  foil  to  Heidegger's  reading.  Placed  back  within  the  context  of  this  thesis,  
Nietzsche's opening claim that animals have forgotten how to speak may reverberate with Heidegger's 
own offering of the potential mythos of the stone. Such projects, of which there are many possible, lie 
outside the immediate scope of this thesis, but could be seen as following directly on from it.
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philosophers for whom intellectual conscience and historical rigour were the highest 
concern is oftentimes lacking. In line with this, and on the basis of these two threads of 
investigation,  I  have  attempted  to  explore  some  of  the  challenges  that  face 
philosophical activity in the modern world. Heidegger may agree with Thacker that 
“life” is the question that defines the modern age, but he does not consider it to be one 
which  could  sustain  philosophy in  the  contemporary  situation.  Demanding  of 
Heidegger that he place the problematic of “life” at the heart of his philosophy, and in 
such a way that he deals with the biological or even metaphysical nature of the animal,  
rather than take up this problematic in his own way, determines the matter for his 
philosophy from outside of it. This is certainly a problem for those of us who wish to 
take seriously Heidegger's claims about the history of philosophy itself.
This question of life may well be one of the most salient for the modern world, but, as 
this  thesis  has  shown  in  relation  to  FCM,  moving  from  everyday  concepts  to 
fundamental  concepts  of  philosophy  is  by  no  means  easy.  Perhaps,  in  a  world 
dominated  by  everything  biological  (biopolitics,  bioethics,  naturalism, 
environmentalism  etc.),  philosophy  as  viewed  through  Heidegger's  lens  may  then 
seem like the “inverted world”. This is not a problem for Heidegger, but rather for us, 
insofar  as  we are as  potentially  caught  up in  the  fatally  contemporary concerns of 
modern life. At its most successful, this idea, if it holds any weight, casts the glance of 
philosophy back in  the  direction of  those  who philosophise,  and asks  that  we put 
ourselves  at  stake  in  every  moment  of  our  philosophical  endeavours.  Leaving  a 
philosopher behind and advancing beyond their  thought is  the genuine goal  of  all 
philosophising, but, if Heidegger's  Auseinandersetzung has anything to teach us, this 
achievement comes at a great cost, and can only be won on the back of a profound 
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apprenticeship to the rigours of the history of philosophy itself.
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